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Abstract
I introduce a specification language for modeling an agent’s prioritized goals and their
dynamics. I use the situation calculus along with Reiter’s solution to the frame prob-
lem and predicates for describing agents’ knowledge as my base formalism. I further
enhance this language by introducing a new sort of infinite paths. Within this language,
I discuss how to systematically specify prioritized goals and how to precisely describe
the effects of actions on these goals. These actions include adoption and dropping of
goals and subgoals. In this framework, an agent’s intentions are formally specified as
the prioritized intersection of her goals. The “prioritized” qualifier above means that
the specification must respect the priority ordering of goals when choosing between
two incompatible goals. I ensure that the agent’s intentions are always consistent with
each other and with her knowledge. I investigate two variants with different commit-
ment strategies. Agents specified using the “optimizing” agent framework always try
to optimize their intentions, while those specified in the “committed” agent framework
ii
will stick to their intentions even if opportunities to commit to higher priority goals
arise when these goals are incompatible with their current intentions. For these, I study
properties of prioritized goals and goal change. I also give a definition of subgoals, and
prove properties about the goal-subgoal relationship.
As an application, I develop a model for a Simple Rational Agent Programming
Language (SR-APL) with declarative goals. SR-APL is based on the “committed
agent” variant of this rich theory, and combines elements from Belief-Desire-Intention
(BDI) APLs and the situation calculus based ConGolog APL. Thus SR-APL supports
prioritized goals and is grounded on a formal theory of goal change. It ensures that the
agent’s declarative goals and adopted plans are consistent with each other and with her
knowledge. In doing this, I try to bridge the gap between agent theories and practical
agent programming languages by providing a model and specification of an idealized
BDI agent whose behavior is closer to what a rational agent does. I show that agents
programmed in SR-APL satisfy some key rationality requirements.
iii
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Introduction
According to cognitive scientists, theory of mind/common sense psychology is a key
component of human cognitive capabilities. In at least some cases, it allows us to pre-
dict and explain the behavior of others by ascribing high-level mental attitudes such as
beliefs, goals, intentions, etc. to them, and assuming that they will behave rationally
by performing actions that best satisfy their goals and intentions based on what they
believe. Philosopher Daniel Dennett [58] called this adopting the intentional stance.
This turned out to be one of the most successful abstractions proposed to date in an
attempt to unveil the mysteries of human mind: how mind works, and how we are
able to predict the behavior of others with surprising accuracy and to adjust our own
behavior accordingly. Following on this success, AI researchers have also been ask-
1
ing whether such an abstraction is useful in designing, analyzing, and predicting the
behavior of complex artificial systems. Adopting the intentional stance for these sys-
tems, often refereed to as agents, has at least a couple of advantages. First, it allows the
designer of an agent to specify it from a high level. Secondly, and more importantly,
it allows an agent to reason about other cooperating or competing agents with little or
no knowledge about their internal design, and only in terms of their mental states.
Today the term ‘agent’ is used in so many different ways and contexts that its use
here requires some clarification. I consider an agent to be an artificial, intelligent,
adaptive, and autonomous system that can be described using mental states such as
beliefs, knowledge, goals, intentions, etc., and whose behavior, at least to some ex-
tent, can be predicted in terms of these associated mental states. Agents are typically
situated in an environment inhabited by other agents with whom they communicate,
cooperate, negotiate, and compete.
1.2 The Context
Research on intelligent agents can be divided into three related areas that focus on
integrated treatments of agents: agent theories, architectures, and languages [251].
All three of these areas are concerned with different aspects of the same enterprise,
namely, the specification and implementation of intelligent agents.
2
Agent theories (e.g. [151, 35, 36, 181, 213, 130, 249, 97, 201, 113, 89, 203]) use
formal logic to model various mental attitudes of an agent, such as beliefs, desires,
goals, intentions, commitments, abilities etc., and the dynamics of these attitudes.
They also formalize how these mental attitudes relate to each other and to the agent’s
behavior, i.e. they specify the inter-attitudinal constraints that are required to manage
the rational balance needed among an agent’s beliefs, goals, plans, commitments, and
intentions. Finally, these theories have also grappled with problems associated with
multiple agents, such as the coordination of and communication between a group of
agents, and the modeling of joint mental attitudes.
Agent architectures (e.g. [174, 108]) provide mechanisms for managing the mental
and physical resources of an agent to meet the demands of complex, dynamic environ-
ments.
Agent programming languages (e.g. [205, 172, 140, 51, 13, 47, 101, 186]) attempt
to bridge the gap between theory and practice by specifying mechanisms for agents
to dynamically select and execute plans to achieve their goals. These languages often
have representational primitives corresponding to various mental state components of
the agent. An agent performs reasoning on these primitives to decide which plan she
should commit to and what action she should execute next. The key issue in agent
programming language design concerns the “right way” of programming an agent, i.e.
3
an autonomous, reactive, proactive, situated, and interacting computing element. In
other words, what kind of programming language components should these languages
contain so as to allow the programmer to design an agent in the most convenient,
most natural, most succinct, most efficient, and most comprehensible way, and how to
effectively execute these agent programs.
Recently, there has been a fair amount of work on establishing a link between agent
logics and agent programming frameworks by incorporating declarative goals in agent
programming [100, 247, 233]. In addition to supporting the definition of procedures
which are executed to try to achieve a goal, these programming languages also for-
malize goals as declarative descriptions of the states of the world which are sought.
These declarative goals can be used to decouple plan failure/success from goal fail-
ure/success. An agent may be able to successfully execute a plan. However, this does
not necessarily mean that the agent was successful in achieving the associated goal,
since the environment may interfere with this. Similarly, external interferences may
render a user-defined plan impossible to execute; but this does not necessarily mean
that the agent will never be able to achieve the associated goal. Thus, these declarative
goals play an essential role for monitoring goal achievement and performing recovery
when a plan has failed. Since these goals capture the reason for executing plans, it’s
not hard to see that they are also necessary to model rational deliberation and action,
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and to model rational response to changes in goals that result from communication,
e.g. requests.
1.3 The Problem
There has been much work on modeling agents’ mental states, beliefs, goals, and in-
tentions, and how they interact and lead to rational decisions about action. As well,
there has been a lot of work on modeling belief change. But the dynamics of motiva-
tional attitudes has received much less attention. Most formal models of goals and goal
change assume that all goals are equally important and many only deal with achieve-
ment goals (an achievement goal is a goal to eventually establish some state property;
other types of temporally extended goals include maintenance goals, i.e. goals to main-
tain some property over some time interval). Moreover, most of these frameworks do
not guarantee that an agent’s goals will properly evolve when an action/event occurs,
e.g. when the agent’s beliefs/knowledge changes or a goal is adopted or dropped. Also,
they do not model the dependencies between goals and the subgoals and plans adopted
to achieve these goals. For instance, subgoals and plans adopted to bring about a
goal should be dropped when the parent goal becomes impossible, is achieved, or is
dropped. Dealing with these issues is important for developing effective models of
rational agency. It is also important for work on belief-desire-intention (BDI) agent
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programming languages, where handling declarative goals is an active research topic.
In addition, while current agent programming languages with declarative goals
have evolved over the past few years, to keep them tractable and practical, they sac-
rifice some principles of rationality. In particular, while selecting plans to achieve a
declarative goal, these agent programming languages ignore other concurrent inten-
tions of the agent. As a consequence, the selected plan may be inconsistent with the
agent’s other intentions. Thus the execution of such an intended plan can render other
contemporary intentions impossible to bring about. Moreover, most of these languages
typically rely on syntactic formalizations of declarative goals, subgoals, and their dy-
namics, whose properties are often not well understood. Again, most assume that all
the goals of the agent are equally important. Finally, only a few formalize temporally
extended goals and thus most are restricted to achievement goals.
One of the primary reasons for these deficiencies in agent programming languages
is the fact that it is quite challenging to formalize an agent programming language
that is sufficiently expressive and that can also be implemented relatively efficiently.
To cope with the complexity that comes with expressiveness, most existing agent pro-
gramming languages with declarative goals follow a similar pattern: they start with an
agent theory that has very little expressive power, and specify an agent programming
language based on this theory. The inherited limited expressiveness of these agent
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programming languages in turns pushes the agents specified using them further away
from rationality and contributes to the aforementioned limitations. The lack of proper
formalizations of goals and their dynamics in the agent theory literature also partly
contributes to these limitations.
1.4 The Approach
Here, I focus on the specification of prioritized goals and agent programming lan-
guages with prioritized declarative goals. First, I develop a logical account of pri-
oritized goals and their dynamics. My model of goals supports the specification of
general temporally extended goals, not just achievement goals, and handles goal dy-
namics and goal-subgoal dependency; a model-theoretic semantics is provided. In my
framework, goals are revised appropriately when knowledge changes and when new
goals are adopted or existing goals are dropped. I use an action theory based on the
situation calculus [148] along with my formalization of paths in the situation calculus
as my base formalism for this. I prove that the proposed account has many intuitively
desirable properties.
As an application of my theory, I provide a specification for an agent programming
language with declarative goals that is based on a version of this rich theory, com-
bining elements from BDI agent programming languages (e.g. [172]) and from the
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situation calculus based ConGolog agent programming language [51]. While doing
this, I address some of the aforementioned problems of current agent programming
languages. In particular, my agent programming language supports prioritized goals
and is grounded on a formal theory of goal change. I ensure that the agent’s declarative
goals and her procedural goals (i.e. plans) are consistent with each other and with the
agent’s knowledge. I also show that agents programmed in my language satisfy some
key rationality requirements.
1.5 Contributions
The contributions of this thesis can be divided into the five following parts. First of all,
to support modeling temporally extended goals, I introduce a new sort of infinite paths
in the situation calculus, and propose an axiomatization of infinite paths. The rationale
behind introducing infinite paths as a sort is that of expressiveness: it allows first-order
quantification over paths and one can also evaluate goals over these infinite paths and
handle arbitrary temporally extended goals, e.g. unbounded maintenance goals; such
unbounded goals can’t be modeled in terms of finite paths. I prove the correctness
of my axiomatization and show that infinite paths in the situation calculus are well
behaved and indeed correspond to an intuitive notion of paths.
Secondly, I present a formalization of prioritized goals and their dynamics within
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the agent theory paradigm. An agent specified using this theory always tries to opti-
mize her prioritized goals. My contributions to this end are as follows: I support a rich
specification of the goals of an agent. In my agent theory, an agent can have multiple
goals/desires at different priority levels, possibly inconsistent with each other. I assume
that goals are totally ordered w.r.t. the priority ordering. I define intentions/chosen
goals, i.e. the goals that the agent is actively pursuing, as the maximal set of highest
priority goals that are consistent with each other and with the agent’s knowledge. My
model of goals supports the specification of general temporally extended goals, not
just achievement goals.
I also specify how these goals evolve when actions/events occur, when the agent’s
knowledge changes, or when the agent adopts or drops a goal. My formalization of
prioritized goal dynamics ensures that the agent always optimizes her chosen goals.
She will abandon a chosen goal φ if an opportunity to commit to a higher priority
goal, that is inconsistent with φ, arises (cf. Chapter 4 for a concrete example). As
such my model displays an idealized form of rationality. In Chapter 4, I discuss how
my proposal compares to Bratman’s [20] model of practical rationality that takes into
consideration the resource-boundedness of real world agents. Note that, being ideally
rational, my theory is computationally costly as it requires the agent to constantly
deliberate about her intentions, and thus may not be suitable as a foundation for an
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agent programming language, which are supposed to be more practical, often at the
cost of rationality.
I show that my agent theory for “optimizing agents” has some basic desirable prop-
erties such as the consistency of chosen goals, that adopting and dropping goals have
the expected effects, that agents can introspect their goals, etc. I also prove some
properties that specify the conditions under which an agent’s achievement prioritized
goals and achievement chosen goals persist. Finally, I show that the framework sat-
isfies some goal change postulates found in the literature [43, 44, 107]. To illustrate
the use of the framework, I then specify a personalized travel planning domain in the
framework and prove some properties of the specification.
Thirdly, I propose an account of subgoals and their dynamics within my theory
of prioritized goals for optimizing agents. More specifically, I give a definition of
subgoals and discuss how subgoals change when an agent’s knowledge changes as a
result of the execution of an action, or when she adopts a subgoal relative to a parent
goal. I show that my formalization of subgoal dynamics ensures that a subgoal is
dropped when its parent goal becomes impossible or is dropped, but not necessarily
vice versa.
As mentioned above, my formalization of prioritized goals (and subgoals) for op-
timizing agents presents difficulties for resource-bounded agents. To deal with this,
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fourthly, I develop a modified version for more committed agents that maintain a com-
mitment to a prioritized goal φ as long as φ is known to be possible, φ is not inconsis-
tent with other (already adopted) higher priority goals, and φ is not explicitly dropped.
Unlike in the optimizing agent framework, in this committed agent framework the
agent’s prioritized goals are dropped permanently as soon as they become unrealistic
or conflicting with other higher priority goals. So a goal cannot be dropped because a
conflicting higher priority goal has become consistent with the agent’s higher priority
goals (cf. Chapter 6 for a concrete example). As discussed in Chapter 6, this “com-
mitted agent” framework is closer to Bratman’s original proposal since it accounts for
the resource-boundedness of the agent by limiting her deliberation.
I also prove properties about committed agents that are similar to those I proved
for optimizing agents, and in light of these properties, I discuss the similarities and
the differences between these two frameworks. In particular, I show that prioritized
goals/desires are more persistent in the optimizing agent framework than in the com-
mitted agent framework, while in the latter chosen goals/intentions are more persistent.
Finally, I contribute to the foundations of BDI agent programming languages/frame-
works with declarative goals by developing the specification of a Simple Rational
Agent Programming Language, SR-APL, that is based on my theory of prioritized
goals and subgoals for committed agents. To this end, I discuss the components of SR-
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APL, and give a set of transition rules that specifies the semantics of SR-APL. I focus
on developing an expressive agent programming language that allows one to specify
agents that are rational without worrying about tractability. I maintain that while effi-
ciency is essential for an agent programming language, one needs to first understand
what rationality in a programming context really means. With such an understanding,
one can then try to identify restricted versions of the language that are more tractable.
This bridges the gap between agent theories and agent programming languages by en-
suring that the behavior of any agent specified using the agent programming language
is close to what a rational agent does.
Using an example, I discuss how the proposed programming framework compares
to existing agent programming languages with declarative goals. In particular, I show
that when effects of actions are not reversible or when goals with deadlines are consid-
ered, agents specified in other programming languages may behave irrationally in the
sense that they can adopt and execute plans that make some of their other goals/plans
impossible to achieve/execute. I then show that in the absence of external interferences,
an agent specified in SR-APL behaves rationally in that in each state she satisfies some
key rationality principles, and the evolution of her agent program is rational. In the fu-
ture, I would like to investigate restricted versions of SR-APL that are practical, with
an understanding of how they compromise rationality.
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Parts of these contributions or their preliminary versions have been published ear-
lier. In particular, part of the work on infinite paths appeared in a recent publication in
KR 2016 [122]. Some of the work on prioritized goals and subgoals were published
in AAMAS 2009 [115], Commonsense 2009 [114], DALT 2009 [117], and AAMAS
2010 [116, 112]. Finally, preliminary versions of the work on simple rational agent
programming language appeared in the proceedings of DALT 2010 [118], AAMAS
2011 [120], and ProMAS 2011 [119].
1.6 Organization
The thesis is organized as follows: in the next chapter, I discuss previous work on
agent theories and agent programming languages. I focus primarily on existing for-
malizations of goals and goal change and BDI agent programming languages with
declarative goals. In Chapter 3, I present the foundational work that my theories are
based on: I discuss a formalization of action in the situation calculus and an account
of knowledge and knowledge change in the situation calculus. I then propose my ax-
iomatization of infinite paths in the situation calculus, followed by some properties of
paths. I also discuss the situation calculus-based ConGolog agent programming lan-
guage. In Chapter 4, I develop my account of prioritized goals and their dynamics for
optimizing agents. In Chapter 5, I formalize subgoals and their dynamics within the
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optimizing agent framework. In Chapter 6, I propose a modified version of the frame-
work to model committed agents. Then based on this committed agent framework, I
present a model for a rational agent programming language with prioritized declarative
goals in Chapter 7. Finally in Chapter 8, I summarize my results and discuss possible
future work.
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Chapter 2
Literature Review
2.1 Introduction
In this chapter, I review previous work on agent theories, agent architectures, and
agent programming languages. In the next section, relevant work on agent theories
are considered. In this, my discussion is primarily centered around previous proposals
on motivational attitudes such as goals, desires, and intentions, and how they relate to
agents’ knowledge/beliefs and future actions. In Section 2.3, I review previous work
on agent architectures.1 Then in Section 2.4, I review work on agent programming
languages in general, followed by those with declarative goals in Section 2.5.
1Some of the material in these sections is adapted from [180].
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2.2 Agent Theories
Viewing an entity as an agent involves ascribing high-level cognitive attitudes such as
beliefs, goals, desires, and intentions to agents. As mentioned earlier, this is called
taking an intentional stance. Often, we design agents by representing such attitudes
explicitly and implementing reasoning procedures over them. Theories that formalize
various aspects of agents are often known as belief-desire-intention (BDI) theories.
Most of the existing BDI theories attempt to deal with one or more of the following
questions:
• What are the connections between agents’ informational attitudes and their ac-
tions, i.e. what are the informational preconditions of actions and what effects
do actions have on these attitudes?
• What motivational attitudes (e.g. goal, choice, and intention) are necessary, and
how should these attitudes be formalized? How should agents’ motivational
attitudes change as a result of actions?
• What inter-attitudinal constraints are required to manage the rational balance
needed among an agent’s beliefs, goals, plans, commitments, and intentions?
• How should one formalize ability, i.e. under what conditions can one expect an
agent to succeed in achieving her intentions?
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• What does it mean for an agent to behave rationally? How should an agent’s
future behavior depend on her current mental attitudes?
• How can multiple agents coordinate to achieve a common goal?
In the following, I discuss previous work that attempts to address some of these ques-
tions.
2.2.1 Informational Attitudes and Action
One concern of BDI logic theories has been to formalize informational attitudes, such
as knowledge and belief, and their relationship to action. This relationship can be
broken down into two aspects, namely, the informational preconditions of actions,
and the effects of actions on agents’ information. In BDI logic theories, the informa-
tional attitudes of the agents are almost always modeled using accessibility relations
on possible worlds [125, 126, 127]. However, along with the associated computational
complexity, possible worlds reasoning suffers from a number of other problems, such
as logical omniscience (i.e. that of knowing all valid formulae, and that of knowledge
being closed under logical consequence). To deal with this, various other approaches
has been proposed in the literature [70].
Moore [151, 152] was a pioneer to integrate knowledge and action into a single
framework. In his formal theory, he accomplished this by formalizing Hintikka’s
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modal logic of knowledge [102] within McCarthy’s first order situation calculus [148].
Variants of this model were later proposed in [134, 188, 50]. Others added informa-
tional modalities to other logics of action, such as dynamic logic [232] and CTL∗
[174, 213].
Moore’s main concern was to study the problem of knowledge preconditions for
actions, that is, the question of what an agent needs to know in order to be able to
perform some action. Moore formalized the ability to perform an action using an
agent’s knowledge of the referent of the action. In his framework, an agent knows the
referent of an action, if it denotes the same action in all of the agent’s possible worlds.
If the agent knows that the action is also executable, then she is able to perform the
action.
Moore, and later others [52, 134, 213, 50], also define what it means for an agent
to satisfy the knowledge preconditions of complex actions. The underlying concept
in these accounts is that to know how to do a parameterized action, the agent must
know the “procedure” (i.e. the action function), and know the value of the arguments
of the action. For instance, an agent can perform the action of dialing the combination
of a safe Safe1 (i.e. dial(combOf(Safe1))) if she knows the procedure the dial
action refers to, and knows the value of the term combOf(Safe1). Also, an agent can
perform a complex action if she knows that she can execute a sequence of primitive
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actions that implements the complex action. However, the agent is not required to
know in advance the exact sequence of actions she will execute, since the sequence
could depend on information the agent gathers along the way. At all time points the
agent must know how to execute the current step of the complex action, know that
she will eventually complete the execution of the complex action, and that she will
know when the execution is complete. Both Moore’s and Singh’s theories are limited
to determinate complex actions, but Davis, Sardin˜a et al., and Lespe´rance et al. handle
indeterminate complex actions. Although Moore’s framework allows multiple agents,
the definition of ability with respect to a complex action involves only action by a
single agent. Also, Moore does not address the frame problem for actions, that is,
how to specify what remains unchanged after an action is performed. Finally, the
framework ignores the formulation of ability to achieve a goal and its relation with
being able to perform a complex action. Others, however, do mention how it is a
simple matter to add.
A different account was presented in [227], where van der Hoek et al. introduce a
primitive capability operator in a propositional modal logic. This operator indicates,
for each primitive action and world, whether an agent is capable of performing that
action in that world. In this account, the capabilities of complex actions are defined in
terms of capabilities of primitive actions. This approach is more flexible than the oth-
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ers, since concepts such as moral capacity can be easily incorporated in this account.
However, in this account, one has to specify for each agent, world, and primitive action
whether the agent is capable of performing that action in that world. In other words,
every instance of a procedure/parameterized action needs to be handled distinctly in
this account.
An agent is unable to perform some action when she does not satisfy the infor-
mational prerequisites of that action. In that case, it would certainly be useful if the
agent had the means to acquire the necessary information. Thus, any agent framework
should formalize actions that an agent can use to increase her information. These ac-
tions are often known as informative actions [152], test actions [230], and knowledge
producing actions [188]. In most agent frameworks, the effect of these actions on
agents’ knowledge are handled in a similar manner. The result of performing an action
that tests the value of a proposition p is that the worlds that disagree with the value
of p in the real world are removed from the epistemic accessibility relation. With the
situation calculus based formalisms [152, 188, 189], there is an additional requirement
that after performing any action a in situation s, the situations that are epistemically
related to s are projected/extended by a to get the updated state. In other words, the
situations which have not resulted from performing a in an epistemic alternative in
s cannot be in the epistemic accessibility relation at do(a, s). So, in this case, even
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“non-informative actions” affect the knowledge of the agent in the sense that the agent
gets to know that it has just performed a. On the other hand, in [230], non-informative
actions do not affect the epistemic accessibility relation; also, in their dynamic logic
based language, there is no way to say that the agent has just performed action a.
Most of the work already mentioned assumes that new information is consistent
with existing knowledge (this is called belief expansion). There has also been much
work on belief revision (and contraction) where this may not be the case [86, 231].
Also various researchers have proposed mechanisms for iterated belief change, possi-
bly with noisy sensors [86, 202, 195].
2.2.2 Motivational Attitudes
Along with agents’ informational states, a general theory of agency must also take
their motivations into account, since agents are expected to act to achieve their goals.
To this end, the general trend followed in the literature is to specify a primitive moti-
vational attitude, and then to define compound and more useful motivational attitudes
using this. There are two main categories of motivational primitives, namely goal
[35, 174] (variously known as choice [181], wish [20], and preference [232]), and in-
tention. While goals are sometimes allowed to be inconsistent and thus difficult to
formulate [20], intentions are mostly considered to be consistent. Another difference
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between these attitudes lies in the agent’s level of commitment towards them. Inten-
tion is sometimes primitive [174, 124, 97] and sometimes a defined concept, specified
in terms of goals [35, 181, 213]. In his philosophical work [20], Bratman argues that
intention is different from goals. He identifies the following important properties of
intention:
1. Intentions pose problems for agents; they need to determine a way of bringing
about their intentions.
2. Intentions provide a filter for adopting new intentions; intentions that are incom-
patible with an agent’s currently held intentions can not be adopted.
3. Agents will maintain an intention if they attempt to achieve it, the attempt fails,
but they still believe the intention is achievable.
Previous work on motivational attitudes mostly concern two aspects of these atti-
tudes, namely, when goals are satisfied, and how long should goals persist. The former
differentiates maintenance goals and achievement goals, while the latter can be used to
specify different levels of commitments to a goal. Maintenance goals are propositions
that are currently true, and the agent wants it to remain true. Achievement goals, on
the other hand, are propositions that are currently false, which the agent would like to
be true eventually. Most of the research in the literature focuses on achievement goals.
22
In the literature, there have been various proposals characterizing different types of
persistence of motivational attitudes.
In their linear time temporal model, Cohen and Levesque [35] define a primitive
goal modality with its own accessibility relationG similar to the belief modality. Since
their model does not have branching futures, it cannot be used to distinguish between
some/all branches; rather it can only be used to talk about the actual future. Intuitively,
the G-accessible worlds are the ones where all the goals of the agent are satisfied. The
goals of the agent are formally defined to be the propositions that are true in all the
agent’s G-accessible worlds. According to Cohen and Levesque’s definition, an agent
has a proposition p as an achievement goal if she has the goal that p eventually be
true, and believes that it is currently false. Others have adopted a similar primitive
motivational operator [174, 181, 232].
Cohen and Levesque point out, following Bratman [20], that since an agent’s goals
should be compatible with her beliefs, her goal worlds should be constrained to be a
subset of the believed worlds. This constraint is known as realism. It ensures that the
agent does not have an impossible goal. I discuss whether this constraint is actually
desirable in the next section.
Cohen and Levesque [35] also investigated the persistence of achievement goals.
To ensure that agents do not procrastinate forever, they assume that eventually all
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achievement goals get dropped. Using this assumption, they then define two types
of persistence. According to them, an agent has p as a persistent goal if p is one of
her achievement goals, and if she does not drop the goal until either she believes the
goal has been achieved, or believes that the goal will never be achieved. Cohen and
Levesque acknowledge that agents with persistent goals are fanatically committed to
their goals. To remedy this, they therefore define the notion of a relativized persistent
goal, which is a persistent goal with the further condition that the agent may drop the
goal if she comes to know that some proposition q has become false. Typically, the
goal p is a means to achieving the super-goal q, or q can be some requester agent’s in-
tention. The idea behind this is that the agent adopted the goal relative to the condition
q being true, so if q becomes false the agent can freely drop the goal. By Cohen and
Levesque’s definition, it is not known whether an agent has a persistent goal until the
agent drops the goal.
Cohen and Levesque [35] define intention as a special kind of persistent goal. In
their framework, they distinguish between an intention to perform an action and an
intention to achieve a proposition. An agent intends to perform action a, if she has a
persistent goal to perform a, immediately after believing she would perform a. Here,
the constraint about the agent’s belief is required to prevent the agent from intending to
accidentally or unknowingly perform the action. An agent intends to achieve proposi-
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tion p if she has the persistent goal to perform some sequence of actions a, after which
p is true. Moreover, immediately before performing a, it is required that the agent
believes that she is about to perform some (possibly different) sequence of actions a0,
after which p holds, and that she does not have the goal that it not be the case that
p is true immediately after doing a. Note that the believed sequence of actions can
be different from the actual sequence. The reason for this is that it allows the agent
to intend to bring about a state of affairs without knowing in advance exactly how to
do it. It is also required that in at least one of the agent’s chosen worlds, the agent
performs a, i.e., the sequence of actions that the agent really does, after which p holds.
This is meant to rule out cases in which the agent is trying to do, say, a1 to bring about
p, but in the course of doing a1, she accidentally ends up bringing about p in a com-
pletely unforeseen way before completing a1. Both these definitions of intention can
be relativized to a condition q by replacing the persistent goal with a relativized per-
sistent goal. Cohen and Levesque [35] show that their definition of intention satisfies
the properties of intention given by Bratman [20].
Rao and Georgeff [174] adopt a primitive intention modality in addition to the
goal modality. Their formal language is based on a first-order modal logic that is a
variant of the Computation Tree Logic (CTL∗) framework [67]. This is a branching-
time temporal logic, so it can refer to possible or optional futures (i.e. formulae that
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hold in at least one branch among the paths emanating from the current situation) and
inevitable futures (i.e. formulae that hold in all branches emanating from the current
situation), in contrast to Cohen and Levesque’s account, where one can only talk about
the actual/inevitable future. However, unlike in the latter, there is no way to talk about
the actual future, i.e. the path that represents the actual evolution of the world. In their
framework, the intention accessible worlds are the worlds that the agent is committed
to trying to actualize. The intentions of the agent are then defined as the propositions
true in all the intention accessible worlds.
Rao and Georgeff [174] studied the persistence of intentions rather than the persis-
tence of goals. Like Cohen and Levesque, they assume that all intentions eventually get
dropped. They define three types of commitments, namely, blind commitment, single-
minded commitment, and open-minded commitment. An agent is blindly committed to
an intention if she maintains her intention to achieve a goal until she believes that the
goal holds. An agent is single-mindedly committed to an intention if she maintains
her intention to achieve a goal until she believes the goal is true, or until she doesn’t
believe the goal might eventually be true. Finally, open-minded commitment is the
same as single-minded commitment, except that the agent can drop the intention if she
drops the goal that the proposition might eventually be true, instead of dropping that
belief.
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Sadek [181] revises Cohen and Levesque’s account to incorporate a branching time
temporal logic. He uses a primitive goal modality called choice. One problem with
Cohen and Levesque’s realism constraint is that there is no way to distinguish between
the goals due to realism (i.e. a goal that φ provided that the agent believes that φ is
inevitable) and the goals that the agent actually wants. To distinguish between agents’
free choices and choices due to the realism constraint, Sadek [181] introduces the
concept of relevant choice. According to Sadek, an agent i relevantly chooses that φ,
if she chooses that φ, and that if she does not believe that φ is not the case, then she
chooses that φ (i.e. RC(i, φ) .= C(i, φ∧ (¬B(i,¬φ) ⊃ C(i, φ)))). However, this does
not fix the “problem”. Sadek’s definition of relevant choice along with his KD45 logic
of choice implies that any chosen proposition is a relevantly chosen one. Thus Sadek’s
choice modality seems to be similar to Cohen and Levesque’s goal modality.
Sadek uses a weaker definition of achievement goals than Cohen and Levesque. In
his branching time temporal model, he only requires that in every chosen world, p will
eventually be true in some possible future. In contrast, Cohen and Levesque requires
p to be eventually true in all possible futures (i.e. in their case, the only, inevitable
future) of every chosen world. Sadek [181] modified Cohen and Levesque’s definition
of a persistent goal, by requiring that the agent choose not to drop the goal until either
the agent believes that the goal has been achieved, or she believes that the goal will
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never be achieved. Sadek’s definition is meant to allow agents to have some awareness
that they were adopting a persistent goal. However, a problem with this definition is
that it does not guarantee that the persistent goal will actually persist. This is due to
the fact that an agent may have a persistence goal at some time-point, but at a later
time-point she might change her preferences and thus drop the goal.
In [181], Sadek presents a definition of an intention to achieve a proposition p,
where an agent is allowed to include actions by other agents in her plan to achieve
p (as long as the initial actions are done by the agent herself). Unfortunately, this
definition has some problems. For example, despite claims to the contrary, the given
definition allows the agent to intend p when there is no sequence of actions that the
agent believes will bring about p.
Another account of both achievement and maintenance goals was presented in
[199, 194, 200] where Shapiro et al. define goals using a knowledge accessibility
relation K and a primitive “want” accessibility relation W (or H). Intuitively, the W -
accessible worlds for an agent are the happy worlds where all her goals are satisfied.
They then define goal accessible worlds G as the intersection of W and the knowledge
accessible relation K, in the sense that a G-accessible world is a W -accessible world
that has a K-accessible world in its history. The reason for imposing this constraint is
that this assures that agents’ goals are realistic, i.e. an agent does not have a goal that
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she knows is impossible to achieve (this also holds in Cohen and Levesque’s frame-
work, as discussed below). Goals are then defined to be all the formulae that are true
over the interval [now, then], where now is a K-accessible world, and then is a G-
accessible world. Their account is more flexible than others as it handles both types of
goals in a uniform way.
One principle that a logic of intention should satisfy is the side-effect-free principle,
i.e. that an agent should not necessarily intend all the believed “side-effects” of their
intentions. For instance, consider the following example (adopted from [35]): suppose
that an agent has the intention to go to the dentist to get her teeth fixed, and also
believes that getting her teeth fixed will always involve pain. A normal modal logic2 of
intention along with the realism constraint entails that the agent also has the intention to
have pain. Thus, even if after the surgery, she finds out that the procedure didn’t cause
any pain, she will actively pursue her intention to have pain! This causes problems for
many of the normal modal logics of intentions seen so far. I discuss this in detail in
the next section. To avoid the problem altogether, various researchers have proposed
to use non-normal model logics to model motivational attitudes.
Konolige and Pollack’s [124] only motivational operator is a primitive intention
operator. The main advantage of their account is that it follows directly from their
2A normal modal logic is one that satisfies the K axiom, i.e. G(φ ⊃ ψ) ⊃ (Gφ ⊃ Gψ). Modal
operators with a classical possible worlds semantics satisfy this axiom.
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non-normal modal semantics that intention is not closed under logical consequence
and conjunction. Thus it does not suffer from the side-effect problem, unlike Cohen
and Levesque and Sadek’s account. In their semantics, intentions are associated with a
set of scenarios I. A scenario is the set of possible worlds that satisfies some sentence
in the non-modal sub-language of their language. An interpretation satisfies Intend(p)
if there is an I ∈ I that is a scenario for p, i.e. p is true in all the worlds in I and every
world that satisfies p is in I . Their non-normal semantics of intention is equivalent to
the minimal model semantics of Chellas [31]. Unfortunately, in their framework they
have no requirements that intentions persist, and thus their intention modality is closer
to what others use as the goal modality.
In an attempt to obtain a minimal logic of intention, Herzig and Longin [97] model
intention using a primitive modal operator. Their semantics of intention modality is a
non-normal one, and thus in their framework intention is neither closed under logical
truth, nor under logical consequence, conjunction, and material implication.
Other researchers have incorporated a procedural motivation component in their
framework; sometimes these are used to define the agent’s intentions, and sometimes
to model the agent’s commitment towards actions. In his branching future logic, Singh
[213] offers such a model of intention. The underlying temporal logic of his frame-
work is a very expressive one, and one can model true concurrent execution of actions
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(modeled not just as interleaved actions, but parallel execution of actions), and actions
with varying durations. Moreover, unlike Rao and Georgeff’s model, Singh’s interpre-
tations single out a branch that corresponds to the actual future. Thus, his language
can talk about what will really happen. Singh also introduces a procedural motivation
component, called a strategy. A strategy is an abstract plan or program built-up from
constructs such as primitive actions, waiting for conditions, sequences, conditional
strategies, and conditional loops, and is viewed as a description of what the agent is
currently trying to achieve. In this framework, agents are assigned a strategy in each
state. This is modeled using a function CY that associates a strategy with an agent
at a world and a time. Singh defines intentions in terms of the strategy the agent is
following. An agent is said to intend proposition p if it is a necessary consequence of
executing her strategy. Singh uses a strong notion of the persistence of intentions, and
stipulates that agents do not change their strategies as long as they are able to continue
to follow them.
van Linder et al. [232, 149] use a primitive preference modality called wish.
Wishes are interpreted as a necessity operator over an accessibility relation W . Thus,
agents can have contradictory wishes. They offer a strong definition of achievement
goals, where the agent is required to know that there is a sequence of primitive actions
that she is able perform and whose execution will achieve the goal, i.e. that the goal is
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implementable. In their framework, achievement goals are known to be currently false.
Furthermore, they constrain that a goal must be known to be an explicit preference of
the agent (defined using the awareness approach of [69]). To this end, they introduce
a special action called select. The result of performing select φ marks the wish φ as
selected. They then define achievement goals as selected wishes that are unfulfilled
and implementable. The advantage of this formalization of goals is that it does not
suffer from the side-effect problem, and the transference problem, i.e. the problem
that all logical tautologies are goals of the agent. This is due to the fact that goals are
defined not just as wishes, but explicitly chosen wishes/preferences. van Linder et al.
require that agents never drop any of their wishes. However, in their framework, goals
are dropped as soon as they are fulfilled or become non-implementable, as required by
their definition of goals. Due to this, their goals are really intentions.
To model an agent’s commitment, van Linder et al. use a semantic primitive called
an agenda. They define two meta-actions, commit(a) and uncommit(a), that update the
agenda of the agent so that the agent becomes committed to and uncommitted from
the complex action a. An agent can only be committed to a single complex action at
any one time. To commit to a complex action, the agent must be able to perform this
action and it must achieve one of her goals; she must also have finished executing her
previous commitments (i.e. the agenda must be empty). An agenda is a function that
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maps an agent and a world to a finite sequence of primitive actions and test actions.
This action sequence corresponds to one of the terminating executions of the complex
action that the agent is committed to achieving. The result of committing to a com-
plex deterministic action (built from primitive actions, tests, sequences, conditional
compositions, and iterations) in a given world w is defined in way such that it updates
the agent’s agenda by adding the appropriate sequence of primitive and test actions to
the agenda not only in w, but also in all the knowledge-accessible worlds in w, and
in all the worlds that lie along the execution trajectory of the action (i.e. that can be
reached from these worlds by performing some prefix of this sequence). This ensures
that commitments are known, and that a commitment to a complex action is linked to
commitments to its constituents. On the other hand, an agent can uncommit from a
complex action if it is no longer useful in achieving any of her goals. Thus the agenda
along with the two meta-actions can be used to model an agent’s commitment towards
actions that achieve one of her goals. While this account links an agent’s declarative
intentions with her intended actions, it abstracts from how an agent comes to know
that a plan is appropriate for a goal. Also, nothing in the framework prevents an agent
from performing something that is not in her agenda.
Most of these logical accounts of goals do not deal with goal dynamics properly. In
particular, these frameworks do not guarantee that an agent’s goals will properly evolve
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when an action/event occurs, when the agent’s beliefs/knowledge changes, or when a
goal is adopted or dropped. In their situation calculus based framework discussed
above, Shapiro et al. [194, 200] incorporate goal expansion and a limited form of goal
contraction. They formalize goal dynamics by providing a successor-state axiom [178]
for their want or W -accessibility relation. An agent’s intentions are expanded when
it is requested something by another agent. After the request(req, agt, ψ) action, agt
adopts the goal that ψ, unless she has a conflicting goal or is not willing to serve req
for ψ. This is modeled by ensuring that (under appropriate conditions) this action
causes agt to drop any situations s′ in W s.t. ψ does not hold over [now, s′] (as dis-
cussed above, here now is a knowledge accessible situation in the history of s′). Their
framework also handle a limited form of intention contraction. Suppose that the agent
req requests agt that ψ and later decides it no longer wants this. The requester req
can perform the action cancelRequest(req, agt, ψ), which causes agt to drop the goal
that ψ. cancelRequest actions are handled by determining what the W relation would
have been if the corresponding request action had never happened. Essentially, this
involves restoring the W relation to the way it was before the corresponding request
action occurred, considering all the actions that occurred in the history of the current
situation starting just after the request, and if required removing situations from W to
reflect the occurrence of these actions. A cancelRequest action can only be executed
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if a corresponding request action has occurred in the past. Thus in this framework, an
agent remains committed to a requested goal unless the requester cancels this request.
Note that, a goal is retained even if the agent learns that it has become impossible, and
in this case the agent’s goals become inconsistent.
Shapiro and Brewka [196] modify this framework to ensure that goals are dropped
when they are believed to be impossible or when they are achieved. In addition, their
account assume a priority ordering over the set of requested goals, and in every situ-
ation they compute chosen goals by computing a maximal consistent goal set that is
also compatible with the agent’s beliefs. In their framework, goals are only partially
ordered and inconsistencies between goals at the same level (given goals at higher lev-
els and knowledge) can be resolved differently in different models. In fact, the agent’s
chosen goals in do(a, s) in a model may be quite different from her goals in s, al-
though a did not make any of her goals in s impossible or inconsistent with higher
priority goals, simply because the inconsistencies between goals at the same priority
level are resolved differently in s and do(a, s). This is rather unintuitive.
There has been a lot of work on belief revision/update, and researchers have pro-
posed postulates to specify the change in an agent’s beliefs due to these operators. For
instance, the AGM theory [1, 86] can be viewed as the prototypical example of a be-
lief revision specification. However, there has been very little work on goal/intention
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change postulates. Part of this can be explained by the fact that these postulates are
harder to formulate compared to their belief revision counterparts since the agent’s
future goals depend on both her current beliefs and goals. To the best of my knowl-
edge, there are only two attempts to propose a set of goal change postulates that can
be found in the literature. The first set of postulates is proposed by da Costa Pereira et
al. in a series of papers on goal revision for rational agents (e.g., see [43, 44, 42]). In
their framework, an agent’s state S is a triple 〈σ, γ,RD〉 that consists of a belief-base
σ and a desire-base γ (these are presumably achievement goals), each of which is a
set of propositional formulae taken from an object language L containing the standard
Boolean connectives, and a desire adoption rule-baseRD. The latter consists of rules,3
which depending on the agent’s current beliefs and desires, allow her to derive new de-
sires, and are meant to serve as a justification for having a desire. Given a state S, a
rule whose antecedent is entailed by the agent’s current beliefs and desires is called an
active rule. An agent’s desires are updated both as a result of a new/revised belief b
and of adoption of a new desire d. When the agent’s beliefs are revised/updated, she
removes from her desire-base any desire d for which there is no justification in the
desire adoption rule-base, i.e. there is no active desire adoption rule inRD that can be
used to derive d. In addition, she adds the new desires that can be derived from her
3These rules are similar to those in PRS [88]; see Section 2.3.3 for details.
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active desire adoption rules. Thus γ is closed under the application of rules from RD.
When the agent adopts a new desire d, a new goal update rule with the antecedent that
True is added to her rule-base, which in turns makes her add d to her desire-base. The
authors then suppose that an intention/goal selection function I is provided, which
given a belief-base and a desire-base, decides which of these desires the agent should
actively pursue, i.e. intend.
Their notion of consistency of goals/desires appeals to a specification of consis-
tency of plans for these goals. Consistency of plans is specified in terms of consistency
in ordinary propositional logic, as opposed to using a proper formalization for actions
and their preconditions and effects in a suitable temporal framework.
To model prioritized desires, they assume a preference relation  over desires in γ
that is reflexive and transitive, which they extend to apply to sets of desires.
In the following, I give their postulates which constrain I. Suppose that ⊗ is the
desire-base γ revision operator, ⊕ is the desire adoption rule-baseRD update operator
(that adds an unconditional rule toRD when the agent adopts a new desire), and Sd =
〈σ, γ ⊗ d,RD ⊕ d〉 is the updated state resulting from the adoption of desire d in S.
Then:
I1 : For all S, I(S) is a feasible goal set, i.e. a consistent set of goals that are
possible.
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I2 : For all S, if γ′ ⊆ γ is a feasible goal set, then I(S)  γ′, i.e. a rational agent
always selects the most preferable intention set.
I3 : If d is consistent with I(S), then d ∈ I(Sd).
I4 : If d is inconsistent with I(S) and there is an intention i in I(S) that is conflicting
with d and i  d, then I(Sd) = I(S).
I5 : If d is inconsistent with I(S) and for all intentions i in I(S) that are conflicting
with d, we have d  i, then d ∈ I(Sd) and i /∈ I(Sd).
While these postulates are based on notions of consistency of sets of desires and exe-
cutability of desires that seems problematic, given an appropriate interpretation, these
postulates are in fact sound. I will come back to this issue in Chapter 4.
Another set of goal change postulates is proposed by Icard et al. [107], who studied
the problem of joint belief and intention revision as a database management problem
[206] in the spirit of the AGM theory [1]. In their logic, they incorporate explicit time
indices, (primitive) actions, and pre- and post-conditions of actions. They define a
path pi as Z → (P × Act), i.e. a mapping from the set of natural numbers, used to
represent time indices t on pi, to a set of propositions and “proposition-like formulas”,
representing what is true at some time index t on pi, and what pre- and post-conditions
of actions hold at t on pi, respectively, and a set of actions, giving the next action a at t
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on pi. These paths include impossible or “imaginary” ones as there is no requirement
that pre-conditions of actions hold; post-conditions are however guaranteed. Given a
path pi and time index t on pi, they have a modal operator for talking about what holds
on all paths that share the same past with pi up to time t.
A belief set in this framework is defined using a set of paths Π and a total pre-
order ≤ on this set; in particular it is the minimal set under ≤, i.e. {pi ∈ Π : pi ≤
pi′ for all pi′ ∈ Π}. Note that while paths include imaginary ones, the set Π above is
required to be appropriate in the sense that if there is a path pi in Π where the precondi-
tions of some action a holds at time t, then Π must include at least one path that share
the same history as pi up to t and where the next action performed is a. Intentions in
this framework is simply a finite set of action/time pairs.
A belief-intention-base 〈B, I〉 consists of a consistent and closed set of formulaeB
representing the beliefs of the agent, and a finite set of action/time pairs representing
the intentions of the agent. Given a set B, ρ(B) is defined to be the set of paths where
all formulae in B hold at time 0. The belief base B is said to be coherent w.r.t. the
intention base I if there is a path in B (presumably, in ρ(B), i.e. in the set of paths
induced by B) over which the preconditions of all actions a, s.t. (a, t) ∈ I , is satisfied
at the corresponding time t. Since ρ(B), being a belief set, is also appropriate, a path
where a happens at t (with the preconditions of a met) must be included in it. Thus, in
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this framework, belief-intention consistency is defined via the existence of a path over
which each of the intended actions a is performed in the appropriate time step t, and a
is executable in t. Oddly, there is no requirement that the path is indeed a realistic one;
e.g. nothing in their framework seem to constrain that other (non-intended) actions on
this path are in fact executable.
Having discussed their framework, let me now list their intention revision postu-
lates. Suppose ◦ is the intention revision operator, and 〈B′, I ′〉 is the result of revising
〈B, I〉 with intention (a, t). Then:
BI1 : 〈B′, I ′〉 is coherent.
BI2 : If 〈B, (a, t)〉 is coherent, then (a, t) ∈ I ′.
BI3 : If 〈B, I ∪ {(a, t)}〉 is coherent, then I ∪ {(a, t)} ⊆ I ′.
BI4 : I
′ ⊆ I ∪ {(a, t)}.
BI5 : B = B
′.
BI1 says that intention revision should restore coherence. BI2 states that the new in-
tention (a, t) takes precedence over existing ones, and thus if coherence can be attained
after adding (a, t), the agent must do so, even if this means that she must give up some
of the existing intentions. BI3 and BI4 together states that if it is possible to maintain
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coherence by simply adding the new intention, then this is the only change that should
be made. BI4 in addition says that unlike in the case for belief revision, no extraneous
intentions are ever added. Finally, BI5 states that beliefs do not change with intention
revision.
Since belief revision should trigger the revision of intentions, for every belief revi-
sion operator ∗ they also include its own intention revision operator ◦∗. In addition to
the AGM belief revision postulates, they propose two more relevant intention revision
postulates. Suppose 〈B, I〉 ∗ φ = 〈B′, I ′〉. Then:
BI6 : 〈B′, I ′〉 = 〈B′, I〉 ◦∗ .
BI7 : If 〈B, I ′′〉 ∗ φ = 〈B′′, I ′′′〉, then B′ = B′′.
BI6 says that if intention revision is needed to maintain coherence after beliefs are
revised, then intentions must be revised (with an empty intention ). BI7 on the other
hand states that the underlying intention set is irrelevant to belief revision.
The authors presented a representation theorem showing that for every belief-
intention-base and belief and intention revision function that satisfy the above proper-
ties, there is a corresponding model in their theory.
Note that, intentions in this framework are limited to primitive actions. Also, as
mentioned above, their notion of consistency via the existence of a path is problematic
41
as the path is not guaranteed to be realistic. Moreover, clearly the second postulate is
disputable and is only acceptable if the intention (a, t) is indeed more valuable to the
agent than her existing intentions. BI5 (and BI7) also seem problematic for a general
framework, specially one where agents are considered to be introspective – the agent
needs to revise her beliefs about her intentions when the latter change. Finally, their
framework inherits the issues with iterated revision from the AGM theory. Otherwise,
the rest of the postulates seem sound. I will return to this discussion in Chapter 4.
2.2.3 Interattitudinal Constraints and Properties
In order to capture some of our intuitions about the intentional attitudes and to prove
desirable properties about them, the primitive attitudes discussed in previous sections
need to be constrained. One constraint introduced by Cohen and Levesque [35] that
received some attention is the realism constraint. This is a semantic constraint that says
that the goal worlds should be a subset of the believed worlds. The reason for imposing
this constraint is that it is unintuitive for a rational agent to adopt an achievement
goal that she believes will never hold (this property is also known as intention-belief
inconsistency [20]). This constraint rules out these states of affairs. Since, each of the
agent’s goals must be satisfied in at least one of the believed worlds, the agent cannot
believe the negation of any of its goals. This constraint is also adopted by Sadek [181]
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and Konolige and Pollack [124], although Konolige and Pollack constrain the intended
worlds (in contrast to the goal worlds, as in Cohen and Levesque’s framework) to be a
subset of the believed worlds. As mentioned earlier, this constraint also follows from
Shapiro et al.’s [199] definition of goal.
Rao and Georgeff [173, 174] introduce two variants of the realism constraint,
namely, weak realism and strong realism. Weak realism constrains the intersection
of the believed worlds and the chosen/intended worlds to be non-empty, and is thus
weaker than realism. Rao and Georgeff [173] also adopt a similar constraint between
chosen worlds and intended worlds. The strong realism constraint [174], that can only
be defined for worlds that have branching futures, requires that for every believed
world, there is a goal world that is a sub-tree of the believed world with the same truth
assignments and accessibility relations at all timepoints. They also adopt a similar
constraint between goal worlds and intended worlds. This constraint is stronger than
realism in the sense that it restricts the agent to choose only goals that it believes it
will always be able to achieve, regardless of what happens in the future. Singh [213]
imposes a constraint that ensures that if an agent intends a proposition p, then it does
not believe that p will never hold in the real future.
As discussed earlier, another property of intentions proposed by Bratman [20] is
that agents need not always intend the believed side-effects of their intentions. There
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are various forms of this “side-effect-free” principle. The weak version states that
an agent should be able to consistently intend that p, believe that p always implies
q, and not intend that q. Cohen and Levesque [35] and Singh [213] show that their
theories are consistent with this. A stronger version of the principle says that an agent
should be able to consistently intend that p, and always believe that p always implies
q, without intending that q. Cohen and Levesque [35], Rao and Georgeff [173, 174]
and Sadek [181] show that their theories are consistent with this version of side-effect-
free principle. However, for Cohen and Levesque, this holds for the wrong reason,
i.e. because the agent may believe that the side-effect already holds, and thus will not
have the persistent goal that the side effect hold, and hence the intention to achieve
it. Rao and Georgeff’s weak and strong realism constraints are meant to ensure that
side-effects need not be intended; these constraints do not rule out the existence of an
intention/goal-accessible world that does not agree with the belief-accessible worlds
on the truth values of a formula, and thus there may be goal/intention-accessible worlds
where p ⊃ q does not hold. However, their theory is still closed under conjunction.
Both van Linder et al.[232] and Konolige and Pollack [124] show that their frameworks
are consistent with yet another stronger version of the side-effect-free principle, which
says that if p logically implies q, and the agent prefers or intends p, then the agent may
consistently not prefer q.
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Rao and Georgeff [173] argue that although agents’ goals should be potentially
achievable, no rational agent should be forced to choose all her beliefs; they call this
property belief-goal transference. They point out that Cohen and Levesque’s realism
constraint sanctions this property. Since the chosen worlds are a subset of the believed
worlds, the agent chooses all of its beliefs. Sadek [181] argues that transference is
not problematic, if one can differentiate between choices made due to the realism
constraint and choices made freely by the agent. Rao and Georgeff [173], on the other
hand, argue that transference is irrational, and show that both strong and weak realism
avoid transference. One could claim that the realism constraint causes problems in
Cohen and Levesque’s framework because their logic deals with the actual future,
rather than possible futures. For instance, in Shapiro’s branching future framework,
the realism constraint seems unproblematic. What the realism constraint sanctions in
Shapiro is that you can’t have the goal that p if you believe that ¬p is inevitable, and
this seems unproblematic.
Finally, another useful property for goals is that of introspection. If an agent has
a goal that φ, then it is useful to believe/know that she has this as her goal. This
is known as positive introspection of goals. On the other hand, if an agent does not
have a goal, she should also believe/know this. This is called negative introspection
of goals. In their framework, Shapiro et al. [194, 200] showed how positive and
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negative introspection of intentions can be modeled by placing some constraints on K
and W which are similar to transitivity and Eucledeanism. They showed that in their
framework, if these constraints are prescribed for the initial situations, they continue
to hold for all situations since they are preserved by the successor-state axiom for their
want accessibility relation W .
2.2.4 Success Theorems and Rational Action
One important aspect of an agent theory is the connection between beliefs, goals, and
intentions and the agent’s action. Theorems that link these attitudes to an agent’s future
behavior and the achievement of her goals have been called Success Theorems [213],
since they characterize conditions under which one can expect an agent to succeed in
fulfilling her intentions. Success theorems are important for motivating goal delegation
via communication. For instance, to plan a complex action that involves delegating
subgoals to other agents, waiting for those subgoals to hold, and then resume working
on the goal, it is necessary for the agent to know that the delegated subgoals will
eventually become true. Using a success theorem, it is adequate for the agent to know
about the other agent’s intentions and abilities to infer this.
In [35], Cohen and Levesque present a success theorem which states that if an
agent has proposition p as a persistent goal, is always competent with respect to p
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(i.e., whenever the agent believes p, p is true), and it is not the case that the agent will
believe p will never occur before she drops p, then eventually p will hold. To relate
agents’ intentions with their actions, Cohen and Levesque assume that all intentions
eventually get dropped. This implies that the agents do not procrastinate indefinitely
with respect to their intentions (AKA the no infinite deferral assumption). According
to the definition of persistent goal, it can only be dropped if the agent believes that
the goal has been achieved or is impossible to achieve. The latter case is ruled out by
the premise of the theorem, therefore the agent eventually believes p. Moreover, since
the agent is competent with respect to p, it follows that p eventually holds. Note that,
this theorem does not imply that the agent will eventually act, because some external
event might achieve p. But Cohen and Levesque claim that if the agent knows that it is
the only one that can act to realize p, then under certain (unstated) circumstances, the
agent will act. Nevertheless, this account can be criticized since the no infinite deferral
assumption should follow from other axioms of the theory, rather than be imposed
separately [113]. Rao and Georgeff [174] also offer similar theorems for their three
forms of commitments to intentions.
Singh [210] criticizes these success theorems as being too powerful. In particular,
he points out that they do not take into account the abilities of agents. He requires that
agents always perform actions that they know will ensure the eventual success of their
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strategies. Using this assumption, he showed that if an agent knows how to follow her
strategy, and if her strategy necessarily leads to p (and thus she intends that p), then
eventually p will hold. Both Shapiro et al. [198] and Khan and Lespe´rance [113] also
prove success theorems in which the agent is only guaranteed to achieve her intentions
if she is able to achieve them. The latter consider multiple agents, in the sense that
agents are allowed to delegate actions to other agents.
One important concept that has largely been left out of agent theories is that of
rational choice of action. If agents are not acting rationally, then they cannot be ex-
pected to achieve their intentions even if they have the required commitment. Singh’s
agents are trying to “achieve strategies”. His assumption that agents perform actions
that they know will achieve their strategies actually ensures that agents act rationally.
In their earlier work, Shapiro et al. [198] formalize strategies as functions from situ-
ations to actions (called Action Selection Function (ASF)). They use the agent’s goals
to provide an ordering on ASFs for each situation. For a given situation s, an ASF σ1
is said to be as good as another ASF σ2 iff σ1 achieves all of the agent’s goals in all
the alternative situations where σ2 does. They then define an ASF σ to be a rational
course of action for a given situation s iff it is maximal in the ordering for s. In [187],
Sardin˜a and Shapiro extended this concept of domination of strategies to deal with
prioritized goals. Building on Shapiro et al.’s model of goals in [199, 194], Khan and
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Lespe´rance [113] also use an agent’s goals to provide an ordering on complex actions
(i.e. plans) for each situation. Plans in their framework can include actions by other
agents. They then define a plan to be rational for an agent in a situation iff the plan is
maximal in that ordering for that agent in that situation, and the plan is epistemically
and intentionally feasible for the agent. The additional condition on epistemic feasi-
bility ensures that the agent fulfills the knowledge preconditions required to execute
the plan. In case the plan includes actions by others, the agent is also required to know
that the executing agent fulfills the knowledge preconditions of the actions delegated
on her, and that she intends to execute the appropriate actions in the plan when it is
her turn to act. In other words, the plan must be both epistemically and intentionally
feasible with respect to the agent. Most work on rational action selection has been
done in the decision theory setting, where the outcomes of actions are assigned numer-
ical probabilities and utilities [19, 243, 61]. Boutillier [19] provides a framework for
analyzing rational action selection in a logical setting using qualitative orderings for
preferences and likelihoods.
49
2.2.5 Multiagent Systems: Collective Mental Attitudes, Communication, and
Coordination
So far, I have mainly discussed work on modeling individual agents. The study of
collective mental attitudes and collaborative action has also received attention. The
motivation for such collaborative action is that it is often the case that although no in-
dividual member of a group can bring about some goal, collectively they can achieve it
if they coordinate and cooperate with each other. Work in this field is variously known
as teamwork, cooperative problem solving, team activity, and cooperative plans.
Researchers in multiagent systems have formalized various collective mental atti-
tudes. Common knowledge can roughly be modeled using infinite nesting of a group
knowledge (i.e. “everyone in the group knows that”) modality. It is possible to for-
mulate common knowledge as a fixed point formula [96]. Joint intentions are often
formalized as a non-primitive construct built using concepts such as mutual belief and
intention [192, 38, 39, 91, 92, 109, 110, 138, 218]. Although joint intentions imply
individual commitments for the team members, these collective intentions are usually
not reducible to summation of individual intentions. Others formalize group inten-
tion from an external perspective by utilizing an explicit social structure for a group
[208, 212]. Examples of work on joint ability include [91, 94, 160, 161, 209, 228, 246,
250, 252].
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When multiple agents are working together to solve a problem, they need some
mechanism for exchanging information, such as beliefs, plans, intentions, synchro-
nization information, and so on. Communication plays an important role in the co-
ordination of multiple agents. Agent communication theories are founded on Speech
act theory [4, 191], which originated in the philosophy of language. The key idea in
speech act theory is that communication acts can be viewed as regular actions. While
most actions are performed to change the physical state of the world, communication
actions are mainly done to alter the hearer’s mental states. Speech acts can be cate-
gorized into assertives (e.g. informing), directives (e.g. requesting), commissives (e.g.
promising), declaratives, permissives, and prohibitives.
The literature on speech act theory is quite extensive. Cohen and Levesque showed
that in a BDI framework, many properties of speech act theory can be derived from
an independently motivated theory of rational interaction, which is in turn grounded in
the rational theory of action [36, 37]. Following this approach, they proposed formal
semantics for speech acts. They model speech acts as attempts to bring about some
effects by performing some sequence of events, but with the intent to produce at least
some result. For instance, a request to achieve φ is considered as an attempt by the
speaker to have the hearer bring about φ, with the intent of at least making the hearer
believe that it is mutually believed that the speaker has the goal that the hearer brings
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about φ. Singh [211], on the other hand, argued that the semantics of speech acts cor-
responds to their satisfaction conditions, and identified these conditions for different
types of speech acts. For instance, an assertive is satisfied if its propositional content
is true at the time of the utterance. A directive is satisfied if its proposition comes to
hold at a later point in the future, and the hearer has the know-how and the intention
to achieve it. A commissive is almost like directive except that the role of hearer and
speaker is switched, and so forth for permissive, prohibitive, and declarative speech
acts. Herzig and Longin [97] proposed some cooperative principles, and showed how
these rules can be used to infer the effects of a yes-no question and that of a request
from that of an associated assertive. Their model provides a simpler logical account
where only assertives are primitive.
In the ARTIMIS rational agent model [182], Sadek formalizes planning for com-
municative actions using a backward chaining planning mechanism that utilizes the
feasibility preconditions (FP) and perlocutionary effects (PE) of the speech acts. Here,
the FP specify the conditions that have to be satisfied in order to plan for the act, and
the PE correspond to the rational effects of the action. For instance, consider the action
of i informing j that φ is true. The preconditions for this inform action is that i should
believe that φ holds, and i should not know that j knows that φ holds. On the other
hand, the rational effects of this action are that j will learn that φ holds. Sadek argues
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that rational effects of a communicative act serve as the reason for planning that act, in
the sense that an agent should select an action only if she needs to achieve the rational
effect of that action.
One problem with this account is that it fails to specify the conditions under which
the rational effects become actual effects; one cannot reason about these conditions.
Moreover, the planning mechanism in [182] is incomplete and many rational plans can-
not be inferred. Louis [142] extended this framework to incorporate a more general
model of planning (state space planning by regression and hierarchical planning) and
plan adoption. His framework is more complex, and uses defaults (as does Sadek’s).
The approach supports multiagent plans and has been implemented. But there is no
formalization of epistemically feasible plans, and no success theorem. Also, commit-
ment to a plan is modeled using a special predicate rather than using the intention
attitude.
Examples of other interesting agent communication theories include [245, 244,
163, 40, 164, 128]. Using these theories, researchers have developed artificial lan-
guages for agent communication (e.g. FIPA-ACL [79], KQML [68]), proposed seman-
tics for agent communication protocols [83, 82, 80, 81], and implemented cooperative
spoken dialogue systems (e.g. ARTIMIS [183, 184]).
There have been many proposals for semantics of communication acts based on
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social commitments [214, 254, 78, 239]. The commitments associated with a conver-
sation would be accessible to an observer and relevant social rules could be enforced.
While it is very important to capture and enforce the social aspects of agent commu-
nication, i.e. the obligations that go with membership in an agent society, it should
be noted that communication cannot be reduced to this public social commitments
level [113]. There has also been a suggestion that public social commitment semantics
support more efficient reasoning and are more “tractable”. However, it has been also
pointed out that this is an orthogonal issue [113].
Another way of coordinating agents is to use social laws [9, 207, 155]. These
laws are often modeled by incorporating various deontic logic notions [30], such as
obligations, prohibitions, and rights into the framework.
2.3 Agent Architectures
The aim of agent architectures is to shift the emphasis from theory to practice. Thus,
researchers in this field are concerned with issues surrounding the construction of com-
puter systems that satisfy the properties specified by agent theorists. In classical plan-
ning, the agent is given a model of the actions available and their preconditions and
effects on the domain states and a goal, and her job is to find a sequence of actions
whose execution brings about this goal. Thus classical planning assumes a static en-
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vironment. However, real environments tend to be dynamic, that is, they often change
in unexpected ways at run-time. They may include exogenous actions (i.e. actions by
other agents or natural events) and the world may change during planning. The initial
state could change before the agent starts executing the plan. The world might not
change as a result of plan execution as expected due to the occurrence of exogenous
actions. Thus, a classical planning agent will often not do well in such environments.
This is one of the areas where work on agent architecture contributes, by taking into
account the resource limitations of the agent. Researchers in this area are concerned
with designing agents that may have incomplete information about the current state of
the world, are not always able to accurately predict the effects of their actions, can deal
with external interference, and do not have arbitrary time to deliberate.
One important issue addressed by the agent architecture community is the tradeoff
between commitment vs. intention reconsideration, i.e. how strongly should an agent
be committed to her intentions in a changing environment. Generally, intentions are
considered to be persistent, and are only dropped when they are achieved or they be-
come impossible to achieve, as discussed in Section 2.2. However, prior intended plans
may be subject to reconsideration or abandonment when the agent’s beliefs change in
various ways, for instance, when the agent becomes aware of a more attractive way
of achieving her goal. But, according to Bratman [21], “...if an agent constantly re-
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considers her plans, they will not limit her deliberation in the way they need to for a
resource-bounded agent.” Nevertheless, if an opportunity with very high utility arises,
the agent should take advantage of this by weighing competing alternatives and recon-
sidering her current intentions. Thus, there exists a tension between the stability of
intended plans that is required for practical reasoning, and the revocability inherent in
these plans, as these are often formed based on incomplete information.
Another related issue in agent architecture is the tradeoff between reactivity and
deliberation. While agents need some mechanism to support goal-directed reasoning
and deliberation, they must also be able to react rapidly to unanticipated changes in
the environment. Moreover, since they only have incomplete information about their
environment, it is not always possible for them to produce a complete plan for a given
goal. Rather, information about how to best achieve a goal can often be acquired after
executing some initial part of the plan.
Researchers have proposed various agent architectures that differ depending on
how the agent’s ability to act is realized. Previous work on agent architecture can
be classified roughly into four categories, namely, deliberative architectures, reactive
architectures, reactive plan execution architectures, and hybrid architectures. In the
following I discuss these categories.
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2.3.1 Deliberative Architectures
A deliberative architecture is one that contains an explicitly represented symbolic
model of the world (i.e. beliefs, desires, intentions, and actions), and where deci-
sions, such as what actions to perform next, are made via logical reasoning (i.e. plan-
ning). Thus deliberative architectures are based on Newell and Simon’s [157] physical-
symbol system hypothesis –they use a physically realizable set of symbols that can be
combined to form structures and are capable of running processes that operate on those
symbols according to symbolically coded sets of instructions, in order to produce intel-
ligent action. Most innovations in deliberative architecture design have come from the
AI planning community. Since deliberative architectures have a planning process as
their central component, these architectures can deal with unanticipated goals. How-
ever, the disadvantage of a purely deliberative approach lies in the computational com-
plexity of planning: the agent may not be able to find plans in a timely manner. Also,
the plans generated by a deliberative architecture often fail in a dynamic environment.
Examples of deliberative architectures whose primary component is a planner include
the Integrated Planning, Execution, and Monitoring (IPEM) system [2] (based on a
sophisticated non-linear planner), and Wood’s AUTODRIVE system [248] (a traffic
simulation with planning agents).
One particularly interesting class of deliberative architectures is plan-based delib-
57
erative architecture. The role of commitment to adopted plans or intentions is a critical
component in plan-based architectures. Thus, these architectures use adopted plans to
limit practical reasoning. The range of reasoning modeled by these frameworks in-
clude means-ends analysis (planning), choosing between alternative courses of action
(decision analysis), checking consistency of plans and beliefs, and revising beliefs and
goals in response to external events.
Building on Bratman’s philosophical work in [20], Bratman et al. [21] consider
adopted partial plans to structure and focus practical reasoning in their (mostly) de-
liberative architecture IRMA (Intelligent Resource-bounded Machine Architecture).
IRMA has four key data structures: a plan library, and explicit representations of be-
liefs, desires, and intentions. In this architecture, once an agent adopts a plan, she
becomes committed to executing this plan. The agent’s commitment to a plan implies
that she will not reconsider this adopted plan, unless the environment has changed in a
relevant way, and reconsidering this plan will result in a reasonable increase in utility.
Also, she will not adopt any further intentions that are inconsistent with achieving her
adopted plans.
The adopted plans can be both temporally and structurally partial, meaning that
these plans schedule actions for some time period, but not for others, and that these
plans specify goals to be achieved leaving open the means to achieve these ends. As
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discussed above, the motivation for this is that often at plan time, the agent only has
partial knowledge about the world, and thus it is not always possible to decide on
a complete course of action. These adopted intentions limit the agent’s deliberation
since they focus means-ends reasoning, and they constrain the number of alternative
options for actions that are fed to the decision process.
A partial plan needs to be filled out using means-ends reasoning. Thus, these
adopted partial plans focus the means-ends reasoning of the agent. Given a partial
plan, the means-ends reasoning process outputs some options for courses of actions
that refine this plan. But not all suggested courses of actions will be consistent with
the already adopted plans. Thus, before these suggested courses of actions are supplied
to the decision-making process, they need to be passed through a ‘compatibility filter’.
After filtering out the inconsistent plans, the compatible options are then fed to the
decision-maker for further deliberation. Bratman et al. remarked that the compatibility
filter must be computationally efficient relative to the deliberation process.
In addition to allowing deliberation, IRMA also attempts to provide some form of
reactivity unlike most deliberative architectures. IRMA utilizes an ‘opportunity ana-
lyzer’ and ‘filter override mechanism’ in an attempt to model reactivity. The opportu-
nity analyzer takes the agent’s beliefs and goals as input, and watches for opportunities
to satisfy the agent’s desires when some change in the environment is detected. While
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doing this, it ignores the agent’s adopted plans. When it detects such an opportunity,
it suggests a course of action to fulfill the goal to the compatibility filter. While the
compatibility filter’s job is to detect and eliminate inconsistent plans, the filter override
mechanism can be used to allow some of these inconsistent options to be passed to the
decision-maker for deliberation. If the filter override mechanism passes such an op-
tion to the decision-maker, it must be the case that at least one of the agent’s adopted
plans are incompatible with this option. So, in that case, the decision-maker needs
to decide to either ignore this incompatible option, or to revise the adopted plans that
conflict with this option. Note that, although this process is able to handle unantici-
pated changes in the environment, it is not a completely reactive mechanism, due to
the deliberation involved.
2.3.2 Reactive Architectures
Some architectures that have been proposed are completely reactive in nature. In these,
all the deliberation is done in advance and compiled into the architecture itself. In some
approaches, the designer is responsible for this compilation (e.g. [24]). Another way of
doing this is to use an automatic compilation process [179]. Thus these architectures
neither contain a symbolic model of the world nor a reasoner for manipulating rules
and finding plans (i.e., they are not knowledge-based). Although such architectures
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are very efficient and can perform simple tasks quite well, a major problem is that
they are ineffective in environments that deviate from those expected by the designer.
The primary reason for this is that the behavior of the agents in these frameworks is
essentially hardwired. Also, it is often hard to design agents with multiple complex
goals in these frameworks.
Perhaps the best known reactive agent architecture is Brooks’ subsumption archi-
tecture [25, 26, 27]. Brooks proposed that intelligent behavior can be generated with-
out explicit representations of symbols and without explicit abstract reasoning, and
that intelligence is an emergent property of certain complex systems. He identifies
two key properties of intelligence – ‘real’ intelligence is situated in the world and not
disembodied (such as theorem provers or expert systems), and intelligence arises as a
result of a system’s interaction with its environment.
To demonstrate the validity of his claims, Brooks built a number of robots using his
subsumption architecture. A subsumption architecture consists of a hierarchy of task-
achieving behaviors/layers. Each layer in this hierarchy is used to implement a certain
goal of the robot. These behaviors compete with each-other to exercise control over
the robot. Lower layers are used to encode more primitive kinds of behavior, and have
precedence over the layers further up in the hierarchy. Each layer’s goal subsumes
that of the underlying layers. Each of these layers accesses some of the sensor data
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and generates actions for the actuators. It should be emphasized that the generation
of actions in this system is extremely computationally efficient and does not involve
any explicit reasoning, or even pattern matching. A layer can inhibit inputs or overrule
outputs of the layers below it. This allows the lowest layers to work like fast-adapting
mechanisms, while the higher layers control the main direction to be taken in order
to achieve the overall goal. Thus this architecture is capable of reacting quickly to
changes in the environment.
2.3.3 Reactive Plan Execution Architectures
A reactive plan execution architecture is one that includes a user-defined library of
hierarchical plans. Each of these plans consists of a trigger condition (i.e. goal), a
precondition (i.e. context), and a body. The trigger condition specifies what the plan
is good for, that is, what goal can be achieved using the plan. The context condition
describes the conditions under which the plan should be considered for execution.
Another component of a reactive plan execution architecture is triggering events. An
agent in this kind of architecture responds to events from an event-queue by adopting
the appropriate plan, and by eventually executing it. In addition to primitive actions,
the body of a plan can contain subgoals (i.e. events), which may in turn trigger the
selection and execution of other plans (sub-plans). Thus, in these architectures, the
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changes in the environment determine which plans should be executed, and how these
plans are decomposed.
The most well known version of this architecture is the Procedural Reasoning Sys-
tem (PRS) [88, 87]. A PRS agent consists of a belief-base, a goal-base, a set of plans,
and a set of intention structures. Beliefs in PRS are facts about both the external world
and the agent’s internal state expressed in first-order logic. Goals are represented as
temporal formulae, which include formulae for achieving a property, testing for a con-
dition, waiting for a condition to hold, and preserving/maintaining a condition. These
goals are meant to be used in the triggering event part of a plan. Like IRMA, PRS
also uses plans to structure reasoning. Plans in PRS are complex structures called
Knowledge Areas (KA). Each of these KAs is a rule, and consists of an invocation
condition that specifies when it is applicable, and a body that describes a set of steps
to be achieved. The body of a KA can be viewed as a graph with a single start node
and possibly multiple end nodes. Arcs in this graph represent subgoals. A successful
execution of a KA amounts to achieving each of the subgoals in a path between the
start node and one of the end nodes. Intentions of a PRS agent consist of the set of
active KA stacks, each of which keeps track of all the subgoals of the original KA.
PRS uses KAs to encode procedural knowledge about the domain. KAs may be
activated in a goal-driven fashion, i.e. as a result of acquisition of a new goal, or in a
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data-driven/reactive fashion, i.e. as a result of some change in the agent’s beliefs. These
adopted KAs can be used to structure the practical reasoning, since they constitute the
entire reasoning process. At each iteration of the PRS interpreter, the set of applicable
KAs are determined (by unification) using the agent’s beliefs and active goals. Then
one or more of these KAs are selected and inserted into the intention structure for
execution. Finally, one of the intentions from the (root of the) intention structure
is selected, and a step of this intention is executed. This execution can involve an
unelaborated subgoal; in that case, this goal is added to the goals of the system. The
interpreter then loops to the next iteration, where a new set of applicable KAs are
determined based on the perceived changes. Note that, if the selected KA arose as a
result of the acquisition of a new goal (called intrinsic goal) or a change in belief, then
it is inserted into the intention structure as a new intention. On the other hand, if the
selected KA was triggered due to the execution of an already existing intention (called
operational goal), this KA is pushed on top of the KA stack comprising that intention.
PRS uses a special class of KAs (namely, meta-level KAs) to update the beliefs,
goals, and intentions of the PRS agent. Meta-level KAs can also be used to control the
adoption of lower-level KAs (e.g. in case more than one KA is applicable), create new
subgoals, handle failures, reorder the intentions in the intention structure, etc. Thus
KAs are very powerful and can be used to capture procedural domain knowledge as
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well as decision knowledge.
PRS can be used to guarantee some form of reactivity. In fact, it was shown in
[88] that there exists a bound on the ‘reaction time’ of a PRS agent. Note that, in each
iteration, the interpreter checks for applicable KAs and places one or more appropriate
KAs in the intention structure. This process uses unification and is able to ‘react’ in a
timely manner. Note however that, although a PRS agent is able to promptly recognize
changes in the environment and adopt intentions accordingly, she may take arbitrarily
long to ‘react to the environment’ by executing some action. This is due to the fact
that there is nothing in the framework that ensures that the process of hierarchical
plan decomposition will quickly converge to a sequence of a primitive actions. In
other words, the execution of a knowledge area may involve a long and possibly even
an infinite chain of subgoaling. Thus the term ‘react’ above (as used by Georgeff et
al. [88]) is used in a weak sense, and should be read as ‘recognize’. Nevertheless,
it should be noted that PRS assumes that the designer is responsible to ensure that
plan decomposition completes in a reasonable time. In practice, these architectures
generally respond fairly quickly to changes in the environment.
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2.3.4 Hybrid/Cognitive Architectures
There has also been work on architectures that handle the tradeoff between reactivity
and deliberation by implementing reactive mechanisms and a deliberation module in
two different but interacting layers. Some architectures also include additional layers
for plan execution and/or coordination. These architectures are known as layered archi-
tectures. A typical layered architecture works as follows: the reactive layer generates
potential courses of action in response to time critical events that happen too quickly to
be handled by the other layers. It is often implemented using a set of situation-action
rules, and thus does not involve complex reasoning. The reactive execution layer (or
scheduler) selects precompiled plans to achieve current goals and schedules them for
execution. The deliberation layer uses an explicit model of the world and a planner to
generate new plans. Finally, the multiagent coordination (A.K.A. the modeling) layer
contains models of the cognitive states of other agents in the environment (including
human agents). These models are used to manage the dependencies between the activ-
ities of the agent and those of other agents (e.g. to identify and resolve goal conflicts).
Some of these architectures have control mechanisms to decide which layer controls
execution at a given time. Depending on what layers are included in the framework,
layered architectures are capable of providing a guaranteed level of responsiveness,
performing resource-bounded deliberation to cope with exceptional events, as well as
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providing the flexibility to adapt ongoing plans as required by changes in the envi-
ronment. Examples of layered architectures include Touring Machines [71], Inhabited
Dynamical Systems [143], and InterRRap [156].
Some proposals were made to capture human-like functionalities and capabilities.
Since these architectures model structures for performing a wide variety of cognitive
tasks, they are often called cognitive architectures. Examples of cognitive architectures
are SOAR [129], Homer [240], and OSCAR [171], to name a few. In addition to as-
cribing to the agents intentional modalities such as beliefs, goals, and intentions, these
architectures often attempt to formalize learning, problem-solving, natural language
processing and generation, planning, memory, defeasible reasoning, etc. However,
cognitive architectures have not dealt with the main problems faced by researchers in
agent architecture, namely, the tradeoff between deliberation and reactivity, and han-
dling resource boundedness.
2.3.5 Relation to Agent Theories
In [175], Rao and Georgeff attempt to relate their agent theory in [174] to a simpli-
fied version of the PRS interpreter. This “abstract” interpreter operates on a (logically)
closed and consistent set of beliefs, goals, and intentions. Also, the belief-base is
closed w.r.t. an agent’s plans, i.e. the agent knows all her plans, and all possible de-
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compositions of her plans are pre-computed. Using these, it generates all the options
for action in a single cycle. Then it selects an action for execution, executes this ac-
tion, and updates the agent’s mental states. Rao and Georgeff informally discuss how
to constrain various procedures called by this interpreter, and thus implement some of
the basic axioms of their theory in this architecture. This includes axioms that relate
various mental states (such as belief-goal compatibility), and axioms that model vari-
ous forms of commitment (e.g. blind commitment). They also have an axiom which is
similar to Cohen and Levesque’s ‘no infinite deferral’ assumption (i.e. that all inten-
tions must be eventually dropped). Unfortunately, they do not consider axioms related
to agents’ abilities required to achieve goals, and axioms that deal with rationality (e.g.
that agents should not adopt plans that are very unlikely to achieve a goal). They then
present a “practical” interpreter that is similar to the PRS interpreter, in the sense that
it operates on a knowledge-base of explicit (and grounded) beliefs and goals that is
not closed under logical consequence, and that it computes the decomposition of the
adopted plans over an arbitrary number of cycles of the interpreter. At every step of
the interpreter, in response to an event, the option generator iterates through the plan
library and returns the plans whose invocation condition matches this event and whose
context condition follows from the agent’s beliefs. The deliberator then utilizes meta-
level rules to decide which of these options should be selected. In the next step, one
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of the intentions is executed. Like in PRS, the execution of an intention may involve
triggering of another event, or execution of a primitive action. While Rao and Georgeff
acknowledge that this practical interpreter does not obey all the axioms of their agent
theory, no suggestions for revising the axioms were given. They did however hint that
under certain circumstances, namely when no external events occur during the execu-
tion of a goal, the practical interpreter behaves like the abstract one, and satisfies these
axioms. However, it is not clear that this is the case. For instance, there is no way of
preventing the adoption of a plan that is inconsistent with the agent’s adopted inten-
tions, since no lookahead mechanism is incorporated in this practical interpreter. Thus
the axiom which states that the agent’s intentions should be consistent clearly does not
follow from this interpreter.
2.4 Agent Programming Languages
The beginning of the current interest in agent programming languages (APLs, hence-
forth) might be attributed to Shoham’s proposal of Agent-Oriented Programming (AOP)
[204, 205], as a ‘new programming paradigm based on a societal view of computation’,
and as a specialization of object-oriented programming. The key idea of this AOP
paradigm is to use mentalistic and intentional notions formalized by agent theorists to
design and program agents.
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Another front that pushed the concept of agent-oriented programming is Rao and
Georgeff’s PRS architecture. As we have seen, the key concept in the PRS architecture
is that of using events for selecting hierarchically decomposed plans, and thus avoiding
planning from scratch. In the following, we will see that many APLs in the literature
are based on a simplified version of the PRS architecture.
Thus, most of the APLs in the literature can be classified into two classes, namely
deductive reasoning languages and reactive plan execution languages. While the for-
mer was derived from various agent theories, logics, and calculi, the roots of the latter
can be traced back to reactive plan execution architectures (viz. PRS and dMARS
[123]).
Logic based APLs are usually more expressive and strongly grounded into the
underlying logic. The latter means that programs written in these can often be verified
easily by theorem proving or model checking. However, this expressiveness and ease
of verification usually comes at the cost of computational complexity. Most of these
languages also suffer from other significant limitations, such as poor scalability and
modularity, and no support for physical distribution of the computation, nor for the
integration of external packages and languages. Examples of logic-based APLs include
AGENT0 [204, 205] (based on modal and deontic logic), Concurrent METATEM [72,
73] (based on modal and temporal logic), the Golog family [140, 51, 55] (based on
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the situation calculus), FLUX [222] (based on the fluent calculus), and MINERVA
[131, 132] (based on a non-monotonic logic).
In contrast, efficiency and modularity are two areas where the reactive plan execu-
tion languages shine. In addition, these languages provide means for encoding con-
trol knowledge by using user-defined plan/rule libraries. Nevertheless, most of these
PRS-based languages often have limited expressiveness. Examples of reactive plan
execution languages include AgentSpeak(L) [172], 3APL [99], and CAN [247].
APLs also differ on how they handle several issues. For instance, some of these in-
corporate BDI concepts such as beliefs, desires, goals, etc (e.g. AgentSpeak(L), 3APL,
PLACA, etc.), while others do not (e.g. Golog and Concurrent METATEM). A few of
these languages handle incomplete knowledge and sensing actions (e.g. Golog and
FLUX). Some languages allow planning with lookahead; others only allow reactive
plan selection (from a user-defined plan library) and execution. Examples of APLs
that allow offline planning include Golog and CAN-PLAN [185]. Some of these lan-
guages allow modeled exogenous actions (e.g. ConGolog), have constructs to support
communication (e.g. PLACA, Jason), support multiple agents (e.g. JACK), or provide
a programming logic on top of the associated programming language to specify agent
properties, such as liveness and safety properties (e.g. GOAL, Dribble).
Besides these two classes of APLs that I have identified, there has also been work
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on purely behavior-based or reactive languages [26, 27, 3, 145]. However, these are
closer to agent architectures than APLs. Also, researchers have developed various
agent-oriented software engineering methodologies (e.g. Prometheus [159] and Gaia
[253]) and tools. Surveys of these can be found in [12] and [13].
In the following, I review work on APLs in our two classes. Later in Section
2.5, I focus on more recent work on agent programming languages that incorporate
declarative goals.
2.4.1 Logic-Based/Deductive Reasoning Languages
AOP, AGENT0, PLACA
Shoham [205] identifies three essential components of an AOP language: a theory for
defining the mental state of agents; an interpreted programming language for program-
ming agents, whose semantics must be faithful to the theory; and an ‘agentification’
process, which wraps components of physical systems into agents. He acknowledges
that the agentifier is not necessary for systems designed with AOP in mind. However,
he envisions applying the AOP framework even to ordinary devices, such as watches
and cameras, for which the agentification process is required.
AOP incorporates a quantified multi-modal logic with direct reference to time-
points. The theory contains three modalities, namely, belief, commitment (also re-
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ferred to as choice or decision), and ability. Commitment is a derived operator, and
defined in terms of obligation to oneself. An example of a formula of the logic is as
follows: CAN7a open(safe)
9 ⊃ B7b CAN7a open(safe)9. This says that if at time
7, agent a can ensure that she is able to open a safe at time 9, then at time 7, agent b
believes this. Unfortunately, AOP does not include a formal semantics for this modal
logic.
Shoham’s first attempt at an AOP language resulted in the AGENT0 programming
language [205]. In AGENT0, an agent is specified in terms of a set of initial beliefs
and commitments, a set of (fixed) capabilities, and a set of commitment rules. The
set of commitment rules is a key component in AGENT0, and it determines how the
agent acts. A commitment rule associates a message condition and a mental condi-
tion with an action. If the message conditions match an incoming message and the
mental conditions are true in the agent’s current mental state, then the corresponding
commitment rule fires, and as a result, the agent becomes committed to the associated
action. Commitment to an action in AGENT0 amounts to no more than scheduling
an action. The AGENT0 interpreter maintains a database of committed to actions and
their scheduled times, and when the appropriate time arrives, the action is executed.
Along with private actions (i.e. internally executed subroutines), AGENT0 also pro-
vides communicative actions in the spirit of speech-act theory [4, 191, 40]. The basic
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loop of the AGENT0 interpreter consists of two steps: in the first step, it reads the
current incoming message and updates the mental state (i.e. the agent’s beliefs and
commitments) by applying all applicable commitment rules; in step 2, it executes the
commitments for the current time, possibly further updating the mental state.
In her 1993 Doctoral thesis [223], Thomas introduces the PLAnning Commu-
nicating Agents (PLACA) language as a more refined implementation of AGENT0.
PLACA addresses a severe drawback to AGENT0, namely the inability of agents to
plan and to communicate their declarative goals (via requests). The overall struc-
ture of PLACA is very similar to that of AGENT0. To handle planning, the initial
mental state now also contains a declarative motivational intention-base, and a proce-
dural plan-base. Also, commitment rules are now replaced with mental-change rules,
each of which associates a set of mental state changes with a set of message con-
ditions/mental conditions/(outgoing) message-list. At every tick of the global clock,
these mental change rules are used to update the agent’s declarative intentions. Plans
on the other hand are fed to the system using an external planner, described as a black
box in [224], which is responsible for updating the plan-base at every tick of the clock.
For longer deliberations, the planner may request the ‘mental-rule checker’ module
to skip some cycles (while queuing the incoming messages) and allow uninterrupted
planning. The architecture also utilizes a separate executor module that is responsible
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for sending outgoing messages, and for executing the scheduled actions when the time
has come.4 Thus, PLACA separates deliberation about which intentions to adopt from
considerations of means of achieving the adopted intentions. While the agent program
is used to formalize the former, the latter is modeled using a black-box external planner
and not properly fleshed out (i.e. mostly unspecified) by the framework.
In [219], Tan and Weihmayer discuss an AOP-based framework for cooperative
problem solving that integrates AGENT0 and the state-space planner PRODIGY [150].
The major difference between PLACA and this framework is that in the latter, planning
occurs directly as a result of the firing of commitment rules, and thus is not interrupt-
ible. Therefore, planning in this account behaves like a single primitive action. Also,
since many rules may fire during a cycle, several planning processes may be triggered,
which is computationally demanding and may hamper reactivity.
All of these languages were only intended as prototypes. Thus, various simpli-
fying assumptions were incorporated. For example, AGENT0 lacks a formal seman-
tics. Also, agents can only commit to primitive actions that can be directly executed.
AGENT0 and PLACA both assume a global clock. Although PLACA includes declar-
ative goals that trigger planning, it does not formally specify how plan generation and
commitment to plans are handled.
4Recall that every action is dated, i.e. has a time-stamp associated with it.
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Concurrent METATEM and its BDI-Extensions
A problem with AGENT0 and PLACA is that no formal semantics for agent program
execution is provided. Also, the execution of these languages cannot be said to truly
execute the associated logic. A desirable property of any APL semantics is that it
should be strongly coupled to the underlying (BDI) logic. In other words, the program
execution semantics should satisfy the underlying logic. This ensures that these two
are compatible with each-other; for instance, if the underlying theory sanctions that
an agent is (physically and mentally) able to perform some action in some situation,
then it is only intuitive that the APL execution semantics agrees with this and that one
could derive that there is a legal transition of the agent program with this action in
that situation. The Concurrent METATEM language proposed by Fisher and Barringer
[74], and its extensions [72, 73] attempt to address these issues.
A Concurrent METATEM system is a collection of concurrently executing objects,
whose behavior is specified directly using an executable temporal logic. These ob-
jects can communicate via asynchronous broadcast message passing. Each object is
specified using an object-interface and a set of executable temporal rules. An object-
interface identifies the messages that an object can recognize, together with the mes-
sages that it can produce. The temporal rules associated with the objects form the bulk
of a Concurrent METATEM program. These have the following general form: ‘past
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and present formula’ ⊃ ‘present and future formula’, and are assumed to hold at all
time-points. In Concurrent METATEM, an object’s specification is directly executed
to generate its behavior. The execution of an object involves iteratively constructing
a model from the corresponding temporal formulae, in the presence of input from the
program’s environment. Starting from the initial state, at each step the program rules
are consulted to check which of the rules have antecedents that are satisfied by the
partial model constructed so far. The consequents of all such rules are collected to-
gether. These consequents represent constraints on present and future properties of
this model, and these along with any outstanding constraints generated in some pre-
vious steps are used to construct the current state. Any outstanding constraints are
passed to the next step. If at any point, a contradiction is generated, the system may
backtrack (i.e. undo some actions) to a previous choice-point and attempt to construct
a model for the program in a different way, giving up indicating an execution fail-
ure when no choice-points are remaining. Note that, sources of non-determinism (i.e.
choice-points) include the execution of a rule whose consequent contains a disjunction
or an 3-formula, i.e. the execution of eventual satisfaction of some formula.
To summarize, Concurrent METATEM differs from other languages in that it based
on a satisfiability point of view. As mentioned, an advantage of Concurrent METATEM
is that in this framework, the theory and the programming language are strongly cou-
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pled. Also, the semantics of program execution is closely related to the semantics of
the associated temporal logic. Thus, verifying agents’ properties specified in the lan-
guage is a viable proposition. In [73], Fisher uses a series of examples to demonstrate
that Concurrent METATEM can be used to specify intelligent objects that exhibit an in-
teresting range of behaviors, which include cooperation and competition, negotiation,
obeying safety and liveness constraints, and so forth. Also it can be used to specify
groups of objects (societies) and hierarchical problem solving objects. Unfortunately,
Concurrent METATEM has some limitations. For instance, recall that building a model
may require backtracking; it seems that this is not always possible, e.g., in some do-
mains, the effects of actions may not be reversible. Also, like satisfiability, it requires
complete knowledge.
Recently, Fisher and Ghidini [75] extended Concurrent METATEM by incorporat-
ing the notions of belief, ability, and the “motivational” operator confidence. Agents’
beliefs are represented using a (KD45) multi-context logic [90]. Multi-context logic is
a formal framework for modular representation of (nested) beliefs of multiple agents,
and is based on the notion of belief contexts. A belief context is a representation of a
collection of beliefs that an agent ascribes to herself and to other agents. For example,
an agent i may have some beliefs about the world; in addition she may have some
beliefs about another agent j, beliefs about j’s beliefs about another agent k, etc. In a
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multi-context logic, each of these sets of beliefs is represented using a distinct formal
language, and the interpretation of such a language is local to the belief context it is
associated with. A context structure in a multi-context logic contains an infinite tree
(where the root of the tree represents the belief context of the agent whose belief is
under consideration), and allows one to represent arbitrarily nested beliefs. Although
distinct, the contents of different belief contexts can be related. For instance, an ob-
vious relation is the following: if a sentence of the form P is in the belief context for
i’s beliefs about j (i.e. in the context ij), then a sentence of the form “j believes that
P ” is in the belief context for i. Another relation says that a sentence of the form P
is in ij, only if a sentence of the form “j believes that P ” is in the context i. Depend-
ing on the relations among different contexts, one can model agents having different
reasoning capabilities. As we can see from the above description, the key feature of
belief-contexts is modularity. Note that, the extended Concurrent METATEM incorpo-
rates the appropriate relations so that agents’ beliefs are KD45.
An agent’s abilities are constant over time. The semantics of the ability operator
is formalized using a function r that associates a belief context to a (fixed) set of
formulae. Thus, e.g. if r associates {φ} with the context for agent i, then i has the
ability that φ; on the other hand if r associates {φ, ψ} with the context for agent k’s
belief about agent j’s belief about agent i, then k believes that j beliefs that i has the
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ability to achieve φ and ψ. Confidence in φ, which is a derived attitude, is defined
as believing that φ will eventually happen (i.e. Bi3φ). As in the original Concurrent
METATEM, agents are specified using an agent-interface and a set of temporal rules
in this framework. However, rules are now allowed to have modal operators; the rules
must be in normal forms that only allow present and future temporal operators.
The key idea in this framework is that the language provides a mechanism for de-
riving concrete specification of motivations from more abstract ones. Consider the in-
teraction between the following temporal goal formulae (in descending order in terms
of abstractness): Bi3φ, Bi3jφ, 3φ, and φ, that is, the agent i is confident about φ,
i is confident about φ and believes that j is responsible for bringing about φ, φ will
eventually hold, and φ is currently true, respectively. Fisher and Ghidini argue that by
providing rules that can be used to derive a more concrete goal formula from one of
these abstract goal formulae, we are essentially specifying a rational agent. One such
rule is as follows:
(Bi3φ ∧ Aiφ) ⊃ 3φ.
This says that, if agent i is confident about φ, and is able to achieve φ, then φ eventually
holds. Another example of this is that an agent may move from ‘confidence’ (i.e.
Bi3φ) to ‘confidence in another agent’ (i.e. Bi3jφ, where i 6= j), through deduction
or communication. Again, moving from 3φ to φ is essentially a matter of scheduling.
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In this framework, various rules can be tailored and various constraints onBi can be
imposed to specify realism, strong-realism, and weak-realism properties (see Section
2). Also, rules can be used to implement sensing actions. Thus, this extension of
Concurrent METATEM brings it closer to other BDI languages. Even more recently,
Fisher et al. [77, 76] extended Concurrent METATEM to include groups of agents and
show how agents can be efficiently organized to collectively solve problems.
One problem with these frameworks is that in these languages, the programmer
needs to explicitly specify the behavior of the agents using temporal rules. Thus al-
though verification of agent properties is relatively straightforward, programming even
simple agents puts a heavy burden on the programmer. The examples in [73] and [75]
show this. Also, while it is possible to write chaining rules (i.e. rules whose con-
sequent fires other rules) in this language, these rules do not exactly correspond to
hierarchically decomposed procedures/plans. Finally, this model of agent program-
ming is problematic in the sense that although specifying rational actions (or in this
case, rational temporal rules) is left to the programmer, there is nothing to prevent the
programmer from writing inconsistent or non-terminating sets of rules.
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Golog, ConGolog, and IndiGolog
Another style of agent programming is developed in the logic programming-based
Golog family [140, 51, 55]. In Golog, the programmer first declaratively specifies
the agent’s knowledge of the dynamics of the world (i.e. preconditions and effects of
actions), and the initial state of the world in a situation calculus dialect, a first-order
language for dynamic domains which incorporates a solution to the frame problem due
to Reiter [176, 178]. Then various Golog constructs, such as primitive actions, testing
for a condition, sequences, non-deterministic branch, loops, etc. are used to write pro-
grams. Given a program and the domain axioms, the interpreter attempts to prove that
the program has a terminating execution starting in the initial situation. A sequence of
actions for executing the program is uniquely identified by the terminating situation.
Once an action sequence is found, the agent executes the program, by executing one
action at a time. Thus, Golog redefines the planning problem of ‘looking for a legal
sequence of actions to achieve some goal’ as the problem of ‘searching for a legal
sequence of actions that amount to a legal execution of the high-level program’. The
program can encode search control knowledge.
In contrast to most other logic-based APLs where the agent’s state must be explic-
itly updated by the executing program, Golog and its successors employ an automatic
state update mechanism using their background action theory for the domain. Also,
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unlike other APLs where the designer specifies the agent’s behavior using some form
of rules, Golog has the programmer specify a high-level non-deterministic program,
and the underlying interpreter’s task is to search for an execution of this program.
ConGolog extends Golog to include concurrency by providing constructs for non-
deterministic iteration, concurrency (with and without priority), and interrupts, which
makes it easier to write reactive programs. ConGolog also replaces the evaluation
semantics of Golog with a transition semantics, since a single-step semantics is better
suited for concurrency.
The ConGolog interpreter proves that some branch of the non-deterministic pro-
gram yields a terminating state of the program, and thus resolves the non-determinism
in an off-line style using lookahead planning. This offline planning cannot handle dy-
namically changing worlds too well, especially when sensing and exogenous actions
are involved. For instance, consider the following program: (a|b); senseq; if q then ∆1
else ∆2 endIf;φ?, which says that the agent should first nondeterministically choose
between a and b and execute it, then sense the truth-value of q, and based on this value,
should execute either ∆1 or ∆2, terminating successfully if the test φ? succeeds. Note
that, an offline interpreter for this program cannot commit to either a or b in advance,
since it does not know which of these will ensure that φ, and thus cannot use the
sensing action to determine whether q would hold after the action. The only option
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available to the interpreter is to check if one of the actions a or b will lead to φ for both
values of q. Thus, early occurrences of non-deterministic choices can result in unac-
ceptable delay. The situation gets even worse when loops are involved. To deal with
this, the language IndiGolog [55] was proposed. In IndiGolog, programs are executed
incrementally to allow for interleaved action, planning, sensing, and exogenous events.
Informally, the semantics of incremental execution is as follows: an incremental exe-
cution of a program finds a next possible action, executes it in the real world, obtains
the sensing results afterwards, and repeats this cycle until the program is finished.
Since this makes it possible to quickly execute the actions without much deliberation,
this approach is suitable for realistic changing worlds. However, since the program
may contain non-deterministic choice points, some lookahead mechanism is required
to avoid unsuccessful (dead end) executions. For this reason, a search operator Σ is
introduced in IndiGolog. Intuitively, Σ(prog) selects from all possible transitions of
prog one for which there exists a sequence of further transitions that leads to a termi-
nating configuration. The IndiGolog interpreter automatically monitors the execution
of a plan generated by such a search block, and re-plans when the current plan fails or
is no longer appropriate due to changes in the environment. IndiGolog also supports a
simple form of contingent planning, where the dynamic environment is modeled as a
simple deterministic reactive program [135].
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Thus, IndiGolog is a powerful language that is able to handle incomplete knowl-
edge, sensing, and exogenous actions, and allows the specification of prompt reactive
behavior as well as user-controlled deliberation. Note however that, the standard im-
plementation of IndiGolog makes a dynamic closed-world assumption, i.e. it assumes
that a program has sufficient knowledge to evaluate a query/test by the time it is eval-
uated, and if initially the answer to the query is not known, sensing actions will be
executed before the query is made. Thus it is assumed that the on-line interpreter has
complete knowledge of the relevant fluents by the time the query is evaluated. To
avoid this limitation, an extension of the Golog formula evaluator was presented in
[238], where the evaluator keeps track of the possible values that functional fluents
can take in a given history (i.e. a situation along with the sensing results obtained so
far). A fluent is said to be known at some history h iff it has only one possible value
at h. Note that this only handles limited forms of incomplete knowledge, namely, not
knowing the value of a fluent; general disjunctive knowledge is not handled. This work
is still at an early stage, and the issue of how to deal with efficient belief update in the
presence of incomplete knowledge is still not completely clear.
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FLUX
One disadvantage of IndiGolog and some other logic-based non-BDI languages is that
the knowledge of the current state is represented indirectly using histories, i.e. via the
initial conditions and the actions that the agent has performed so far. A consequence
of this is that each time the agent needs to evaluate a condition, she has to consider the
entire history of actions and perform regression. Thus these languages do not handle
long running agents efficiently. The fluent calculus-based high-level programming
language FLUX (FLUent eXecutor) [222] attempts to solve this problem using an
explicit state representation and progressing it when an action is performed. FLUX
incorporates an implementation of the fluent calculus, a language for reasoning about
actions. The fluent calculus provides a basic solution to the frame problem using
the concept of state update axioms. It also addresses a variety of other aspects such
as, ramifications, qualifications, nondeterministic and concurrent actions, continuous
change, and noisy sensors and effectors.
A FLUX agent program consists of three parts, namely a background theory that
encodes the agent’s internal model of the environment, a kernel that provides the agent
with cognitive abilities to reason about her actions and acquired sensor data, and a
strategy that specifies the agent’s task oriented behavior. The types of incomplete
knowledge FLUX can encode are restricted. The underlying inference engine of FLUX
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is sound but incomplete. However, it can be shown that reasoning in FLUX is linear
in the size of the internal state representation. Thus FLUX scales up well to long-
term control. FLUX allows the use of full expressive power of logic programming in
defining strategies. It also facilitates formal proofs of correctness of strategies.
MINERVA
The MINERVA agent programming language [131, 132] utilizes logic programming
and several non-monotonic knowledge representation and reasoning mechanisms to
provide a common multiagent framework. A MINERVA agent consists of several
specialized concurrently running sub-agents performing various tasks. These agents
can read and manipulate a common knowledge base specified in the Multi-dimensional
Dynamic Logic Programming language (MDLP). In MINERVA, agents are driven by
an observation-deliberation-action cycle. The behavior of these agents is specified in
the Knowledge and Behavior Update Language (KABUL).
MDLP provides an extension of Answer Set Programming (ASP). In MDLP, an
agent’s knowledge is represented using logic programs arranged in an acyclic digraph,
in which the vertices are sets of logic programs, and edges represent the relationship
between these programs. MDLP benefits from the advantages of ASP, such as default
negation, which can be used to deal with incomplete knowledge. Also, it can be used
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to represent the evolution of knowledge, and preferences.
KABUL is a logic programming language that can be used to specify updates to
knowledge bases, and to the KABUL program itself. A KABUL program consists of a
set of condition-action rules that encode the agent’s behavior. Since actions in KABUL
can update both the knowledge base represented in MDLP and the KABUL program
itself, it can be used to specify agents that change their behavior over time. Conditions
in these rules can refer to external observations, the epistemic state of the agent, as
well as to occurrences of exogenous actions. Since no external stimuli are needed to
trigger the behavior of the agent, KABUL can be used to specify both reactive and
proactive behavior.
Other Logic-Based APLs
There has been work on various other logic-based APLs. Those that gained some pop-
ularity include APRIL [146], the deontic logic-based IMPACT [62, 63], the dynamic
logic-based Dylog [6], the linear logic-based εhhf [57], the ambient calculus-based
CLAIM [193], the Horn Clauses and Least Herbrand Models based DALI [41], and
ReSpecT [158]. Surveys of some of these languages can be found in [144, 12, 13]. In
the next section, I discuss some of the reactive plan execution languages.
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2.4.2 Reactive Plan Execution Languages
AgentSpeak and its Variants and Implementations (Jason, JACK, Jadex)
As discussed in Section 2, there has been much work on agent theories, and current
theories are quite mature and well established. However, there is a large gap between
agent theories and BDI APLs.5 In [172], Rao introduced the AgentSpeak(L) language
as an attempt to show a one-to-one correspondence between the model theory, proof
theory, and the abstract interpreter of this language. Here, model theory, proof theory,
and abstract interpreter refers to the underlying BDI theory, the formal semantics of
the programming language (often specified using a transition semantics, as discussed
below), and the implemented interpreter for the language, respectively. Rao argues that
there is a better chance of unifying theory and practice by taking a simple specification
language as the execution model of an agent, and then ascribing mental attitudes to
this agent. To this end, he used the Procedural Reasoning System (PRS) and its more
recent incarnation the distributed Multi-Agent Reasoning System (dMARS) [123] as
a starting point for the AgentSpeak(L) implemented system. To establish the link be-
tween agent theories and APLs, it is necessary to have a way of deriving the formal
5Here, BDI APLs refers to APLs that incorporate concepts such as beliefs, desires, goals, and inten-
tions. Also, note that the original proposal of Concurrent METATEM, the Golog family, and many other
declarative APLs are tightly coupled to the associated logic/theory. However, most of these languages
are not per se typical BDI-languages.
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semantics of program execution from the underlying agent logic. To do this, Rao first
defined program states of an APL using agent configurations. An agent configuration
consists of a sentential description of an agent’s beliefs and her motivational states,
derived from associated components of the underlying agent theory. Intentions in a
configuration are represented procedurally as in PRS. He then defined program ex-
ecution or agent behavior as transitions from configuration to configuration. These
transitions are guided by a set of transition rules (A.K.A. proof rules), which specify
how an agent configuration and its components may change as a result of executing an
action, and what actions can be executed. AgentSpeak(L) is based on reactive plan ex-
ecution architectures, where rather than deliberating on which action to execute next,
the agents utilize the changes in the environment to decide which given hierarchical
plan should be adopted, and how to decompose and execute this hierarchical plan.
An AgentSpeak(L) agent consists of a belief-base, a set of plans, and a set of in-
tentions. When an agent acquires a new goal, or notices a change in her environment,
she may trigger additions or deletions to her goals or beliefs. These events are referred
as triggering events. Agents in this framework respond to triggering events. Plans in
AgentSpeak(L) are rules of the form: (e : cc ← p). Intuitively, this says that in re-
sponse to the event e, the agent should adopt the plan-body/intention that p, provided
that the context condition cc follows from her belief. The plan-body can be built us-
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ing sequences of goals and actions. Goals in AgentSpeak(L) are of two types, namely
achievement goals, and test goals. Achievement goals are an abstraction mechanism,
and serve the same purpose as procedure calls in imperative programming. In other
words, the execution of an achievement goal triggers an event, and as a result, the
agent adopts the appropriate plan as her intention, just as the execution of a procedure
in imperative programming amounts to the execution of the procedure body. These
plans may in turn include achievement goals in them, and in that case when executed,
they will trigger the adoption of other plans. Thus achievement goals and plans to-
gether provide a mechanism for event-invoked hierarchical decomposition of goals.
AgentSpeak(L) also uses these plans to revise agents’ beliefs and goals by generat-
ing primitive addition/deletion events. Test goals involve testing the belief-base and
may be used to compute variable bindings. Intentions in AgentSpeak(L) are stacks
of partially instantiated plans. At any time, the agent may have multiple intentions.
Initially, each of these intention stacks contain only one element, namely, the plan that
was adopted in response to an external event (i.e. due to a change in the external en-
vironment). The execution of these intentions may involve executing an achievement
goal, which triggers the adoption of new intentions. In that case, this new intention is
pushed on top of the intention stack that triggered the adoption of this intention.
The overall control flow of the system is determined by the AgentSpeak(L) in-
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terpreter, and goes as follows. The interpreter uses a given selection function SE to
determine which pending event to process next. Then it computes the relevant plans
by checking the plans whose associated event matches (i.e. can be unified) with this
event. From these plans, it then computes the set of applicable plans by checking
whether an instance of the context condition follows from the agent’s beliefs. An-
other selection function SO is used by the interpreter to choose one of the applicable
plans, and this plan is then added to the intention base. The interpreter uses a third
selection function SI to decide which of these intentions should be executed next. As
discussed above, these adopted intentions can in turn post so called internal events.
Internal events are processed similarly to regular or external events. However, rather
than adding the selected applicable plan to the intention base, it is now pushed on top
of the intention-stack that posted this event. Only the plans that are on top of an in-
tention stack are considered for execution, and only one of them are executed in each
cycle.
For instance, suppose that an agent has the following plans in her plan-base:
+!φ1 : true←!ψa; a1; a2,
+!ψa : true← a3; a4.
Here + and !φ refers to an addition event and an achievement goal φ, respectively.
The first plan says that in response to the event where the agent acquires the goal to
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achieve φ1, she should adopt the plan to achieve the goal ψa first, and then execute the
primitive action a1 followed by a2. Similarly, the second plan says that in response to
the event where the agent acquires the goal to achieve ψa, she should adopt the plan
to execute the primitive action a3 followed by a4. For simplicity, I assume that both
of these rules have a true context condition. Now, suppose that the agent acquires the
goal to achieve φ1 through some external event (such as, via a request action), and that
SE chooses to process this event next. Since the first rule’s trigger condition matches
(unifies) with this event, the context condition trivially follows, and there is only one
applicable rule (i.e. SO returns this plan), she will adopt this plan as her intention.
Thus, a new intention [+!φ1 : true ←!ψa; a1; a2] will be added to her intention base
(let’s call this intention i1). Similarly, each time she acquires an intention due to an
external event, a new intention will be added to the intention-base. Now, suppose that
SI chooses to execute i1. Since executing the first action of i1 involves executing the
achievement goal ψa, it will generate the event that +!ψa, and this event will be added
to the event queue. In the next cycle, suppose that SE chooses to process the event
+!ψa. In response to this event and after unifying the trigger condition and verifying
the context condition, the agent will adopt the intention that [+!ψa : true ← a3; a4],
since there is only one applicable rule. But, since this event was generated due to the
execution of another intention, namely i1, it will be pushed on top of the stack for
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i1 rather than being added as a new intention. Recall that, when deciding on which
intention to execute next, only the plans that are on top of the intention stack are
considered. This ensures that the agent will execute a3; a4 before executing a1; a2.
An AgentSpeak(L) agent is specified by a tuple 〈E,B, P, I, A, SE , SO, SI〉, where
E is a set of possible events, B is a set of possible base beliefs (defined using a ground
set of atoms), P is a set of possible plans, I is a set of possible intentions, A is a set
of actions (denoting the possible set of actions that the agent has performed so far),
and SE , SO, and SI are the three selection functions. An AgentSpeak(L) agent can
have a number of executions defined in terms of the configurations reachable from
the initial configuration. A BDI configuration is a tuple of 〈Ei, Bi, Ii, Ai, i〉, where
Ei ⊆ E,Bi ⊆ B, Ii ⊆ I, Ai ⊆ A, and i is the label of the configuration. Note that,
an agent’s plans are considered to be static, and thus are not included in a configu-
ration. The semantics of the AgentSpeak(L) programming language is defined using
a labeled BDI transition system that specifies how agents can evolve from one con-
figuration to another. A BDI transition system is a pair 〈Γ,`〉, where Γ is a set of
BDI configurations, and ` is a binary transition relation Γ × Γ defined using a set of
proof (transition) rules. A BDI derivation/execution is defined to be a (possibly infi-
nite) sequence of BDI configurations γ0, γ1, · · · , γi, · · · such that for all i, γi ∈ Γ, γ0
is the initial configuration, and for any consecutive pair of configurations (γj, γj+1),
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γj ` γj+1. For the AgentSpeak(L) programming logic, the notion of ‘refutation’ is
defined in terms of an intention: it starts when the agent adopts an intention, and ends
when her intention stack becomes empty. Rao argued that this programming logic can
be used to formally prove certain properties about an agent’s behavior, such as safety
and liveness of the agent system. Also, there is an one-to-one correspondence between
the AgentSpeak(L) interpreter and AgentSpeak(L) transition rules.
Since Rao’s original proposal [172], other researchers have proposed various ex-
tensions and implementations of the AgentSpeak(L) language. In [60], d’Inverno and
Luck use the Z specification language to formally specify a complete abstract inter-
preter for AgentSpeak(L) similar to that given to dMARS [59]. In [153], the op-
erational semantics of AgentSpeak(L) is specified using a more standard Plotkin-style
structural approach [168]. The three major implementations of AgentSpeak(L) include
JACK [105], Jason [16, 13], and Jadex [22, 170]. In the following, I briefly discuss
these, and also point out the extensions provided by these implementations.
The Java Agent Compiler and Kernel (JACK) Intelligent AgentsTM framework
[105] is a commercial agent-oriented programming tool developed by Agent-Oriented
Software Pty. Ltd. Unlike Jason and Jadex, JACK does not provide a logic-based
language to specify agents’ beliefs and intentions; rather, it uses an extension of Java
to implement some features of the underlying logic, such as logical variables, events,
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beliefs, and plans. One of the design goals of JACK was to provide developers with a
robust, stable, light-weight product that can be used to develop components of larger
environments, such as legacy software systems. To this end, JACK provides three
extensions of Java. It extends the Java syntax to include BDI-related keywords, dec-
laration of attributes, and statements. It provides a compiler that compiles these BDI
syntactic additions into pure Java classes that can be used by other ordinary Java code.
Finally, it incorporates a set of kernel classes that provide the required runtime support
to the generated code.
From a functionality point of view, JACK incorporates six components, namely,
agent, capability, belief-set, view, event, and plan. The agent construct defines the
behavior of an agent by including the capabilities an agent has, the types of events
she responds to, and the plans she uses to achieve her goals. The capability con-
cept structures the reasoning capabilities of agents into clusters. Capabilities are built
up from events, beliefs, plans, Java code, etc. They simplify agent design by allow-
ing code reuse and encapsulate agent functionality. This allows the agent architect
to build up a library of capabilities over time, and create an agent promptly by sim-
ply plugging in the required capabilities. JACK uses a generic relational model to
represent the agents’ beliefs. A belief-set consists of relations of the following form:
relationName(key1, key2, · · · , data1, data2, · · · ). Each relation can be identified by
96
the relation name and any number of keys. The data fields are used to encode the at-
tributes of a relation. Elements of a belief-set can be retrieved using unification as in
Prolog. The view construct is central to JACK’s data modeling capability. It is built up
from multiple belief-sets or arbitrary Java data structures, and allows general purpose
queries to be made about an underlying data model. Events and plans are similar to
AgentSpeak(L).
On top of these architecture independent facilities, JACK provides a set of plug-in
components that address the requirements for specific agent architectures. Currently
it supports two such plug-ins, namely a PRS/dMARS-based BDI interpreter, and a
plug-in for building teams of agents, called SimpleTeam. The underlying concept be-
hind SimpleTeam is that it allows the programmer to specify a high-level view of the
coordinated behavior of a team, and then map this high-level view to the individual ac-
tivities of the participating agents. JACK also include a graphical agent development
environment, a debugger, and an object modeling toolkit to support object transport
and interaction with existing applications in Java and C++. JACK has been used to
develop commercial applications, such as decision support and defense simulation for
analysis applications.
Recently, Bordini and Hu¨bner developed a Java-based open source practical in-
terpreter for AgentSpeak(L) called Jason [16, 13], that incorporates an extension of
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the AgentSpeak(L) semantics to support speech-act based inter-agent communication
[154]. To allow for both closed-world and open-world belief-bases, Jason also allows
the use of strong negation in beliefs and plans of agents. Jason also has provision for
handling plan failure. This is done by generating a “deletion of goal” event when some
action fails (or when some subgoal fails as a result of the absence of an applicable plan
for achieving that subgoal), and then handling that goal deletion event by searching for
an applicable plan in the rule library, eventually executing one of these plans. How-
ever, for this to work properly, the user must define appropriate responses to various
plan failures. In case no such plans are defined, the Jason interpreter just drops the
intention altogether. In Jason, it is possible to design plan failure handling rules in a
way so that plan failure is propagated up the intention stack. To do this, Jason provides
some special actions called internal actions. Internal actions only change an agent’s
mental states and have no effect on the world. These actions can be used both in the
context and the body of plans. For instance, if the designer under certain conditions
wants to propagate a plan failure up the intention stack, he/she can write a plan failure
handling rule whose context condition encodes these conditions, and whose body has
an internal action that removes the appropriate intentions.
In [11], Bordini et al. aim to provide a more practical programming language by
specifying various selection functions of AgentSpeak(L). In particular, they provide
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specifications of relations between plans and quantitative criteria (such as the quality,
duration, and cost of plans, and the deadlines specified for them) for their execution,
and then use efficient decision-theoretic task scheduling to automatically guide the
choices made by an agent’s intention selection function. The design of the Jason APL
allows atomic formulae and plans to have annotations [241, 154] which can be used
by various user-defined selection functions.6 For instance, annotations within the be-
lief base can be used to register the source of the associated information, and can later
be utilized by the (user-defined) belief update function. Annotations in action expres-
sions can be used to implement sophisticated applicable plan selection and efficient
decision theoretic intention selection functions. Another interesting feature of Jason
is that it can be easily configured to run on various hosts. This is done using an agent
communication infrastructure called SACI [106].
Another implemented agent programming framework is the Jadex software frame-
work [22, 170]. Jadex is implemented as an agent reasoning layer that sits on top
of the middleware agent infrastructure JADE [10]. The reasoning engine of Jadex is
similar to that of AgentSpeak(L). Jadex utilizes both declarative and procedural ap-
proaches to define various components of an agent. It uses Java to procedurally define
plan bodies (i.e. actions), and the XML language to declaratively define all other men-
6However, these sophisticated selection functions are not yet provided with the current distribution
of Jason.
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tal attitudes. While Jadex provides a semantics for declarative goals (as discussed in
the next section), the current implementation does not utilize these goals. The Jadex
toolkit comes with a graphical debugger and various other tools to help the application
developer. Jadex has been used in various applications such as simulation, scheduling,
and mobile computing.
Bordini and Moreira [17] use the transition semantics in [153] to prove various
BDI properties of AgentSpeak(L) agents, including the intention-belief inconsistency
principle. There has also been some work on automatic verification of AgentSpeak(L)-
like programs. In [18, 14, 15], Bordini et al. introduce a toolkit called CASP which
can be used to translate a simplified version of AgentSpeak(L) into the input language
of existing model checkers for linear temporal logic, such as SPIN [103] and JPF2
[242].
An Abstract Agent Programming Language (3APL)
Another major PRS-based agent programming language that can be found in the litera-
ture is An Abstract Agent Programming Language (3APL) [99]. Like AgentSpeak(L),
3APL utilizes a procedural notion of goals/intentions, and specifies a static set of rules,
now called Practical Reasoning rules or PR-rules, which operate on these goals. How-
ever, 3APL differs from AgentSpeak(L) in various ways and I discuss these differences
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below.
3APL incorporates the notion of basic actions, which are used to specify agents’
basic capabilities. These actions are viewed as application dependent mental state
transformers in that these change agents’ beliefs. The specification of belief updates
associated with a basic action is formally represented using a partial function T that
returns the result of updating a belief base by performing an action. Note that T is
a partial function, since the action may not be executable in some belief states. In
contrast, recall that in AgentSpeak(L) one uses rules to update beliefs by generating
a primitive addition/deletion event which triggers some update rules (treated like any
other plan).
A 3APL agent consists of a belief-base, a goal-base, and a set of rules. While
AgentSpeak(L) agents respond to events, 3APL agents respond to goals in their evolv-
ing goal-base. The concept of event is missing from 3APL. 3APL rules are triggered
by conditions on the goals and belief-bases, rather than events. If an agent has reacted
to some new goal or belief, she should memorize it so that the relevant rule won’t
fire twice. In [98], it has been shown that 3APL can bi-simulate AgentSpeak(L).7 In
response to a goal in the goal-base, a 3APL agent searches for a rule whose trigger
7The underlying idea for this involves the generation of an event-queue from the goal-base, and the
creation of an intention-base from the goal-base and rule-base. However, this technique does not cover
the deletion of goal events, and the addition and deletion of belief events (i.e. it only handles the addition
of goal events).
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condition can be unified with this goal, and whose context-condition follows from
her beliefs. The agent then replaces the goal in the goal-base with the body of one
such rule. Thus, the agent’s goal-base in 3APL evolves over time and works like the
intention-base in AgentSpeak(L).
3APL provides a richer set of rules than AgentSpeak(L). Also, the plan-body of a
rule can now be constructed using various imperative programming constructs, rather
than only using sequences as in AgentSpeak(L). PR-rules can be classified into four
types, namely, failure rules, reactive rules, plan rules, and optimization rules. The roles
of these rules are as suggested by their names. A typical failure or optimization rule is
of the form pih ← φ | pib, where pi (possibly with subscripts) denotes a plan/program.
This says that if pih is part of the agent’s plan, and she believes that φ, then this plan
should be replaced by pib. Note that failure rules with empty bodies can be used to drop
a goal (plan). Reactive rules are rules with an empty head (i.e. of the form← φ | pi),
and state that whenever the agent believes that φ, it should adopt the plan/goal that pi.
These rules are used to create new goals. Finally, a plan rule is of the form G(
−→
t ) ←
φ | pi, and states that when the agent believes that φ, one way of achieving the (atomic)
goal G(
−→
t ) is pi. In addition to facilitating planning for simple achievement goals,
these rules in some sense provides a mechanism for revision and monitoring of goals.
Thus, a 3APL agent is a tuple 〈Π, σ,Γ〉, where Π is a possible goal-base, σ is a
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possible belief-base, and Γ is a possible PR-base. The operational semantics of 3APL
is provided using a transition semantics. 3APL provides two sets of transition rules,
one for specifying the execution of individual plans, and another for specifying the
execution of an agent. Plan-level execution rules define what it means to execute a
single goal, and include rules for executing basic actions, test goals, sequential goals,
non-deterministic choice, and application of PR-rules. Agent-level execution rules,
which are defined in terms of these plan-level execution rules, specify what it means
for an agent to execute multiple goals in parallel. The overall semantics of 3APL is
defined in terms of computations. A computation is a finite or infinite sequence of
mental states such that the first mental state in this sequence is the initial mental state
of the agent, and the successive mental states can be derived using the agent-level
transitions.
Another novel feature of 3APL is that it separates the semantic specifications for
the agent language, and its control structure, by introducing a distinction between an
object-level and meta-level semantics. The control structure at the meta-level specifies
which goals should be executed and which rules should be applied next. To this end,
3APL introduces a meta-language that includes some meta-actions and a meta-level
transition system. To determine which goals (rules) should be executed (applied, re-
spectively) next, the meta-language assumes that there is a fixed user-defined ordering
103
on goals (rules, respectively). The transitions of the meta-actions are derived in terms
of the object-level transitions. For instance, if there is a rule in the object-level transi-
tion system that says that a goal g is executable, then a meta-level transition rule selects
g for execution provided that g is maximal w.r.t. the ordering on the set of all goals.
The overall control structure of 3APL is a specialization of the update-act cycle. In
the planning/application phase, the ordering on rules and goals is used to determine
the strongest applicable reactive, plan, or optimization rule, and if there is such a rule,
it is then applied to the agent’s plan. After this, in the filtering phase, the controller
uses the ordering on goals to choose a goal, searches for failure rules applicable on that
goal, and applies all such rules. Finally, in the execution phase, it executes a single
step of the chosen goal, provided that the first action of the chosen goal is executable.
While AgentSpeak(L) has a similar control mechanism provided via the three selec-
tion functions SE , SO, and SI , the major difference is that (the original proposal of)
AgentSpeak(L) [172] does not handle plan failure, and thus the filtering phase of 3APL
is omitted from AgentSpeak(L).
2.5 Declarative Goals in Agent Programs
As mentioned, an important concept in the context of agent programming is that of
declarative goals. I start the discussion on declarative goals by pointing out the differ-
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ences in expressiveness between declarative and procedural goals, and the advantages
of incorporating these goals in APLs.
2.5.1 Advantages of Declarative Goals
Declarative goals in agent programs are necessary for a variety of reasons. The major
difference between declarative and procedural goals lies in the way they express an
agent’s degree of commitment towards a goal. Being committed to a procedural goal
amounts to nothing more than being committed to a plan, i.e. to execute a (possibly in-
finite) sequence of actions that the procedural goal can be decomposed to. On the other
hand, being committed to a declarative goal is much more expressive, and it amounts
to being committed to one of all possible plans that achieve the goal. Thus, the differ-
ence between them can be viewed as commitment towards some means to an end vs.
commitment towards an end. For a static environment, where the agent programmer
has a complete model of the world and knows about all possible exogenous actions in
advance, it may be possible for him/her to specify an extensive set of hierarchical rules
that covers all the ways to achieve some goal (like a policy). However, this may require
much effort; also this becomes even harder when the agent designer only has partial
knowledge about the domain, and cannot predict all possible interruptions (generally
a fixed utility function is assumed). Also, from a technical point of view, procedural
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goals have limited expressiveness. Procedural goals cannot be combined using logical
operators. For instance, even if the agent programmer specifies two procedures for
achieving two separate goals P and Q, he/she needs to write a third procedure for the
conjunctive goal (P ∧Q).
Motivations for declarative goals in agent programs can be roughly classified into
two categories, namely theoretical and practical motivations. From a theoretical point
of view, it has been argued that declarative goals are required in order to bridge the gap
between agent theories and APLs [100, 247, 233]. The reason for this is that in agent
theories, goals are declarative concepts, and thus the incorporation of these goals is
viewed as a necessary prerequisite for bridging this gap. From a practical perspective,
various advantages of declarative goals have been pointed out in the literature. In the
following, I discuss these advantages.
One reason for using declarative goals is to decouple plan execution and goal
achievement. A declarative (achievement) goal represents a state that is to be reached.
Declarative goals can be used to decide whether a plan was successful in achieving
the associated goal or not. The successful execution of a plan does not necessarily
indicate the successful achievement of a goal. Also, failure to execute a plan does not
mean that the goal can’t be achieved, since there might be another way of achieving
the goal, one that is not described by the procedural goal. For instance, consider the
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following example of a hungry cat (from [247]). Initially, the cat knows that some
food has been left on the table, and has the goal of reaching the food. If we are
using a procedural representation of goals, one way to define this goal is using the
cat’s plan that leapOnChair(chair); fromChairJumpToTable(chair, table), i.e. it
should first jump on a chair that is close to the table, and then jump from the chair to
the table, where the food is located. Suppose, with this goal in mind, the cat leaps on to
the chair. At this point, a nearby human, realizing the cat’s intention, moves the chair
further away from the table. Thus, since the second action is no longer executable,
the cat’s plan has failed, and since we are using a procedural definition of goal, the
cat’s goal has also failed. Note that, by using only procedural goals, the reason for
performing the plan is lost. On the other hand, if we were using a declarative defini-
tion of goals, we can use NextTo(Cat, Food) as the goal. In that case, even though
the cat’s plan fails, it can try to plan again using this goal. Consider another example
in the same domain: suppose that the cat was successful in jumping on to the table.
Note that, this does not necessarily mean that it was successful in reaching food, since
somebody might have removed all the food from the table. These examples illustrate
that the success and failure of a plan do not tell us much about the success or failure
of the associated goal. Once again, this is especially true in dynamic environments
where unexpected events may occur, and it is impossible for the designer to predict all
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possible interruptions caused by exogenous actions.
Declarative goals can also be used to detect fortuitous achievement of goals. For
instance, suppose that some food was left on the chair. So after leaping onto the chair,
the cat can detect this, and since its goal to reach the food has been achieved, it can
drop the plan to jump to the table. Now, consider why an APL that does not incorporate
declarative goals, such as 3APL, cannot detect this. Recall that in 3APL, the agent
programmer specifies rules that can be triggered due to the presence of procedural
goals in the goal-base. Then the procedural goal is decomposed to/replaced with the
rule-body, and eventually executed to achieve the goal. Suppose that the programmer
only has partial knowledge about the cat’s environment, and wrote the following rule
that can be used to achieve the cat’s goal:
goNextToFood(Cat)← true | leapOnChair(Chair);
fromChairJumpToTable(Chair, Table).
Assume that the programmer does not know that unusual situations such as one where
food is left on the chair can occur. In response to the procedural goal goNextToFood
(Cat) in the goal-base, the cat will adopt the plan leapOnChair(Chair); fromChair−
JumpToTable(Chair, Table). After executing the first action, the cat is on the chair.
However, although food is at its current location, the 3APL-cat not knowing that the
state that needs to be reached (i.e. NextTo(Cat, Food)) has been reached, will not
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drop the goal of jumping to the table. Thus, if goals are defined procedurally, the cat
still has the plan to jump on the table even though its goal has been satisfied. Note
that, while a 3APL PR-rule of the form (δ ← φ | nil), which says that if the agent
believes that φ and has the plan that δ, then she should give up this plan, can be used
to detect this, it involves the use of a declarative goal φ in the context condition. Also,
in order to do this, the agent programmer needs to specify an extensive set of such
rules. The reason for this is that an exogenous action could occur at any stage dur-
ing the execution of the plan, and thus the dropping of the current plan due to early
achievement of the associated goal should be considered for all possible configurations
of the plan. For instance, even for a simple plan a1; a2; a3 that includes three primi-
tive actions in sequence, the programmer needs to specify the three following rules:
(a1; a2; a3 ← φ | nil), (a2; a3 ← φ | nil), and (a3 ← φ | nil).
Another important motivation for using declarative goals is communication. While
an agent can delegate a procedural goal to another agent, she is required to plan for the
goal before she can delegate it. Moreover, the requester may not know how to achieve
the goal. Thus the use of declarative goals allows distribution of both computation and
knowledge, in the sense that the requesting agent need not plan for all of her goals.
Declarative goals are also necessary for reasoned responses to communication. For
instance, to determine if an agent should adopt a request to achieve a goal, she must
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know whether this requested goal conflicts with her own goals. Moreover, even if this
requested goal conflicts with one of her plans, she (being a very helpful agent) might
still decide to adopt it provided that it does not conflict with the associated declarative
goal.
Declarative goals are essential for rational behavior. In addition to allowing an
agent to plan from scratch when all her plans in the plan library have failed, declarative
goals facilitate reasoning about interferences among goals. An agent may have two
conflicting goals in the goal base. To decide which goal to achieve, it can do some
reasoning with these declarative goals to find out which of these is more important to
the agent.
2.5.2 Issues in Agent Programming Languages with Declarative Goals
As mentioned earlier, recently there has been some work on APLs with declarative
goals. Before going over these frameworks, I briefly discuss the common issues in
APLs with declarative goals.
One issue in APLs with declarative goals concerns the type of goals handled by an
APL. Most APLs use achievement goals as the only type of goals. Achievement goals
refer to a goal that needs to be achieved once. Some APLs also allow the use of other
types of goals, e.g. maintenance goals and perform goals (i.e. a goal to execute some
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actions). Some also allow the use of inconsistent goal bases (e.g. GOAL [100], Dribble
[237]). They assume that two inconsistent achievement goals need to be achieved at
different times. Thus, although in these frameworks the goal-base can be inconsistent,
the adopted declarative goals (i.e. intentions) must be consistent with each-other. Note
that, the need for such inconsistent goal-bases arises from the fact that these APLs take
goals to be state formulae, rather than general temporal formulae. For instance, if an
agent has two inconsistent achievement goals φ and ¬φ, the agent’s goal state could
be represented by the temporal formula 3φ ∧3¬φ, i.e. the goal to eventually achieve
φ and to eventually achieve ¬φ, which is consistent. One exception to this is [187],
that defines a goal as a path formula; however it does not deal with the dynamics of
declarative goals. Some frameworks model goals with different priorities (e.g. [187]).
Another issue concerns the representation of declarative goals and intentions. In
other words, how can one incorporate these goals as a part of the programming lan-
guage, and what features of these goals are included in the framework. Most APLs
keep declarative goals and procedural plans in two separate databases. They then use
these goals to trigger some AgentSpeak(L) or 3APL-like rules. Other frameworks
treat declarative goals as individual and active components that manage their own
state and post events as required (e.g. Jadex [23]). These events are then handled
by AgentSpeak(L)-like agents. These frameworks also define the life-cycle of these
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goals explicitly.
A third issue concerns the consistency of intentions. Two intended goals can be
conflicting in various ways, such as:
• A goal can be directly inconsistent with another goal. In that case, all the plans
for achieving that goal conflict with all of the plans to achieve the other goal.
• A goal can be inconsistent with some of the plans to achieve another goal, and
not others. In that case, any plan to achieve the first goal is in conflict with some
of the plans to achieve the second.
• Two goals may be mutually consistent. However, it may be the case that some of
the plans to achieve one goal are inconsistent with some of the plans to achieve
the other.
Thus, while selecting a plan to achieve a goal, the agent must check that only consistent
plans are selected. This ensures that the agent will not commit to and execute a plan
that makes one of her goals impossible to achieve. Unfortunately, in most APLs with
declarative goals, there is no requirement that a declarative goal be consistent with a
procedural goal, i.e. plan. The fact that these APLs maintain intended goals and plans
in two separate databases makes it even harder to ensure this consistency. In fact, to
the best of our knowledge, no APL in the literature handles these issues.
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A fourth issue involves the representation of means-ends relationship between
goals and subgoals or plans adopted to achieve these goals, i.e. how these frameworks
capture the dependency between subgoals and their parent-goals. Recall that, PRS-
based agents adopt plans in response to procedural goals. Similarly, in PRS-based
declarative goal oriented APLs, agents adopt plans in response to declarative goals in
the goal-base. These plans may in turn involve the achievement of other declarative
(sub)goals that may trigger the adoption of other plans. Note that, the only reason the
agent intends any of these subgoals and plans is due to her commitment towards the
parent goal. In other words, the agent’s commitments towards these subgoals can be
viewed as conditional intentions, (implicitly) conditioned on intending the super-goal.
Thus, if in any situation the agent drops the super-goal, she should also drop all these
subgoals. Most APLs do not model this dependency, and thus fail to give up subgoals
or plans when the associated goal is dropped. The ones that do, share a similar un-
derlying technique: they introduce some construct in the language that captures the
fact that a subgoal was adopted to achieve a goal (and a sub-subgoal was adopted to
achieve the subgoal, etc.). Then, when the goal is dropped, they use this information
to drop all such subgoals (and the sub-subgoals etc., if any). For instance, GD-3APL
[48] attaches a declarative goal with each intended plan, and this information can be
used to abandon plans when necessary. However, no mechanism is provided to use this
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information to effect the appropriate goal contraction. CAN [247] includes a procedu-
ral construct that includes both the associated declarative goal and its failure condition
with an adopted plan.
Another issue concerns how these declarative goals are used by these frameworks,
i.e. which of the aforementioned advantages of declarative goals are realized. As men-
tioned earlier, the literature identifies three major uses of declarative goals: selecting
plans using these goals, decoupling plan success/failure from goal success/failure, and
planning for goals on-the-fly.
In the following, I discuss in more detail various declarative goal-oriented APLs
found in the literature.
2.5.3 Declarative Goal Oriented Languages
GOAL
The programming language Goal Oriented Agent Language (GOAL) [100] can be
identified as one of the first to attempt to incorporate declarative goals in agent pro-
gramming languages. Like 3APL, GOAL integrates theory and programming in a
single framework by providing both an agent programming framework and a program-
ming logic, the latter derived from the operational semantics of the former. Thus state-
ments proven in the logic concern properties of agents specified in the programming
114
language. Unfortunately, GOAL does not take most of the advantages of declarative
goals (as discussed in Section 5.1) into account, and only uses declarative goals to
select plans.
A GOAL agent keeps a propositional belief-base and a declarative goal-base. To
consider the possibility of mutually inconsistent goals (to be achieved at different time
steps), the goal-base is allowed to be inconsistent. However, individual goals need to
be consistent, and believed propositions cannot be in the goal-base. An agent’s goals
are then defined to be the formulae that are entailed by an entry in the goal-base, rather
than those that are entailed by the entire goal-base. The reason for doing this is that,
since the agent can have mutually inconsistent goals, defining goals using the latter
can trivialize the logic. Thus agents’ goals are modeled using a weak logic that does
not include the K axiom, and as a result, goals do not distribute over implication, and
two goals cannot be conjoined to form another goal. Note that, this formalization of
goals is very “syntactic” and can only handle achievement goals.
A central idea in GOAL is that of conditional actions. These actions are used
to help agents decide what actions to perform next, and thus can be viewed as very
simple action selection rules. Intuitively, a conditional action φ → do(a) states that
the agent may consider executing the basic action a if the mental state condition φ
holds. Basic actions are defined similarly as in 3APL, i.e. using a (unspecified) partial
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function on the belief-base. Also, two special actions adopt and drop are introduced
to respectively adopt a new goal, or drop some old goals. The semantics of adopt,
drop, and conditional actions are specified in terms of the semantics of basic actions.
GOAL adopts a simple blind commitment strategy [35]. The authors argue that this is
just a default strategy, and that conditional actions (with a drop in the consequence)
can be used to override this commitment strategy. However, it is not obvious how any
other strategies can be adopted. E.g., say one wants to specify a commitment strategy
that enables an agent to give up her goals when they become impossible to achieve.
Without a temporal component built into the goal semantics, this is clearly impossible
to express.
A GOAL agent is thus defined to be a tuple 〈Π,Σ0,Γ0〉 consisting of a set of condi-
tional actions Π and an initial mental state 〈Σ0,Γ0〉, where Σ0 is the initial belief-base
and Γ0 is the initial goal-base. While AgentSpeak(L) and 3APL agents search for ap-
plicable rules and execute intended actions at every step, a GOAL agent searches for
an appropriate conditional action. Since a conditional action associates a basic (prim-
itive) action with a mental condition, the deliberation mechanism of GOAL is indeed
a very primitive one. The overall operational semantics of GOAL agents is given us-
ing traces, which are infinite sequences of consecutive mental states interleaved with
scheduled conditional actions, where the first state of each of the traces is the agent’s
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initial mental state.
The specification for basic actions provides the basis for the programming logic
of GOAL. Actions are specified using Hoare triples of the form {φ} a {ψ}, where
φ and ψ are mental state formulae. Hoare triples for conditional actions are inter-
preted relative to the set of traces associated with the GOAL agent, and a time-point in
these traces. These user-defined Hoare triples are used to specify preconditions, post-
conditions, and frame conditions of actions. On top of the Hoare triples for specifying
actions, a temporal logic is defined for specifying properties of GOAL agents. One
can then express various liveness and safety properties of an agent A by considering
the temporal formulae that are valid with respect to the set of traces SA associated
with A. It can be shown that such properties are equivalent to a set of Hoare triples.
Thus the properties can be proven by showing that the Hoare triples are entailed by the
specifications of the actions that appear in the program. Thus it is very straightforward
to verify the properties of agents in GOAL.
Note that, a rich notion of action structure is missing in the GOAL programming
language. All one has is simple condition-action rules. Moreover, the only deliberation
and planning mechanism in GOAL is provided via conditional actions that allow the
agents to select primitive actions based on their mental states.
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Dribble
Unlike GOAL, Dribble [237] incorporates a procedural motivation component (i.e.
plans) in the language. In particular, Dribble takes 3APL’s [99] mechanism for creating
and modifying plans during the execution of the agents, and GOAL’s facility for using
declarative goals for selecting actions into account, and combines these in a single
framework. Thus, Dribble uses declarative goals to allow agents to select and modify
plans when required. Moreover, as in GOAL, Dribble also includes a dynamic logic
on top of its operational semantics to specify and verify properties of agents.
In addition to beliefs and declarative goals, the mental state of a Dribble agent
also includes a plan component. Only a single plan can be handled at any one time (no
concurrency). The plan of an agent can be changed through application of rules as well
as execution of executable actions. Dribble defines two types of rules, namely Goal
rules, and Practical Reasoning (PR) rules. A goal rule g is a pair ϕ→ pi such that ϕ is
a propositional formula involving beliefs and goals, and pi is a plan. Intuitively a goal
rule says that the plan pi can be adopted if the mental condition ϕ holds. Goal rules
are used to select plans for the first time (i.e. when the plan component of the agent is
an empty plan). The condition in ϕ specifies what the plan pi is good for. On the other
hand, PR rules are similar to rules in 3APL, and can be used to create plans (possibly
from abstract plans), to modify plans, and to model reactive behavior (using rules with
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empty heads).
Programming a Dribble agent amounts to specifying its initial beliefs and goals
and writing sets of goal rules and PR rules. Formally, a Dribble agent is a triple
〈〈σ0, γ0, E〉,Γ,∆〉, where 〈σ0, γ0, E〉 is the initial mental state with initial belief-base
σ0, initial goal-base γ0, and an empty plan E, and where Γ is a set of goal rules and
∆ is a set of PR rules. Note that the initial plan of a Dribble agent is the empty plan
E. The reason for this is that a Dribble agent should be able to select a plan (using
rules) based on its declarative goal specification, and giving the agent a plan at start
up is counter-intuitive in this respect. The operational semantics of the Dribble pro-
gramming language is specified using a transition system. A computation run CR(s0)
is a finite or infinite sequence s0, · · · , sn or s0, · · · , where si = 〈σi, γi, pii〉 are mental
states (where pii denotes the plan of the agent), and for all i there exists a transition
from si−1 to si as defined in the transition system for the Dribble agent. The meaning
of a Dribble agent 〈〈σ0, γ0, E〉,Γ,∆〉 is then defined to be the set of its computation
runs CR(〈σ0, γ0, E〉). Thus the first state of the computation runs is the initial mental
state of the Dribble agent.
As mentioned, Dribble is an expressive language that improves on GOAL by adding
complex plans and rules to manipulate goals. Nevertheless, it has some limitations.
Although the authors argue that goal rules and PR rules together can be used as a re-
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gression planning mechanism, this is misleading, since no lookahead is incorporated.
Also, Dribble does not support exogenous actions; e.g., suppose that the agent has δ as
a plan, and some exogenous action happens, which makes the preconditions of δ false
forever. While a PR rule with an empty body can be used drop this plan, without a
temporal component built into the language, it is impossible to detect that the plan has
become forever impossible to execute. Note that, such a mechanism is important if one
wants to ensure that the agents do not intend unachievable goals. Moreover, Dribble
only allows sequential plan adoption and execution. In other words, agents cannot con-
currently commit to two different plans. Finally, one major problem in Dribble is that
it uses distinct databases for two types of intentions, i.e. declarative goals and procedu-
ral plans, and there is no mechanism for ensuring consistency between these two. Put
otherwise, Dribble semantics allows agents with an inconsistent intention-base, e.g.
an agent can have a declarative goal φ and a plan that makes φ unachievable. While
other programming languages address some of the problems mentioned earlier, to the
best of our knowledge, no BDI agent programming language with both declarative and
procedural goals offers a solution to this problem.
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Goal Directed 3APL (GD-3APL)
In [48], Dastani et al. present an extension of 3APL [99], called Goal Directed 3APL
(GD-3APL), that incorporates both declarative and procedural goals into a single frame-
work. GD-3APL agents are similar to Dribble agents, in that they have beliefs, goals,
plans, and rules. The overall semantics is also very similar. The major difference is
that GD-3APL uses a more expressive first order language, and that it defines an addi-
tional rule type to allow the agents to reason about and modify their declarative goals.
GD-3APL provides three types of rules: Goal Revision (GR) rules, Plan Selection (PS)
rules, and Plan Revision (PR) rules. GR rules can be used to revise goals, and variants
of GR-rules can be used to generate, extend, or drop goals. In some sense, these rules
allow agents to reason about their declarative goals. PS rules are like Dribble’s Goal
rules and PR rules are similar to practical reasoning rules in Dribble and 3APL.
Another advantage of GD-3APL is that an agent’s plans/procedural intentions are
modeled using a 〈plan-body, goal〉 pair, where the second element is added to record
the goal for which the plan was selected. So if the goal gets dropped for some reason
or revised by a GR rule before the agent has finished executing this plan, this infor-
mation is used to also drop the plan. This facilitates decoupling of plan success from
goal success. However, exactly how this information can be utilized is left open in
the framework. Finally, GD-3APL agents can concurrently handle several goals, by
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committing to and executing multiple plans, unlike Dribble agents. Note that, GD-
3APL does not provide a logic to verify properties of agent programs. Also, an offline
lookahead mechanism for planning is still missing.
2APL
Another extension of the 3APL language called 2APL was proposed in [47]. In ad-
dition to incorporating first-order features and declarative (achievement) goals, 2APL
extends the original proposal of 3APL in many different ways. In particular, 2APL has
programming features to support multiple agents, their environments, sensing actions,
goal modification actions (for the adoption/dropping of goals), and agent communi-
cation (speech acts). Moreover, in addition to the plan selection/generation and plan
repair rules, a new type of rules called PC or “Procedure Call” rules is introduced to
process internal and external events and received messages. Finally, it extends the
plan language of the APL to include a new plan construct to implement atomic (non-
interleaving) execution of plans.
A BDI Extension of the Golog-Family
One problem with all of the above frameworks is that although they may support
declarative goals, they do not support planning in the sense that there is no looka-
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head mechanism built into these frameworks. Also, most of these frameworks are
not grounded on a formal theory of action, and thus only allow limited reasoning.
The agent programming language proposed by Sardin˜a and Shapiro [187] (let us call
it S&S) combines two existing approaches to agent theory (viz. the work in [198])
and to agent programming (namely, IndiGolog) to provide an expressive BDI-agent
programming language that supports planning/lookahead. S&S is built on top of a
situation calculus-based action theory.
In S&S, an agent program consists of a high-level procedural specification of the
agent’s behavior (i.e. a single non-deterministic program), a declarative specification
of the agent’s mental states, and an underlying action theory. The interpreter’s job
is to search for a rational execution of the given program (i.e., one that satisfies the
agent’s goals, as discussed below). An agent’s mental state consists of her beliefs and
her goals. S&S incorporates a KD45 model of knowledge and a KD model of goals,
both specified in terms of accessibility relations over possible worlds. The model
of goals has a temporal component associated with it, and thus it can handle both
achievement and maintenance goals. Also, S&S supports prioritized goals through
prioritized accessibility relations and all goals are not assumed to be equally important.
(φ1 > φ2 > · · · > φn)s is used to represent that the agent in situation s has n prioritized
goals, where φi denotes all the goals of the agent at level i, φ1 being the highest priority
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goal. Moreover, S&S’s language is rich enough to allow queries of whether the agent
is able to achieve certain goals in a given situation.
To help the agents decide which plans are preferable, S&S defines an ordering
on plans/strategies, which are modeled using action selection functions (as discussed
in Section 2.4). It then defines a rational course of action to be a strategy that the
agent knows-how (i.e. is able) to execute, and she knows is one of the most preferred
strategies w.r.t. her prioritized declarative goals.
As discussed above, most reactive plan execution languages that incorporate declar-
ative goals include a pre-compiled plan library. The agents use their declarative goals
as triggers to select plans from this library, and hierarchically decompose and execute
these plans. Unlike these APLs, S&S uses an IndiGolog-style controller. Recall that, in
IndiGolog, the programmer’s job is to model the domain using the appropriate axioms,
and specify the agent’s behavior using a high-level non-deterministic program. Given
a starting situation, the IndiGolog interpreter tries to (incrementally) find an execution
of this non-deterministic program. S&S uses a similar control strategy. However, the
S&S interpreter also needs to take the agent’s declarative goals into account.
To this end, the rational-search operator ∆rat(δ : XG) was introduced in S&S. The
idea of this construct is that, given a non-deterministic IndiGolog program δ and a set
of prioritized goals XG = φ1 > φ2 > · · · > φn, the ∆rat(δ : XG) operator will
124
produce a simple and ready to execute terminating deterministic plan (i.e. sequence
of actions or conditional plans) δ′, whose execution respects both the given program
δ, in the sense that δ′ is an instantiation of δ, and the set of declarative goals, in that
it achieves as many highest priority goals as possible (i.e. it is a rational course of
action w.r.t. the given set of declarative goals). S&S assumes that the given program
has the highest priority, and thus any declarative goals that conflict with this program
will not be achieved. This operator provides a mechanism for combining a procedural
specification of behavior and a set of prioritized declarative goals, and is meant to be
used by the agent programmer to specify when lookahead is necessary.
To the best of my knowledge, S&S is one of the only two BDI agent program-
ming frameworks8 that offers deliberation with lookahead, and thus supports planning.
Thus, S&S combines a procedural representation of behavior and prioritized declara-
tive goals in an expressive language that is able to model ability and know-how, the
temporal aspects of goals and actions, and the relative importance of goals. However,
this expressiveness of S&S comes at the cost of complexity – determining whether a
plan is rational or not involves searching the plan space defined by the given high-level
non-deterministic program, and comparing all the strategies that can be induced by this
program. This is clearly problematic in a dynamic environment. In fact it is unknown
8Another such language, as discussed below, is CAN-PLAN.
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whether there exists a practical procedure to implement this mechanism. Also, it can
be argued that agents in S&S are not so goal-directed, since their overall behavior is
controlled by the given program.
CAN and CAN-PLAN
As mentioned earlier, another agent programming language that supports lookahead/pl-
anning is CAN-PLAN [185], which is an extension of the Conceptual Agent Notation
language (CAN) [247]. In contrast to the situation calculus based S&S, CAN-PLAN
is a PRS-based language.
The underlying basic infrastructure of CAN is similar to that of AgentSpeak(L).
Agents in CAN have a first-order belief-base, a set of plans, and a first-order intention-
base, and thus an agent configuration is modeled as a tuple 〈B,A,Γ〉, where B is a
possible belief-base, A denotes the actions performed by the agent so far, and Γ rep-
resents a possible intention-base. Plan-bodies or programs in CAN can be constructed
from primitive actions, operations to add/delete beliefs, tests for conditions, events or
achievement goals !e, sequences, parallelism, the operator I{· : ·}J which is used
to represent a set of guarded alternatives as discussed below, the choice operator dual
of sequencing P1  P2 which executes P1 and then executes P2 only if P1 fails, and
the operator Goal(φs, P, φf ) (discussed later). CAN uses a set of transition rules to
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specify the evolution of an agent. Agents in this language respond to events. In re-
sponse to an event e, a CAN agent uses the plan-library Π with rules of the form
(e′ : φi ← Pi) to collect all context condition-plan-body pairs φi : Pi whose event e′
can be unified with e, places these pairs inside the special construct I{}J to form the
plan I1 = Iφ1 : P1, · · ·φn : PnJ,9 and inserts I1 into the intention-base. Another tran-
sition rule is then used to (non-deterministically) choose from one of the plan-bodies
in I1 whose context condition holds. Suppose that the context condition φ1 holds, and
the agent chooses to try P1 first. In that case, I1 will be replaced with the new intention
P1  I2, where I2 = I1 − {φ1 : P1}, i.e. with the plan that P1 should be tried first, and
if the execution of P1 fails for some reason, the intention I2 (which is similar to I1 but
now does not include the pair φ1 : P1) will be attempted. Thus, unlike AgentSpeak(L)
and similarly to Jason and 3APL, CAN provides a mechanism for handling failure of
plans. However, this is very different from 3APL failure rules.
In addition to this basic infrastructure, CAN provides a mechanism for represent-
ing both declarative and procedural goals in a uniform manner. For this purpose, it
uses the procedural construct Goal(ψs, P, ψf ), which can be read as: the agent should
achieve the declarative goal ψs using the set of procedures P (which is of the form
I1 discussed above), failing if ψf becomes true. CAN provides a set of transition
9Note that I simplified the notation a bit by getting rid of the variable bindings.
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rules for Goal(ψs, P, ψf ) defined in terms of the above rules. The execution of a
Goal(ψs, P, ψf ) construct is specified such that at every step, it only updates the asso-
ciated P (by executing a step of P ), giving up only when the goal ψs is achieved, or
when it is no longer possible (i.e. when ψf holds). Using these rules, CAN guarantees
that the execution of Goal(ψs, P, ψf ) will obey some of the properties of declarative
goals discussed in Section 5.1. For example, the explicitly specified success condi-
tion can be used by the semantic specification to detect early/fortuitous achievement
of goals (i.e. achievement of goals before the associated plan has been fully executed)
and drop the associated goal and plan. Also, it can be used decouple successful execu-
tion of plans from successful achievement of goals. This is done by checking whether
the success condition φs holds after the execution of a plan from P ; if the plan has
been successfully executed, but the goal has not been achieved yet, the CAN agent
will try another plan from P . If the goal remains false after all plans in P have been
executed, the CAN agent will retry the plans in P . This mechanism is provided by
replacing the intention Goal(ψs, P, ψf ) with Goal(ψs, P  P, ψf ) at the beginning of
the execution, and whenever P is not of the form P1P2 (i.e. after it has already tried
P but failed to achieve the associated goal). Similarly, the failure condition is speci-
fied to decouple plan failure from goal failure, and to remove any committed-to plans
when the associated goal has failed (or becomes impossible). This special construct
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is meant to appear in the plan body part of rules specified by the agent programmer.
Thus, this mechanism of CAN can be used for both failure handling and monitoring of
declarative goals.
CAN-PLAN [185] extends CAN by including a lookahead mechanism to support
offline planning. To perform offline planning, one needs an action theory. To this
end, agents in CAN-PLAN are equipped with a simple STRIPS-like action descrip-
tion library Λ that contains rules of the form a : ψa ← Φ−a ; Φ+a , one for each ac-
tion a in the domain. Here ψa corresponds to the preconditions of a and Φ+a and
Φ−a denotes the add and delete list of atoms, respectively. CAN-PLAN incorporates
the additional Plan(P ) operator in the plan language. This operator searches for a
complete hierarchical decomposition of P before executing a single step in a simi-
lar way to an HTN planner. It is very similar to the IndiGolog Σ search operator,
in that Plan(P ) can evolve to Plan(P ′), provided that P can evolve to P ′ and can
reach a final configuration in a finite number of steps. In CAN-PLAN, the agent pro-
grammer can mix the Goal() and Plan() operators in various ways to produce dif-
ferent types of failure handling and lookahead. For example, consider the construct
Goal(φs, P lan(Goal(φs, P, φf )), φf );
• The external Goal() operator ensures that the agent will use the program P ∗ =
Plan(Goal(φs, P, φf )) towards the eventual satisfaction of the goal φs. The
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agent is committed to φs, in that P ∗ is reinstantiated and retried until φs holds.
Also, it is not necessary to completely execute the plan returned by the planner
(i.e. P ∗), e.g. if φs is satisfied before P ∗ has been fully executed. Finally, the
goal φs is dropped when failure condition φf becomes true.
• The Plan() operator guarantees that the program P ∗ has a terminating execu-
tion. Note that, an exogenous action might render this program non-executable;
however, as mentioned above, in that case the external Goal() operator will call
the planner again.
• The internal Goal() operator ensures that the agent will use the program P to-
wards the eventual satisfaction of the goal φs. Also, at plan-time, P is solved up
to the point where the goal is met.
It can be shown that for a restricted class of CAN-PLAN agents,10 the Plan() operator
indeed corresponds to an HTN-planner in the sense that for an agent, there is an execu-
tion of Plan(P ) in CAN-PLAN, if and only if there is a solution to the corresponding
planning problem in a HTN-planner. Also, any execution of Plan(P ) corresponds to
a HTN-plan solution.
Thus, CAN-PLAN provides a mechanism for on demand lookahead planning to
10This constraint restricts the belief-base language of an CAN-PLAN agent to that of an HTN planner.
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the agent programmer. While the Plan() operator itself does not consider potential
interaction with exogenous actions, in some sense Goal() and Plan() can be mixed
to handle external interferences. For instance, Goal(φs, P lan(P ), φf ) will re-plan if
the initial plan obtained fails due to an external interference. Nevertheless, CAN-
PLAN’s lookahead feature is local in the sense that it does not take into account other
concurrent intentions. In other words, the result of planning may include actions that
are in conflict with other goals of the agent. Also, while CAN-PLAN uses an action
theory for deliberation, it does not utilize this for updating the agent’s state, which is a
bit inconsistent.
Jadex
Following [45, 229, 136], Braubach et al. [23] propose to treat declarative goals as
first class objects in the Jadex framework. Declarative goals in Jadex are individual
entities that manage their own state (in contrast to being managed by the agent), and
post appropriate events as necessary. Recall that Jadex agents are PRS based agents
that have a built-in plan library, and that respond to events. Thus, to handle these
declarative goals, all an agent has to do is to listen to and respond to these events
posted by the goal objects by adopting, executing, or dropping the appropriate plan.
Note that, the current implementation of Jadex [22] does not utilize these declarative
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goals, and thus it only provides a specification of an extended version of the language.
Braubach et al. studied various goal oriented agent programming languages, archi-
tectures, and methodologies, and identified four different types of goals: achievement
goals, maintenance goals, perform goals, and query goals. Here, a perform goal spec-
ifies some activities to be done, and hence the success of the perform goal depends
only on the fact that the activity was performed. They argued that perform goals are
different from achievement or maintenance goals, since they do not require any state to
be achieved or maintained. Query goals serve the purpose of information acquisition.
If there is enough information in the agent’s knowledge-base to answer a query goal,
it succeeds with that answer; otherwise it becomes the achievement goal of collecting
enough information to answer that query.
By analyzing these goals, Braubach et al. identified various states that a goal can
be in during its lifecycle. The basic three states of a generic goal are new, adopted, and
finished. An adopted goal can in turn be in various sub-states, such as option, active,
and suspended. Adopting a goal makes it desirable to achieve it and thus it can be seen
as an option that the agent can possibly pursue when the actual circumstances allow.
To actively pursue a goal, the agent’s deliberation mechanism must activate the goal
to initiate goal processing. Active goals can be later deactivated by the deliberation
mechanism, and saved as an option. For instance, an active goal needs to be deactivated
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when it conflicts with another higher priority goal. On the other hand, an active or
option goal can be suspended when its context becomes invalid. For example, a robot
that has a goal of guarding some property during the night can suspend this goal in
the day. Unlike options, suspended goals are not fed to the deliberator when it is
deciding on what goal to actively pursue next. When the context becomes valid again,
the suspended goal is added as an option.
For each of the four goal types, Jadex specifies a refinement of the active state by
considering various attributes and the specific life cycle of these goals. For instance, an
achievement goal has three sub states of the active state, namely in process, succeeded,
and failed. It also consists of two conditions, a target condition, and a failure condition.
The target condition specifies the world state that the achievement goal wants to bring
about, and the failure condition specifies the conditions under which the goal should be
dropped and considered to have failed. An active achievement goal will first check the
target condition for fulfillment of the goal, and if the condition is met, the goal can be
moved to the succeeded state and eventually dropped. If both the target and the failure
conditions are false, the active achievement goal can post a goal addition event to the
event queue. In response to this event, the agent will eventually adopt an applicable
plan, and execute this plan to achieve the goal. At any stage of this execution, if the
target or failure conditions are met, the goal will move to the succeeded or failed state,
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and post a drop event. To handle this event, the agent needs to drop this plan (along
with all subgoals adopted for this goal). Braubach et al.’s proposal also specifies how
the other three types of goals are processed (see [23] for details).
Thus, like CAN, Jadex allows full decoupling of goals and plans by monitoring
declarative goals. In other words, this framework provides a way to decouple both
goal-plan failure and success. Moreover, as in CAN, it provides a mechanism for de-
tecting fortuitous or early achievement of goals. Unfortunately, Jadex does not provide
a formal semantics for these goals and their dynamics. While it allows the use of in-
compatible goals, it does not deal with the relationships between these incompatible
goals. For instance, it does not require a plan adopted to process a goal to be compati-
ble with another adopted goal.
Other Recent Work
Recently, there has been work on incorporating more expressive types of temporally
extended goals in APLwDGs [236, 235, 49]. In their APL-based framework, van
Riemsdijk et al. [236] studied various types of goals commonly found in the literature.
By investigating the commonalities among these goals, they proposed an abstract uni-
fying framework that handles four types of temporally extended goals, namely achieve-
ment goals, query/test goals, perform goals, and limited forms of maintenance goals
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(e.g. a reactive maintenance goal, i.e. the goal to always make some proposition φ
eventually true when it becomes false: 2(¬φ → φ)). In contrast to Jadex, they gave
a generic definition of goals and a generic transition system that is based on the life-
cycle of goals and that includes generic rules specifying the conditions under which
such a goal can become active, suspended, or dropped, and under which a plan for a
goal can be adopted or dropped. In their framework, they define a generic goal con-
struct as g(C,E, S, pi). Here, S ∈ {Active,Suspended} is the current state of the goal,
and pi is the plan of the goal. Also, C is a set of condition-action pairs that speci-
fies when the goal changes state, provided that the agent’s plan is non-empty. C is of
the form 〈condition, action〉 with action ∈ {Suspend,Activate,Drop}; each of these
pairs represents that if the condition follows from the agents beliefs, and the plan pi is
non-empty, then the action should be applied on the corresponding goal. Similarly, E
is a set of condition-action pairs that specifies when the goal changes state, provided
that the agent’s plan is empty (a distinction between C and E, i.e. conditions that are
checked during plan execution and those that are checked when a plan completes or
has not been generated yet was made as the authors found it useful to do so). Then for
each type of goal, they specify these condition-action pairs for C and E. For instance,
for an achievement goal 3φ, the corresponding C is of the form {〈s ∨ f,Drop〉},
i.e. the goal with its non-empty plan can be dropped if the success condition s of the
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goal holds, or if its failure condition f holds. On the other hand, E is of the form
{〈s ∨ f,Drop〉, 〈true,Activate〉}, i.e. the goal with its empty plan can be dropped if
the success condition s of the goal holds, or if its failure condition f holds. Also, if
the plan for the goal is empty, it can be unconditionally activated. The framework thus
provides a uniform way of handling multiple types of goals. However, their account
do not handle other types of temporally extended goals, e.g. regular maintenance goals
(i.e. 2φ).
Dastani et al. [49] formalized this framework and extended it with various other
types of temporally extended goals. They use LTL to specify goals, and showed that
many kinds of temporally extended goals can be operationalized via that of achieve-
ment and maintenance goals. In particular, they include five additional types of goals
that involve maintaining a formula φ over an interval: 2φ (which maintains φ over all
states), φ U τ (where φ is maintained until its terminating condition τ becomes true),
(τ∧2φ) (where φ is maintained after its triggering condition τ holds), (τ∧(φ U τ ′))
(where φ is maintained once its triggering condition τ holds and until its terminating
condition τ ′ becomes true), and2(τ → (φ U τ ′)) (where whenever the triggering con-
dition τ becomes true, φ is maintained until its terminating condition τ ′ holds). They
proved that their operational semantics produces correct results by showing that the
traces produced by them satisfy the LTL formula. Since this is an abstract framework,
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the ideas here can be implemented in any APLwDG that provides a proper operational
semantics for achievement and maintenance goals. However, being an abstract frame-
work, many of the components are left abstract; for instance, while these frameworks
assume the existence of a means-end reasoner that given a new goal g and an existing
set of goals and plans, returns a plan that is consistent with the current goals and plans
and that can be used to bring about g, no details about the reasoner or how to actually
enforce and maintain this consistency are given.
2.6 Conclusion
In this chapter, I reviewed previous research on three related areas that focus on in-
telligent agents, namely agent theories, agent architectures, and agent programming
languages. In these, I focused on logical formulations of motivational attitudes, both
from the agent theory and the agent programming language perspectives. In the sequel,
I will refer to some of these and compare them with my contributions.
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Chapter 3
Foundations
3.1 Introduction
In this chapter, I first discuss previous work that my formalization of prioritized goals
and their dynamics is founded on. I start by introducing the situation calculus [148],
which is a (mostly) first-order language for representing dynamically changing worlds,
and by examining a class of action theories within the situation calculus [178] that can
be used to succinctly specify dynamic domains. Then I talk about previous work to
formalize knowledge and knowledge change in the situation calculus. Following this,
to support modeling temporally extended goals in the situation calculus, in Section
3.5, I introduce a new sort of infinite paths in the situation calculus and propose an
axiomatization for infinite paths. I also show some properties of the axiomatization.
The material in this section is new work. Finally, I review ConGolog [51], a rich pro-
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gramming/process specification language in the situation calculus that the semantics
of my proposed agent programming language SR-APL borrows from.
3.2 The Situation Calculus
The formal basis of my agent theory is Reiter’s [178] version of the situation calcu-
lus [148]. The situation calculus is a sorted, (mostly) first-order language where all
changes are the result of named actions. I will use sorts for actions, situations, paths,
agents, and domain-specific objects. I use a, s and now, p and path, and agt (possibly
with decorations) to quantify over actions, situations, paths, and agents, respectively.
In addition, I use ~x and ~y to denote sequences of variables, ∀~x to denote universal
quantification over a sequence of variables, and P and Q as predicate variables and F
and σ as function variables in second order quantification. I adopt the convention that
function symbols begin with a lowercase letter while predicate symbols begin with an
uppercase letter. I also assume that unless otherwise noted, all free variables in a for-
mula are implicitly universally quantified in the widest scope. Finally, I use standard
notations for logical connectives and quantifiers, and the constants True and False for
the true and false propositions.
A situation in the situation calculus represents a possible partial history of the do-
main. The initial situations are situations in which no actions have yet occurred. In
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general, a situation s describes a possible finite evolution of the domain that results
from the occurrence of a certain finite sequence of actions (those in the history of s)
starting from the initial situation associated with s.
The set of initial situations correspond to the ways the agent believes the domain
might be initially. There can be multiple initial situations to facilitate modeling the
fact that the agent may have incomplete knowledge initially. The actual initial state
of the domain is represented by the distinguished initial situation constant S0. The
distinguished binary function symbol do(a, s) is used to denote the successor situation
of s resulting from action a being performed in situation s. In the situation calcu-
lus, actions are denoted by function symbols, possibly with parameters, and situations
(world histories) are first order terms. For domains with multiple agents, the actions
will include arguments specifying the agents involved in these actions, usually the
first few arguments. For example, if put(agt, x, y) stands for an agent agt’s action of
putting object x on object y, then the situation term do(put(Agt1, X1, Y1), S0) denotes
the situation resulting from Agt1’s putting X1 on Y1 when the world is in situation
S0. Also, do(putDown(Agt1, X1), do(walk(Agt1, P1), do(pickUp(Agt1, X1), S0)))
is a situation denoting the world history consisting of the following sequence of ac-
tions:
[pickUp(Agt1, X1), walk(Agt1, P1), putDown(Agt1, X1)].
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We want to define situations to be the smallest set that can be obtained by executing
a sequence of actions starting from some initial situation. To define the structure of the
situations, I adopt a set of foundational axioms given by Shapiro [194] that is based
on the foundational axioms listed by Lakemeyer and Levesque [130], which in turns
extend those given by Reiter [176] by incorporating multiple initial situations to model
agents’ knowledge and goals. The initial situations are first defined to be those that
have no predecessors.
Definition 3.2.1.
Init(s′) def= ¬∃a, s. s′ = do(a, s).
Secondly, S0 is declared to be an initial situation.
Axiom 3.2.2.
Init(S0).
Another axiom is needed to state that performing different actions yields different
situations, i.e. that do is injective.
Axiom 3.2.3.
∀a1, a2, s1, s2. do(a1, s1) = do(a2, s2) ⊃ (a1 = a2 ∧ s1 = s2).
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The next axiom is a second-order induction axiom for situations. It says that if a
property P holds for all the initial situations, and if P holds for all successors to a
situation s provided that it holds for s, then P holds for all situations.
Axiom 3.2.4.
∀P. [(∀s. Init(s) ⊃ P (s)) ∧ (∀a, s. P (s) ⊃ P (do(a, s)))] ⊃ ∀s. P (s)).
The next axiom defines precedence for situations: s1 strictly precedes s2 if s2 can
be obtained by executing a non-empty sequence of actions starting in s1.
Axiom 3.2.5.
∀s1, s2. s1 ≺ s2 ≡ (∃a, s. s2 = do(a, s) ∧ (s1  s)),
where s1  s2 denotes that s1 precedes s2 and is defined as follows:
Definition 3.2.6.
s1  s2 def= s1 = s2 ∨ s1 ≺ s2.
Shapiro [194] showed that this axiomatization of ≺ is equivalent to the one given by
Levesque et al. [139].11
I also borrow another axiom from Shapiro to recursively define the concept of
situations having the same history. Two situations are said to have the same history if
11Note that [178] uses the notation < and v to denote strict precedence and precedence when situa-
tions are not assumed to be executable (see below for a definition of executable situations).
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they can be obtained by performing the same sequence of actions, but perhaps starting
from different initial situations.
Axiom 3.2.7.
SameHist(s1, s2) ≡ (Init(s1) ≡ Init(s2)) ∧
(¬Init(s1) ⊃ ∃a, s′1, s′2. s1 = do(a, s′1) ∧ s2 = do(a, s′2) ∧ SameHist(s′1, s′2)).
Relations and functions whose value may change from situation to situation are
called fluents, and are denoted by predicate and function symbols taking a situation
term as their last argument. These fluents are used to specify the dynamic aspects of
the domain. For example, Holding(r, x, s), which is a relational fluent, might mean
that a robot r is holding an object x in situation s; position(r, s) is a functional fluent
that might denote the position of robot r in situation s. There is also a special predicate
Poss(a, s) meaning that the action a is executable (physically possible) in situation s.
3.3 Action Theory
Within this language, action theories can be formulated to describe how the world
changes as a result of available actions. I use a theory that includes a set of axioms
due to Reiter [178]. In the following, I discuss and provide examples of these axioms.
To specify the actions in a domain, one must state the conditions under which it is
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physically possible to perform these actions. This is done by providing an action
precondition axiom for each action in the domain. Poss is used to specify these axioms.
For each action function f , an axiom of the following form is included in the theory:
Poss(f(~x), s) ≡ Φf (~x, s),
where Φf is a formula whose free variables are among ~x, s. For example,
Poss(pickup(agt, x), s) ≡ ∀y ¬Holding(agt, y, s) ∧ NextTo(agt, x, s) ∧ ¬Heavy(x)
says that the action pickup(agt, x), i.e., an agent agt picking up an object x, is possible
in situation s if and only if agt is not already holding something in situation s, she is
positioned next to x in s, and x is not heavy.
A situation is called executable if every action in its history was executable:
Definition 3.3.1.
Executable(s) def= ∀a, s′. do(a, s′)  s ⊃ Poss(a, s′).
One must also specify how an action affects the state of the world; this can be done
by providing effect axioms. For relational fluents, these axioms come in two varieties:
positive effect axioms say what fluents become true when an action is executed under
some conditions, while negative effect axioms specify what fluents become false when
an action is executed under some conditions. For example, the following positive
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effect axiom says that dropping an object x causes it to become broken provided that
x is fragile:
Fragile(x, s) ⊃ Broken(x, do(drop(agt, x), s)).
For functional fluents, we only need a single type of effect axioms. These specify what
functional fluents change their values when an action happens under certain conditions.
While these effect axioms provide some causal laws for the domain of application,
McCarthy and Hayes [148] showed that they are not sufficient if one wants to reason
about change. If the agent wants to form a plan that involves dropping an object, she
might need to know that many fluents are not affected by dropping the object. For
example, if an agent intends to sort some objects according to their color, she needs
to know that the color of an object is not affected by picking it up, walking to another
location, or by dropping it. Thus it is usually necessary to add so called frame axioms
to specify when fluents remain unchanged following an action. Again for relational
fluents, frame axioms also come in positive and negative varieties, while for functional
fluents, we have a single type of frame axioms. For example, the following frame
axiom says that dropping an object does not affect the color of things:
color(y, s) = c ⊃ color(y, do(drop(agt, x), s) = c.
The frame problem [148] arises because the number of these axioms is of the order of
the product of the number of fluents and the number of actions [178]. Reiter [176, 178]
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proposed a solution to the frame problem using what he called successor-state ax-
ioms (SSA). Building on proposals by Haas [95], Pednault [162], and Schubert [190],
he developed a solution to the frame problem for domains that do not involve non-
deterministic actions or state constraints. His solution allows the specifier to only state
the effect axioms; from these, a single successor-state axiom is obtained for each fluent
by performing a syntactic transformation and using a causal completeness assumption
and a consistency assumption. The causal completeness assumption says that before
performing the syntactic transformation, effect axioms have been given for all possible
ways the fluent may change value. The consistency assumption states that the condi-
tions under which a fluent becomes true when an action is executed in some situation
and those under which it becomes false are never jointly satisfied. As an alternative
to the theory transformation on effect axioms, the axiomatizer can write the successor
state axioms directly.
The successor-state axiom for a domain-dependent relational fluent R has the fol-
lowing form:
R(~x, do(a, s)) ≡ (γ+R(~x, a, s) ∨ (R(~x, s) ∧ ¬γ−R(~x, a, s))),
where γ+R(~x, a, s) (γ
−
R(~x, a, s), respectively) specifies all the conditions under which
R(~x, do(a, s)) becomes true (false, respectively). It is assumed that γ+R(~x, a, s) and
γ−R(~x, a, s) are never jointly satisfied. Such a successor-state axiom encodes both effect
146
and frame axioms and specifies exactly when the fluent changes.12 While in general
successor-state axioms are more complex than effect axioms, there will be much fewer
successor-state axioms (one per fluent) than effect axioms and frame axioms com-
bined. Note that to define regression for situation calculus formulae, Reiter restricts
the right-hand side of a successor-state axiom of the above form to be uniform in s,
which essentially requires s to be the only situation term mentioned in it. But this is too
restrictive for my theory, since both the successor-state axioms of my knowledge and
goal accessibility relations quantify over situations, making these non-uniform. There-
fore, I do not impose this restriction for accessibility fluents. For similar reasons, I also
do not require the right-hand side of action precondition axioms, i.e. Φf (~x, s), to be
uniform in s. This does not pose a problem for my theory as I do not address regres-
sion here. Note that, Scherl and Levesque [189] have shown how regression can be
performed for action theories with knowledge.
Let me give an example of a successor-state axiom for the Broken(x, s) fluent. The
actions that affect this fluent are drop(agt, x) and repair(agt, x), which stands for the
action of dropping and repairing, respectively, object x by agent agt. The successor-
12I do not discuss the ramification problem here; see [141] for a treatment compatible with my theory.
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state axiom for Broken is as follows:
Broken(x, do(a, s)) ≡ (a = drop(agt, x) ∧ Fragile(x, s)) ∨
(Broken(x, s) ∧ a 6= repair(agt, x)).
It says that an object x is broken in the situation resulting from action a being per-
formed in s, if and only if a is dropping x and x is fragile, or x was already broken in
situation s prior to the action and a is not the action of repairing x.
The successor-state axiom for a domain-dependent functional fluent can also be
specified in a similar manner. Assume that the only action that affects the color(x, s)
fluent is the paint(agt, x, c) action, which stands for the action of painting object x
with color c by agent agt. Then the successor-state axiom for the color fluent can be
specified as follows:
color(x, do(a, s)) = c ≡ a = paint(agt, x, c) ∨
(color(x, s) = c ∧ ¬∃c′. c′ 6= c ∧ a = paint(agt, x, c′)).
It says that an object x has color c in the situation resulting from action a being per-
formed in s, if and only if a refers to the action of painting x with color c, or x was
already of color c in situation s prior to the action and a is not the action of painting x
with a different color.
To specify successor-state axioms, Reiter relied on the assumption that different
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action terms represent different actions. For example, the above successor-state ax-
iom for the Broken fluent is only meaningful if for all agt and x, drop(agt, x) and
repair(agt, x) represent two different actions. Otherwise, the agent agt might end up
with a broken object x after repairing it. This assumption can be formalized using
unique names axioms for actions. For any pairs of distinct action functions f1 and f2,
an axiom of the following form is needed:
Axiom 3.3.2.
f1(~x) 6= f2(~y).
Also, another axiom of the following form is needed for every action function f :
Axiom 3.3.3.
f(~x) = f(~y) ⊃ ~x = ~y.
For example, (a) below says that a drop action and a repair action are two different
actions, and (b) says that two drop actions are not the same if they do not have the
same agent or do not involve dropping the same object:
a) drop(agt, x) 6= repair(agt′, x′),
b) drop(agt, x) = drop(agt′, x′) ⊃ (agt = agt′ ∧ x = x′).
In general, for n action functions, O(n2) unique names axioms are required. However,
these can be automatically generated from a list of action names and arities.
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To define the domain, one also needs to specify what fluents hold initially and
the agents’ knowledge and goals in the initial situation. This is done using initial
state axioms that only mention initial situations. For example, consider the following
axioms:
a) Init(s) ⊃ ¬Broken(Obj1, s),
b) Know(Agt1,¬Broken(Obj1, now), S0).
(a) says that the object Obj1 is intact in all the initial situations, and (b) states that the
agent Agt1 knows in the actual initial situation S0 that Obj1 is intact. I will discuss the
formalization of knowledge in Section 3.4.
When there are multiple agents in the domain, one also needs to include axioms
for identifying the agent of an action, axioms such as:
agent(drop(agt, x)) = agt,
which says that the agent of the drop(agt, x) action is agt; this uses a distinguished
function ‘agent’.
Finally, on some occasions I will need to quantify over formulae, use formulae as
arguments of actions, and use predicates that take programs as arguments and these
programs may contain formulae in wait/test conditions, etc. Thus I must encode for-
mulae and programs as terms and formalize their relationship to the associated situ-
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ation calculus formulae. This is tedious but can be done essentially along the lines
of [51], where a Holds predicate relating an encoded formula to the corresponding
situation calculus formula is axiomatized. Variables in the argument formulae must
be represented as terms and substitution must be axiomatized. I assume that we have
such an encoding and axiomatization of Holds in the rest of this thesis. For notational
simplicity, I will suppress this encoding and use formulae and programs as terms di-
rectly. Also, note that if, for a particular domain, the set of formulae that will be used
is known in advance, one can write the Holds axioms directly for those formulae only.
A basic action theory is a theory that contains the following kinds of axioms:
• Foundational axioms Σ, i.e. Axioms 3.2.2-3.2.7;
• Unique name axioms for actions Duna, i.e. Axiom schemata 3.3.2 and 3.3.3;
• Action precondition axioms Dap;
• Successor-state axioms Dss;
• Initial state axioms Dinit;
• Axioms identifying the agent of each action Dagt (if needed);
• Encoding Axioms Denc (if needed).
From now on, I will refer to the union of these sets of axioms as Dbat:
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Definition 3.3.4.
Dbat def= Σ ∪ Duna ∪ Dap ∪ Dss ∪ Dinit ∪ Dagt ∪ Denc.
Note that here and in the sequel, I just use standard Tarskian semantics of first
and second order logic (except for the semantics of SR-APL in Chapter 7). Sorts
are handled in the standard way. I define modal operators simply as abbreviations
with their semantics in terms of accessibility relations added to the situation calculus
language.
I believe that Reiter’s relative satisfiability theorem [178], which states that a BAT
D is satisfiable if and only if DUNA ∪ DS0 is, can be extended to my framework. In
Section 3.5, I introduce a new sort of infinite paths in the situation calculus. Note that
paths are already there in the standard situation calculus models (satisfying Reiter’s
foundational axioms), but one needs to use second order quantification to refer to them.
I think that the relative satisfiability theorem can be extended to include these paths
axioms too. Such infinite paths are used to define the semantics of well known logics
such as LTL and CTL∗.
A word on axiomatizability/decidability: Reiter has shown that regressable projec-
tion queries within the situation calculus can be answered using first-order entailment.
Others have proven decidability results for reasoning in interesting fragments of the
language; for example, see [220] for an argument-less fluents fragment and [93] for
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a description logic like 2 variables fragment. Also, recently De Giacomo et al. [53]
showed that verification of an expressive class of first-order µ-calculus temporal prop-
erties in the situation calculus with bounded action theories (i.e. where in all situations
the number of ground fluent atoms that hold is bounded) is decidable.
3.4 Knowledge in the Situation Calculus
I allow the specifier to model the agents in terms of their mental states by including
operators to specify agents’ information and their motivation. In my framework, I
work with knowledge rather than belief. Although much of my formalization should
extend to the latter, I leave dealing with belief and belief revision for future work (see
[194] for an account in the situation calculus). In the following, I discuss the formal
basis of my information operator, i.e. knowledge.
3.4.1 Semantics
The logical foundation of my knowledge operator can be traced back to Hintikka’s
[102] reinterpretation of Kripke’s possible world semantics of necessity [125]. Moore
[151] was a pioneer in integrating knowledge and action into a single logical frame-
work. In his formal theory, he accomplished this by formalizing Hintikka’s modal
logic of knowledge within McCarthy’s first order situation calculus [148]. The basic
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idea is to use situations as possible worlds and to use a relation on situations as the
accessibility relation for knowledge.
Scherl and Levesque [188] extended Reiter’s successor-state axiom approach to
model the effects of actions on agents’ knowledge, combining ideas from Reiter and
Moore. They use K(s′, s) to denote that in situation s, the agent thinks that she could
be in situation s′.13 s′ is called a K-alternative situation to s. Also, the abbrevia-
tion14 Know(Φ, s) is used to denote that the agent knows that Φ in situation s. The
fluents in Φ will usually contain a situation constant or placeholder now that stands
for the situation in which Φ must hold, e.g. Broken(obj, now). Φ(s) denotes the for-
mula that results from replacing now with s in Φ. For ease of readability, I will
suppress the placeholder where the intended meaning is clear from the context, e.g.
Know(Broken(obj), s). Shapiro [194] generalized the Know and K notation to handle
multiple agents by adding an agent argument to them. I adopt this convention, but I
will suppress the agent argument when dealing with single agent domains.
Scherl and Levesque require that initial situations can only be K-related to other
initial situations:
13To comply with the situation calculus convention for fluents, which says that the last argument
represents the actual situation, Scherl and Levesque reversed the order of the arguments of K.
14Note that the knowledge operator Know is an abbreviation or macro and not a predicate in the
language, and thus it does not require formulae Φ to be encoded as a first-order term.
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Axiom 3.4.1.
Init(s) ∧K(agt, s′, s) ⊃ Init(s′).
As we will see later, the successor-state axiom for K ensures that in all the situations
that are K-accessible from do(a, s), a was the last action performed. This implies that
all K-related situations share the same history. Since I am dealing with knowledge, I
also constrain K to be initially reflexive (which also implies that K is initially serial):
Axiom 3.4.2.
Init(s) ⊃ K(agt, s, s).
Finally, to get positive and negative introspection of knowledge, I require K to be
initially transitive and Euclidean:
Axiom 3.4.3.
Init(s) ⊃ ∀s1, s2. K(agt, s1, s) ∧K(agt, s2, s1) ⊃ K(agt, s2, s).
Axiom 3.4.4.
Init(s) ⊃ ∀s1, s2. K(agt, s1, s) ∧K(agt, s2, s) ⊃ K(agt, s2, s1).
As shown in Scherl and Levesque [188] and later in Shapiro [194], once these con-
straints are imposed on the initial situation, they continue to hold after any executable
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sequence of actions since they are preserved by the successor-state axiom for K.15
Using K, the knowledge of an agent, Know(agt,Φ, s), is defined as follows:
Definition 3.4.5.
Know(agt,Φ, s) def= ∀s′. K(agt, s′, s) ⊃ Φ(s′).
Two useful abbreviations Kwhether and Kref are also defined. Kwhether(agt,Φ, s)
means that the agent agt knows whether the formula Φ holds in situation s.
Definition 3.4.6.
Kwhether(agt,Φ, s) def= Know(agt,Φ, s) ∨ Know(agt,¬Φ, s).
Kref(agt, θ) means that the agent agt knows in situation s who/what the term θ refers
to.
Definition 3.4.7.
Kref(agt, θ, s) def= ∃t. Know(agt, t = θ, s).
3.4.2 Knowledge Change
Scherl and Levesque [188] showed how to capture the changes in knowledge of agents
that result from actions in the successor-state axiom for K. In their framework, an
15Scherl and Levesque consider sensing actions as their only type of knowledge-producing actions
while Shapiro deals exclusively with some inform communication actions (as discussed below).
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agent’s knowledge is affected by every action in the sense that she comes to know that
the action was performed. It is assumed that agents know the successor-state axioms
for actions, so the agents also acquire knowledge about the effects of these actions.16
In addition, they allow the specifier to include actions that change the agent’s knowl-
edge in non-trivial ways. These actions, called knowledge-producing actions, come in
two varieties: binary sensing actions and non-binary sensing actions. A binary sensing
action is a sensing action that senses the truth-value of an associated proposition; e.g.,
the binary sensing action senseonTable(agt, b) could be performed to sense whether the
block b is on the table or not. On the other hand, non-binary sensing actions refer
to sensing actions where the agent senses the value of an associated term; e.g., the
non-binary sensing action countBlocksOnTable(agt) could be performed to get the
number of blocks that are on the table. Following [137], the information provided by
a binary sensing action is specified using the predicate SF(a, s), which holds if the ac-
tion a returns the binary sensing result 1 in situation s. A guarded sensed fluent axiom
is used to associate an action with the property sensed by this action. For example, one
might have a guarded sensed fluent axiom to assert that the action senseonTable(agt, b)
tells the agent agt whether the block b is on the table in the situation where it is per-
16One consequence of this is that agents are assumed to be aware of all actions that may happen in
the environment. This in part allows us to avoid belief revision and its difficulties.
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formed, provided that agt, b, and the table are located in the same room:
InRoomWithTable(agt) ∧ Collocated(agt, b) ⊃
(SF(senseonTable(agt, b), s) ≡ OnTable(b, s)).
Similarly for non-binary sensing actions, the term sff(a, s) is used to denote the sens-
ing value returned by the action. For example, the following guarded sensed fluent ax-
iom asserts that the action countBlocksOnTable(agt) tells agt the number of blocks
that are currently on the table, provided that agt and the table are collocated:
InRoomWithTable(agt) ⊃
(sff(countBlocksOnTable(agt), s) = numOfBlocksOnTable(s)).
When communication between agents is allowed, it is necessary to include ad-
ditional types of knowledge-producing actions. Shapiro [194] considers the inform
communication action as his only type of knowledge-producing action. The inform(agt1,
agt2,Φ) action can be used by an agent agt1 to inform another agent agt2 that the for-
mula Φ currently holds. agt1 can inform agt2 that Φ if she currently knows that Φ:
Poss(inform(agt1, agt2,Φ), s) ≡ Know(agt1,Φ, s).
Note that, since in this framework all actions are public (see footnote 16), whenever
an inform action occurs, every agent learns the informed formula Φ (as they know
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that since the inform action occurred, its preconditions must have been true, i.e. they
know that the informer knows that Φ; this along with the reflexivity of K implies
that Φ). This may be problematic in some domains where some sort of privacy is re-
quired, e.g., when there are other competing agents in the environment. One solution
is to encrypt the content Φ of the inform action [197, 194]. Another solution to this
problem was proposed by Lespe´rance [133]. He further extends the set of knowledge-
producing actions in [188] to include two variants of the inform communication ac-
tion, informWhether and informRef . informWhether(agt1, agt2,Ψ), which is
a primitive action, denotes that the agent agt1 informs the agent agt2 about the current
truth value of the formula Ψ. agt1 can inform agt2 whether Ψ holds if she knows the
current truth-value of Ψ:
Axiom 3.4.8.
Poss(informWhether(agt1, agt2,Ψ), s) ≡ Kwhether(agt1,Ψ, s).
On the other hand, the informRef(agt1, agt2, θ) communication action is also a
primitive action and it means that the agent agt1 informs the agent agt2 of who/what
the term θ is. agt1 can inform agt2 who/what θ is if she knows the current value of θ:
Axiom 3.4.9.
Poss(informRef(agt1, agt2, θ), s) ≡ Kref(agt1, θ, s).
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Returning to our discussion on private communication, note that both of these actions
hide the actual content of the message. For example, when the informWhether(agt1,
agt2,Φ) action happens, every agent learns that the informer agt1 informed the in-
formee agt2 whether Φ holds, but does not acquire any knowledge about the actual
truth-value of Φ.
The version of the successor-state axiom for K that I adopt specifies how agents’
knowledge is updated as a result of sensing actions as well as the informWhether
and the informRef communication actions:
Axiom 3.4.10.
K(agt, s∗, do(a, s)) ≡ ∃s′. [K(agt, s′, s) ∧ s∗ = do(a, s′) ∧ Poss(a, s′)
∧ CompatWithKnowledgeAcquired(agt, a, s′, s)],
where
CompatWithKnowledgeAcquired(agt, a, s′, s) def=
BinarySensingAction(a) ∧ agent(a) = agt ⊃ SF(a, s′) ≡ SF(a, s)
∧ NonBinarySensingAction(a) ∧ agent(a) = agt ⊃ sff(a, s′) = sff(a, s)
∧ ∀agt′,Ψ. a = informWhether(agt′, agt,Ψ) ⊃ Ψ(s′) ≡ Ψ(s)
∧ ∀agt′, θ. a = informRef(agt′, agt, θ) ⊃ θ(s′) = θ(s).
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This says that after an action happens, every agent learns that it has happened. This
is formalized by ensuring that any situation that is K-related to do(a, s) must have
a as the last action performed. Since action precondition axioms and successor-state
axioms are assumed to be common knowledge, agents also learn the preconditions
and effects of actions – this is usually called knowledge update. Moreover, if the
action is a sensing action, the agent performing it acquires knowledge of the associ-
ated proposition or term. Furthermore, if the action involves someone informing agt
whether Ψ holds, then agt comes to know the truth-value of Ψ afterwards. Finally, if
the action involves someone informing agt who/what θ is, then agt knows the value
of θ afterwards. Note that this axiom only handles knowledge expansion, not revi-
sion. Handling belief revision complicates the framework somewhat, and therefore I
focus on knowledge rather than belief. Also, the above axiom only handles completely
accurate sensors. After performing a sensing action, the agent learns whether the as-
sociated proposition actually holds. See [202, 195] for a treatment of belief revision in
the situation calculus and [195] for an account that deals with noisy sensors.
I illustrate the successor-state axiom for K using the scenario in Figure 3.1. In this
figure, situations are nodes in the graph, and the edges are labeled by actions. Part of
the K-relation is represented by the ovals around the nodes. If a situation s appears in
the same box as another situation s′, then K(agt, s′, s). Finally, in this figure s denotes
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Figure 3.1: An Example of Knowledge Change
the actual situation, i.e. the one representing the true state of the world. First, con-
sider the case for knowledge expansion due to regular actions, as depicted in Figure
3.1(A). Assume that initially s, s1, and s2 are accessible from each other. Then after
a happens in s, according to the successor-state axiom for K, only do(a, s), do(a, s1),
and do(a, s2) will be accessible from do(a, s), but not do(b, s2), etc. Thus, in do(a, s)
the agent knows that the action a has just happened and knows that its effects hold.
If a makes P become true, then the agent knows that P holds afterwards. Next, con-
sider the case for knowledge expansion as a result of knowledge producing actions, as
illustrated in Figure 3.1(B). Assume that initially s, s1, and s2 are in the same equiv-
alence class w.r.t. K, and that Φ(s),Φ(s1), and ¬Φ(s2). Then after the agent senses
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the value of Φ in s, according to the successor-state axiom for K, only do(senseΦ, s)
and do(senseΦ, s1) will be K-accessible from do(senseΦ, s), but not do(senseΦ, s2).
Since Φ holds in all situations that areK-accessible from do(senseΦ, s), the agent will
thus know that Φ in do(senseΦ, s).
Henceforth, I will refer to the set of axioms for modeling knowledge (i.e. Axioms
3.4.1-3.4.10) as Dknow. See Chapter 2 for a review of other dynamic epistemic log-
ics/frameworks.
3.5 Infinite Paths in the Situation Calculus
In this section, I set the stage for formalizing agent motivation by introducing a new
sort of infinite paths in the situation calculus.
Agents’ goals are future oriented.17 For example, an agent might have a goal to
eventually achieve some property. Therefore unlike knowledge formulae that take a
single situation as argument, goal formulae are evaluated over a (possibly infinite)
sequence of consecutive situations, i.e. a path. While some work has been done to
capture the notion of paths in the situation calculus, all of these approaches have draw-
backs. I discuss some of these here; see the end of this section for a discussion of other
17I use the word “goal” here as an umbrella term for any motivational operator, including goals,
desires, intentions, etc. See Chapter 2 for the precise distinction between these notions.
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related work. While specifying agents’ goals and behavior, Shapiro [194] considers
only finite paths. He formalized a finite path using a pair of situations representing the
beginning state and the ending state of the path. Unfortunately, a temporal framework
based on such finite paths has limited expressiveness and can’t capture arbitrary tem-
porally extended formulae, e.g. the goal to maintain a property φ indefinitely far in the
future, 2φ. Also, quantification over these finite paths requires dealing with a pair of
situations explicitly which is somewhat clumsy. Lespe´rance et al. [134] on the other
hand looked at infinite paths. They introduced the notion of action selection functions
(also called strategies in [198]), which are mappings from situations to primitive ac-
tions. The idea is that given a situation s, a strategy σ prescribes an action that the
agent must perform in s if she were to follow the path induced by this strategy. An
infinite path can then be formalized as a tuple (s, σ), where s is the starting situation
of the path, and σ is a strategy that defines an infinite sequence of situations by spec-
ifying an action for every situation starting from s. Their account however does not
have paths as a sort and thus does not allow for first-order quantification over paths.
To support modeling temporally extended goals, I adopt Lespe´rance et al.’s notion
of infinite paths. Following [134], I only consider “realistic” paths; paths involving
non-executable actions cannot really occur as they are not realistic. Thus a path in my
framework is essentially an infinite sequence of situations, where each situation along
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the path can be reached by performing some executable action in the preceding situ-
ation. To allow (first-order) quantification over infinite paths, I in addition introduce
a new sort called paths in the language with (possibly sub/super-scripted) variables p
ranging over paths. In the next subsection, I give an axiomatization for infinite paths.
Thus my formalization of infinite paths is more general than Shapiro’s finite paths.
Arbitrary temporally extended formulae such as unbounded maintenance goals can be
interpreted using my paths. Moreover, my account is simpler than that of Lespe´rance
et al., and unlike them, I allow quantification over paths, which makes my language
easier to use.
Before delving into the technical details, let me point out some notational conven-
tions that I adopt. I will use both state and path formulae. I use uppercase Greek letters
and lowercase Greek letters to denote state formulae and path formulae, respectively.
A state formula Φ(s) is a formula that has a free situation variable s in it, whereas a
path formula φ(p) is one that has a free path variable p. State formulae are used in
the context of knowledge while path formulae are used in that of goals. As with a
state formula that will usually contain a situation constant now, a path formula φ will
usually contain a path constant/placeholder path that stands for the path over which φ
must be evaluated. φ(p) denotes the formula that can be obtained by replacing path
with p in φ. I often suppress the path variable p in a path formula φ(p) when the intent
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is clear from the context.
3.5.1 Axiomatization of Infinite Paths
I now give my axiomatization for infinite paths. I have a predicate OnPath(p, s), mean-
ing that the situation s is on path p. Also, the abbreviation Starts(p, s) means that s
is the starting situation of path p. A path p starts with s if and only if s is the earliest
situation on p:
Definition 3.5.1.
Starts(p, s) def= OnPath(p, s) ∧ ∀s′. OnPath(p, s′) ⊃ s  s′.
As shown in Lespe´rance et al., one can use action selection functions (ASFs) to
model infinite paths. Recall that ASFs or strategies are mappings from situations to
primitive actions. The idea is that given a situation s, an ASF F prescribes an action
that the agent must perform in s if she were to follow the path induced by this strategy.
An infinite path can then be formalized as a tuple (s, F ), where s is the starting situ-
ation of the path, and F is a strategy that defines an infinite sequence of situations by
specifying an action for every situation starting from s. Thus, one way of axiomatizing
paths is by making them correspond to such pairs (s, F ):
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Axiom 3.5.2.
(i). ∀p. (∃F, s. Executable(F, s) ∧ ∀s′. OnPath(p, s′) ≡ OnPathASF(F, s, s′)),
(ii). ∀F, s. Executable(F, s) ⊃
(∃p. Starts(p, s) ∧ ∀s′. OnPathASF(F, s, s′) ≡ OnPath(p, s′)).
This second-order axiom says that for every path p, there is an action selection func-
tion F and a situation s such that F starting in s is executable, and that F produces
exactly the same sequence of situations on p starting from situation s. Also, for ev-
ery executable action selection function F and situation s, there is a path p that starts
with s and that corresponds exactly to the sequence of situations produced by F start-
ing from s. Here, OnPathASF(F, s, s′) means that the situation sequence defined by
(s, F ) includes the situation s′:
Definition 3.5.3.
OnPathASF(F, s, s′) def= s  s′ ∧ ∀a, s∗. s ≺ do(a, s∗)  s′ ⊃ F (s∗) = a.
Also, the situation sequence encoded by a strategy F and a starting situation s is ex-
ecutable if and only if s is executable, and for all situations s′ on this sequence, the
action selected by F in s′ is executable in s′.
Definition 3.5.4.
Executable(F, s) def= Executable(s) ∧ ∀s′. OnPathASF(F, s, s′) ⊃ Poss(F (s′), s′).
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Another axiom is needed to state that different situation sequences represent dif-
ferent paths.
Axiom 3.5.5.
∀p, p′. (∀s. OnPath(p, s) ≡ OnPath(p′, s)) ≡ p = p′.
Note that, for every situation s on a path, there must be an action that is possible in
s:
∀p, s. OnPath(p, s) ⊃ ∃a. Poss(a, s).
I consider that situations where no action is possible are “artificial”. One can always
introduce a dummy action noOp that has the precondition that True, and consequently
is always executable. Taking paths to be sequences of executable situations means that
there may be infinite sequences of successor situations that are not paths; even if the
situations on a prefix of a sequence are executable, the presence of a non-executable
situation in the sequence means that it is not a path. One could easily modify the above
axiomatization to include paths with non-executable situations, and identify the subset
of such paths that are executable.
Also, while I focus on infinite paths, finite (executable) paths can be viewed as
prefixes of paths since a finite path can always be extended to an infinite one, e.g. by
extending the prefix with an infinite sequence of noOp actions.
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I next define some useful path-related constructs that I will need to use. First, I
define a set of Linear Temporal Logic (LTL) operators [169, 64].18 Formulae defined
using these operators will be evaluated w.r.t. a path p and a time index/situation s on
p. In these, I will use the starting situation s of the path p as the time index, and since
s can be obtained from p, I will suppress this index.19 I say that©Φ(p), i.e. Φ holds
next over a path p if Φ holds in the successor to the starting situation of p:
Definition 3.5.6.
©Φ(p) def= ∃s, a. Starts(p, s) ∧ OnPath(p, do(a, s)) ∧ Φ(do(a, s)).
Φ U Ψ (Φ until Ψ) holds over a path p if there is a situation s′ on p in which Ψ holds,
and Φ continuously holds in every situation from the starting situation of p until s′:
Definition 3.5.7.
(Φ U Ψ)(p) def= ∃s, s′. Starts(p, s)∧OnPath(p, s′)∧Ψ(s′)∧∀s∗. s  s∗ ≺ s′ ⊃ Φ(s∗).
Other LTL operators can be defined as usual, e.g. eventually Φ (denoted by 3Φ), al-
ways Φ (denoted by 2Φ), Φ unless Ψ (denoted by Φ W Ψ), Φ before Ψ (denoted by
Φ B Ψ), etc.
18In addition, Khan and Lespe´rance [121] show how arbitrary CTL∗ [66] formulae can be interpreted
over situation calculus with paths defined here.
19Note that one can evaluate a temporal formula w.r.t. any time index/situation s along a path p just
by evaluating it w.r.t. the suffix p′ of p that starts with s (see Definition 3.5.16). Also, the following
semantics closely corresponds to the one given by Emerson [64].
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Definition 3.5.8.
3Φ(p) def= (True U Φ)(p).
Definition 3.5.9.
2Φ(p) def= ¬3¬Φ(p).
Definition 3.5.10.
(ΦW Ψ)(p) def= (Φ U Ψ)(p) ∨2(Φ ∧ ¬Ψ)(p).
Definition 3.5.11.
(Φ B Ψ)(p) def= ¬(¬Φ U Ψ)(p).
Let us also introduce a few more definitions. Firstly, I say that φ is weakly in-
evitable in s if φ holds over all paths that start with s:
Definition 3.5.12.
WeaklyInevitable(φ, s) def= ∀p. Starts(p, s) ⊃ φ(p).
Secondly, I say that φ is strongly inevitable in s if φ is weakly inevitable in all
situations that have the same history as s:
Definition 3.5.13.
StronglyInevitable(φ, s) def= ∀s′. SameHist(s′, s) ⊃WeaklyInevitable(φ, s′).
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Thus, φ is strongly inevitable in situation s if φ holds over all paths that start with a
situation that has the same action history as s.
Thirdly, an agent knows in s that φ is inevitable if she knows that φ is weakly
inevitable in s, i.e., φ holds over all paths that start with a K-accessible situation in s:
Definition 3.5.14.
KInevitable(φ, s) def= Know(WeaklyInevitable(φ, now), s).
Note that KInevitable(φ, s) is similar to StronglyInevitable(φ, s), except for the fact
that in this case φ is weakly inevitable only in the situations that are knowledge acces-
sible from s – a subset of the set of situations that share the same history with s.
An agent knows in s that φ is impossible if she knows that ¬φ is inevitable in s:
Definition 3.5.15.
KImpossible(φ, s) def= KInevitable(¬φ, s).
Finally, I define what it means for a path p′ to be a suffix of another path p w.r.t. a
situation s:
Definition 3.5.16.
Suffix(p′, p, s) def= OnPath(p, s) ∧ Starts(p′, s)
∧ ∀s′. s  s′ ⊃ (OnPath(p, s′) ≡ OnPath(p′, s′)).
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That is, a path p′ is a suffix of another path p w.r.t. a situation s if and only if s is on p,
and p′ which starts with s, contains exactly the same situations as p starting from s.
3.5.2 Properties
I now show some properties of my axiomatization of paths. All my arguments and
claims in the proofs of these will be semantic in nature. I will use the following lem-
mata in these proofs (here Σ is the set of foundational axioms).
Σ entails that all initial situations are executable:
Lemma 3.5.17.
Σ |= ∀s. Init(s) ⊃ Executable(s).
Proof. Follows from Axiom 3.2.5 and Definitions 3.2.1 and 3.3.1.
Σ entails that doing an action yields a different situation:
Lemma 3.5.18.
Σ |= ∀a, s. s 6= do(a, s).
Proof. See Proposition 2.4.1 in [194].
Σ entails that a situation s strictly precedes the situation that results from doing an
action in s:
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Lemma 3.5.19.
Σ |= ∀a, s. s ≺ do(a, s).
Proof. See Proposition 2.4.2 in [194].
Σ entails that ≺ is transitive:
Lemma 3.5.20.
Σ |= ∀s, s1, s2. s ≺ s1 ∧ s1 ≺ s2 ⊃ s ≺ s2.
Proof. See Proposition 2.4.6 in [194].
Σ entails that ≺ is irreflexive:
Lemma 3.5.21.
Σ |= ∀s. s ⊀ s.
Proof. See Proposition 2.4.7 in [194].
Σ entails that ≺ is asymmetric:
Lemma 3.5.22.
Σ |= ∀s1, s2. s1 ≺ s2 ⊃ ¬(s2 ≺ s1).
Proof. Follows from the transitivity of ≺ (i.e. Lemma 3.5.20) and irreflexivity of ≺
(i.e. Lemma 3.5.21).
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Σ entails that if a situation strictly precedes another situation, then they are differ-
ent:
Lemma 3.5.23.
Σ |= ∀s, s′. s ≺ s′ ⊃ s 6= s′.
Proof. (By contradiction) Fix situations S1 and S2 and assume that S1 ≺ S2 and
S1 = S2. If we substitute S1 for S2 in the former, we have S1 ≺ S1, but this is
contradictory to Lemma 3.5.21.
Σ entails that the result of doing a in s does not precede s:
Lemma 3.5.24.
Σ |= ∀a, s. do(a, s) ⊀ s.
Proof. See Proposition 2.4.9 in [194].
Σ entails that a situation s precedes doing an action in s:
Lemma 3.5.25.
Σ |= ∀a, s. s  do(a, s).
Proof. See Corollary 2.4.3 in [194].
Σ entails that  is reflexive:
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Lemma 3.5.26.
Σ |= ∀s. s  s.
Proof. Trivial.
Σ entails that  is antisymmetric:
Lemma 3.5.27.
Σ |= ∀s, s′. s  s′ ∧ s′  s ⊃ s = s′.
Proof. See Proposition 2.4.11 in [194].
Σ entails that  is transitive:
Lemma 3.5.28.
Σ |= ∀s, s1, s2. s  s1 ∧ s1  s2 ⊃ s  s2.
Proof. See Proposition 2.4.12 in [194].
Σ entails that if do(a, s) is executable, then it is possible to execute a in s, and s is
executable:
Lemma 3.5.29.
Σ |= ∀a, s. Executable(do(a, s)) ⊃ Poss(a, s) ∧ Executable(s).
Proof. See Proposition 2.4.16 in [194].
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Σ entails that if two situations do(a, s) and do(b, s) obtained by performing two
actions a and b in the same situation s each precedes a third situation s′, then a and b
represent the same action.
Lemma 3.5.30.
Σ |= ∀a, b, s, s′. (do(a, s)  s′ ∧ do(b, s)  s′) ⊃ a = b.
Proof. (By induction on s′) For the base case, fix A1, B1, S1, and S ′1, and assume that:
do(A1, S1) = S
′
1,
do(B1, S1) = S
′
1.
From this, we have:
do(A1, S1) = do(B1, S1).
From this and Axiom 3.2.3, we have A1 = B1.
For the inductive hypothesis, fix S ′′1 and assume that:
(do(A1, S1)  S ′′1 ∧ do(B1, S1)  S ′′1 ) ⊃ A1 = B1. (3.1)
Fix action C1. We have to show that:
(do(A1, S1)  do(C1, S ′′1 ) ∧ do(B1, S1)  do(C1, S ′′1 )) ⊃ A1 = B1.
Assume that (do(A1, S1)  do(C1, S ′′1 ) ∧ do(B1, S1)  do(C1, S ′′1 )). Then we have 4
cases to consider.
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Case 1. do(A1, S1) = do(C1, S ′′1 ) and do(B1, S1) = do(C1, S ′′1 ). In this case, by
Axiom 3.2.3, we have A1 = C1 and B1 = C1, and thus A1 = B1.
Case 2. do(A1, S1) = do(C1, S ′′1 ) and do(B1, S1) ≺ do(C1, S ′′1 ). From the former
and Axiom 3.2.3, we have S1 = S ′′1 . If we substitute S1 for S
′′
1 in the latter, we have
do(B1, S1) ≺ do(C1, S1). From this, Axiom 3.2.5, and the fact that do is a function,
we have do(B1, S1)  S1; but by Definition 3.2.6 and Lemmata 3.5.18 and 3.5.24, this
is impossible.
Case 3. do(A1, S1) ≺ do(C1, S ′′1 ) and do(B1, S1) = do(C1, S ′′1 ). As in Case 2, this
case is also not possible.
Case 4. do(A1, S1) ≺ do(C1, S ′′1 ) and do(B1, S1) ≺ do(C1, S ′′1 ). From these, Axiom
3.2.5, and the fact that do is a function, we have:
do(A1, S1)  S ′′1 ∧ do(B1, S1)  S ′′1 .
Thus we can apply the inductive hypothesis (3.1), which gives us A1 = B1.
I say that two situations are co-linear if they are the same or if one of them strictly
precedes the other. Assume that s1 and s2 are successors of two different situations,
obtained by performing two different actions a and b, respectively, in the same situation
s. Σ entails that s1 and s2 are not co-linear.
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Lemma 3.5.31.
Σ |= ∀s, s1, s2, a, b. a 6= b ∧ do(a, s)  s1 ∧ do(b, s)  s2 ⊃
s1 6= s2 ∧ s1 ⊀ s2 ∧ s2 ⊀ s1.
Proof. (By contradiction) Fix A1, B1, S1, S11 , and S21 and assume that:
A1 6= B1, (3.2)
do(A1, S1)  S11 ∧ do(B1, S1)  S21 , and (3.3)
S11 = S
2
1 ∨ S11 ≺ S21 ∨ S21 ≺ S11 . (3.4)
Now, (3.3) above gives us the following four cases:
Case 1. Assume that:
S11 = do(A1, S1), and (3.5)
S21 = do(B1, S1). (3.6)
From these, (3.2), and Axiom 3.2.3, we have:
S11 6= S21 . (3.7)
Thus from (3.4) and (3.7), we have: S11 ≺ S21 ∨ S21 ≺ S11 . Assume that S11 ≺ S21 . Then
from this, (3.5), and (3.6), we have: do(A1, S1) ≺ do(B1, S1). From this, Axiom 3.2.5,
and the fact that do is a function, we have: do(A1, S1)  S1. From this and Definition
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3.2.6, it follows that either do(A1, S1) = S1 or do(A1, S1) ≺ S1. But by Lemma
3.5.18, the former is impossible. By Lemma 3.5.24, the latter is also impossible. It
thus follows that:
S11 ⊀ S21 . (3.8)
Similarly, it can be shown that:
S21 ⊀ S11 . (3.9)
But (3.7), (3.8), and (3.9) is contradictory to (3.4).
Case 2a. Assume that:
S11 = do(A1, S1), and (3.10)
do(B1, S1) ≺ S21 . (3.11)
I will show that ¬(S11 = S21 ∨ S11 ≺ S21 ∨ S21 ≺ S11) by going over each case, one at
a time. First, suppose that S11 = S
2
1 . From this and (3.10), we have S
2
1 = do(A1, S1).
From this and (3.11), we have do(B1, S1) ≺ do(A1, S1). From this, Axiom 3.2.5, and
the fact that do is a function, we have do(B1, S1)  S1. But again, this is impossible
by Definition 3.2.6 and Lemmata 3.5.18 and 3.5.24. Thus we have:
S11 6= S21 . (3.12)
Now suppose that S11 ≺ S21 . Then from this and (3.10), we have:
do(A1, S1) ≺ S21 .
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From this, (3.11), and Definition 3.2.6, we have:
do(A1, S1)  S21 ∧ do(B1, S1)  S21 .
From this and Lemma 3.5.30, we have A1 = B1, which is contradictory to (3.2). Thus
we have:
S11 ⊀ S21 . (3.13)
Finally, suppose that S21 ≺ S11 . Then from this and (3.10), we have S21 ≺ do(A1, S1).
From (3.11), this, and transitivity of ≺ (i.e. Lemma 3.5.20), we have do(B1, S1) ≺
do(A1, S1). But as shown above, this is impossible. Thus:
S21 ⊀ S11 . (3.14)
But (3.12), (3.13), and (3.14) is contradictory to (3.4).
Case 2b. Assume that:
do(A1, S1) ≺ S11 , and (3.15)
S21 = do(B1, S1). (3.16)
The proof for this case is similar to that of Case 2a.
Case 3. Assume that:
do(A1, S1) ≺ S11 , and (3.17)
do(B1, S1) ≺ S21 . (3.18)
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Again, I will show that ¬(S11 = S21 ∨ S11 ≺ S21 ∨ S21 ≺ S11) by going over each case
separately. First, assume that S11 = S
2
1 . From this and (3.18), we have do(B1, S1) ≺
S11 . From this and (3.17), we have:
do(A1, S1) ≺ S11 ∧ do(B1, S1) ≺ S11 .
From this and Definition 3.2.6, we have:
do(A1, S1)  S11 ∧ do(B1, S1)  S11 .
From this and Lemma 3.5.30, we have A1 = B1, which is contradictory to (3.2). Thus
we have:
S21 6= S11 . (3.19)
Next, assume that S11 ≺ S21 . Then by this, (3.17), and transitivity of ≺ (i.e. Lemma
3.5.20 ), we have do(A1, S1) ≺ S21 . From this, (3.18), and Definition 3.2.6, we have:
do(A1, S1)  S21 ∧ do(B1, S1)  S21 .
From this and Lemma 3.5.30, we have A1 = B1, which is contradictory to (3.2). Thus
we have:
S11 ⊀ S21 . (3.20)
Finally, assume that S21 ≺ S11 . The proof for this case is similar to the above. Hence
we have:
S21 ⊀ S11 . (3.21)
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But (3.19), (3.20), and (3.21) is contradictory to (3.4).
If two situations are both preceded by a third situation and they are not co-linear,
then there must be two different situations that precede them, and these situations can
be obtained by performing two different actions in the same situation.
Lemma 3.5.32.
Σ |= ∀s, s1, s2. s  s1 ∧ s  s2 ∧ ¬(s1 = s2 ∨ s1 ≺ s2 ∨ s2 ≺ s1) ⊃
∃s′, a1, a2. s  s′ ∧ do(a1, s′)  s1 ∧ do(a2, s′)  s2 ∧ a1 6= a2.
Proof Sketch. Fix S1, S11 , and S21 , and assume that:
S1  S11 , (3.22)
S1  S21 , and (3.23)
¬(S11 = S21 ∨ S11 ≺ S21 ∨ S21 ≺ S11). (3.24)
Now (3.22) and (3.23) above give us 4 cases.
Case 1. Assume that S1 = S11 and S1 = S21 . Then we have S11 = S21 ; but then this case
is ruled out by (3.24).
Case 2. Assume that S1 = S11 and S1 ≺ S21 . Then we have S11 ≺ S21 ; but then this case
too is ruled out by (3.24).
Case 3. Assume that S1 ≺ S11 and S1 = S21 . Then we have S21 ≺ S11 ; again by (3.24),
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this is also impossible.
Case 4. Assume that:
S1 ≺ S11 , and (3.25)
S1 ≺ S21 . (3.26)
Consider the path from S1 to S11 : there must be a situation s
′ such that S1 ≺ s′  S11
and ¬(s′  S21), otherwise S11 and S21 are colinear, contradicting (3.24). Let S ′ be the
unique situation such that:
S1 ≺ S ′  S11 , (3.27)
¬(S ′  S21), and (3.28)
∀s∗. S1  s∗ ≺ S ′ ⊃ s∗ ≺ S21 . (3.29)
From (3.27), we have S1 ≺ S ′. From this and Axiom 3.2.5, it follows that there is an
action A1 and situation S ′′ such that:
S ′ = do(A1, S ′′), and (3.30)
S1  S ′′. (3.31)
From (3.30) and (3.27), we have:
do(A1, S
′′)  S11 . (3.32)
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From (3.31), (3.30), and Axiom 3.2.5, we have: S1  S ′′ ≺ S ′. By this and (3.29), we
have: S ′′ ≺ S21 . From this, (3.30), and (3.28), it follows that there exists an action A2
such that:
A1 6= A2, and (3.33)
do(A2, S
′′)  S21 . (3.34)
The consequent thus follows from (3.31), (3.32), (3.34), and (3.33).
Σ entails that all non-initial situations are preceded by some initial situation.
Lemma 3.5.33.
Σ |= ∀s. ¬Init(s) ⊃ ∃s′. Init(s′) ∧ s′ ≺ s.
Proof. By induction on s.
Σ ∪ Dknow entails that two K-accessible situations share the same action history:
Lemma 3.5.34.
Σ ∪ Dknow |= ∀s, s′. K(s′, s) ⊃ SameHist(s′, s).
Proof. By induction on s.
Σ ∪ Dknow entails that given a situation s, all K-accessible situations in s are
executable:
184
Lemma 3.5.35.
Σ ∪ Dknow |= ∀s, s′. K(s′, s) ⊃ Executable(s′).
Proof. (By induction on s) In the base case where s is an initial situation, the result
follows from Axiom 3.4.1 and Lemma 3.5.17.
For the inductive case, fix Sn and assume that:
∀s′. K(s′, Sn) ⊃ Executable(s′).
Fix action An; we have to show that:
∀s′. K(s′, do(An, Sn)) ⊃ Executable(s′).
Now from Axiom 3.4.10, it follows that:
∀s∗. K(s∗, do(An, Sn)) ⊃ ∃s∗∗. K(s∗∗, Sn) ∧ s∗ = do(An, s∗∗) ∧ Poss(An, s∗∗).
From this and the inductive hypothesis, it follows that:
∀s∗. K(s∗, do(An, Sn)) ⊃ ∃s∗∗. s∗ = do(An, s∗∗) ∧ Executable(s∗∗) ∧ Poss(An, s∗∗).
Finally, from this and Definition 3.3.1, it follows that:
∀s∗. K(s∗, do(An, Sn)) ⊃ ∃s∗∗. s∗ = do(An, s∗∗) ∧ Executable(do(An, s∗∗)),
and thus that ∀s∗. K(s∗, do(An, Sn)) ⊃ Executable(s∗).
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LetDpath consist of the axiomatization for paths, i.e. Axioms 3.5.2 and 3.5.5. Then,
my first property captures the conditions under which a situation can be extended to a
path: Σ∪Dpath entails that for any executable situation, there is a path that starts with
that situation, provided that for any situation there exists an executable action.
Proposition 3.5.36.
Σ ∪ Dpath |= (∀s′. ∃a. Poss(a, s′)) ⊃ (∀s. Executable(s) ⊃ ∃p. Starts(p, s)).
Proof. Fix situation S1 and assume that ∀s. ∃a. Poss(a, s) and Executable(S1). Con-
struct an action selection function F1 as follows:
F1(s) = a, for any situation s,
where a is an arbitrary action that is executable in s, i.e. Poss(a, s); by the antecedent,
such an action is always available. Then by the antecedent, Definitions 3.5.4 and 3.5.3,
and by construction of F1, we have:
Executable(F1, S1).
The consequent follows from this and Axiom 3.5.2(ii).
Again, I maintain that situations with no executable actions are “artificial”. Hence-
forth, I will use Proposition 3.5.36 without worrying about the antecedent that there is
an executable action for any situation, i.e. that ∀s′. ∃a. Poss(a, s′); if this assumption
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does not hold for some theory, we can simply add a dummy action noOp that has a
True precondition and that is always executable.
Next, I prove some properties of the starting situation of a path. In particular, I can
show that Σ∪Dpath entails that (a) any path starts with some situation, (b) the starting
situation of any path is unique, and (c) the starting situation of any path is executable.
Proposition 3.5.37.
(a). Σ ∪ Dpath |= ∀p. ∃s. Starts(p, s),
(b). Σ ∪ Dpath |= ∀p, s, s′. Starts(p, s) ∧ Starts(p, s′) ⊃ s = s′,
(c). Σ ∪ Dpath |= ∀p, s. Starts(p, s) ⊃ Executable(s).
Proof. (a). Fix path P1. By Axiom 3.5.2(i), there is a corresponding function F1 and
situation S1 such that:
∀s. OnPath(P1, s) ≡ OnPathASF(F1, S1, s). (3.35)
From (3.35) and Definition 3.5.3, it follows that:.
∀s. OnPath(P1, s) ≡ S1  s ∧ ∀a, s∗. S1 ≺ do(a, s∗)  s ⊃ F1(s∗) = a. (3.36)
From this and Definition 3.2.6, we have:
OnPath(P1, S1), and (3.37)
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∀s. OnPath(P1, s) ⊃ S1  s. (3.38)
From 3.37, 3.38, and Definition 3.5.1, it follows that Starts(P1, S1).
(b). Fix path P1 and starting situations S1 and S ′1. By the antecedent, we have
Starts(P1, S1). From this and Definition 3.5.1, we have:
OnPath(P1, S1), (3.39)
∀s. OnPath(P1, s) ⊃ S1  s. (3.40)
Again, from the antecedent, we have Starts(P1, S ′1). From this and Definition 3.5.1,
we have:
OnPath(P1, S ′1), (3.41)
∀s. OnPath(P1, s) ⊃ S ′1  s. (3.42)
From 3.40 and 3.41, we have:
S1  S ′1. (3.43)
Moreover, from 3.39 and 3.42, we have:
S ′1  S1. (3.44)
The consequent follows from 3.43, 3.44, and Lemma 3.5.27.
(c). Fix path P1. By Axiom 3.5.2(i), there is a corresponding function F1 and situation
S1 such that:
Executable(F1, S1), (3.45)
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∀s. OnPath(P1, s) ≡ OnPathASF(F1, S1, s). (3.46)
As in the proof of Proposition 3.5.37(a), from (3.46) and Definitions 3.5.1 and 3.5.3,
it follows that Starts(P1, S1). Moreover, by this and Proposition 3.5.37(b), it follows
that ∀s. Starts(P1, s) ≡ s = S1. Finally, from (3.45) and Definition 3.5.4, it follows
that Executable(S1).
The next two properties deal with the successor situation of a situation on a path
that is also on the path. The first states that Σ∪Dpath entails that for any situation s on
a path p, there is a successor situation s′ = do(a, s) on p, and s′ can be reached from s
by performing an executable action a.
Proposition 3.5.38.
Σ ∪ Dpath |= ∀p, s. OnPath(p, s) ⊃ ∃s′, a. OnPath(p, s′) ∧ s′ = do(a, s) ∧ Poss(a, s).
Proof. Fix path P1. By Axiom 3.5.2(i), there is a corresponding function F1 and
situation S1 such that:
Executable(F1, S1), (3.47)
∀s. OnPath(P1, s) ≡ OnPathASF(F1, S1, s). (3.48)
Consider any situation Sn on P1, i.e., OnPath(P1, Sn). By (3.48), Sn must also be on
the sequence defined by (S1, F1):
OnPathASF(F1, S1, Sn). (3.49)
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From (3.49) and Definition 3.5.3, we have:
S1  Sn, and (3.50)
∀a, s. S1 ≺ do(a, s)  Sn,⊃ F1(s) = a. (3.51)
Assume F1(Sn) = An. Then from (3.50) and Lemmata 3.5.25 and 3.5.28, we have:
S1  do(An, Sn). (3.52)
From (3.52), (3.51), the assumption that F1(Sn) = An, and Definition 3.5.3, it follows
that the situation do(An, Sn) must be on the sequence defined by (S1, F1):
OnPathASF(F1, S1, do(An, Sn)). (3.53)
Also, by (3.53) and (3.48), do(An, Sn) must be on path P1:
OnPath(P1, do(An, Sn)). (3.54)
Finally, by (3.47), (3.53), and Definition 3.5.4, action An must have been executable
in Sn:
Poss(An, Sn). (3.55)
The proposition follows from (3.54) and (3.55).
Moreover, Σ ∪ Dpath entails that the successor situation of a situation on a path is
unique.
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Proposition 3.5.39.
Σ∪Dpath |= ∀p, s. OnPath(p, s)∧OnPath(p, do(a, s))∧OnPath(p, do(b, s)) ⊃ a = b.
Proof. (By contradiction) Fix path P1. By Axiom 3.5.2(i), there is a corresponding
function F1 and situation S1 such that:
∀s. OnPath(P1, s) ≡ OnPathASF(F1, S1, s). (3.56)
Fix S11 , A1, and A2 and assume that:
OnPath(P1, do(A1, S11)), (3.57)
OnPath(P1, do(A2, S11)), and (3.58)
A1 6= A2. (3.59)
From (3.56), (3.57), and Definition 3.5.3,it follows that:
∀a, s∗. S1 ≺ do(a, s∗)  do(A1, S11) ⊃ F1(s∗) = a. (3.60)
Similarly, from (3.56), (3.58), and Definition 3.5.3, it follows that:
∀a, s∗. S1 ≺ do(a, s∗)  do(A2, S11) ⊃ F1(s∗) = a. (3.61)
But from (3.60), (3.61), and (3.59), we have that:
F1(S
1
1) = A1 ∧ F1(S11) = A2 ∧ A1 6= A2,
which is contradictory to the fact that F1 is a function.
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The next property deals with the uniqueness of paths: Σ ∪ Dpath entails that if
p 6= p′, then there is a situation that is on path p but not on path p′.
Proposition 3.5.40.
Σ ∪ Dpath |= ∀p, p′. p 6= p′ ⊃ ∃s. (OnPath(p, s) ∧ ¬OnPath(p′, s)).
Proof. Follows from Axiom 3.5.5.
I can also show that Σ ∪ Dpath entails that all situations on a path are executable.
Corollary 3.5.41.
Σ ∪ Dpath |= ∀p, s. OnPath(p, s) ⊃ Executable(s).
Proof. (By induction on s) Fix path P1. The base case follows from Propositions
3.5.37(b) and 3.5.37(c). For the inductive hypothesis, fix situation S1 and assume that:
OnPath(P1, S1), and (3.62)
Executable(S1). (3.63)
From this and Propositions 3.5.38 and 3.5.39, it follows that there is a unique successor
situation S2 and action A1 such that:
OnPath(P1, S2) ∧ S2 = do(A1, S1), and (3.64)
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Poss(A1, S1). (3.65)
From (3.63), (3.65), and Definition 3.3.1, it follows that Executable(do(A1, S1)).
My next set of properties deal with the structure of situations on paths and shows
that paths are essentially linear sequences of situations. First I have Σ ∪ Dpath entails
that any pair of situations on the same path are co-linear:
Proposition 3.5.42.
Σ ∪ Dpath |= ∀p, s, s′. OnPath(p, s) ∧ OnPath(p, s′) ⊃ s = s′ ∨ s ≺ s′ ∨ s′ ≺ s.
Proof. (By contradiction) Fix path P1. By Axiom 3.5.2(i), there is a corresponding
function F1 and situation S1 such that:
∀s. OnPath(P1, s) ≡ OnPathASF(F1, S1, s). (3.66)
Fix Sm and Sn and assume that:
OnPath(P1, Sm), (3.67)
OnPath(P1, Sn), (3.68)
¬(Sm = Sn ∨ Sm ≺ Sn ∨ Sn ≺ Sm). (3.69)
From (3.66), (3.67), and Definition 3.5.3,it follows that:
S1  Sm, and (3.70)
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∀a, s∗. S1 ≺ do(a, s∗)  Sm ⊃ F1(s∗) = a. (3.71)
Similarly, from (3.66), (3.68), and Definition 3.5.3, it follows that:
S1  Sn, and (3.72)
∀a, s∗. S1 ≺ do(a, s∗)  Sn ⊃ F1(s∗) = a. (3.73)
From (3.69), (3.70), (3.72), and Lemma 3.5.32, it follows that there is a situation S2
and actions A1 and A2 such that:
S1  S2 ∧ do(A1, S2)  Sm ∧ do(A2, S2)  Sn ∧ A1 6= A2. (3.74)
But from (3.71), (3.73), and (3.74), we have that:
F1(S2) = A1 ∧ F1(S2) = A2 ∧ A1 6= A2,
which is contradictory to the fact that F1 is a function.
Secondly, I have Σ ∪ Dpath entails that if situations s and s′ are on a given path p,
then all situations in the interval defined by these two situations are also on p.
Proposition 3.5.43.
Σ∪Dpath |= ∀p, s, s′, s∗. OnPath(p, s)∧OnPath(p, s′)∧s  s∗  s′ ⊃ OnPath(p, s∗).
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Proof. Fix path P1. By Axiom 3.5.2(i), there is a corresponding function F1 and
situation S1 such that:
∀s. OnPath(P1, s) ≡ OnPathASF(F1, S1, s). (3.75)
Fix Sm, Sn, Sp and assume that:
OnPath(P1, Sm), (3.76)
OnPath(P1, Sp), (3.77)
Sm  Sn  Sp. (3.78)
From (3.75) and (3.76), it follows that:
OnPathASF(F1, S1, Sm). (3.79)
Similarly, from (3.75) and (3.77), it follows that:
OnPathASF(F1, S1, Sp). (3.80)
From (3.79) and Definition 3.5.3, it follows that:
S1  Sm. (3.81)
From this, (3.78), and transitivity of  (i.e. Lemma 3.5.28), it follows that:
S1  Sn. (3.82)
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From (3.80) and Definition 3.5.3, it follows that:
∀a, s∗. S1 ≺ do(a, s∗)  Sp ⊃ F1(s∗) = a. (3.83)
From this, (3.78), and (3.82), it follows that:
∀a, s∗. S1 ≺ do(a, s∗)  Sn ⊃ F1(s∗) = a. (3.84)
From (3.82), (3.84), and Definition 3.5.3, it follows that OnPathASF(F1, S1, Sn). The
proposition follows from this and (3.75).
Finally, I can show that Σ∪Dpath entails that two paths can share only one common
prefix. Once they branch at some situation, they never merge after that.
Proposition 3.5.44.
Σ ∪ Dpath |= ∀p1, p2, s, a, b, s1, s2. OnPath(p1, do(a, s)) ∧ OnPath(p2, do(b, s))
∧ a 6= b ∧ s ≺ s1 ∧ s ≺ s2 ∧ OnPath(p1, s1) ∧ OnPath(p2, s2)
⊃ s1 6= s2.
Proof. (By contradiction) Fix P1, P2, S1, A1, B1, S11, and S12, and assume that:
OnPath(P1, do(A1, S1)), (3.85)
OnPath(P2, do(B1, S1)), (3.86)
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A1 6= B1, (3.87)
S1 ≺ S11, (3.88)
S1 ≺ S12, (3.89)
OnPath(P1, S11), and (3.90)
OnPath(P2, S12). (3.91)
Also, assume that the consequent is false:
S11 = S12. (3.92)
From (3.85), (3.90), Proposition 3.5.42, and Definition 3.2.6, it follows that:
do(A1, S1)  S11 ∨ S11  do(A1, S1). (3.93)
Now suppose that:
S11 ≺ do(A1, S1).
Then by Axiom 3.2.5, we have:
∃b, s. (do(A1, S1) = do(b, s) ∧ S11  s).
Then from this and Axiom 3.2.3, it follows that S11  S1. By (3.88) and Lemma
3.5.23, it follows that S11 6= S1. Thus by Definition 3.2.6, we have:
S11 ≺ S1.
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Since by Lemma 3.5.22, ≺ is asymmetric, it follows from this that ¬(S1 ≺ S11). But
this contradicts (3.88). Thus it follows that:
¬(S11 ≺ do(A1, S1)). (3.94)
From (3.93) and (3.94), it follows that:
do(A1, S1)  S11. (3.95)
Similarly, it can be shown that:
do(B1, S1)  S12. (3.96)
Now from (3.92), we have S11 = S12. But from (3.95), (3.96), (3.87), and Lemma
3.5.31, this is impossible.
The next few properties deal with suffixes and prefixes of a given path. The first of
these states that Σ ∪ Dpath entails that for any situation s on a path p, there is a suffix
of p that starts with s.
Proposition 3.5.45.
Σ ∪ Dpath |= ∀p, s. OnPath(p, s) ⊃ ∃p′. Suffix(p′, p, s).
Proof. Fix path P1. By Axiom 3.5.2(i), there is a function F1 and situation S1 such
that:
Executable(F1, S1), (3.97)
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∀s. OnPath(P1, s) ≡ OnPathASF(F1, S1, s). (3.98)
Fix situation Sn such that:
OnPath(P1, Sn). (3.99)
We will show that there is a path Pn s.t. Pn, that starts with Sn, is a suffix of P1.
Consider the pair (Sn, F1). From (3.98) and (3.99), we have that:
OnPathASF(F1, S1, Sn). (3.100)
From this and Definition 3.5.3, it follows that:
S1  Sn. (3.101)
From (3.100), (3.101), (3.97), and Definitions 3.5.4 and 3.3.1, we have:
Executable(F1, Sn). (3.102)
By (3.102) and Axiom 3.5.2(ii), it follows that there is a path Pn s.t.
Starts(Pn, Sn), and (3.103)
∀s. OnPathASF(F1, Sn, s) ≡ OnPath(Pn, s). (3.104)
Now, we need show that Suffix(Pn, P1, Sn). From (3.98) and Definition 3.5.3, we have:
∀s. OnPath(P1, s) ≡ S1  s ∧ ∀a, s∗. S1 ≺ do(a, s∗)  s ⊃ F1(s∗) = a. (3.105)
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Similarly, from (3.104) and Definition 3.5.3, we have:
∀s. OnPath(Pn, s) ≡ Sn  s ∧ ∀a, s∗. Sn ≺ do(a, s∗)  s ⊃ F1(s∗) = a. (3.106)
From (3.105), (3.106), (3.101), and (3.99), it follows that:
∀s. Sn  s ⊃ OnPath(P1, s) ≡ OnPath(Pn, s). (3.107)
Then Suffix(Pn, P1, Sn) follows from (3.99), (3.103), (3.107), and Definition 3.5.16.
Secondly, I can show that given a path p with starting situation do(a, s), Σ ∪Dpath
entails that there is a path p′ s.t. p′ starts with s, and p is a suffix of p′ starting from
do(a, s).
Proposition 3.5.46.
Σ ∪ Dpath |= Starts(p, do(a, s)) ⊃ ∃p′. Starts(p′, s) ∧ Suffix(p, p′, do(a, s)).
Proof. Fix P1, A1, and S1 and assume that:
Starts(P1, do(A1, S1)). (3.108)
By Axiom 3.5.2(i), there is a function F1 and situation S2 such that:
Executable(F1, S2), and (3.109)
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∀s. OnPath(P1, s) ≡ OnPathASF(F1, S2, s). (3.110)
From (3.110), Lemma 3.5.26, and Definition 3.5.3, we have:
OnPath(P1, S2). (3.111)
Again, from (3.110) and Definition 3.5.3, we have:
∀s. OnPath(P1, s) ⊃ S2  s. (3.112)
From (3.111), (3.112), and Definition 3.5.1, we have that:
Starts(P1, S2). (3.113)
From (3.108), (3.113), and Proposition 3.5.37(b), it follows that:
S2 = do(A1, S1).
From this and (3.109) and (3.110), it follows that:
Executable(F1, do(A1, S1)), and (3.114)
∀s. OnPath(P1, s) ≡ OnPathASF(F1, do(A1, S1), s). (3.115)
Now, consider the pair (S1, F 11 ), where F
1
1 is defined as follows:
F 11 (s) = A1, if s = S1
= F1(s), otherwise .
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From (3.114) and Definition 3.5.4, it follows that:
Executable(do(A1, S1)).
From this and Lemma 3.5.29, it follows that:
Poss(A1, S1), and (3.116)
Executable(S1). (3.117)
From (3.114), (3.116), Definition 3.5.4, and by definition of F 11 , it follows that:
∀s. OnPathASF(F 11 , S1, s) ⊃ Poss(F 11 (s), s). (3.118)
From (3.117), (3.118), and Definition 3.5.4, we have that:
Executable(F 11 , S1). (3.119)
Now, by (3.119) and Axiom 3.5.2(ii), there is a path P 11 such that:
Starts(P 11 , S1), and (3.120)
∀s. OnPathASF(F 11 , S1, s) ≡ OnPath(P 11 , s). (3.121)
We need to show that Suffix(P1, P 11 , do(A1, S1)). From Lemma 3.5.25, we have:
S1  do(A1, S1). (3.122)
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Also, by definition of F 11 , it follows that:
∀a, s. S1 ≺ do(a, s)  do(A1, S1) ⊃ F 11 (s) = a. (3.123)
From (3.122), (3.123), and Definition 3.5.3, it follows that:
OnPathASF(F 11 , S1, do(A1, S1)).
From this and (3.121), it follows that:
OnPath(P 11 , do(A1, S1)). (3.124)
From (3.115) and Definition 3.5.3, we have:
∀s. OnPath(P1, s) ≡ do(A1, S1)  s
∧ ∀a, s∗. do(A1, S1) ≺ do(a, s∗)  s ⊃ F1(s∗) = a.
(3.125)
Similarly, from (3.121) and Definition 3.5.3, we have:
∀s. OnPath(P 11 , s) ≡ S1  s ∧ ∀a, s∗. S1 ≺ do(a, s∗)  s ⊃ F 11 (s∗) = a. (3.126)
Note that, by Lemmata 3.5.19, 3.5.20, and 3.5.23, it follows that:
∀s. do(A1, S1)  s ⊃ s 6= S1.
From this, (3.126), and definition of F 11 , we have:
∀s. do(A1, S1)  s ⊃
OnPath(P 11 , s) ≡ S1  s ∧ ∀a, s∗. S1 ≺ do(a, s∗)  s ⊃ F1(s∗) = a.
(3.127)
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From (3.125) and (3.127), it follows that:
∀s. do(A1, S1)  s ⊃ OnPath(P1, s) ≡ OnPath(P 11 , s). (3.128)
From (3.124), (3.108), (3.128), and Definition 3.5.16, it follows that:
Suffix(P1, P 11 , do(A1, S1)). (3.129)
The consequent follows from (3.120) and (3.129).
Finally, Σ ∪ Dpath entails that any path that starts with a non-initial situation can
be extended in the past; formally, for all situations s1 and s2, if s1 strictly precedes s2
and there is a path p2 that starts with s2, then there must also exist a path p1 such that
p1 starts with s1 and p2 is a suffix of p1 starting from s2.
Lemma 3.5.47.
Σ ∪ Dpath |= ∀s1, s2, p2. s1 ≺ s2 ∧ Starts(p2, s2) ⊃
∃p1. Starts(p1, s1) ∧ Suffix(p2, p1, s2).
Proof. (By induction on situation s2) For the base case, fix Sb2 such that Init(Sb2).
Then by this, Definition 3.2.1, and Axiom 3.2.5, we have: ¬∃s. s ≺ Sb2, and thus the
antecedent is false and the thesis follows trivially.
For the inductive hypothesis, fix situation S2 and assume that:
∀s1, p2. s1 ≺ S2 ∧ Starts(p2, S2) ⊃ ∃p1. Starts(p1, s1) ∧ Suffix(p2, p1, S2). (3.130)
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Fix A2. We have to show that:
∀s1, p2. s1 ≺ do(A2, S2) ∧ Starts(p2, do(A2, S2)) ⊃
∃p1. Starts(p1, s1) ∧ Suffix(p2, p1, do(A2, S2)).
Fix S1 and P2 and assume that:
S1 ≺ do(A2, S2), and (3.131)
Starts(P2, do(A2, S2)). (3.132)
By (3.132) and Proposition 3.5.46, it follows that there is a path P3 s.t.:
Starts(P3, S2) ∧ Suffix(P2, P3, do(A2, S2)). (3.133)
Also by (3.131) and Axiom 3.2.5, we have:
∃s, a. do(A2, S2) = do(a, s) ∧ S1  s.
By this and Axiom 3.2.3, we have:
S1  S2.
By this and Definition 3.2.6, it follows that:
S1 = S2 ∨ S1 ≺ S2.
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Case 1. Assume that S1 = S2. Then by (3.132) and Proposition 3.5.46, it follows that:
∃p. Starts(p, S1) ∧ Suffix(P2, p, do(A2, S2)),
and we are done.
Case 2. Assume that S1 ≺ S2. Then by this, (3.133), and (3.130), it follows that there
is a path P4 s.t.:
Starts(P4, S1) ∧ Suffix(P3, P4, S2). (3.134)
We will show that Suffix(P2, P4, do(A2, S2)). By (3.133) and Definition 3.5.16, we
have:
OnPath(P3, do(A2, S2)), and (3.135)
∀s′. do(A2, S2)  s′ ⊃ (OnPath(P3, s′) ≡ OnPath(P2, s′)). (3.136)
By (3.134) and Definition 3.5.16, we have:
∀s′. S2  s′ ⊃ (OnPath(P3, s′) ≡ OnPath(P4, s′)). (3.137)
Since by Lemma 3.5.25, S2  do(A2, S2), it follows from (3.135) and (3.137) that:
OnPath(P4, do(A2, S2)). (3.138)
Also from (3.136) and (3.137), it follows that:
∀s′. do(A2, S2)  s′ ⊃ (OnPath(P2, s′) ≡ OnPath(P4, s′)). (3.139)
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Finally, from (3.132), (3.138), (3.139), and Definition 3.5.16, we have:
Suffix(P2, P4, do(A2, S2)).
3.5.3 Induction Principles
I now prove some second-order induction principles for paths and for situations in a
path. First I have Σ∪Dpath entails that if some property Q holds for all paths that start
with an initial situation, and if wheneverQ holds for all paths that start with situation s,
then it holds for all paths that start with any successor situation to s, then the property
Q holds for all paths.
Theorem 3.5.48 (Induction on Paths).
Σ ∪ Dpath |= ∀Q. [{∀s, p. Init(s) ∧ Starts(p, s) ⊃ Q(p)} ∧
{∀a, s. (∀p. Starts(p, s) ⊃ Q(p))
⊃ (∀p′. Starts(p′, do(a, s)) ⊃ Q(p′))}]
⊃ ∀p. Q(p).
Proof. (By contradiction) Fix property Q1 and assume:
∀s, p. Init(s) ∧ Starts(p, s) ⊃ Q1(p), (3.140)
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∀a, s. (∀p. Starts(p, s) ⊃ Q1(p)) ⊃ (∀p′. Starts(p′, do(a, s)) ⊃ Q1(p′)). (3.141)
Also assume that there is a path P1 over which Q1 is false:
¬Q1(P1). (3.142)
By Proposition 3.5.37(a,b), P1 must start with some unique situation, call it S1:
Starts(P1, S1). (3.143)
We now prove by induction on s that:
∀s, p. Starts(p, s) ⊃ Q1(p).
For the base case where s is an initial situation, the thesis follows from (3.140).
For the inductive step, fix S2 and assume that:
∀p. Starts(p, S2) ⊃ Q1(p). (3.144)
Take some arbitrary action A1. It follows from (3.141) and (3.144) that:
∀p. Starts(p, do(A1, S2)) ⊃ Q1(p). (3.145)
Thus by induction on s, we have:
∀s, p. Starts(p, s) ⊃ Q1(p). (3.146)
By (3.146) and (3.143), it follows that Q1(p); but this is contradictory to (3.142).
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Moreover, Σ∪Dpath entails that if some property Q holds for the starting situation
of a given path p, and if whenever Q holds for a situation s on path p, then it holds for
the successor situation to s on p, then the property Q holds for all situations on path p.
Theorem 3.5.49 (Induction on Situations in a Path).
Σ ∪ Dpath |= ∀p,Q. [{∀s. Starts(p, s) ⊃ Q(s)} ∧
{∀a, s. (OnPath(p, s) ∧Q(s) ∧ OnPath(p, do(a, s))) ⊃ Q(do(a, s))}]
⊃ ∀s. OnPath(p, s) ⊃ Q(s).
Proof. (By contradiction) Fix path P1 and property Q1 and assume:
∀s. Starts(P1, s) ⊃ Q1(s), (3.147)
∀a, s. OnPath(P1, s) ∧Q1(s) ∧ OnPath(P1, do(a, s)) ⊃ Q1(do(a, s)). (3.148)
Also assume that there is a situation SP1 on path P1 over which Q1 is false:
OnPath(P1, SP1) ∧ ¬Q1(SP1). (3.149)
By Proposition 3.5.37(a,b), P1 must start with some unique situation, call it S1:
Starts(P1, S1). (3.150)
From this and Definition 3.5.1, we have:
OnPath(P1, S1). (3.151)
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We now prove by induction on s that:
∀s. OnPath(P1, s) ⊃ Q1(s).
For the base case where s is the starting situation of P1, i.e. S1, the thesis follows from
(3.147), (3.150), and (3.151).
For the inductive step, fix S2 and assume that:
OnPath(P1, S2) ∧Q1(S2). (3.152)
Take some arbitrary actionA1 such that OnPath(P1, do(A1, S2)). Then by this, (3.152),
and (3.148), it follows that:
Q1(do(A1, S2)). (3.153)
Thus by induction on s, we have:
∀s. OnPath(P1, s) ⊃ Q1(s). (3.154)
But this is contradictory to (3.149).
3.5.4 Correctness of Axiomatization
Next, I prove the correctness of my axiomatization. Note that, a natural way of captur-
ing the notion of infinite path is by specifying it as a mapping from the set of natural
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numbers to situations on a path. To this end, I use a function σ of the following sort
(here S denotes the set of all situations):
σ : N→ S.
I say that such a function σ models a path sequence if σ maps the number 0 to an exe-
cutable situation (representing the starting situation of the path), and for each number
n, there is an action a that is executable in the situation sn produced by σ(n) such that
σ maps the immediate successor of n (i.e. n+ 1) to the situation do(a, sn).
Definition 3.5.50.
PathSeq(σ) def= Executable(σ(0)) ∧ ∀n. ∃a. Poss(a, σ(n)) ∧ σ(n+ 1) = do(a, σ(n)).
When I prove results involving path sequences, I will use an axiomatization of the
natural numbers, i.e., standard second-order Peano arithmetic, for the natural number
sort, denoted by ΣN.
I will use the following to prove the completeness theorem. Given Definition
3.5.50, it can be shown that if σ is a path sequence and i < j, then the situation
given by σ(i) precedes the one given by σ(j):
Lemma 3.5.51.
ΣN ∪ Σ ∪ Dpath |= ∀σ, i, j. PathSeq(σ) ∧ i < j ⊃ σ(i) ≺ σ(j).
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Proof. (By induction on n, where n = j − i) Fix σ1 and assume:
PathSeq(σ1). (3.155)
For the base case, fix I1 and J1 and assume that J1 − I1 = 1. Then it follows from
(3.155) and Definition 3.5.50 that there is an action A1 s.t.:
σ1(J1) = σ1(I1 + 1) = do(A1, σ1(I1)).
From this and Lemma 3.5.19, it follows that σ1(I1) ≺ do(A1, σ1(I1)), i.e. σ1(I1) ≺
σ1(I1 + 1), and thus σ1(I1) ≺ σ1(J1).
For the inductive case, fix IN , JN , and N1 and assume that:
JN − IN = N1, and (3.156)
PathSeq(σ1) ∧ IN < JN ⊃ σ1(IN) ≺ σ1(JN). (3.157)
We have to show that:
PathSeq(σ1) ∧ IN < JN+1 ⊃ σ1(IN) ≺ σ1(JN+1),
where JN+1 − IN = N1 + 1, i.e. by (3.156), JN+1 = JN + 1.
Now, from (3.155) and (3.156), it follows that PathSeq(σ1) ∧ IN < JN . From this and
the inductive hypothesis (i.e. (3.157)), we have:
σ1(IN) ≺ σ1(JN). (3.158)
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Moreover, from (3.155) and Definition 3.5.50 it follows that there is an action AN s.t.:
σ1(JN + 1) = do(AN , σ1(JN)).
From this and Lemma 3.5.19, it follows that σ1(JN) ≺ do(AN , σ1(JN)), i.e. σ1(JN) ≺
σ1(JN + 1), and thus:
σ1(JN) ≺ σ1(JN+1). (3.159)
Finally, from (3.158), (3.159), and the transitivity of ≺, i.e. Lemma 3.5.20, we have:
σ1(IN) ≺ σ1(JN+1).
To show that for every path sequence there is a corresponding path, it is useful to
first introduce a corresponding ASF. Given path sequence σ, let Fσ be the ASF defined
as follows:
Definition 3.5.52.
Fσ(s) = an, if ∃n. σ(n) = s ∧ σ(n+ 1) = do(an, s),
Fσ(s) = b, otherwise,
where b is some fixed but arbitrary action.
I can show that given a path sequence σ, any situation s that is on the path defined by
the corresponding ASF Fσ and the initial situation of the path sequence σ(0) is in fact
on the path sequence σ at some position n:
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Lemma 3.5.53.
ΣN ∪ Σ ∪ Dpath |= ∀s, σ. PathSeq(σ) ∧ σ(0) ≺ s ∧ OnPathASF(Fσ, σ(0), s) ⊃
∃n. σ(n) = s.
Proof. (By induction on s) Fix σ1. Construct a function from situations to actions Fσ1
such that Fσ1 is the corresponding ASF to σ1. Also, assume that:
PathSeq(σ1). (3.160)
In the base case where s is an initial situation, ¬∃s′. s′ ≺ s by Definition 3.2.1 and
Axiom 3.2.5, so the antecedent is false and the thesis trivially holds.
For the inductive step, fix SN and assume that:
σ1(0) ≺ SN ∧ OnPathASF(Fσ1 , σ1(0), SN) ⊃ ∃n. σ1(n) = SN . (3.161)
Also, fix action AN and assume that:
σ1(0) ≺ do(AN , SN), and (3.162)
OnPathASF(Fσ1 , σ1(0), do(AN , SN)). (3.163)
From (3.163) and Definition 3.5.3, it follows that:
∀a, s. σ1(0) ≺ do(a, s)  do(AN , SN) ⊃ Fσ1(s) = a. (3.164)
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From (3.162) and Axiom 3.2.5, it follows that:
σ1(0)  SN . (3.165)
From Lemma 3.5.25, we have SN  do(AN , SN). From this and (3.164), we have:
∀a, s. σ1(0) ≺ do(a, s)  SN ⊃ Fσ1(s) = a. (3.166)
From (3.165), (3.166), and Definition 3.5.3, we have:
OnPathASF(Fσ1 , σ1(0), SN). (3.167)
Now, (3.165) and Definition 3.2.6 give us two cases. In the case where σ1(0) = SN ,
it trivially follows that ∃n. σ1(n) = SN . In the case where σ1(0) ≺ SN , from this,
(3.167), and the induction hypothesis, i.e. (3.161), it follows that ∃n. σ1(n) = SN .
Thus, in both these cases, there is a N1 such that:
σ1(N1) = SN . (3.168)
From (3.160), (3.168), and Definition 3.5.50, it follows that there is an action, let us
call it A∗N , s.t.:
σ1(N1 + 1) = do(A
∗
N , σ1(N1)). (3.169)
We just need to show that A∗N = AN . From the definition of Fσ1 , it follows that:
∀a. σ1(N1 + 1) = do(a, σ1(N1)) ⊃ Fσ1(σ1(N1)) = a. (3.170)
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From (3.168), (3.169), and (3.170), it follows that:
Fσ1(SN) = A
∗
N . (3.171)
From (3.164), we have Fσ1(SN) = AN . Finally from this and (3.171), we have AN =
A∗N , and thus from this, (3.169), and (3.168), it follows that σ1(N1 +1) = do(AN , SN),
i.e. ∃n. σ1(n) = do(AN , SN).
I say that a path p matches a path sequence σ if σ is indeed a path sequence, σ(0)
is the starting situation of p, and for all n, s and a, if σ(n) is a situation s on path p,
then σ(n+ 1) is the successor situation do(a, s) of s on p:
Definition 3.5.54.
Matches(p, σ) def= PathSeq(σ) ∧ (σ(0) = s ≡ Starts(p, s))
∧ ∀n, s. [σ(n) = s ∧ OnPath(p, s) ⊃
∀a. (σ(n+ 1) = do(a, s) ≡ OnPath(p, do(a, s)))].
Given this formalization, the task of proving correctness of my axiomatization for
infinite paths can be reduced to showing that path sequences are isomorphic to paths
defined by Σ ∪ Dpath, i.e. that there is an one-to-one mapping between these two. To
this end, I first show that for any path p, there is a path sequence σ that matches p.
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Theorem 3.5.55 (Soundness).
ΣN ∪ Σ ∪ Dpath |= ∀p. (∃σ. PathSeq(σ) ∧Matches(p, σ)).
Proof. Fix path P1. By Propositions 3.5.37(a), and 3.5.37(c), there is an executable
situation S1 such that P1 starts with S1:
Starts(P1, S1), and (3.172)
Executable(S1). (3.173)
By Axiom 3.5.2(i), there is an action selection function F1 and situation S2 such that:
Executable(F1, S2), and
∀s′. OnPathASF(F1, S2, s′) ≡ OnPath(P1, s′).
From this and Definition 3.5.3, it follows that S2 is the earliest situation of path P1.
Moreover, from Definition 3.5.1 and (3.172), it follows that S1 is the earliest situation
that is also on path P1. Thus it follows that S1 = S2 and hence we have:
Executable(F1, S1), and (3.174)
∀s′. OnPathASF(F1, S1, s′) ≡ OnPath(P1, s′). (3.175)
Let σ1 be defined as follows:
σ1(0) = S1, (3.176)
σ1(n+ 1) = do(F1(σ1(n)), σ1(n)), for n ≥ 0. (3.177)
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We have to prove that PathSeq(σ1) ∧Matches(P1, σ1).
First, let me show that PathSeq(σ1). By Definition 3.5.50, to show this we have to
prove that:
(a). Executable(σ1(0)), and
(b). ∀n. ∃a. Poss(a, σ1(n)) ∧ σ1(n+ 1) = do(a, σ1(n)).
(a) follows from (3.173) and (3.176). By (3.177), for each n there is indeed an action
a = F1(σ1(n)) s.t. σ1(n+ 1) = do(a, σ1(n)). Thus to show (b), we have to prove that
∀n. Poss(F1(σ1(n)), σ1(n)). Now, from (3.174) and Definition 3.5.4, it follows that:
∀s′. OnPathASF(F1, S1, s′) ⊃ Poss(F1(s′), s′).
Thus, to prove that ∀n. Poss(F1(σ1(n)), σ1(n)), we just need to show that:
∀n. OnPathASF(F1, S1, σ1(n)).
I will show this by induction on n. For the base case, i.e. when n = 0, it follows from
(3.176) that σ1(n) = S1. Thus we have to show that OnPathASF(F1, S1, S1). This
follows trivially from Definitions 3.2.6, 3.5.3, and Lemmata 3.5.20 and 3.5.21 (which
imply that there are no situations do(a, s∗) such that S1 ≺ do(a, s∗)  S1). For the
inductive case, fix N1 and assume that:
OnPathASF(F1, S1, σ1(N1)). (3.178)
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We have to show that OnPathASF(F1, S1, σ1(N1 + 1)). From (3.178) and Definition
3.5.3, we have:
S1  σ1(N1), and (3.179)
∀a, s∗. S1 ≺ do(a, s∗)  σ1(N1) ⊃ F1(s∗) = a. (3.180)
From (3.180) and Definition 3.5.3, it follows that OnPathASF(F1, S1, σ1(N1 + 1))
holds if the following hold:
(b1). S1  σ1(N1 + 1), and
(b2). ∀a, s∗. σ1(N1) ≺ do(a, s∗)  σ1(N1 + 1) ⊃ F1(s∗) = a.
Now, from (3.177), we have:
σ1(N1 + 1) = do(F1(σ1(N1)), σ1(N1)). (3.181)
From this and Lemma 3.5.25, we have:
σ1(N1)  σ1(N1 + 1).
(b1) follows from this, (3.179), and the transitivity of  (i.e. Lemma 3.5.28). More-
over, (b2) follows from (3.181) and Lemmata 3.5.20 and 3.5.21 (which imply that there
are no situations between σ1(N1) and σ1(N1 + 1)). Thus, we have PathSeq(σ1).
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Next, let me show that Matches(P1, σ1). We already proved that σ1 is a path se-
quence. Thus by Definition 3.5.54, we need to show that:
(c). σ1(0) = s ≡ Starts(P1, s) and
(d). ∀n, s. [σ1(n) = s ∧ OnPath(P1, s) ⊃
∀a. (σ1(n+ 1) = do(a, s) ≡ OnPath(P1, do(a, s)))].
(c) follows from (3.172), (3.176) and the uniqueness of starting situations of paths, i.e.
Proposition 3.5.37(b). For (d), fix N1 and Ŝ1 and assume that:
σ1(N1) = Ŝ1, and (3.182)
OnPath(P1, Ŝ1). (3.183)
For the (⊃) direction, fix A1 and assume that:
σ1(N1 + 1) = do(A1, Ŝ1).
Then by this and (3.177), we have:
do(A1, Ŝ1) = do(F1(σ1(N1)), σ1(N1)).
From this and (3.182), we have:
do(A1, Ŝ1) = do(F1(Ŝ1), Ŝ1). (3.184)
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From (3.175) and (3.183), we have:
OnPathASF(F1, S1, Ŝ1).
From this and Definition 3.5.3, it follows that:
S1  Ŝ1, and (3.185)
∀a, s∗. S1 ≺ do(a, s∗)  Ŝ1 ⊃ F1(s∗) = a. (3.186)
Now, consider the situation do(F1(Ŝ1), Ŝ1). From Lemma 3.5.25, we have:
Ŝ1  do(F1(Ŝ1), Ŝ1). (3.187)
From this, (3.185), and the transitivity of  (i.e. Lemma 3.5.28), it follows that:
S1  do(F1(Ŝ1), Ŝ1). (3.188)
Moreover, from (3.186), (3.187), and Lemmata 3.5.20 and 3.5.21, it follows that:
∀a, s∗. S1 ≺ do(a, s∗)  do(F1(Ŝ1), Ŝ1) ⊃ F1(s∗) = a. (3.189)
From (3.188), (3.189), and Definition 3.5.3, it follows that:
OnPathASF(F1, S1, do(F1(Ŝ1), Ŝ1)).
From this and (3.175), it follows that OnPath(P1, do(F1(Ŝ1), Ŝ1)), i.e. by (3.184) that
OnPath(P1, do(A1, Ŝ1)).
221
For the (⊂) direction, fix A1 and assume that:
OnPath(P1, do(A1, Ŝ1)).
Then from this and (3.175), it follows that:
OnPathASF(F1, S1, do(A1, Ŝ1)).
From this and Definition 3.5.3, it follows that:
A1 = F1(Ŝ1). (3.190)
Now, since by (3.182), σ1(N1) = Ŝ1, it follows by (3.177) that:
σ1(N1 + 1) = do(F1(Ŝ1), Ŝ1).
From this and (3.190), we have:
σ(N1 + 1) = do(A1, Ŝ1).
Thus P1 matches σ1.
Conversely, for any path sequence σ, there is a path p that matches σ.
Theorem 3.5.56 (Completeness).
ΣN ∪ Σ ∪ Dpath |= ∀σ. PathSeq(σ) ⊃ ∃p. Matches(p, σ).
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Proof. Fix function σ1 and assume that:
PathSeq(σ1). (3.191)
From this and Definition 3.5.50, it follows that:
Executable(σ1(0)), and (3.192)
∀n. ∃a. Poss(a, σ1(n)) ∧ σ1(n+ 1) = do(a, σ1(n)). (3.193)
Construct a tuple (σ1(0), Fσ1) such that Fσ1 , which is a function from situations to
actions, is the corresponding ASF to σ1. I will now show that Executable(Fσ1 , σ1(0)).
Assume otherwise. Then from Definition 3.5.4 and (3.192), it follows that there is a
situation SN such that:
OnPathASF(Fσ1 , σ1(0), SN), and (3.194)
¬Poss(Fσ1(SN), SN). (3.195)
From (3.194) and Definition 3.5.3, it follows that σ1(0)  SN . This and Definition
3.2.6 give us two cases. In the case where σ1(0) = SN , it trivially follows that
∃n. σ1(n) = SN . In the case where σ1(0) ≺ SN , from (3.191), the assumption for
this case that σ1(0) strictly precedes SN , (3.194), and Lemma 3.5.53, it follows that
∃n. σ1(n) = SN . Thus, for both these cases, we have that there is a n, say N1, s.t.:
σ1(N1) = SN . (3.196)
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Then from this and (3.193), it follows that there is an action AN s.t.:
σ1(N1 + 1) = do(AN , SN), and (3.197)
Poss(AN , SN). (3.198)
From (3.196), (3.197), and the definition of Fσ1 , it follows that:
Fσ1(SN) = AN .
Finally, from this and (3.198), we have Poss(Fσ1(SN), SN); but this is contradictory to
(3.195). Thus, we have:
Executable(Fσ1 , σ1(0)). (3.199)
From this and Axiom 3.5.2(ii), it follows that there is a path P1 such that:
Starts(P1, σ1(0)), and (3.200)
∀s. OnPathASF(Fσ1 , σ1(0), s) ≡ OnPath(P1, s). (3.201)
Now, we need to show that Matches(P1, σ1). By Definition 3.5.54, this amounts to
showing that:
(a). PathSeq(σ1), and
(b). σ1(0) = s ≡ Starts(P1, s) and
(c). ∀n, s. [σ1(n) = s ∧ OnPath(P1, s) ⊃
∀a. (σ1(n+ 1) = do(a, s) ≡ OnPath(P1, do(a, s)))].
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(a) follows from the antecedent, i.e. (3.191). (b) follows from (3.200) and the unique-
ness of starting situations of paths, i.e. Proposition 3.5.37(b). For (c), fix N̂1 and Ŝ1
and assume that:
σ1(N̂1) = Ŝ1, and (3.202)
OnPath(P1, Ŝ1). (3.203)
For the (⊃) direction, fix Â1 and assume that:
σ1(N̂1 + 1) = do(Â1, Ŝ1). (3.204)
From (3.203) and (3.201), it follows that:
OnPathASF(Fσ1 , σ1(0), Ŝ1).
From this and Definition 3.5.3, we have:
∀a, s. σ1(0) ≺ do(a, s)  Ŝ1 ⊃ Fσ1(s) = a. (3.205)
From (3.202), (3.204), and the definition of Fσ1 , we have:
Fσ1(Ŝ1) = Â1. (3.206)
Now, suppose ¬OnPath(P1, do(Â1, Ŝ1)). Then by (3.201), we have:
¬OnPathASF(Fσ1 , σ1(0), do(Â1, Ŝ1)). (3.207)
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From Lemma 3.5.51, (3.191), and the fact that 0 < N̂1 + 1, we have σ1(0) ≺ σ1(N̂1 +
1). From this and (3.204), we have:
σ1(0) ≺ do(Â1, Ŝ1).
From this, (3.207), and Definition 3.5.3, we have:
∃a, s. σ1(0) ≺ do(a, s)  do(Â1, Ŝ1) ∧ ¬Fσ1(s) = a.
From this and (3.205), it follows that ¬(Fσ1(Ŝ1) = Â1); but this is contradictory to
(3.206).
For the (⊂) direction, fix Â2 and assume that:
OnPath(P1, do(Â2, Ŝ1)). (3.208)
From (3.191) and Definition 3.5.50, it follows that there is an action, say Â3, s.t.:
σ1(N̂1 + 1) = do(Â3, σ1(N̂1)). (3.209)
I will show that Â2 = Â3. From (3.209) and (3.202), it follows that:
σ1(N̂1 + 1) = do(Â3, Ŝ1). (3.210)
From (3.208) and (3.201), we have:
OnPathASF(Fσ1 , σ1(0), do(Â2, Ŝ1)).
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From this and Definition 3.5.3, we have Fσ1(Ŝ1) = Â2. Finally from this, (3.202),
(3.210), and the definition of Fσ1 , we have Â2 = Â3. Thus from this and (3.210), it
follows that σ1(N̂1 + 1) = do(Â2, Ŝ1).
Note that my soundness result implies that for any path p, there is a countably
infinite number of distinct situations on p: as shown above, p corresponds to a path
sequence, and situations along a path sequence are strict successors to each other; this
along with Lemmata 3.5.19, 3.5.20, and 3.5.23 imply that these situations are distinct.
An alternative way to show that there is a countably infinite number of situations on a
path p is to show that (a) there is a situation on p, that (b) for every situation s on p,
there is a successor situation do(a, s) that is also on p, and that (c) these situations are
distinct. (a) follows from Definition 3.5.1 and Proposition 3.5.37(a), while (b) follows
from Proposition 3.5.38. Finally, (c) follows from Lemmata 3.5.19, 3.5.20, and 3.5.23.
3.5.5 Related Work
I have already discussed the work most closely related to my paths at the beginning
of this section. Beyond this, there is some work that deals with the temporal aspects
of situations, i.e. the starting time of situations and action durations [165, 177], but
not temporally extended paths. Another set of approaches introduces some notion of
paths while addressing some application of paths and shows how various temporal
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logic formulae can be interpreted over such paths. Gabaldon [85] was the first to
introduce statements of temporal logic (LTL) into the situation calculus. He used these
to express search control knowledge for forward-chaining planning. However, he only
considers finite paths defined by pairs of situations. Fritz and McIlraith [84] show
how an extended version of LTL interpreted over a finite horizon can be compiled into
ConGolog [51].
Claßsen and Lakemeyer [32] developed a second-order modal logic inspired by
CTL∗ and dynamic logic to express properties about (possibly) non-terminating Con-
Golog programs. The authors define infinite “traces” using program configurations.
A configuration is a pair (δ, z), where δ is a ConGolog program that remains to be
executed and z is a sequence of actions that have been already performed. Given z and
world w, they define infinite execution traces of δ as infinite sequences of configura-
tions, s.t. the ending configuration of any finite prefix of the sequence can be reached
from the initial configuration (δ, z) and w. Note that, a key difference between this
work and my formalization is that while I define paths axiomatically in the situation
calculus, they define a modal logic on top of the situation calculus that allows temporal
properties over execution of programs to be expressed and the semantics of programs
is part of the model theoretic semantics of the logic. For the CTL-like fragment of the
language, the authors also propose a verification method based on fixpoint approxima-
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tion and “characteristic graphs”, which can finitely represent a ConGolog program’s
configuration graph; the method is sound but incomplete.
[56] uses a first-order version of the µ-calculus [65] to specify properties of non-
terminating Golog [140] programs. The µ-calculus is a very expressive temporal logic
that provides least and greatest fixpoints. Interestingly, the semantics of the µ-calculus
operators can be defined without referring explicitly to infinite paths. In the proposi-
tional case, it is well known that the µ-calculus subsumes LTL as well as CTL∗[111, 5],
although translating a CTL∗ formula often results in a much less readable µ-calculus
formula. However, in the first-order case (when quantification over objects across
situations is allowed), the µ-calculus does not subsume LTL (and thus CTL∗), a conse-
quence of results shown in [28]. Thus, my situation calculus with infinite paths, which
can be used to define first-order LTL and CTL∗ over situation calculus theories, can
express properties that cannot be expressed in first-order µ-calculus over such theories.
3.6 The ConGolog Agent Programming Language
I now outline the logic programming language ConGolog [51], the concurrent version
of Golog [140], which will be used to define the semantics of the Simple Rational
Agent Programming Language (SR-APL) in Chapter 7. Within SR-APL, I also specify
the agents’ plans using the notation of ConGolog.
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The ConGolog programming language provides an alternative to AI planning by
looking instead at the problem of high-level program execution. Instead of looking for
a legal sequence of actions to achieve some goal, the ConGolog interpreter searches
for a legal sequence of actions that amount to a legal execution of some high-level
non-deterministic program, one that specifies the agent’s behavior. The more abstract
the program is, the more it resembles traditional planning. But a ConGolog program
can encode search control knowledge. The formalism differs from other concurrent
procedural languages in that the initial state can be incompletely specified. As well,
primitive actions can be user defined, to be specific, by axioms in the situation calculus,
thus allowing these actions to affect the environment in complex ways. Finally, it
also incorporates a rich notion of concurrency, contributing to a level of procedural
complexity that hasn’t been addressed before (e.g. those arising from the interaction
between prioritized concurrency and recursive procedures).
A typical ConGolog program is composed of a sequence of procedure declarations,
followed by a complex action. Complex actions can be composed using constructs
given in Table 3.1. Here a denotes a situation calculus primitive action, φ denotes a
situation calculus formula with the situation argument of its fluents suppressed, δ, δ1,
and δ2 stand for complex actions, ~x is a set of variables, β is a procedure name, and
~p denotes the actual parameters to the procedure. Most of these constructs are self-
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a, primitive action
φ?, wait for a condition
(δ1; δ2), sequence
(δ1 | δ2), nondeterministic choice between actions
pix. δ, nondeterministic choice of arguments
δ∗, nondeterministic iteration
if φ then δ1 else δ2, conditional
while φ do δ, while loop
(δ1‖δ2), concurrency with equal priority
(δ1〉〉δ2), concurrency with different priorities
〈~x : φ→ δ〉, interrupt
δ‖, concurrent iteration
β(~p), procedure call
Table 3.1: Some ConGolog Constructs
explanatory. Intuitively, pix.δ nondeterministically picks a binding for the variable
x and performs the program δ for this binding of x. The interrupt construct works
as follows: whenever φ becomes true for some binding of ~x, δ is executed with this
binding; after this, the interrupt can fire again. The syntax of procedures is as follows:
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proc β(~y)δ, where β is the procedure name, ~y denotes the formal parameters to the
procedure, and δ is a complex action.
For example, consider the simple program to clear a table in a blocks world:
{proc removeABlock
pib. [OnTable(b, now)?; pickUp(b); putAway(b)]
end;
removeABlock∗;¬∃b. OnTable(b, now)?}
Here, first a procedure is defined to remove a block from the table using the non-
deterministic choice of argument operator pi. The wait action OnTable(b, now)? suc-
ceeds only if the chosen argument b is a block that is on the table in the current situa-
tion. The main part of the program uses the non-deterministic iteration operator, and
says to execute the removeABlock program zero or more times until the table is clear.
The semantics of ConGolog programs are defined using structural operational se-
mantics [168], which is based on transitions. A transition is a “single step” of com-
putation, i.e. a primitive action. To this end, two special predicates are introduced,
Final and Trans, where Final(δ, s) means that program δ may legally terminate in sit-
uation s, and where Trans(δ, s, δ′, s′) means that program δ in situation s may legally
execute one step, ending in situation s′ with program δ′ remaining. Trans and Final
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are characterized by giving equivalence axioms for each of the above constructs of
ConGolog.20
In the following, I give axioms only for the program constructs that I will be using
in SR-APL; see [51] for the complete axiomatization of Trans and Final. Also, for test
actions φ?, I use the alternate semantics provided in [54] as it simplifies the operational
semantics of SR-APL. The axioms ΓF for Final are as follows (here, the construct nil
denotes the ‘empty’ program that terminates immediately):
Axiom 3.6.1.
ΓF1 . Final(nil, s) ≡ True,
ΓF2 . Final(a, s) ≡ False,
ΓF3 . Final(φ?, s) ≡ φ(s),
ΓF4 . Final([δ1; δ2], s) ≡ Final(δ1, s) ∧ Final(δ2, s),
ΓF5 . Final(pix. δ, s) ≡ ∃x. Final(δ, s),
ΓF6 . Final(δ
∗, s) ≡ True,
ΓF7 . Final([δ1 ‖ δ2], s) ≡ Final(δ1, s) ∧ Final(δ2, s).
Thus, these axioms define whether the program can be considered to be already in a
legally terminated state in the given situation. For example, axiom ΓF4 says that the
20However, note that De Giacomo et al. defined interrupts in terms of other constructs; see [51] for
details.
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program that involves a sequential composition [δ1; δ2] can be considered completed
in situation s if both δ1 and δ2 are final/completed in s.
The axioms ΓT characterizing Trans are as follows:
Axiom 3.6.2.
ΓT1 . Trans(nil, s, δ
′, s′) ≡ False,
ΓT2 . Trans(a, s, δ
′, s′) ≡ Poss(a, s) ∧ δ′ = nil ∧ s′ = do(a, s),
ΓT3 . Trans(φ?, s, δ
′, s′) ≡ False,
ΓT4 . Trans([δ1; δ2], s, δ
′, s′) ≡ ∃δ′1. (δ′ = [δ′1; δ2] ∧ Trans(δ1, s, δ′1, s′))
∨ Final(δ1, s) ∧ Trans(δ2, s, δ′, s′),
ΓT5 . Trans(pix.δ, s, δ
′, s′) ≡ ∃x. Trans(δ, s, δ′, s′),
ΓT6 . Trans(δ
∗, s, δ′, s′) ≡ ∃δ′1. δ′ = (δ′1; δ∗) ∧ Trans(δ, s, δ′1, s′),
ΓT7 . Trans([δ1 ‖ δ2], s, δ′, s′) ≡ ∃δ′1. (δ′ = [δ′1 ‖ δ2] ∧ Trans(δ1, s, δ′1, s′)),
∨ ∃δ′2. (δ′ = [δ1 ‖ δ′2] ∧ Trans(δ2, s, δ′2, s′)).
These axioms thus specify when a configuration (δ, s) with a program δ remaining in
situation s can evolve in a single step to a configuration (δ′, s′). For example, axiom
ΓT2 says that a program involving a primitive action a in a situation s can make a
transition to (nil, do(a, s)), provided that a is possible in s. After having performed
a, nothing remains to be performed. ΓT4 states that a program that is composed of
234
a sequence [δ1; δ2] in s can evolve to the configuration ([δ′1; δ2], s
′), provided that the
program δ1 in s can evolve to the program δ′1 in s
′. Moreover, this sequential com-
position can also evolve to the configuration (δ′, s′), provided that (δ1, s) is a final
configuration, and the program δ2 in s can evolve to the program δ′ in s′.
The overall semantics of a ConGolog program is specified by the Do predicate,
which is defined as follows:
Definition 3.6.3.
Do(δ, s, s′) def= ∃δ′. (Trans∗(δ, s, δ′, s′) ∧ Final(δ′, s′)),
where Trans∗ is the reflexive transitive closure of the transition relation Trans, which
can be defined using the following second-order situation calculus formula:
Definition 3.6.4.
Trans∗(δ, s, δ′, s′) def=
∀T. [∀δ1, s1. T (δ1, s1, δ1, s1) ∧
∀δ1, s1, δ2, s2, δ3, s3. (Trans(δ1, s1, δ2, s2) ∧ T (δ2, s2, δ3, s3) ⊃ T (δ1, s1, δ3, s3))]
⊃ T (δ, s, δ′, s′).
Thus Do(δ, s, s′) holds if and only if s′ can be reached by performing a sequence of
transitions starting with the program δ in s, and the remaining program δ′ may legally
terminate in s′.
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In [51], De Giacomo et al. showed that the axioms for Trans and Final are defi-
nitional in the sense that the whole of ConGolog completely characterize Trans and
Final for programs without procedures. Thus, these predicates can be eliminated. To
give the semantics of ConGolog programs with procedures, De Giacomo et al. relied
on second-order definitions of Trans and Final. The reason for this is that since a
recursive procedure may do an arbitrary number of procedure calls before it actually
performs a primitive action, and since calling procedures does not involve transitions,
it is impossible to give first-order equivalence axioms for them. However, they showed
that under certain conditions, namely for guarded configurations,21 the second-order
definitions for Trans and Final that is required to handle recursive procedure calls, can
be replaced by first-order axioms. See [51] for the details of these.
3.7 Conclusion
In this chapter, I introduced the situation calculus and action theories. I discussed pre-
vious work on the formalization of knowledge and its dynamics. I then laid the founda-
tions for the semantics of prioritized goals by introducing infinite paths in the situation
calculus, giving an axiomatization of infinite paths, and proving some properties of
21A configuration (δ, s) is guarded if and only if for some n, δ makes at most n recursive procedure
calls before trying to make an actual program step, i.e. an atomic action. See [51] for a formal definition.
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this axiomatization. I will use some of these properties in the proofs of theorems in
future chapters. My formalization of infinite paths is relevant for any account of tem-
poral properties or motivational attitudes (which require the former) in the situation
calculus. My account of infinite paths is more general than Shapiro’s account of finite
paths [194]. Moreover, it allows quantification over paths and thus is simpler to use
than the one proposed by Lespe´rance et al. [134]. I also discussed the ConGolog agent
programming language. The semantics of my agent programming language SR-APL
is based on that of ConGolog.
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Chapter 4
A Formalization of Prioritized Goals for Optimizing
Agents
4.1 Introduction
Not all of the agent’s goals are equally important to her. For example, ensuring that
the spacecraft does not explode should in principle be much more important than any
other goal that a space agent may have – she must not sacrifice this goal to achieve any
number of lower priority goals.22 Thus, it is useful to support a priority ordering over
goals. This information can be used to decide which of the agent’s intentions should
no longer be actively pursued in case they become mutually inconsistent.
An agent’s goals must properly evolve when an action/event occurs, when the
22This example is borrowed from [187].
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agent’s beliefs/knowledge changes, or when a goal is adopted or dropped. Such changes
in the agent’s goals must be consistent with her knowledge about the world she lives
in. For example, the agent should drop an existing goal if she learns that it has been
brought about or that it has become impossible to achieve. As discussed in Chapter 2,
most work on formalizing goals (e.g., [35, 181, 124, 213, 198, 247, 187, 235]) only
deals with static goal semantics and not their dynamics. Those that handle goal dynam-
ics mostly provide a syntactic formalization of goal change, which usually amounts to
adding or deleting primitive facts from a goal-base (e.g., [234, 44, 43]). Such for-
malizations can only capture limited types of temporally extended goals (in particular,
most deal with achievement goals exclusively).23 Moreover, their properties are often
not well understood. Finally, these frameworks do not maintain the consistency of
intended goals.
In this chapter, I formalize goals with different priorities using a new indexed set
of accessibility relations G. I call these goals prioritized goals or p-goals. Prioritized
goals in my framework are analogous to desires and need not be actively pursued by
the agent. As such, they are not required to be consistent with the agent’s knowledge
or with each-other. In terms of these, I define the consistent set of chosen goals or
intentions (c-goals, henceforth) that the agent is committed to realize. I then formalize
23See Section 4.6 for a discussion on recent work that attempts to handle one or more of these limi-
tations.
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p-goal dynamics by giving a successor-state axiom for G that is affected by, among
other things, two special actions, adopt and drop. A regular (non-adopt/drop) action
causes an agent to temporally progress all her goals to reflect the fact that this action
has happened. As we will see later, this may render some of her goals impossible to
bring about and may make other goals inconsistent with others. On the other hand, an
adopt action causes an agent to adopt a new prioritized goal at some specified priority
level, while a drop action causes an agent to drop an existing goal from all levels of
her goal hierarchy. Since an agent’s c-goals are specified in terms of her p-goals, they
are automatically updated when her p-goals are revised. I show that agents specified in
this framework always try to optimize their chosen goals – they will drop an intended
c-goal φ whenever an opportunity to commit to a higher priority (but inconsistent with
φ) goal arise. I then consider some basic properties of my axiomatization: consistency
and realism [35]. I also discuss some properties w.r.t. goal change. In particular, I show
that adopting a new goal and dropping an existing goal has the desired effects. Also, I
identify the restrictions on G that give us positive and negative introspection of goals,
and show that if these restrictions are asserted of the initial situations, they persist
after any sequence of actions is performed, as they are preserved by the successor-
state axiom for G. I then identify the conditions under which an agent’s achievement
p-goals and achievement c-goals persist. Finally, I discuss an example to illustrate the
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proposed formalization.
4.2 Prioritized Goals
I specify each p-goal of an agent by its own accessibility relation/fluent G. For a
given priority level n, the G relation is specified as a relation on an infinite path p
representing a possible evolution of the world and a situation s which stands for the
current world. Intuitively, a path p is G-accessible at priority level n in situation s,
denoted byG(p, n, s), if the goal of the agent at priority level n in situation s is satisfied
over path p and if p starts with a situation that has the same action history as s. The
latter requirement ensures that the agent’s p-goal accessible paths reflect the actions
that have been performed so far.24 I use a reverse priority ordering on goals – a smaller
n represents higher priority, and the highest priority level is 0. Also, I assume that the
set of p-goals are totally ordered according to priority. Thus given a priority level, the
agent can have only one goal at that level, possibly a complex one, e.g., a conjunctive
goal. While some authors contend that this is too strong an assumption for a realistic
agent, it could be argued that a strict order is necessary for any resource-bounded
agent. I will come back to this issue in Section 4.6.
24Since the agent’s goals are future oriented, they should be evaluated w.r.t. paths that are consistent
with the actions that have been performed in the actual world. The requirement that a G-accessible path
starts with a situation that has the same history as the actual current situation enforces this.
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I say that an agent has the p-goal that φ at level n in situation s if φ holds over all
paths that are G-accessible at n in s.
Definition 4.2.1.
PGoal(φ, n, s) def= ∀p. G(p, n, s) ⊃ φ(p).
Note that for a given priority level, the PGoal construct can be used to talk about parts
(or logical consequences) of the goal at that level, and thus an agent might have many
PGoals at some level.
I also define the OPGoal(φ, n, s) predicate which holds when φ corresponds ex-
actly to the agent’s goal at priority level n in situation s, i.e. her only p-goal at level n
in s.
Definition 4.2.2.
OPGoal(φ, n, s) def= PGoal(φ, n, s) ∧ (∀p. φ(p) ⊃ G(p, n, s)).
An agent has the only p-goal that φ at level n in situation s if φ is a p-goal at n in s,
and any path over which φ holds is G-accessible at n in s.
I allow the agent to have infinitely many goals. I expect the modeler to include
some specification of what paths are G accessible at the various levels initially. I call
these axioms initial goal axioms. In many cases, the user will want to specify a finite
set of initial p-goals. This can be done by providing a set of axioms as in the example
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below. But in general, an agent can have a countably infinite set of p-goals, e.g., an
agent that has the p-goal at level n to know what the n-th prime number is for all n.
The agent’s set of p-goals can even be incompletely specified, e.g., the theory might
not specify what the p-goals at some level are initially.
The following example illustrates how we can specify the initial p-goals of an
agent. We have an agent who initially has the following three p-goals: φ0 = 2BeRich,
φ1 = 3GetPhD, and φ2 = 2BeHappy at level 0, 1, and 2, respectively. This domain
can be specified using the following two initial goal axioms:
(a) Init(s) ⊃ ((G(p, 0, s) ≡ ∃s′. Starts(p, s′) ∧ Init(s′) ∧ φ0(p))
∧ (G(p, 1, s) ≡ ∃s′. Starts(p, s′) ∧ Init(s′) ∧ φ1(p))
∧ (G(p, 2, s) ≡ ∃s′. Starts(p, s′) ∧ Init(s′) ∧ φ2(p))),
(b) Init(s) ∧ n ≥ 3 ⊃ (G(p, n, s) ≡ ∃s′. Starts(p, s′) ∧ Init(s′)).
(a) specifies the p-goals φ0, φ1, φ2 (from highest to lowest priority) of the agent in the
initial situations, and makes G(p, n, s) true for every path p that starts with an initial
situation and over which φn holds, for n = 0, 1, 2; each of them defines a set of initial
goal paths for a given priority level, and must be consistent. (b) makes G(p, n, s) true
for every path p that starts with an initial situation for n ≥ 3. Thus at these levels, the
agent has the trivial p-goal that she be in an initial situation. Given this axiomatization,
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it can be shown that in my example, I have the following:25
Proposition 4.2.3.
(i). For n = 0, 1, 2, ΣP ∪ {(a)} |= OPGoal(φn ∧ ∃s. Starts(s) ∧ Init(s), n, S0),
(ii). For n ≥ 3, ΣP ∪ {(b)} |= OPGoal(∃s. Starts(s) ∧ Init(s), n, S0).
Recall that the paths in a G accessibility relation are the ones that the agent wants
to actualize independently of what she knows. While p-goals or desires are allowed
to be known to be impossible to bring about, an agent’s c-goals or intentions must be
compatible with what she knows [35]. Not all of the G-accessible paths are realistic
in the sense that they start with a K-accessible situation. To filter these out, I define
realistic p-goal accessible paths GR:
Definition 4.2.4.
GR(p, n, s)
def
= G(p, n, s) ∧ ∃s′. Starts(p, s′) ∧K(s′, s).
Thus a path p is GR-accessible at level n in situation s if it is G-accessible at n in s,
and if p starts with a situation that is K-related to s. The GR relation prunes out the
paths from the G relation that are known to be impossible, and since I define c-goals
in terms of GR, this ensures that agents’ c-goals are realistic. I say that an agent has
25Here, ΣP is an abbreviation for Σ ∪ Dpath.
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the realistic p-goal that φ at level n in situation s if φ holds over all paths that are
GR-accessible at n in s.
Definition 4.2.5.
RPGoal(φ, n, s) def= ∀p. GR(p, n, s) ⊃ φ(p).
In our example, assume that initially the agent knows that all of her p-goals are
individually possible:
(c). ∀n. ∃p. GR(p, n, S0).
Given this, it can be shown that the agent’s realistic p-goals in the initial situation S0
are 2BeRich, 3GetPhD, and 2BeHappy in order of priority:26
Proposition 4.2.6.
ΣPK ∪ {(a)} |= RPGoal(2BeRich, 0, S0) ∧ RPGoal(3GetPhD, 1, S0)
∧ RPGoal(2BeHappy, 2, S0).
Using realistic p-goals, I next define c-goals. The idea of how I specify c-goal
accessible paths is as follows. The set of GR-accessibility relations represents a set of
prioritized temporal formulae that are candidates for the agent’s c-goals. Given GR,
26Here ΣPK is an abbreviation for Σ ∪ Dknow ∪ Dpath. Also, note that we don’t need to use Axiom
(c) to prove this proposition – if e.g., 2BeRich is initially known to be impossible, then by Definitions
4.2.4 and 4.2.5, the agent trivially has the realistic p-goal that 2BeRich at level 0, as in that case her set
of GR-accessible paths at level 0 is empty (and similarly for 3GetPhD and 2BeHappy).
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in each situation I want the agent’s c-goals to be the maximal consistent set of her
higher priority realistic p-goals in that situation. I formalize this iteratively starting
with the set of all realistic paths, i.e. paths that start with K-accessible situations. At
each iteration i, I take the intersection of this set with the next highest priority set of
GR-accessible paths. If the intersection is not empty, I thus obtain a new chosen set
of paths at level i. I call p-goals chosen by this process active p-goals. If on the other
hand the intersection is empty, then it must be the case that a p-goal at this level is
either in conflict with another active higher priority p-goal/a combination of two or
more active higher priority p-goals, or is known to be impossible. In that case, all the
p-goals at that level are ignored (i.e. marked as inactive), and the chosen set of paths
at level i is the same as at level i − 1. To get the intersection of the first n priority
levels, I repeat this until I reach i = n. Axiom 4.2.7 specifies this intersection (here
if φ then φa else φb is an abbreviation for (φ ⊃ φa) ∧ (¬φ ⊃ φb)):
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Axiom 4.2.7.
G∩(p, n, s) ≡ if (n = 0) then
if ∃p′. GR(p′, n, s) then GR(p, n, s)
else ∃s′. Starts(p, s′) ∧K(s′, s)
else
if ∃p′.(GR(p′, n, s) ∧G∩(p′, n− 1, s))
then (GR(p, n, s) ∧G∩(p, n− 1, s))
else G∩(p, n− 1, s).
In the above axiom, G∩(p, n, s) denotes that path p is in the intersection of the set of
realistic paths in situation s up to level n. It has two cases, each with two sub-cases.
The base iteration, when n = 0, specifies G∩ in terms of the highest priority GR-
accessible paths. If the highest priority goal is realistic, i.e. there is a GR-accessible
path at level 0 in situation s, then the G∩ relation at level 0 in s consist of the paths that
are GR-accessible at level 0 in s, i.e. G∩(p, 0, s) ≡ GR(p, 0, s). Otherwise, G∩ at 0 in
s is specified to include all realistic paths in s, i.e. those that start with a K-accessible
situation in s, and thusG∩(p, 0, s) ≡ ∃s′. Starts(p, s′)∧K(s′, s). For each n s.t. n > 0,
the G∩ relation at level n in situation s is specified to be the prioritized intersection of
the GR relation at the first n priority levels (giving priority to the most important goals
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– the ones with lower n’s – while maintaining consistency). If there is a path that is
GR-accessible at level n in s and that is in the intersection of the first n − 1 priority
levels (i.e. G∩ at level n − 1 in s), then this intersection includes all such paths, i.e.
G∩(p, n, s) ≡ GR(p, n, s) ∧ G∩(p, n − 1, s). Otherwise it is the same as that of the
intersection of the first n− 1 priority levels, i.e. G∩(p, n, s) ≡ G∩(p, n− 1, s).
Using this, I define what it means for an agent to have a c-goal at some level n as
follows:
Definition 4.2.8.
CGoal(φ, n, s) def= ∀p. G∩(p, n, s) ⊃ φ(p).
Thus an agent has the c-goal at level n in situation s that φ if φ holds over all paths
that are in the prioritized intersection of the set of GR-accessible paths up to level n in
situation s.
I define c-goal accessible paths in terms of c-goal accessible paths at level n:
Definition 4.2.9.
G∩(p, s)
def
= ∀n. G∩(p, n, s).
Thus a path is c-goal accessible in situation s if for all levels n, it is c-goal accessible
at n in s. Using this, I define c-goals as follows:
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Definition 4.2.10.
CGoal(φ, s) def= ∀p. G∩(p, s) ⊃ φ(p).
That is, the agent has the c-goal that φ in situation s if φ holds over all of her G∩-
accessible paths in s. Note that, by Axiom 4.2.7 and Definitions 4.2.9 and 4.2.10, a
lower priority realistic goal is added as a c-goal only if it is consistent with the higher
priority goals that are already chosen as c-goals. In Proposition 4.4.5 below, I formally
show that an agent’s chosen lower priority goals must be consistent with higher priority
ones. Thus, an agent’s set of c-goals in some situation is the maximal consistent set of
her higher priority realistic p-goals in that situation.
Returning to our example, assume that the agent knows that her p-goal to eventu-
ally get a Ph.D. is inconsistent with her highest priority p-goal of always being rich as
well as with her p-goal of always being happy, while the latter are consistent with each
other:
(d). ¬(∃p. GR(p, 0, S0) ∧GR(p, 1, S0)) ∧ ¬(∃p. GR(p, 1, S0) ∧GR(p, 2, S0))
∧ (∃p. GR(p, 0, S0) ∧GR(p, 2, S0)).
Then it can be shown that initially our example agent has the c-goals that 2BeRich
and 2BeHappy, but not 3GetPhD:
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Proposition 4.2.11.
ΣPK ∪ {Axiom 4.2.7, (a)–(d)} |= CGoal(2BeRich ∧2BeHappy, S0)
∧ ¬CGoal(3GetPhD, S0).
Proof Sketch. According to Axiom 4.2.7, the G∩-accessible paths at level 0 in S0 are
the ones that start with a K-accessible situation in S0 and where 2BeRich holds, since
by Axiom (a) the agent initially has the p-goal that she be in an initial situation and
that 2BeRich at level 0, and by Axiom (c) 2BeRich is initially possible, i.e., there is
a GR-accessible path over which 2BeRich holds. Moreover, the G∩-accessible paths
at level 1 in S0 are the same as at level 0, since by Axiom (d) there is no realistic path
over which both3GetPhD and 2BeRich hold. Again, the G∩-accessible paths at level
2 in S0 are those that start with a K-accessible situation and over which 2BeRich ∧
2BeHappy holds, as by Axiom (a) the agent initially has the p-goal that she be in an
initial situation and that 2BeHappy at level 2, by Axiom (c) 2BeHappy is initially
known to be possible, and by Axiom (d) 2BeRich and 2BeHappy are initially known
to be mutually consistent. Finally, the G∩-accessible paths at any level greater than
2 in S0 are the same as level 2 since by Axiom (b), any G∩-accessible path at level
2 is also GR-accessible at these levels. The proposition thus follows from this and
Definitions 4.2.9 and 4.2.10.
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Note that according to this definition of c-goals, the agent can have a c-goal that
φ in situation s for various reasons. First of all, φ might be known to be inevitable
in s, i.e. φ might hold over all paths that start with a knowledge-accessible situation
(and thus over all GR-accessible paths) in s. Secondly, φ might be an active p-goal
at some level n in s. Finally, φ might be a consequence of two or more active p-
goals at different levels in s.27 To be able to refer to c-goals for which the agent has
a primitive motivation, i.e. c-goals that result from a single only p-goal at some active
priority level n, in contrast to those that are known to be inevitable or those that hold
as a consequence of two or more active p-goals at different priority levels, I define the
notion of primary c-goals:
Definition 4.2.12.
PrimCGoal(φ, s) def= ∃n. PGoal(φ, n, s) ∧ ∃p. G(p, n, s) ∧G∩(p, n, s).
An agent has the primary c-goal that φ in situation s, if φ is a p-goal at some level n in
s, and there is a G-accessible path p at n in s that is also in the prioritized intersection
of GR-accessible paths up to n in s. The conjunct ∃p. G(p, n, s) ∧ G∩(p, n, s) is
required to ensure that n is indeed an active level, since having a p-goal that φ does not
necessarily imply that the agent has the c-goal that φ. Also, while one might be tempted
27By Axiom 4.2.7 and Definitions 4.2.9 and 4.2.10, agents’ c-goals are closed under logical conse-
quence.
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to define primary c-goals as ∃n. PGoal(φ, n, s)∧CGoal(φ, s), this is inadequate since
it does not guarantee that the agent choose φ due to the presence of her p-goal that φ at
level n. For example, it might be the case that there is noGR-accessible path p at n that
is in G∩(p, n, s) – this might happen if another p-goal at level n becomes impossible
or becomes inconsistent with higher priority active goals – and that the agent choose
φ as a consequence of other chosen G-accessibility levels. As well, defining primary
c-goals as ∃n. OPGoal(φ, n, s) ∧ CGoal(φ, s) is also problematic, since it only allows
some of the p-goals of the agent, namely the only p-goals, to be her primary c-goals.
Thus if an agent has a primary c-goal that φ, then she also has the c-goal that φ,
but not necessarily vice-versa. It can be shown that initially our example agent has the
primary c-goals that 2BeRich and 2BeHappy, but not their conjunction:
Proposition 4.2.13.
ΣPK ∪ {Axiom 4.2.7, (a)–(d)} |= PrimCGoal(2BeRich, S0)
∧ PrimCGoal(2BeHappy, S0) ∧ ¬PrimCGoal(2BeRich ∧2BeHappy, S0).
To some extent, this shows that primary c-goals are not closed under logical conse-
quence. In this sense, my formalization of primary c-goals is related to the non-normal
modal formalizations of intentions found in the literature [124], and as such it does not
suffer from the “side-effect problem” discussed in Chapter 2. To borrow an example
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from [35], in this framework an agent can have the primary c-goal to get her teeth fixed
and know that this always involves pain, but not have the primary c-goal to have pain.
I also define a useful version of PrimCGoal, PrimCGoal(φ, n, s), that makes ex-
plicit the level n where φ is a primitive chosen goal:
Definition 4.2.14.
PrimCGoal(φ, n, s) def= PGoal(φ, n, s) ∧ ∃p. G(p, n, s) ∧G∩(p, n, s).
4.3 Goal Dynamics
An agent’s goals change when her knowledge changes as a result of the occurrence of
an action (including exogenous actions/events), or when she adopts or drops a goal.
I formalize this by specifying how an agent’s p-goals change. Her c-goals are then
obtained using (realistic) p-goals in every new situation as above.
I introduce two actions for adopting and dropping a p-goal, adopt(φ, n) and drop(φ).
The action precondition axioms for these are as follows. An agent can adopt the p-goal
that φ at level n in situation s if she does not already have φ as her p-goal at some level
n′ in s:
Axiom 4.3.1.
Poss(adopt(φ, n), s) ≡ ¬∃n′. PGoal(φ, n′, s).
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An agent can drop the p-goal that φ in situation s if she has the p-goal that φ at some
level n in s:
Axiom 4.3.2.
Poss(drop(φ), s) ≡ ∃n. PGoal(φ, n, s).
I also assume the availability of unique names axioms for adopt and drop as in axiom
schemata 3.3.2 and 3.3.3.
In the following, I specify the dynamics of p-goals by giving a successor-state
axiom for the G relation, and then discuss each case, one at a time:
Axiom 4.3.3 (SSA for G).
G(p, n, do(a, s)) ≡
∀φ,m. (a 6= adopt(φ,m) ∧ a 6= drop(φ) ∧ Progressed(p, n, a, s)) ∨
∃φ,m. (a = adopt(φ,m) ∧ Adopted(p, n,m, a, s, φ)) ∨
∃φ. (a = drop(φ) ∧ Dropped(p, n, a, s, φ)).
The overall idea of the successor-state axiom for G is as follows. First of all, to handle
the occurrence of a non-adopt/drop (i.e. a regular) action a, I progress all G-accessible
paths at all levels to reflect the fact that this action has just happened; this is done
using the Progressed(p, n, a, s) construct, which replaces each G-accessible path p′
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with starting situation s′ at level n in situation s, by its suffix p provided that it starts
with do(a, s′):
Definition 4.3.4.
Progressed(p, n, a, s) def= ∃p′, s′. G(p′, n, s) ∧ Starts(p′, s′) ∧ Suffix(p, p′, do(a, s′)).
Any path over which the next action performed is not a is eliminated from the G-
accessibility level being considered.
Secondly, to handle the adoption of a p-goal φ at level m, I insert a new temporal
goal that φ to the agent’s goal hierarchy at m by modifying the G-relation in the fol-
lowing manner. The G-accessible paths at all levels above m are progressed as above.
The G-accessible paths at level m are the ones that starts with a situation that share
the same history with do(a, s) and over which φ holds. The G-accessible paths at all
levels below m are the ones that can be obtained by progressing the level immediately
above it. Thus the agent acquires the p-goal that φ at level m, and all the p-goals with
priority m or less in s are pushed down one level in the hierarchy.
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Definition 4.3.5.
Adopted(p, n,m, a, s, φ) def=
if (n < m) then Progressed(p, n, a, s)
else if (n = m) then ∃s′. Starts(p, s′) ∧ SameHist(s′, do(a, s)) ∧ φ(p)
else Progressed(p, n− 1, a, s).
Finally, to handle the dropping of a p-goal φ, I replace the temporal formulae that
imply the dropped goal in the agent’s goal hierarchy by the trivial proposition that the
history of actions in the current situation has occurred. Thus, in addition to progressing
all G-accessible paths as above, I add back all paths that share the same history with
do(a, s) to the existing G-accessibility levels where the agent has the p-goal that φ.
Definition 4.3.6.
Dropped(p, n, a, s, φ) def=
if PGoal(φ, n, s) then ∃s′. Starts(p, s′) ∧ SameHist(s′, do(a, s))
else Progressed(p, n, a, s).
In our example, recall that our agent has the c-goals/active p-goals in S0 that
2BeRich and 2BeHappy, but not 3GetPhD, since the latter is inconsistent with her
higher priority p-goal2BeRich. Assume that, after the exogenous event/action goBan-
krupt happens in S0, i.e. in S1 = do(goBankrupt, S0), the p-goal 2BeRich becomes
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impossible while the other p-goals remain possible (assume that a BAT for this domain
implying this has been specified):
(e). ¬∃p. GR(p, 0, S1) ∧ ∃p′. GR(p′, 1, S1) ∧ ∃p′′. GR(p′′, 2, S1).
Then in S1, the agent has the c-goal that3GetPhD, but not2BeRich nor2BeHappy:28
Proposition 4.3.7.
ΣPK ∪ {Axiom 4.2.7, Axioms 4.3.1–4.3.3, (a)–(e)} |= CGoal(3GetPhD, S1)
∧ ¬CGoal(2BeRich, S1) ∧ ¬CGoal(2BeHappy, S1).
2BeRich is excluded from the set of c-goals since by Axiom (e), it has become im-
possible to bring about (i.e. unrealistic). Also, since her higher priority active p-goal
of eventually getting a Ph.D. is inconsistent with her p-goal of always being happy in
S1,29 the agent will make 2BeHappy inactive.
Note that, while it might be reasonable to drop a p-goal (e.g., 3GetPhD) that is
in conflict with another higher priority active p-goal (e.g., 2BeRich in the initial sit-
uation), in my framework I keep such p-goals around. The reason for this is that
although 2BeRich is initially inconsistent with 3GetPhD, the agent might later learn
28In the following, I assume that unique names axioms for goBankrupt are given.
29Since by the unique name axioms, goBankrupt, adopt, and drop all refer to different actions,
from Axiom 4.3.3, it follows that after the goBankrupt action happens, all G-accessible paths at all
priority levels are simply progressed. This and Axiom (d) imply that the p-goals that 3GetPhD and2BeHappy remain inconsistent in S1.
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that 2BeRich has become impossible to bring about (e.g., after goBankrupt occurs),
and then might want to pursue 3GetPhD. Thus, it is useful to keep these inactive p-
goals since this allows the agent to optimize her chosen goals by taking advantage of
such opportunities. As mentioned earlier, c-goals are my analogue to intentions. Re-
call from Chapter 2 that Bratman’s [20] model of intentions limits the agent’s practical
reasoning – agents do not always optimize their utility and don’t always reconsider
all available options in order to allocate their reasoning effort wisely. In contrast to
this, my c-goals are defined in terms of the p-goals, and at every step, I ensure that the
agent optimizes her c-goals so that these are the set of highest priority goals that are
consistent given the agent’s knowledge. Thus, my notion of c-goal is not as persistent
as Bratman’s notion of intention. For instance as mentioned above, after the action
goBankrupt happens in S0, the agent will lose the c-goal that 2BeHappy, although
she did not drop it and it did not become impossible or achieved. In this sense, my
model is that of an idealized optimizing agent. There is a tradeoff between optimizing
the agent’s chosen set of prioritized goals and being committed to chosen goals. In
my framework, chosen goals behave like intentions with an automatic filter-override
mechanism [20] that forces the agent to drop her chosen goals when opportunities to
commit to other higher priority goals arise. In the future, it would be interesting to
develop a logical model that captures the pragmatics of intention reconsideration by
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supporting control over it.
4.4 Properties
I now show that my formalization of prioritized goals for optimizing agents has some
desirable properties. Let DOAgt consist of Σ,Dknow,Dpath, and Axioms 4.2.7 and
4.3.1–4.3.3 and the associated definitions as in the two previous sections. Also, given
some situation s, let’s call a priority level n an active level if there is a G-accessible
path at level n in s that is also G∩-accessible up to n in s:
Definition 4.4.1.
ActiveLevel(n, s) def= ∃p. G(p, n, s) ∧G∩(p, n, s).
4.4.1 Basic Properties
An agent’s chosen goals are consistent:
Proposition 4.4.2 (Consistency).
DOAgt |= ∀s. ¬CGoal(False, s).
Proof. (By contradiction) Fix situation S1 and assume that CGoal(False, S1). From
this and Definitions 4.2.9 and 4.2.10, we have ∀p, n. G∩(p, n, S1) ⊃ False(p). Fix
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such an n, say n = 0. Thus we have: ∀p. G∩(p, 0, S1) ⊃ False(p). Since we are
dealing with possible worlds, this is only possible when ¬∃p. G∩(p, 0, S1). By Axiom
4.2.7, this follows only if there is no K-related situation in S1, or there is no path p s.t.
p starts with a K-related situation in S1, i.e.:
¬∃p, s. Starts(p, s) ∧K(s, S1). (4.1)
But the former is impossible since (as discussed in Chapter 3) by Axiom 3.4.2 and
3.4.10, the K relation is reflexive, and thus K(S1, S1). Also, by Lemmata 3.5.35 and
3.5.36, there is indeed a path that starts with S1. But this is contradictory to (4.1).
Thus, the agent cannot have both φ and ¬φ as c-goals in a situation s. Even if all of
the agent’s p-goals become known to be impossible, the set of c-goal accessible paths
will be precisely those that start with a K-accessible situation, and thus the agent will
only choose the formulae that are known to be inevitable.
I also have the property of realism [35], i.e. if an agent knows that something has
become inevitable, then she has this as a c-goal:
Proposition 4.4.3 (Realism).
DOAgt |= ∀s. KInevitable(φ, s) ⊃ CGoal(φ, s).
Proof. Fix S1 and φ1. It follows from the antecedent (i.e., that KInevitable(φ1, S1))
and Definitions 3.5.14, 3.5.12, and 3.4.5 that φ1 holds over all paths that starts with a
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situation that is K-accessible in S1:
∀p, s. Starts(p, s) ∧K(s, S1) ⊃ φ1(p). (4.2)
Also, from Axiom 4.2.7 and by induction on n, it follows that:
∀p, n. G∩(p, n, S1) ⊃ ∃s. Starts(p, s) ∧K(s, S1). (4.3)
The proposition follows from (4.2), (4.3), and Definitions 4.2.9 and 4.2.10.
Note that this is not necessarily true for p-goals and primary c-goals – an agent may
know that something has become inevitable and not have it as her p-goal/primary c-
goal, which is intuitive. While the property of realism is often criticized [173, 174],
one should view these inevitable goals as something that holds in the worlds that the
agent intends to bring about, rather than something that the agent is actively pursuing.
A consequence of Proposition 4.4.2 and 4.4.3 is that an agent does not have a c-goal
that is known to be impossible:
Corollary 4.4.4.
DOAgt |= ∀s. CGoal(φ, s) ⊃ ¬KImpossible(φ, s).
Proof. Fix φ1 and S1. From the antecedent (i.e., that CGoal(φ1, S1)) and Propo-
sition 4.4.2, we have ¬CGoal(¬φ1, S1). From this and Proposition 4.4.3, we have
¬KInevitable(¬φ1, S1). The consequent follows from this and Definition 3.5.15.
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An agent prefers higher priority goals to lower priority goals, and thus her chosen
lower priority goals must be consistent with higher priority ones:
Proposition 4.4.5.
∀n,m, s. CGoal(φ,m, s) ∧ n > m ⊃ CGoal(φ, n, s).
Proof. Fix φ1, N1,M1, and S1. From the antecedent (i.e. that CGoal(φ1,M1, S1)) and
Definition 4.2.8, we have:
∀p. G∩(p,M1, S1) ⊃ φ1(p). (4.4)
From Axiom 4.2.7 and by induction on n, we have: ∀p,m, n, s. n > m ⊃ G∩(p, n, s) ⊃
G∩(p,m, s). From this and the antecedent (i.e. that N1 > M1), we have:
∀p. G∩(p,N1, S1) ⊃ G∩(p,M1, S1). (4.5)
The consequent follows from (4.4), (4.5), and Definition 4.2.8.
4.4.2 Dynamic Properties
I next discuss some properties of the framework w.r.t. goal change. First I show that
an agent always wants to be in a world that has the same action history as the current
situation, provided that initially she wants to be in an initial world.
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Proposition 4.4.6 (Correct Action History).
DOAgt |= (∀p, n, s. Init(s) ∧G(p, n, s) ⊃ ∃s′. Starts(p, s′) ∧ Init(s′))
⊃ (∀p, n, s. G(p, n, s) ⊃ ∃s′. Starts(p, s′) ∧ SameHist(s, s′)).
Proof. (By induction on s) Follows from Axiom 4.3.3 and Definitions 4.3.4, 4.3.5,
4.3.6, 3.5.16, and 3.2.7.
Adopting and dropping logically equivalent goals has the same result:
Proposition 4.4.7 (Extensionality w.r.t. Adoption and Drop).
(a). DOAgt |= (∀p. φ1(p) ≡ φ2(p)) ⊃
(∀n, n′, s. PGoal(ψ, n′, do(adopt(φ1, n), s)) ≡ PGoal(ψ, n′, do(adopt(φ2, n), s))),
(b). DOAgt |= (∀p. φ1(p) ≡ φ2(p)) ⊃
(∀n, s. PGoal(ψ, n, do(drop(φ1), s)) ≡ PGoal(ψ, n, do(drop(φ2), s))),
(c). DOAgt |= (∀p. φ1(p) ≡ φ2(p)) ⊃
(∀n, s. CGoal(ψ, do(adopt(φ1, n), s)) ≡ CGoal(ψ, do(adopt(φ2, n), s))),
(d). DOAgt |= (∀p. φ1(p) ≡ φ2(p)) ⊃
(∀s. CGoal(ψ, do(drop(φ1), s)) ≡ CGoal(ψ, do(drop(φ2), s))).
Proof. (a). Follows from the fact that we use a possible worlds/paths semantics for
p-goals.
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(b). Similar to that of Proposition 4.4.7(a).
(c). Follows from Definition 4.2.10 and the fact that the G∩-accessible paths are the
same in both situations given the antecedent.
(d). Similar to that of Proposition 4.4.7(c).
As a consequence, this property also holds for primary c-goals:
Corollary 4.4.8.
(a). DOAgt |= (∀p. φ1(p) ≡ φ2(p)) ⊃
(∀n, s. PrimCGoal(ψ, do(adopt(φ1, n), s)) ≡ PrimCGoal(ψ, do(adopt(φ2, n), s))),
(b). DOAgt |= (∀p. φ1(p) ≡ φ2(p)) ⊃
(∀s. PrimCGoal(ψ, do(drop(φ1), s)) ≡ PrimCGoal(ψ, do(drop(φ2), s))).
Proof. (a). Follows from Definition 4.2.12 and Proposition 4.4.7(a).
(b). Similar to that of Corollary 4.4.8(a).
An agent acquires the p-goal that φ at level n after she adopts it at n in some
situation s:
Proposition 4.4.9 (Adoption-1).
DOAgt |= PGoal(φ, n, do(adopt(φ, n), s)).
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Proof. Fix φ1, N1, and S1. From Axiom 4.3.3 and Definition 4.3.5, we have that the
agent’s G-accessible paths at N1 in do(adopt(φ1, N1), S1) are the ones that start with
situations that have the same history as do(adopt(φ1, N1), S1) and over which φ1 holds:
∀p. G(p,N1, do(adopt(φ1, N1), S1)) ≡
∃s. Starts(p, s) ∧ SameHist(s, do(adopt(φ1, N1), S1)) ∧ φ1(p).
(4.6)
If such a path p exists, then the consequent follows from (4.6) and Definition 4.2.1.
Otherwise, the consequent holds trivially from Definition 4.2.1.
For the next property, I’ll need to use the following two lemmata. The first says that
if p is in the G∩-relation up to some level n in situation s, then the starting situation of
p must be K-accessible from s:
Lemma 4.4.10.
DOAgt |= ∀p, n, s, s′. G∩(p, n, s) ∧ Starts(p, s′) ⊃ K(s′, s).
Proof. By induction on n and using Axiom 4.2.7 and Definition 4.2.4.
The second lemma says that an agent’s active (and inactive) p-goals below some
level n remain active (inactive, resp.) after she adopts a goal φ at level n in s, provided
that φ is consistent with her c-goals up to level n− 1:
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Lemma 4.4.11.
DOAgt |=
¬CGoal(¬∃s′, p′. Starts(s′) ∧ Suffix(p′, do(adopt(φ, n), s′)) ∧ φ(p′), n− 1, s)
⊃ ∀m. m < n ⊃ (ActiveLevel(m, s) ≡ ActiveLevel(m, do(adopt(φ, n), s)).
Proof. By induction on n.
An agent acquires the primary c-goal (and thus the p-goal and c-goal) that φ after
she adopts it at some level n in s provided that φ is consistent with her c-goals up to
level n − 1; this holds even if she has the inconsistent c-goal at some level that ¬φ
next, provided that she adopts φ at a higher priority than all such inconsistent goals:
Proposition 4.4.12 (Adoption-2).
DOAgt |=
¬CGoal(¬∃s′, p′. Starts(s′) ∧ Suffix(p′, do(adopt(φ, n), s′)) ∧ φ(p′), n− 1, s)
⊃ PrimCGoal(φ, do(adopt(φ, n), s)).
Proof. Fix φ1, N1, and S1. From the antecedent, we have:
¬CGoal(¬∃s′, p′. Starts(s′) ∧ Suffix(p′, do(adopt(φ1, N1), s′))
∧ φ1(p′), N1 − 1, S1).
(4.7)
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From Proposition 4.4.9, we have:
PGoal(φ1, N1, do(adopt(φ1, N1), S1)). (4.8)
Hence by Definition 4.2.12, to show that PrimCGoal(φ1, do(adopt(φ1, N1), S1)), we
will need to show that:
∃p. G(p,N1, do(adopt(φ1, N1), S1)) ∧G∩(p,N1, do(adopt(φ1, N1), S1)).
Let me first prove that ∃p. G(p,N1, do(adopt(φ1, N1), S1)). From Axiom 4.3.3 and
Definition 4.3.5, we have:
∀p. G(p,N1, do(adopt(φ1, N1), S1)) ≡
∃s. Starts(p, s) ∧ SameHist(s, do(adopt(φ1, N1), S1)) ∧ φ1(p).
(4.9)
From (4.7) and Definition 4.2.8, it follows that there is a path, say P1, such that P1 is
in the prioritized intersection of GR-accessible paths up to level N1 − 1 in S1, that the
adopt(φ1, N1) action happens next along P1, and that φ1 holds afterwards:
G∩(P1, N1 − 1, S1) ∧
∃s′, p′. Starts(P1, s′) ∧ Suffix(p′, P1, do(adopt(φ1, N1), s′)) ∧ φ1(p′).
(4.10)
Consider the suffix of P1 after adopt(φ1, N1) has happened; let’s call this path P2.
Note that by (4.10) and Lemma 4.4.10, the starting situation of P1 is K-accessible in
S1:
Starts(P1, s) ⊃ K(s, S1). (4.11)
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By this and Lemma 3.5.34, the starting situation of P1 has the same action history
as S1. Thus it follows that the starting situation of P2 must have the same history as
do(adopt(φ1, N1), S1):
Starts(P2, s) ⊃ SameHist(s, do(adopt(φ1, N1), S1)). (4.12)
Also, by (4.10), φ1 holds over P2:
φ1(P2). (4.13)
From (4.12), (4.13), and (4.9), it follows that P2 is G-accessible at N1 after the adopt
action has happened in S1:
G(P2, N1, do(adopt(φ1, N1), S1)). (4.14)
Next, I will prove that G∩(P2, N1, do(adopt(φ1, N1), S1)). By Axiom 4.2.7, to
prove this, it is sufficient to show that:
If N1 = 0 : GR(P2, N1, do(adopt(φ1, N1), S1));
If N1 > 0 : GR(P2, N1, do(adopt(φ1, N1), S1))
∧G∩(P2, N1 − 1, do(adopt(φ1, N1), S1)).
I will first show that GR(P2, N1, do(adopt(φ1, N1), S1)). Note that by (4.10) and Defi-
nition 3.5.16, P1 is a path and the first action that happens along P1, i.e. in the starting
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situation of P1, is adopt(φ1, N1). From this, Corollary 3.5.41, and Definition 3.3.1 it
follows that:
Starts(P1, s) ⊃ Poss(adopt(φ1, N1), s). (4.15)
Since adopt(φ1, N1) is not a knowledge-producing action, the K-accessible situations
in do(adopt(φ1, N1), S1) are those that can be obtained by performing this action over
some K-accessible situation in S1, provided that the adopt action is executable in
that situation; thus it follows from (4.11), (4.15), and Axiom 3.4.10 that the starting
situation of P2 is K-accessible in do(adopt(φ1, N1), S1):
Starts(P2, s) ⊃ K(s, do(adopt(φ1, N1), S1)). (4.16)
From this, (4.14), and Definition 4.2.4, it follows that:
GR(P2, N1, do(adopt(φ1, N1), S1)). (4.17)
Next, I will show that G∩(P2, N1 − 1, do(adopt(φ1, N1), S1)), where N1 > 0. By
(4.7) and Lemma 4.4.11, it follows that:
∀n. n < N1 ⊃ (ActiveLevel(n, S1) ≡ ActiveLevel(n, do(adopt(φ1, n), S1)).
Thus, a priority level that has higher priority than N1 is active/chosen in do(adopt(φ1,
N1), S1) if and only if it is active/chosen in S1. Now, consider one such active level
M . By Axiom 4.2.7 and (4.10), it follows that GR(P1,M, S1). According to Ax-
iom 4.3.3 and Definitions 4.3.4 and 4.3.5, after the adopt(φ1, N1) action happens in
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S1, the G-accessible paths at all levels that have higher priority than N1 are sim-
ply progressed to reflect that this action has happened. From this, it follows that
G(P2,M, do(adopt(φ1, N1), S1)). Moreover, from this, (4.16), and Definition 4.2.4,
we have GR(P2,M, do(adopt(φ1, N1), S1)). As this holds for all such active lev-
els M where M < N1, it follows from (4.16) and Axiom 4.2.7 that G∩(P2, N1 −
1, do(adopt(φ1, N1), S1)). Thus by (4.16), (4.17), and Axiom 4.2.7, we have:
G∩(P2, N1, do(adopt(φ1, N1), S1)). (4.18)
The consequent follows from (4.8), (4.14), (4.18), and Definition 4.2.12.
Recall that the agent’s (primary) chosen goals, are like intentions, and as such they act
as a filter for adopting newer goals. Proposition 4.4.12 ensures that the agent takes into
consideration the priorities of goals when adopting a new goal that is inconsistent with
her current chosen goals.
A consequence of this is that an agent acquires the primary c-goal that φ after she
adopts it at some level n in some situation s, provided that she does not have the c-goal
in s that ¬φ next:
Corollary 4.4.13 (Adoption-3).
DOAgt |= ¬CGoal(¬∃s′, p′. Starts(s′) ∧ Suffix(p′, do(adopt(φ, n), s′)) ∧ φ(p′), s)
⊃ PrimCGoal(φ, do(adopt(φ, n), s)).
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Proof. Note that by Definitions 4.2.8, 4.2.9, and 4.2.10, we have that:
¬CGoal(¬∃s′, p′. Starts(s′) ∧ Suffix(p′, do(adopt(φ, n), s′)) ∧ φ(p′), s) ⊃
¬CGoal(¬∃s′, p′. Starts(s′) ∧ Suffix(p′, do(adopt(φ, n), s′)) ∧ φ(p′), n− 1, s).
Thus the corollary follows from Proposition 4.4.12 as a case of strengthening its an-
tecedent.
Let ProgOf(φ, a) denote the progression of a path formula φ after some action a
has been performed, which is defined as:
Definition 4.4.14.
ProgOf(φ, a)(p) def= ∃p′, s′. Starts(p′, s′) ∧ Suffix(p, p′, do(a, s′)) ∧ φ(p′).
Then I can show that after dropping the p-goal that φ at n in s, an agent does not
have the p-goal (and thus the primary c-goal) that the progression of φ at n, i.e.
ProgOf(φ, drop(φ)), provided that ProgOf(φ, drop(φ)) is not strongly inevitable in
do(drop(φ), s):
Proposition 4.4.15 (Drop).
DOAgt |= PGoal(φ, n, s) ∧ ¬StronglyInevitable(ProgOf(φ, drop(φ)), do(drop(φ), s))
⊃ ¬PGoal(ProgOf(φ, drop(φ)), n, do(drop(φ), s)),
271
Proof. Fix φ1, N1, and S1. From the antecedent, we have:
PGoal(φ1, N1, S1), (4.19)
¬StronglyInevitable(ProgOf(φ1, drop(φ1)), do(drop(φ1), S1)). (4.20)
We can see from Axiom 4.3.3 and Definition 4.3.6 that after the drop(φ1) action has
been performed in S1, each G-accessibility level in S1 where φ1 is a p-goal is re-
placed by the set of paths that starts with a situation that has the same history as
do(drop(φ1), S1). Thus, by (4.19) and Axiom 4.3.3, we have:
G(p,N1, do(drop(φ1), S1)) ≡ ∃s′. Starts(p, s′) ∧ SameHist(s′, do(drop(φ1), S1)).
(4.21)
Now, by Definition 3.5.13 and (4.20), there exists a path P1 that starts with a situation
that has the same history as do(drop(φ1), S1) and over which ¬ProgOf(φ1, drop(φ1))
holds:
∃s′. Starts(P1, s′) ∧ SameHist(s′, do(drop(φ1), S1)) ∧ ¬ProgOf(φ1, drop(φ1))(P1).
(4.22)
The consequent follows from (4.21), (4.22), and Definition 4.2.1.
Note that, Proposition 4.4.15 does not necessarily hold for CGoal, as φ could still be
a consequence of the agent’s remaining primary c-goals. Also, it does not hold in
general for RPGoal, since it might be the case that the progression of φ is inevitable
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over all GR-accessible paths; however, we could obtain an analogous result by adding
the negation of this as a condition.
4.4.3 Goal Introspection
I want my agents to be able to introspect their goals – if an agent has a realistic p-goal
that φ, she should know that she has this as her goal; moreover if she does not have the
realistic p-goal that φ, she should know this. In the following, I identify constraints on
K and G that yield these properties.30
To get positive introspection of realistic p-goals, we need a constraint similar to
transitivity, which I call KGTrans:
Definition 4.4.16.
KGTrans(n, s)
def
= ∀s1, s2, p. K(s1, s) ∧K(s2, s1) ∧G(p, n, s1) ∧ Starts(p, s2)
⊃ G(p, n, s).
If this constraint is satisfied for some priority level n, then the agents will have positive
introspection of realistic p-goals at n:31
30These constraints and associated propositions are closely related to those given by Shapiro [194];
however they are adapted to work for infinite paths.
31Note that for this to hold, we also need K to be transitive, but this follows from DOAgt.
273
Proposition 4.4.17.
DOAgt |= ∀s, n. KGTrans(n, s) ⊃ (RPGoal(φ, n, s) ⊃ Know(RPGoal(φ, n), s)).
Proof. (By contradiction) Fix φ1, N1, and S1, and assume that:
KGTrans(N1, S1), (4.23)
RPGoal(φ1, N1, S1). (4.24)
Also assume that:
¬Know(RPGoal(φ1, N1), S1). (4.25)
From (4.25) and Definitions 4.2.5, 4.2.4, and 3.4.5, it follows that there is a path P1
and situations S11 and S
2
1 such that:
K(S11 , S1) ∧K(S21 , S11) ∧ Starts(P1, S21) ∧G(P1, N1, S11) ∧ ¬φ1(P1). (4.26)
From this and the transitivity of K (i.e. Axiom 3.4.3), it follows that:
K(S21 , S1). (4.27)
From this, (4.24), (4.26), and Definitions 4.2.5 and 4.2.4, it follows that:
¬G(P1, N1, S1). (4.28)
But it follows from (4.23), (4.26), and Definition 4.4.16 that G(P1, N1, S1), which is
contradictory to (4.28).
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To get negative introspection of realistic p-goals, we need a constraint similar to
Euclideanism. I call this constraint KGEuc:
Definition 4.4.18.
KGEuc(n, s)
def
= ∀s1, s2, p. K(s1, s) ∧K(s2, s) ∧G(p, n, s) ∧ Starts(p, s2)
⊃ G(p, n, s1).
If this constraint is satisfied for some priority level n, then the agents will have negative
introspection of realistic p-goals at n:32
Proposition 4.4.19.
DOAgt |= ∀s, n. KGEuc(n, s) ⊃ (¬RPGoal(φ, n, s) ⊃ Know(¬RPGoal(φ, n), s)).
Proof. (By contradiction) Fix φ1, N1, and S1, and assume that:
KGEuc(N1, S1), (4.29)
¬RPGoal(φ1, N1, S1). (4.30)
Also assume that:
¬Know(¬RPGoal(φ1, N1), S1). (4.31)
32Again, we need K to be Euclidean, which follows from DOAgt.
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From (4.30) and Definitions 4.2.5 and 4.2.4, it follows that there is a path P1 and
situations S11 such that:
K(S11 , S1) ∧ Starts(P1, S11) ∧G(P1, N1, S1) ∧ ¬φ1(P1). (4.32)
From (4.31) and Definitions 4.2.5, 4.2.4, and 3.4.5, it follows that there is a K-
accessible situation in S1 where the agent indeed has the RPGoal that φ1 at N1. Pick
such a K-accessible situation in S1; let’s call it S21 . Thus, we have:
K(S21 , S1) ∧ ∀p, s. (Starts(p, s) ∧K(s, S21) ∧G(p,N1, S21) ⊃ φ1(p)). (4.33)
From (4.32), (4.33), and the Euclideanism of K (i.e. Axiom 3.4.4), it follows that:
K(S11 , S
2
1). (4.34)
Moreover, from (4.29), (4.32), (4.33), and Definition 4.4.18, it follows that:
G(P1, N1, S
2
1). (4.35)
Finally, from (4.33), (4.32), (4.34), and (4.35), it follows that φ1(P1), which is contra-
dictory to (4.32).
In the following, I show that for any executable situation, KGTrans and KGEuc
persist if they hold in all initial situations as they are preserved by the successor-state
axiom for G. First I show the persistence of KGTrans :
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Theorem 4.4.20.
DOAgt |= (∀n, s. Init(s) ⊃ KGTrans(n, s)) ⊃
(∀n, s. Executable(s) ⊃ KGTrans(n, s)).
Proof. (By induction on s) Assume that:
∀n, s. Init(s) ⊃ KGTrans(n, s). (4.36)
The base case, where s is an initial situation, is trivial. For the inductive case, we fix
S1 and A1 and assume that:
Executable(do(A1, S1)). (4.37)
Fix N1. We need to show that KGTrans(N1, do(A1, S1)). From (4.37) and Lemma
3.5.29, we have:
Executable(S1). (4.38)
This, (4.36), and the inductive hypothesis imply:
∀n. KGTrans(n, S1). (4.39)
Assume that S2 = do(A1, S1). Let us expand KGTrans(N1, S2); fix S12 , S
2
2 , and P2,
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and assume:
K(S12 , S2), (4.40)
K(S22 , S
1
2), (4.41)
G(P2, N1, S
1
2), (4.42)
Starts(P2, S22). (4.43)
We need to show that G(P2, N1, S2). (4.40), (4.41), and Axiom 3.4.10 imply that there
exist S11 and S
2
1 such that:
K(S11 , S1) ∧ S12 = do(A1, S11), and (4.44)
K(S21 , S
1
1) ∧ S22 = do(A1, S21). (4.45)
Now, note that by (4.40), (4.41), and the transitivity of K, we have:
K(S22 , S2).
From this and Lemma 3.5.34, we have:
SameHist(S22 , S2). (4.46)
Now, to show that P2 isG-accessible at levelN1 in situation S2, we will need to analyze
the SSA for G. A close look at it gives us four cases with four different mutually
exclusive conditions: Case 1, where one simply progresses the old set of G-accessible
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paths before the action A1 has happened to obtain the new set of G-accessible paths
after the occurrence of A1, Case 2, which involves progression with shifting levels,
Case 3, which involves processing/filtering the old set of G-accessible paths to handle
the adoption of a goal at level N1, and Case 4 that involves processing them to handle
the dropping of a goal at level N1. Let us discuss each case, one at a time. Thus the
successor-state axiom for G (i.e. Axiom 4.3.3) and (4.42) give us four cases:
• Case 1. The action A1 is a regular (non-adopt/drop action), or A1 does not refer
to the adoption of a goal φ at level N1 or at some higher priority level than N1,
or it does not refer to the dropping of a goal φ at N1, i.e.:
¬(A1 = adopt(φ,M) ∧M ≤ N1) ∧ ¬(A1 = drop(φ) ∧ PGoal(φ,N1, S1)).
By the SSA for G and (4.42), in all these cases P2 is the simple progression of
some path P1 that was G-accessible at N1 in S11 :
Starts(P1, S21) ∧ Suffix(P2, P1, do(A1, S21)) ∧G(P1, N1, S11). (4.47)
Definition 4.4.16, (4.39), (4.44), (4.45), and (4.47) imply that:
G(P1, N1, S1). (4.48)
By Axiom 4.3.3, Definitions 4.3.4, 4.3.5, and 4.3.6, the assumption for this case
(i.e. that A1 is a regular action, or that A1 refers to the adoption of a goal at a
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lower priority level than N1 or to the dropping of a goal at some other level than
N1), (4.47), and (4.48), the progression of P1 (i.e. P2) will be retained in the
G-relation at N1 in S2 = do(A1, S1); this is because Progressed(P2, N1, A1, S1)
holds. Thus we have G(P2, N1, S2) and we are done.
• Case 2. A1 refers to the adoption of a goal φ at a higher priority level than
N1, i.e. A1 = adopt(φ,M) ∧M < N1. In this case, P2 is the progression of
some path P1 that was G-accessible at N1 − 1 in S11 (since adopting the goal φ
at higher priority than N1 has pushed all the goals that has priority lower than
M − 1 down by one level):
Starts(P1, S21) ∧ Suffix(P2, P1, do(A1, S21)) ∧G(P1, N1 − 1, S11).
The rest of the proof for this case is similar to that of Case 1.
• Case 3. A1 refers to the adoption of a goal φ at N1, i.e. A1 = adopt(φ,N1).
Then P2 is included in the G-relation at N1 in S2 if it starts with a situation that
has the same history as in S2, and if φ(P2) holds. (4.43) and (4.46) imply this
former. The latter also holds, otherwise by the SSA for G, P2 would have not
been included in the G-relation at N1 in S12 (but it is included by (4.42)).
• Case 4. A1 refers to the dropping of a goal φ at N1, i.e. A1 = drop(φ), where
PGoal(φ,N1, S1). In this case, P2 is included in the G-relation at N1 in S2 if it
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starts with a situation that has the same history as in S2. Again, (4.43) and (4.46)
imply this condition.
The theorem thus follows.
I next show the persistence of KGEuc :
Theorem 4.4.21.
DOAgt |= (∀n, s. Init(s) ⊃ KGEuc(n, s)) ⊃
(∀n, s. Executable(s) ⊃ KGEuc(n, s)).
Proof. (By induction on s) Assume that:
∀n, s. Init(s) ⊃ KGEuc(n, s). (4.49)
The base case, where s is initial, is trivial. For the inductive case, we fix S1 and A1
and assume that:
Executable(do(A1, S1)). (4.50)
Fix N1. We need to show that KGEuc(N1, do(A1, S1)). From (4.50) and Lemma
3.5.29, we have:
Executable(S1). (4.51)
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This, (4.49), and the inductive hypothesis imply:
∀n. KGEuc(n, S1). (4.52)
Assume that S2 = do(A1, S1). Let us expandKGEuc(N1, S2); fix S12 , S
2
2 , and P2, and
assume:
K(S12 , S2), (4.53)
K(S22 , S2), (4.54)
G(P2, N1, S2), (4.55)
Starts(P2, S22). (4.56)
We need to show thatG(P2, N1, S12). (4.53), (4.54), and Axiom 3.4.10 imply that there
exist S11 and S
2
1 such that:
K(S11 , S1) ∧ S12 = do(A1, S11), and (4.57)
K(S21 , S1) ∧ S22 = do(A1, S21). (4.58)
Now, note that by (4.53), (4.54), and the Euclideanism of K, we have:
K(S22 , S
1
2).
By this and Lemma 3.5.34, we have:
SameHist(S22 , S
1
2). (4.59)
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Now, to show that P2 is G-accessible at level N1 in situation S12 , we will need to
analyze the SSA for G. A close look at it gives us four cases with four different
mutually exclusive conditions: Case 1, where one simply progresses the old set of
G-accessible paths before the action A1 has happened to obtain the new set of G-
accessible paths after the occurrence of A1, Case 2, which involves progression with
shifting levels, Case 3, which involves processing/filtering the old set of G-accessible
paths to handle the adoption of a goal at level N1, and Case 4 that involves processing
them to handle the dropping of a goal at level N1. Let us discuss each case, one at a
time. Thus the successor-state axiom for G (i.e. Axiom 4.3.3) and (4.55) give us four
cases:
• Case 1. The action A1 is a regular (non-adopt/drop action), or A1 does not refer
to the adoption of a goal φ at level N1 or at some higher priority level than N1,
or it does not refer to the dropping of a goal φ at N1, i.e.:
¬(A1 = adopt(φ,M) ∧M ≤ N1) ∧ ¬(A1 = drop(φ) ∧ PGoal(φ,N1, S1)).
By the SSA for G and (4.55), in all these cases P2 is the simple progression of
some path P1 that was G-accessible at N1 in S1:
Starts(P1, S21) ∧ Suffix(P2, P1, do(A1, S21)) ∧G(P1, N1, S1). (4.60)
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Definition 4.4.18, (4.52), (4.57), (4.58), and (4.60) imply that:
G(P1, N1, S
1
1). (4.61)
By Axiom 4.3.3, Definitions 4.3.4, 4.3.5, and 4.3.6, the assumption for this case
(i.e. that A1 is a regular action, or that A1 refers to the adoption of a goal at a
lower priority level than N1 or to the dropping of a goal at some other level than
N1), (4.60), and (4.61), the progression of P1 (i.e. P2) will be retained in the
G-relation at N1 in S12 = do(A1, S
1
1), since Progressed(P2, N1, A1, S
1
1) holds.
Thus we have G(P2, N1, S12).
• Case 2. A1 refers to the adoption of a goal φ at a higher priority level than
N1, i.e. A1 = adopt(φ,M) ∧M < N1. In this case, P2 is the progression of
some path P1 that was G-accessible at N1 − 1 in S1 (since adopting the goal φ
at higher priority than N1 has pushed all the goals that has priority lower than
M − 1 down by one level):
Starts(P1, S21) ∧ Suffix(P2, P1, do(A1, S21)) ∧G(P1, N1 − 1, S1).
The rest of the proof for this case is similar to that of Case 1.
• Case 3. A1 refers to the adoption of a goal φ at N1, i.e. A1 = adopt(φ,N1).
Then P2 is included in the G-relation at N1 in S12 if it starts with a situation that
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has the same history as in S12 , and if φ(P2) holds. (4.56) and (4.59) imply this
former. The latter also holds, otherwise P2 would not have been included in the
G-relation at N1 in S2 as in (4.55).
• Case 4. A1 refers to the dropping of a goal φ at N1, i.e. A1 = drop(φ), where
PGoal(φ,N1, S1). In this case, P2 is included in the G-relation at N1 in S12 if it
starts with a situation that has the same history as in S12 . Again, (4.56) and (4.59)
imply this condition.
The theorem thus follows.
4.4.4 Persistence Properties
The next two properties concern the persistence of these motivational attitudes. First I
have a persistence property for achievement realistic p-goals: if an agent has a realistic
p-goal that 3Φ in some situation s, then she will retain this realistic p-goal after some
action a has been performed in s, provided that she knows in s that Φ has not yet been
achieved, and a is not the action of dropping a p-goal.
Proposition 4.4.22 (Persistence of Achievement Realistic Prioritized Goals).
DOAgt |= RPGoal(3Φ, n, s) ∧ Know(¬Φ, s) ∧ ∀ψ. a 6= drop(ψ)
⊃ ∃n′. RPGoal(3Φ, n′, do(a, s)).
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Proof. Fix Φ1, N1, S1, and A1. By the antecedent, we have:
RPGoal(3Φ1, N1, S1), (4.62)
Know(¬Φ1, S1), (4.63)
∀ψ. A1 6= drop(ψ). (4.64)
Now, by Definitions 4.2.4, 4.2.5, 3.5.8, and 3.5.7, the agent has the realistic p-goal that
3Φ1 at N1 in S1 if the following holds:
∀p. G(p,N1, S1)∧∃s. Starts(p, s)∧K(s, S1) ⊃ ∃s∗. OnPath(p, s∗)∧Φ1(s∗). (4.65)
Thus 3Φ1 will persist after A1 has been performed in S1 if there is a level n such that
3Φ1 holds over all G-accessible paths that start with a K-accessible situation (i.e. all
GR-accessible paths) at n in do(A1, S1). After the A1 action has been performed in
S1, every G relation at any level will be updated in accordance with Axiom 4.3.3. By
Axiom 4.3.3, there are three cases to consider: (1) A1 can be a regular action or the
adoption of some goal at a lower priority level than N1, (2) the adoption of some goal
at N1 or at a higher priority level than N1, or (3) the dropping of some goal. The last
case, i.e. an explicit dropping of a goal is ruled out by (4.64). So let us consider the
other two cases, one at a time:
1. A1 is a regular action or the adoption of some goal at lower priority than N1:
First, assume that A1 is a regular action. Then, by Axiom 4.3.3 and Definition
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4.3.4, all G-accessible paths at N1 will be progressed to reflect the fact that A1
has just happened. Next, fix Ψ1 and N2 and assume that A1 = adopt(Ψ1, N2),
where N2 > N1. Then by Axiom 4.3.3 and Definitions 4.3.5 and 4.3.4, the
G-accessible paths at N1 in S1 will be progressed to reflect the fact that A1 has
just happened. Thus, for both these cases the G-accessible paths at N1 in S1 are
simply progressed.
Again, there are two possibilities to consider:
(a) A1 makes 3Φ1 impossible to achieve, and thus there are no paths that are
GR-accessible at N1 in do(A1, S1). However this does not cause a problem
for persistence of 3Φ1, since in that case, the agent’s set of GR-accessible
paths at N1 will be empty, and by Definition 4.2.5 the agent trivially has
the realistic p-goal that 3Φ1 at N1 in do(A1, S1).
(b) There is a GR-accessible path at N1 in do(A1, S1), but 3Φ1 does not hold
over this path. Given the fact that the G-accessible paths at level N1 in
situation do(A1, S1) can only be obtained by progressing those at N1 in S1,
this is only possible if there is aK-accessible situation in S1, say S ′1, where
there is a path P1 that starts with S ′1, P1 is G-accessible at N1 in S1, the
suffix of P1 that starts with do(A1, S ′1), let’s call it P2, is GR-accessible at
287
N1 in do(A1, S1), and 3Φ1 does not hold over P2:
K(S ′1, S1) ∧ Starts(P1, S ′1) ∧G(P1, N1, S1) ∧ Suffix(P2, P1, do(A1, S ′1))
∧GR(P2, N1, do(A1, S1)) ∧ ¬3Φ1(P2).
(4.66)
By (4.65) and (4.66), it follows that ∃s. OnPath(P1, s) ∧ Φ1(s). By this,
(4.66), and Definitions 3.5.8 and 3.5.7, it follows that Φ1(S ′1). But by
(4.66), (4.63), and Definition 3.4.5, we have ¬Φ1(S ′1), a contradiction!
Thus it follows that3Φ1 holds over allGR-accessible paths atN1 in do(A1,
S1).
2. A1 is the adoption of some goal at priority greater or equal to N1:
Fix Ψ1 and assume that A1 = adopt(Ψ1, N2), where N2 ≤ N1. Then by Axiom
4.3.3 and Definitions 4.3.5 and 4.3.4, the G-accessible paths at N1 in S1 are
pushed down one level in the hierarchy, and thus theG-accessible paths atN1+1
in do(A1, S1) are the progressed version of those at level N1 in S1, progressed
to simply reflect the fact that A1 has just happened. The rest of the proof is very
similar to case (1) with the necessary adjustment to reflect that level N1 in S1
indeed refers to level N1 + 1 in do(A1, S1). Thus, in this case too, the realistic
p-goal 3Φ1 persists, however at the lower priority level N1 + 1.
The proposition thus follows.
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Note that, we do not need to ensure that 3Φ is consistent with higher priority active
p-goals, since the successor-state axiom for G does not automatically drop such in-
compatible p-goals from the goal hierarchy. Also, as argued above, the level n where
3Φ is a realistic p-goal may change, e.g. if the action performed is an adopt action
with priority higher than or equal to n. Finally, I believe that the dropping of an unre-
lated p-goal should not affect persistence, and hence it should be possible to strengthen
this proposition. However, I leave this for future work.
The above persistence result can be strengthened to show that a goal 3Φ persists
at its original priority level n (i.e. without possibly shifting its priority level) when
additionally adopting goals at priority greater or equal to n is disallowed:
Corollary 4.4.23.
DOAgt |= (RPGoal(3Φ, n, s) ∧ Know(¬Φ, s)
∧ ∀ψ. a 6= drop(ψ) ∧ ∀ψ,m. ¬(a = adopt(ψ,m) ∧m ≤ n))
⊃ RPGoal(3Φ, n, do(a, s)).
Proof Sketch. Similar to the proof for Proposition 4.4.22, but with the omission of
Case 2, which is ruled out by the antecedent that adoption at level n or at some higher
priority level is not allowed, i.e. that ∀ψ,m. ¬(a = adopt(ψ,m) ∧m ≤ n)).
For achievement chosen goals I have the following persistence result: if in some
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situation s, an agent has the only p-goal at some level n that 3Φ and that the correct
history of actions in s has been performed, and if 3Φ is also a chosen goal in s (and
thus she has the primary c-goal in s that 3Φ), then she will retain the c-goal that 3Φ
at level n after some action a has been performed in s, provided that:
• she knows in s that Φ has not yet been achieved,
• that a is not the action of dropping a p-goal,
• that a is not the action of adopting a p-goal at some higher priority level than n
or at n,
• and that at level n−1, the agent does not have the c-goal that¬3Φ in do(a, s), i.e.
3Φ remains consistent with higher priority c-goals after a had been performed
in s.
Proposition 4.4.24 (Persistence of Achievement Chosen Goals).
DOAgt |= OPGoal(3Φ ∧ ∃s′. Starts(s′) ∧ SameHist(s′), n, s) ∧ CGoal(3Φ, s)
∧ Know(¬Φ, s) ∧ ∀ψ. a 6= drop(ψ) ∧ ∀ψ,m. ¬(a = adopt(ψ,m) ∧m ≤ n)
∧ ¬CGoal(¬3Φ, n− 1, do(a, s))
⊃ CGoal(3Φ, n, do(a, s)).
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Proof. Fix Φ1, N1, S1, and A1. From the antecedent, we have:
OPGoal(3Φ1 ∧ ∃s′. Starts(s′) ∧ SameHist(s′), N1, S1), (4.67)
CGoal(3Φ1, S1), (4.68)
Know(¬Φ1, S1), (4.69)
∀ψ. A1 6= drop(ψ), (4.70)
∀ψ,m. ¬(A1 = adopt(ψ,m) ∧m ≤ N1), (4.71)
¬CGoal(¬3Φ1, N1 − 1, do(A1, S1)). (4.72)
From (4.72) and Definition 4.2.8, there is a path P1 such that:
G∩(P1, N1 − 1, do(A1, S1)) ∧3Φ1(P1). (4.73)
By (4.73) and Axiom 4.2.7, to prove that3Φ1 is a c-goal atN1 in do(A1, S1), it suffices
to show that the agent has the realistic p-goal at N1 in do(A1, S1) that 3Φ1, and that
P1 is indeed GR-accessible at N1 in do(A1, S1). The latter along with Axiom 4.2.7
ensures that there is at least one path, namely P1, that is in G∩ at N1 in do(A1, S1)
and over which 3Φ1 holds, while the former along with Axiom 4.2.7 and the latter
stipulates that 3Φ1 indeed holds over all such paths (i.e. all paths that are in G∩ at N1
in do(A1, S1)).33
33Note that proving the former condition (i.e. that RPGoal(3Φ1, N1, do(A1, S1))) alone is not suf-
ficient since it is possible that N1 will not be selected as an active level in do(A1, S1), e.g. due to
the existence of some goal at N1 in do(A1, S1) that is inconsistent with other higher priority goals in
do(A1, S1).
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First I will show that the agent has the realistic p-goal atN1 in do(A1, S1) that3Φ1.
From (4.67) and Definitions 4.2.2 and 4.2.1, we have PGoal(3Φ1, N1, S1). From this
and Definitions 4.2.1, 4.2.4, and 4.2.5, we have:
RPGoal(3Φ1, N1, S1). (4.74)
From (4.74), (4.69), (4.70), (4.71), and Corollary 4.4.23, it follows that 3Φ1 persists
at level N1 after A1 has been performed in S1, i.e. RPGoal(3Φ1, N1, do(A1, S1)).
Next I will show that P1 is indeed GR-accessible at N1 in do(A1, S1). Consider
an arbitrary path P ′ such that it starts with a situation S ′ that is K-accessible from
do(A1, S1) and such that 3Φ1 holds over P ′:
3Φ1(P ′) ∧ Starts(P ′, S ′) ∧K(S ′, do(A1, S1)). (4.75)
By Axiom 3.2.7, S ′ must be of the form do(A1, S ′′) for some situation S ′′. Moreover,
by Axiom 3.4.10, S ′′ must have been K-accessible in S1:
K(S ′′, S1). (4.76)
Let us extend P ′ in the past to include S ′′, and let us call the path obtained by doing so,
P ′′. Since P ′ is a suffix of P ′′, it follows from (4.75) and Definitions 3.5.8 and 3.5.7
that:
3Φ1(P ′′). (4.77)
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From (4.76) and Lemma 3.5.34, it follows that S ′′ has the same action history as
S1, i.e. SameHist(S ′′, S1). From this and by (4.77), (4.67), and Definition 4.2.2, P ′′
must be G-accessible at N1 in S1, i.e. G(P ′′, N1, S1). From this, (4.76), the fact that
P ′′ starts with S ′′, and Definition 4.2.4, P ′′ must be GR-accessible at N1 in S1, i.e.
GR(P
′′, N1, S1). Moreover, by (4.70), (4.71), Axiom 4.3.3, and Definitions 4.3.4 and
4.3.5, since all GR-accessible paths at N1 in S1 are simply progressed when A1 is per-
formed in S1, it follows that P ′ is GR-accessible at N1 in do(A1, S1). Thus we have:
∀p. 3Φ1(p) ∧ ∃s. Starts(p, s) ∧K(s, do(A1, S1)) ⊃ GR(p,N1, do(A1, S1)). (4.78)
By (4.73), Proposition 3.5.37(a), and Lemma 4.4.10, we have:
3Φ1(P1) ∧ ∃s. Starts(P1, s) ∧K(s, do(A1, S1)).
Finally, by this and (4.78), we have GR(P1, N1, do(A1, S1)).
Note that, this property also follows if we replace the consequent with CGoal(3Φ, do(a,
s)), or PrimCGoal(3Φ, do(a, s)), and thus it deals with the persistence of (primary)
c-goals. Note however that, it does not hold if we replace the OPGoal in the antecedent
with PGoal; the reason for this is that the agent might have a p-goal at level n in s that
3Φ and the c-goal in s that3Φ, but not have3Φ as a primary c-goal in s, e.g. nmight
be an inactive level because another p-goal at n has become impossible, and3Φ could
be a c-goal in s because it is a consequence of two other primary c-goals. Thus even
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if ¬3φ is not a c-goal after a has been performed in s, there is no guarantee that level
n will be active in do(a, s) or that all the active p-goals that contributed to 3Φ in s are
still active. As in Proposition 4.4.22, I believe that the dropping of an unrelated p-goal
will not affect persistence, and hence it should be possible to strengthen this proposi-
tion. Finally, in the future I would like to generalize these two persistence properties
to deal with arbitrary temporally extended goals.
4.5 An Example
In this section, I demonstrate the utility of this framework using an application to
personalized travel planning over the web. Consider the following scenario: Anika,
who lives in Toronto, Canada (YYZ), would like to plan a trip for her holidays. She
would like to depart on July 29, returning on the 5th of August. As for the destination,
she’d really like to go to Kaafu in the Maldives (MLE), but only if she can redeem her
Cool-Air-Miles reward miles for this. Otherwise, she would settle for the Florida Keys
(EYW) and save up for next year’s vacation. Moreover, if for some reason Florida
does not work out, she would like to revisit Varadero, Cuba (VRA) instead. Finally, if
she ends up going to the Keys, she would like to visit her best friend who lives there.
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The following set of axioms specifies her travel agent’s goals initially:34
Axiom 4.5.1.
Init(s) ⊃
((G(p, 0, s) ≡ ∃s′. Starts(p, s′) ∧ Init(s′) ∧
During(At(Anika,MLE), Jul29,Aug05)(p) ∧
(Redeemed(Anika,YYZ,MLE) B (date = Jul29))(p))
∧ (G(p, 1, s) ≡ ∃s′. Starts(p, s′) ∧ Init(s′) ∧
During(At(Anika,EYW), Jul29,Aug05)(p))
∧ (G(p, 2, s) ≡ ∃s′. Starts(p, s′) ∧ Init(s′) ∧
During(At(Anika,VRA), Jul29,Aug05)(p))
∧ (G(p, 3, s) ≡ ∃s′. Starts(p, s′) ∧ Init(s′) ∧
Between(AnikaVisitedBFF, Jul29,Aug05)(p)).
34I focus on the goals of the travel planning agent, which are of course derived from those of the
agent’s client, Anika. I don’t model how Anika communicates her preferences to the agent. To simplify,
I suppress the agent arguments in the K and the G-relations.
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Definition 4.5.2.
During(Φ, from, to)(p) def=
∃s1, s2. OnPath(p, s1) ∧ OnPath(p, s2) ∧ date(s1) = from ∧ date(s2) = to
∧ ∀s. OnPath(p, s) ∧ date(s) > from ∧ date(s) < to ⊃ Φ(s).
Definition 4.5.3.
Between(Φ, from, to)(p) def=
∃s. OnPath(p, s) ∧ date(s) > from ∧ date(s) < to ∧ Φ(s).
Thus, initially the agent’s set of G-accessible paths at the highest priority level com-
prise those that start with initial situations and over which Anika is located at Kaafu
during the week of July 29 to August 5, and she pays for her flight by redeeming her
reward miles for this before the departure date. Similarly, initially her G-accessible
paths at level 1 (the second highest priority level) are the ones that start with initial
situations and over which Anika is located at the Keys during the specified week, and
similarly for level 2, but this time at Varadero. Also, initially her G-accessible paths at
level 3 are those that start with initial situations and over which Anika visits her best
friend between the specified dates.
Finally, for any level that has lower priority than 3, the agent has the trivial goal
that she be on a path that starts with an initial situation:
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Axiom 4.5.4.
Init(s) ∧ n ≥ 4 ⊃ (G(p, n, s) ≡ ∃s′. Starts(p, s′) ∧ Init(s′)).
Note that, here I model time using a date(s) functional fluent along the lines of Reiter’s
account [178]. The only action that affects the date(s) fluent is dateT ick, which incre-
ments the date (see Axioms 4.5.6 and 4.5.15 below). For this, I use the date constants
Jan01 to Dec31 assuming that the year is 2017 (i.e. not a leap year).
Next, I list the actions that can be performed in this domain, along with their pre-
conditions. An agent agt can fly from location x to location y in some situation s, if x
and y refer to two different locations, agt has a ticket from x to y for date d in s, the
date of s is indeed d, the flights between these two locations are running in s, and if
agt is located at x in s:
Axiom 4.5.5.
Poss(fly(agt, x, y), s) ≡ x 6= y ∧ ∃d. HasTicket(agt, x, y, d, s) ∧ date(s) = d
∧ ¬∃d′. FlightsCancelled(x, y, d′, s) ∧ At(agt, x, s).
There are five exogenous actions in this domain: dateT ick increments the calendar
date, addBlacklistLoc(x, d) marks location x as blacklisted at least until date d so
that the customers of Cool-Air-Miles can no longer redeem their reward miles for an
air ticket to x at least until d, removeBlacklistLoc(x) removes x from the blacklisted
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locations, startDisruptionBtwn(x, y, d) starts some sort of disruption between loca-
tions x and y at least until date d, cancelling all flights over this route at least until d,
and endDisruptionBtwn(x, y) ends this disruption, restoring the cancelled flights. I
assume that dateT ick is always possible:
Axiom 4.5.6.
Poss(dateT ick, s) ≡ True.
A location x can be added to the blacklist at least until date d in situation s if and
only if x is not already in the blacklist until some date d′ and if date d is in the future,
i.e. the date of s is less than d (note that x is not automatically removed from the
blacklist even when the date turns d; rather it must be removed explicitly using a
removeBlacklistLoc action):
Axiom 4.5.7.
Poss(addBlacklistLoc(x, d), s) ≡ ¬∃d′. Blacklisted(x, d′, s) ∧ date(s) < d.
A location x can be removed from the blacklist in s if and only if x is currently black-
listed in s and if the expiry date d of the last time x was blacklisted has past, i.e. the
date of s is greater than d:
Axiom 4.5.8.
Poss(removeBlacklistLoc(x), s) ≡ ∃d. Blacklisted(x, d, s) ∧ d < date(s).
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Similarly, the flights between two locations x and y can be cancelled by causing a
disruption between these two locations at least until date d in situation s if and only if
the flights between x and y are not already cancelled until some date d′ in s and if date
d is in the future, i.e. the date of s is less than d (note again that the flights between
these two locations are not automatically restored even when the date turns d; rather
they must be restored explicitly using an endDisruptionBtwn action):
Axiom 4.5.9.
Poss(startDisruptionBtwn(x, y, d), s) ≡
¬∃d′. FlightsCancelled(x, y, d′, s) ∧ date(s) < d.
Finally, the disruption between two locations x and y can be removed in situation s if
and only if the flights between these two locations are currently cancelled in s and if
the expiry date d of the disruption between these locations has past, i.e. the date of s is
greater than d:
Axiom 4.5.10.
Poss(endDisruptionBtwn(x, y), s) ≡ ∃d. FlightsCancelled(x, y, d, s) ∧ d < date(s).
An agent agt can always purchase a ticket between two locations x and y for any
date d (for simplicity, I ignore the monetary aspect, the availability of tickets, etc.):
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Axiom 4.5.11.
Poss(purchase(agt, x, y, d), s) ≡ True.
Moreover, an agent can also obtain a ticket by redeeming her Cool-Air-Miles re-
ward miles; in particular, she can redeem her reward miles for an air ticket from loca-
tion x to location y on date d in situation s if she did not already redeem her Cool-Air-
Miles reward miles for this route in s, y is not blacklisted in s for some date d′, and if
in s she has collected at least as many reward miles as is required to travel from x to
y:35
Axiom 4.5.12.
Poss(redeemMiles(agt, x, y, d), s) ≡ ¬Redeemed(agt, x, y, s)
∧ ¬∃d′. Blacklisted(y, d′, s) ∧milesBtwn(x, y) ≤ hasMiles(agt, s).
Finally, Anika can visit her best friend if she is at the keys:
Axiom 4.5.13.
Poss(anikaV isitsBFF, s) ≡ At(Anika,EYW, s).
35While I could have made this axiom more realistic (e.g. as I did for the preconditions of
removeBlacklistLoc and endDisruptionBtwn actions), this does not add much and would have
made the axiom/framework unnecessarily complex. For the purpose of this example, such a simplistic
model of redemption suffices since, e.g., I assume that initially Anika’s travel agent knows that Anika
did not redeem her miles for the relevant route/trip, that multiple redemption attempts for the same route
will not be considered, etc.
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In the following, I specify the fluents in this domain and their successor-state ax-
ioms. An agent agt is located at x after a has been performed in situation s if and only
if a is the action of agt flying from some location y to x, or if agt was at x in s and a
does not refer to the action of agt flying to another location y:
Axiom 4.5.14.
At(agt, x, do(a, s)) ≡ ∃y. a = fly(agt, y, x)
∨ (At(agt, x, s) ∧ ¬∃y. a = fly(agt, x, y)).
The current date is x after a has been performed in s if and only if the date was y in s,
a is a dateT ick action, and x is the successor date to y, or the date was x in s and a
does not refer to a dateT ick action (I assume that function nextDate(a), which takes a
date a and returns the successor date to a, is available):
Axiom 4.5.15.
date(do(a, s)) = x ≡ (∃y. date(s) = y ∧ a = dateT ick ∧ nextDate(y) = x)
∨ (date(s) = x ∧ ¬a = dateT ick).
A location x is blacklisted at least until some date d in do(a, s) if and only if a is the
action of adding x to the blacklist until date d or if x was already blacklisted until d in
s and a does not refer to the action of removing x from the blacklist:
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Axiom 4.5.16.
Blacklisted(x, d, do(a, s)) ≡ a = addBlacklistLoc(x, d)
∨ (Blacklisted(x, d, s) ∧ ¬a = removeBlacklistLoc(x)).
The flights between location x any y are cancelled at least until some date d after a has
been performed in s if and only if a is the action of starting a disruption between x and
y until date d or if the flights were already cancelled until d in s and a is not the action
of ending the disruption between x and y:
Axiom 4.5.17.
FlightsCancelled(x, y, d, do(a, s)) ≡ a = startDisruptionBtwn(x, y, d)
∨ (FlightsCancelled(x, y, d, s) ∧ ¬a = endDisruptionBtwn(x, y)).
An agent agt has redeemed her reward miles for a flight from location x to y after
action a has been performed in s if and only if a refers to the action of redeeming them
towards a ticket from x to y on some date d or if agt has already redeemed her reward
miles for this route in s:
Axiom 4.5.18.
Redeemed(agt, x, y, do(a, s)) ≡
∃d. a = redeemMiles(agt, x, y, d) ∨ Redeemed(agt, x, y, s).
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An agent agt has a ticket for a flight from location x to y for date d after action a has
been performed in s if and only if a refers to agt’s action of purchasing a ticket from
x to y for d in s or to that of redeeming agt’s reward miles towards a ticket from x to
y for d or if she already had this ticket for this route for d in s:36
Axiom 4.5.19.
HasTicket(agt, x, y, d, do(a, s)) ≡
(a = purchase(agt, x, y, d) ∨ a = redeemMiles(agt, x, y, d))
∨ HasTicket(agt, x, y, d, s).
An agent agt has n reward miles after a has been performed in s if and only if a is the
action of redeeming agt’s reward miles for a ticket from location x to y for date d and
n is what is left of her reward miles after she redeems the required amount of miles for
the ticket, i.e. the difference between the miles she has in s and the distance between
x and y, hasMiles(agt, s) − milesBtwn(x, y), or if she has n reward miles in s and a
is not the action of redeeming them for some ticket:
36Again, this is a simplistic model –e.g. here tickets don’t get cancelled after they have been used up–
but it is adequate for the current example.
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Axiom 4.5.20.
hasMiles(agt, do(a, s)) = n ≡
(∃x, y, d. a = redeemMiles(agt, x, y, d) ∧ n = hasMiles(agt, s)−milesBtwn(x, y))
∨ (hasMiles(agt, s) = n ∧ ¬∃x, y, d. a = redeemMiles(agt, x, y, d)).
Finally, Anika has visited her best friend after an action a has been performed in
situation s if a is the action anikaV isitsBFF or if she has already visited her in s:37
Axiom 4.5.21.
AnikaVisitedBFF(do(a, s)) ≡ a = anikaV isitsBFF ∨ AnikaVisitedBFF(s).
I also need axioms for specifying the nextDate function. For brevity, I just give one
example here:
nextDate(Jan01) = Jan02.
I will call these axioms nextDate axioms.
For these axioms to work, I need to specify unique name axioms for the fly, date-
Tick, addBlacklistLoc, removeBlacklistLoc, startDisruptionBtwn, endDisrup-
tionBtwn, purchase, redeemMiles, and anikaV isitsBFF actions. To this end, I
first need an axiom that captures that actions with different action-function names are
not the same:
37Once again, this simplified model is sufficient for my example.
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Axiom 4.5.22. For all distinct action functions A1 and A2 :
∀~x, ~y. A1(~x) 6= A2(~y).
Thus, for instance, we have that ∀a, b, c. f ly(a, b, c) 6= dateT ick, that ∀a, b, c, d, e.
f ly(a, b, c) 6= addBlacklistLoc(d, e), etc.
Another set of unique names axioms states that two actions with the same name
are the same if their arguments are equal:
Axiom 4.5.23. For all action functions A :
A(x1, . . . , xn) = A(y1, . . . , yn) ⊃ x1 = y1 ∧ . . . ∧ xn = yn.
Thus, for example, it follows from this axiom that fly(a, b, c) = fly(x, y, z) ⊃ a =
x ∧ b = y ∧ c = z, etc.
Again, I also need unique names axioms for location names:
Axiom 4.5.24.
YYZ 6= MLE ∧ YYZ 6= EYW ∧ YYZ 6= VRA
∧MLE 6= EYW ∧MLE 6= VRA ∧ EYW 6= VRA.
Furthermore, I need unique names axioms for date constants:
Axiom 4.5.25. For all distinct date constants d1 and d2:
d1 6= d2.
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Thus, for example, it follows from this axiom that Jul29 6= Jul30, etc.
Finally, the following initial state axioms specify what the world is like and what
the agent knows about the world initially:
Axiom 4.5.26.
(a) milesBtwn(YYZ,MLE) = 8600,
(b) Know(At(Anika,YYZ), S0),
(c) ∀loc. loc 6= YYZ ⊃ Know(¬At(Anika, loc), S0),
(d) Know(date = Jul26, S0),
(e) ∀d. Know(¬Blacklisted(MLE, d), S0),
(f) ∀loc, d. Know(¬FlightsCancelled(YYZ, loc, d), S0),
(g) Know(¬Redeemed(Anika,YYZ,MLE), S0),
(h) ∀x, y, d. Know(¬HasTicket(Anika, x, y, d), S0),
(i) Know(hasMiles(Anika) = 9000, S0),
(j) Know(¬AnikaVisitedBFF, S0).
Thus, the distance between Toronto (YYZ) and Kaafu (MLE) is 8600 miles. More-
over, initially the travel agent knows that Anika is only located at Toronto and not
elsewhere, that the current date is July 26, that Kaafu is not blacklisted, that all flights
from Toronto are operating without any issues, that Anika has not redeemed her reward
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miles for a ticket from Toronto to Kaafu, that initially Anika does not have any tickets,
that initially Anika has 9000 reward miles, and that initially Anika has not visited her
best friend.
Henceforth, I use DTA to denote the set of axioms and definitions required for
formalizing our travel agent example, i.e. one that consists of the axioms and the def-
initions for modeling an optimizing agent DOAgt and Axioms 4.5.1 – 4.5.26 and the
associated definitions. Given this, it can be shown that Anika can only be at one loca-
tion in any given situation, i.e. that the At relation is functional:
Lemma 4.5.27.
DTA |= ∀loc1, loc2, s. At(Anika, loc1, s) ∧ At(Anika, loc2, s) ⊃ loc1 = loc2.
Proof Sketch. By induction on s using Axioms 4.5.14, 4.5.26 (b) and (c), and the
relevant unique names axioms (i.e. 4.5.22, 4.5.23, and 4.5.24).
Moreover, this result can also be extended for a given date interval:
Lemma 4.5.28.
DTA |= ∀loc1, loc2, p. During(At(Anika, loc1), Jul29,Aug05)(p)
∧ During(At(Anika, loc2), Jul29,Aug05)(p)
⊃ loc1 = loc2.
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Proof. By contradiction. Fix path P1 and locations L1 and L2 and assume:
During(At(Anika, L1), Jul29,Aug05)(P1), (4.79)
During(At(Anika, L2), Jul29,Aug05)(P1), (4.80)
L1 6= L2. (4.81)
By (4.79) and Definition 4.5.2, it follows that there are situations S1 and S2 such that:
OnPath(P1, S1) ∧ date(S1) = Jul29, (4.82)
OnPath(P1, S2) ∧ date(S2) = Aug05, (4.83)
∀s. OnPath(P1, s) ∧ date(s) > Jul29 ∧ date(s) < Aug05 ⊃ At(Anika, L1, s). (4.84)
Again, by (4.80) and Definition 4.5.2, we have:
∀s. OnPath(P1, s) ∧ date(s) > Jul29 ∧ date(s) < Aug05 ⊃ At(Anika, L2, s). (4.85)
Fix such a situation S∗ on P1 so that the date of S∗ is later than Jul29 and earlier than
Aug05, say date(S∗) = Jul31. By (4.82), (4.83), Proposition 3.5.43, Axiom 4.5.15,
and nextDate axioms (and the associated unique names axioms), such a situation in-
deed exists. Thus from this and from (4.84) and (4.85), we have:
At(Anika, L1, S∗) ∧ At(Anika, L2, S∗).
Then by this and Lemma 4.5.27, we have: L1 = L2. But this is contradictory to
(4.81).
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I can show that initially our agent has the following only p-goals at the various
levels:
Proposition 4.5.29.
DTA |= OPGoal(∃s. Starts(s) ∧ Init(s) ∧ During(At(Anika,MLE), Jul29,Aug05)
∧ (Redeemed(Anika,YYZ,MLE) B (date = Jul29)), 0, S0)
∧ OPGoal(∃s. Starts(s) ∧ Init(s) ∧ During(At(Anika,EYW), Jul29,Aug05), 1, S0)
∧ OPGoal(∃s. Starts(s) ∧ Init(s) ∧ During(At(Anika,VRA), Jul29,Aug05), 2, S0)
∧ OPGoal(∃s. Starts(s) ∧ Init(s) ∧ Between(AnikaVisitedBFF, Jul29,Aug05), 3, S0).
Proof. First, note that from Definitions 4.2.1 and 4.2.2, it follows that to show that
OPGoal(φn, n, S0) for some formula φn and some level n, we need to show that
∀p. G(p, n, S0) ≡ φn(p). The proposition follows from this and Axiom 4.5.1, since by
Axiom 3.2.2, S0 is an initial situation, i.e. Init(S0).
Also, all of these goals are initially possible:
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Proposition 4.5.30.
DTA |= RPGoal(During(At(Anika,MLE), Jul29,Aug05)
∧ (Redeemed(Anika,YYZ,MLE) B (date = Jul29)), 0, S0)
∧ RPGoal(During(At(Anika,EYW), Jul29,Aug05), 1, S0)
∧ RPGoal(During(At(Anika,VRA), Jul29,Aug05), 2, S0)
∧ RPGoal(Between(AnikaVisitedBFF, Jul29,Aug05), 3, S0).
Proof. I will show this for level 1 only, as the proofs for the other levels are similar.
Since by Axiom 3.2.2, S0 is an initial situation, it follows from Axiom 4.5.1 that:
∀p. G(p, 1, S0) ⊃ During(At(Anika,EYW), Jul29,Aug05)(p). (4.86)
We now have the two following cases. First consider the case where there is a path that
isGR-accessible at 1 in S0. By Definition 4.2.4, we have that allGR-accessible paths at
level 1 in situation S0 are G-accessible at 1 in S0, i.e. ∀p. GR(p, 1, S0) ⊃ G(p, 1, S0).
From this and (4.86), it follows that:
∀p. GR(p, 1, S0) ⊃ During(At(Anika,EYW), Jul29,Aug05)(p).
For this case, the proposition thus follows from this and Definition 4.2.5.
Next consider the case where there are no GR-accessible paths at level 1 in S0.38
But then the proposition trivially follows from Definition 4.2.5.
38In the proof of Proposition 4.5.31, I show that there is in fact a path in GR at level 0 in S0.
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However, initially the agent only has the c-goal that Anika be at Kaafu during the week
of July 29 to August 5 and that she uses her reward miles before the departure date to
buy the ticket for this trip:
Proposition 4.5.31.
DTA |= CGoal(During(At(Anika,MLE), Jul29,Aug05)
∧ (Redeemed(Anika,YYZ,MLE) B (date = Jul29)), S0)
∧ ¬CGoal(During(At(Anika,EYW), Jul29,Aug05), S0)
∧ ¬CGoal(During(At(Anika,VRA), Jul29,Aug05), S0)
∧ ¬CGoal(Between(AnikaVisitedBFF, Jul29,Aug05), S0).
Proof. This can be shown by proving each conjunct, one at a time. Let’s start with
the first conjunct. In the following, I will use φ0 to denote the c-goal of this conjunct,
i.e. φ0 = During(At(Anika,MLE), Jul29,Aug05) ∧ (Redeemed(Anika,YYZ,MLE)
B (date = Jul29)). I will first show that there is aGR-accessible path at level 0 in situ-
ation S0 over which φ0 holds. To this end, let me construct such a path P0 by giving the
situations/actions on the path: S0, S1 = do(redeemMiles(Anika,YYZ,MLE, Jul29),
S0), S2 = do(dateT ick, S1), S3 = do(dateT ick, S2), S4 = do(dateT ick, S3), S5 =
do(fly(Anika,YYZ,MLE), S4), followed by infinitely many dateT ick actions. Note
that, for this sequence of situations to be a valid path P0, these situations need to be
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executable. By Axiom 3.2.2 and Lemma 3.5.17, S0 is executable; I will show that the
rest of the situations are also executable (by showing that these actions are executable
in the corresponding situations) later.
Also, note that P0 starts with S0, and by Axioms 3.2.2 and 3.4.2, S0 is an initial
situation that is K-accessible from S0, i.e. Init(S0) ∧ K(S0, S0). From this, Axiom
4.5.1, and Definition 4.2.4, it follows that P0 is GR-accessible at level 0 in S0 (i.e.
GR(P0, 0, S0)) if φ0 holds over P0. I will now argue that this is indeed that case.
First note that by Axiom 4.5.12, the redeemMiles(Anika,YYZ, MLE, Jul29) action
is possible in S0 if and only if we have:
¬Redeemed(Anika,YYZ,MLE, S0) ∧
¬∃d. Blacklisted(MLE, d, S0) ∧milesBtwn(YYZ,MLE) ≤ hasMiles(Anika, S0).
¬Redeemed(Anika,YYZ,MLE, S0) follows from Axiom 4.5.26 (g) and the reflexivity
ofK. Moreover, ¬∃d. Blacklisted(MLE, d, S0) follows from Axiom 4.5.26 (e) and the
reflexivity of K while milesBtwn(YYZ,MLE) ≤ hasMiles(Anika, S0) from Axioms
4.5.26 (a), (i), and the reflexivity of K. Thus the redeemMiles action is possible in
S0. Note that after this redeemMiles action has been performed, i.e. in S1, it follows
from Axiom 4.5.19 that Anika has a ticket for a flight from Toronto to the Maldives
for July 29, i.e.:
HasTicket(Anika,YYZ,MLE, Jul29, S1). (4.87)
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Also, it follows from Axiom 4.5.18 that she has redeemed her reward miles for this
ticket in S1, i.e.:
Redeemed(Anika,YYZ,MLE, S1). (4.88)
Moreover, it follows from Axiom 4.5.26 (d), the reflexivity of K, and Axiom 4.5.15
(and the unique names for actions axioms39) that the current date was not effected by
this action:
date(S1) = Jul26. (4.89)
Furthermore, it follows from Axiom 4.5.26 (b), the reflexivity of K, and Axiom 4.5.14
that Anika’s location was not effected by this action:
At(Anika,YYZ, S1). (4.90)
Finally, it follows from Axiom 4.5.26 (f), the reflexivity of K, and Axiom 4.5.17 that
the flights between Toronto and the Maldives were not effected by this action either:
∀d. ¬FlightsCancelled(YYZ,MLE, d, S1). (4.91)
Note that, from (4.88), (4.89), and Definition 3.5.11, it follows that:
(Redeemed(Anika,YYZ,MLE) B (date = Jul29))(P0). (4.92)
39For brevity, I won’t mention unique names for actions axioms henceforth.
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Secondly, note that by Axiom 4.5.6, the dateT ick action is possible in situations
S1, S2, and S3. Now, by (4.89) and Axiom 4.5.15, the current date is incremented after
each dateT ick action happens, i.e. date(S2) = Jul27 and:
date(S3) = Jul28, (4.93)
date(S4) = Jul29. (4.94)
Also, by (4.87) and Axiom 4.5.19, (4.91) and Axiom 4.5.17, and (4.90) and Axiom
4.5.14, these dateT ick actions have no effect on Anika’s tickets, flight cancellations,
and Anika’s location:
HasTicket(Anika,YYZ,MLE, Jul29, S4), (4.95)
∀d. ¬FlightsCancelled(YYZ,MLE, d, S4), (4.96)
At(Anika,YYZ, S4). (4.97)
Thirdly, note that by Axiom 4.5.5, (4.95), (4.94), (4.96), and (4.97), the fly(Anika,
YYZ,MLE) action is possible in S4. By (4.97) and Axiom 4.5.14, Anika is located at
MLE after the fly action happens:
At(Anika,MLE, S5). (4.98)
Also, by (4.94) and Axiom 4.5.15, the current date remains the same after the fly
action happens:
date(S5) = Jul29. (4.99)
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Fourthly (and finally), by Axiom 4.5.6, all the remaining dateT ick actions are
possible starting in S5. As discussed before, these dateT ick actions do not affect
Anika’s location, and thus by (4.98) she remains at MLE in all future situations on
path P0:
∀s. OnPath(P0, s) ∧ S5  s ⊃ At(Anika,MLE, s). (4.100)
By Axiom 4.5.15, each of these dateT ick actions flips the date to the next one starting
from July 29. In particular, by (4.94) and Axiom 4.5.15, it follows that:
date(S12) = Aug05, (4.101)
where S12 = do(dateT ick, do(dateT ick, do(dateT ick, do(dateT ick, do(dateT ick,
do(dateT ick, do(dateT ick, S5))))))). Thus, by (4.99), (4.101), the fact that there are
no situations between S5 and S6 = do(dateT ick, S5), (4.100), and Definition 4.5.2, it
follows that:
During(At(Anika,MLE), Jul29,Aug05)(P0). (4.102)
From (4.102) and (4.92), it follows that φ0 holds over P0, and thus we have:
GR(P0, 0, S0). (4.103)
Now, note that by Definitions 4.2.10 and 4.2.9, it follows that CGoal(φ0, S0) if and
only if ∀p, n. G∩(p, n, S0) ⊃ φ0(p). I will show this by induction on n using Axiom
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4.2.7. The base case follows from (4.103) and Axiom 4.2.7 – since there is a GR-
accessible path at level 0 in situation S0, namely P0, the G∩-accessible paths up to
level 0 in S0 are those that are GR-accessible at 0 in S0; by Axiom 4.5.1 and Definition
4.2.4, φ0 holds over all such paths, i.e. ∀p. G∩(p, 0, S0) ⊃ φ0(p). For the inductive
step, fix level N and assume that:
∀p. G∩(p,N, S0) ⊃ φ0(p). (4.104)
From Axiom 4.2.7, we can see that the set of G∩-accessible paths at level N + 1 in S0
is either the same as that of the one at level N in S0 or a proper subset of it. It thus
follows from this and (4.104) that φ0 holds over allGR-accessible paths atN+1 in S0.
Hence, it follows that ∀p, n. G∩(p, n, S0) ⊃ φ0(p) and thus we have CGoal(φ0, S0),
i.e. that the first conjunct of the proposition holds.
Next, let us consider the second conjunct; assume that φ1 = During(At(Anika,EY-
W), Jul29,Aug05). By Definitions 4.2.10 and 4.2.9, to show that ¬CGoal(φ1, S0) we
have to prove that ∃p. ∀n. G∩(p, n, S0)∧¬φ1(p). Since I have shown that CGoal(φ0, S0),
by Definitions 4.2.10 and 4.2.9, and Proposition 4.4.2 (which implies that G∩ cannot
be empty), it follows that ∃p. ∀n. G∩(p, n, S0)∧φ0(p). Thus from the definition of φ0,
we have:
∃p. ∀n. G∩(p, n, S0) ∧ During(At(Anika,MLE), Jul29,Aug05)(p).
316
From this and the fact that At is functional over the date interval (Jul29, Aug05), i.e.
Lemma 4.5.28, it follows that:
∃p. ∀n. G∩(p, n, S0) ∧ ¬During(At(Anika,EYW), Jul29,Aug05)(p).
The conjunct thus follows.
The proof for the third conjunct is similar to that of the second one.
Finally, the proof for the last conjunct is also similar to that of the second one; in
this case, we have to use the additional facts that initially the agent knows that Anika
has not visited her best friend (i.e. Axiom 4.5.26(j)), that the fluent AnikaVisitedBFF
becomes true only if she visits her best friend (i.e. Axiom 4.5.21), and that Anika can
only visit her best friend between Jul29 and Aug05 if Anika is located at EYW during
this period (i.e. Axiom 4.5.13), which is impossible as the second conjunct holds.
Now assume that Anika has just learned from a trusted source that the Keys, at this
time of the year, is very crowded, teeming with tourists from around the U.S. Since
she was looking for a quiet vacation, she gets her agent to change its preferences by
making the Keys its least preferred location. In my framework, such a reordering in
an agent’s preferences can be captured by a sequence of actions that involves dropping
one or more p-goals and then re-adopting them at different levels. Recall that dropping
an existing goal empties up all the levels where the dropped goal was a p-goal in the
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sense that the set of paths at each of these levels are replaced with paths that start with
current K-accessible situations, essentially replacing the p-goals at these levels with
the trivial goal that the correct history of actions in the current situation has occurred.
Re-adopting the dropped goal at some new level n on the other hand adds the goal at
level n by inserting the set of paths representing the goal at level n and pushing down
one level in the goal hierarchy all the other p-goal levels that had priority n or lower
before the adopt action occurred.
Continuing with our example, for instance, here this intended reordering can be
achieved by first dropping the p-goal that Anika be at the Keys during the specified
week and then by re-adopting it at level 3 (or alternatively, by dropping the p-goal
that Anika be at Varadero during that period and then re-adopting it at level 1). It
can be shown that the agent has the following only p-goals after she drops the p-
goal that During(At(Anika,EYW), Jul29,Aug05) and adopts it again at level 3 start-
ing in situation S0, i.e. in S2, where S2 = do(adopt(During(At(Anika,EYW), Jul29,
Aug05), 3), S1) and S1 = do(drop(During(At(Anika,EYW), Jul29,Aug05)), S0):40
40Note that after the agent has dropped the p-goal at level 1 (i.e. in S1), her only p-goal at this level
becomes just the trivial goal to be on a path that includes the actions done so far, i.e. one that starts with a
situation that has the same action history as S1. I could have defined the optimizing-agent framework to
get rid of/compact such “empty” p-goal levels, but this would have complicated the framework further.
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Proposition 4.5.32.
DTA |= OPGoal(∃s. Starts(s) ∧ SameHist(s, S2)
∧ During(At(Anika,MLE), Jul29,Aug05)
∧ (Redeemed(Anika,YYZ,MLE) B (date = Jul29)), 0, S2)
∧ OPGoal(∃s. Starts(s) ∧ SameHist(s, S2), 1, S2)
∧ OPGoal(∃s. Starts(s) ∧ SameHist(s, S2)
∧ During(At(Anika,VRA), Jul29,Aug05), 2, S2)
∧ OPGoal(∃s. Starts(s) ∧ SameHist(s, S2)
∧ During(At(Anika,EYW), Jul29,Aug05), 3, S2)
∧ OPGoal(∃s. Starts(s) ∧ SameHist(s, S2)
∧ Between(AnikaVisitedBFF, Jul29,Aug05), 4, S2).
Proof Sketch. First, note that from Definitions 4.2.1 and 4.2.2, it follows that to show
that OPGoal(φn, n, s) for some formula φn, some level n, and some situation s, we
need to show that ∀p. G(p, n, s) ≡ φn(p). Now from the SSA for G, it follows that
after the drop(During(At(Anika,EYW), Jul29,Aug05) action happens in S0, i.e. in
S1, the agent’s G-accessible paths at all levels are progressed to reflect that this action
has just been performed; in addition to this, the SSA for G adds back all paths that
share the same history with S1 to the existing G-accessibility levels where the agent
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has the p-goal that During(At(Anika,EYW), Jul29,Aug05). Thus, from the SSA for
G (i.e. Axiom 4.3.3 and Definitions 4.3.4 and 4.3.6) and Axiom 4.5.1, it follows that
the agent’s G-accessible paths in S1 at various levels are as follows:
G(p, 0, S1) ≡ ∃s. Starts(p, s) ∧ SameHist(s, S1) ∧
During(At(Anika,MLE), Jul29,Aug05)(p) ∧
(Redeemed(Anika,YYZ,MLE) B (date = Jul29))(p),
(4.105)
G(p, 1, S1) ≡ ∃s. Starts(p, s) ∧ SameHist(s, S1), (4.106)
G(p, 2, S1) ≡ ∃s. Starts(p, s) ∧ SameHist(s, S1) ∧
During(At(Anika,VRA), Jul29,Aug05)(p),
(4.107)
G(p, 3, S1) ≡ ∃s. Starts(p, s) ∧ SameHist(s, S1) ∧
Between(AnikaVisitedBFF, Jul29,Aug05)(p).
(4.108)
Moreover, by the SSA for G, it follows that after the adopt(During(At(Anika,EYW),
Jul29,Aug05), 3) action happens in S1, i.e. in S2, the G-accessible paths at all levels
above level 3 are simply progressed to reflect the fact that this action has been per-
formed. Thus from the SSA for G (i.e. Axiom 4.3.3 and Definitions 4.3.4 and 4.3.5)
and (4.105), (4.106), and (4.107), it follows that the agent’sG-accessible paths at these
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levels are as follows:
G(p, 0, S2) ≡ ∃s. Starts(p, s) ∧ SameHist(s, S2) ∧
During(At(Anika,MLE), Jul29,Aug05)(p) ∧
(Redeemed(Anika,YYZ,MLE) B (date = Jul29))(p),
(4.109)
G(p, 1, S2) ≡ ∃s. Starts(p, s) ∧ SameHist(s, S2), (4.110)
G(p, 2, S2) ≡ ∃s. Starts(p, s) ∧ SameHist(s, S2) ∧
During(At(Anika,VRA), Jul29,Aug05)(p).
(4.111)
Also, theG-accessible paths at level 3 in situation S2 are those that start with a situation
that has the same action history as S2 and over which the adopted goal holds, i.e.
G(p, 3, S2) ≡ ∃s. Starts(p, s) ∧ SameHist(s, S2) ∧
During(At(Anika,EYW), Jul29,Aug05)(p).
(4.112)
Finally, the G-accessible paths at all levels below level 3 in S2 are the ones that can be
obtained by progressing the level immediately above it. Thus from the SSA for G and
(4.108), it follows that:
G(p, 4, S2) ≡ ∃s. Starts(p, s) ∧ SameHist(s, S2) ∧
Between(AnikaVisitedBFF, Jul29,Aug05)(p).
(4.113)
The proposition then follows from (4.109)–(4.113) and Definitions 4.2.1 and 4.2.2.
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Now suppose that at this point, the agent is informed that Cool-Air-Miles has an-
nounced that due to an outbreak of some unknown disease in many Indian ocean is-
lands, they are forced to blacklist the Maldives for a month. Here this can be mod-
eled by having the exogenous action addBlacklistLoc(MLE,Aug26) occur next. In
that case, it can be shown that the agent will choose Varadero over Kaafu in S3 =
do(addBlacklistLoc(MLE,Aug26), S2) since her highest priority p-goal has become
impossible to bring about:
Proposition 4.5.33.
DTA |= KImpossible(During(At(Anika,MLE), Jul29,Aug05)
∧ (Redeemed(Anika,YYZ,MLE) B (date = Jul29)), S3)
∧ ¬CGoal(During(At(Anika,MLE), Jul29,Aug05)
∧ (Redeemed(Anika,YYZ,MLE) B (date = Jul29)), S3)
∧ CGoal(During(At(Anika,VRA), Jul29,Aug05), S3)
∧ ¬CGoal(During(At(Anika,EYW), Jul29,Aug05), S3)
∧ ¬CGoal(Between(AnikaVisitedBFF, Jul29,Aug05), S3).
Proof. I will prove each conjunct, one at a time. Let us consider the first conjunct. I
will show this by contradiction. Assume that φ0 stands for During(At(Anika,MLE),
Jul29,Aug05) ∧ (Redeemed(Anika,YYZ,MLE) B (date = Jul29)). By Definitions
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3.5.15, 3.5.14, 3.5.12, and 3.4.5, ¬KImpossible(φ0, S3) can be expanded as follows:
¬KImpossible(φ0, S3)
≡ ¬KInevitable(¬φ0, S3)
≡ ¬Know(WeaklyInevitable(¬φ0, now), S3)
≡ ¬Know(∀p. Starts(p, now) ⊃ ¬φ0(p), S3)
≡ ¬(∀s′. K(s′, S3) ⊃ (∀p. Starts(p, s′) ⊃ ¬φ0(p)))
≡ ∃s′. K(s′, S3) ∧ ∃p. Starts(p, s′) ∧ φ0(p).
Thus, ¬KImpossible(φ0, S3) holds if there is a path P ∗ that starts with some situation
S∗ that is K-accessible from situation S3 and φ0 holds over P ∗:
Starts(P ∗, S∗) ∧K(S∗, S3) ∧ φ0(P ∗). (4.114)
From this and Definition 4.5.2, it follows that there is a situation S∗∗ such that:
OnPath(P ∗, S∗∗) ∧ date(S∗∗) = Jul29. (4.115)
Now, from (4.114), Definitions 3.5.11 and 3.5.7, and the definition of φ0, it follows
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that:
Redeemed(Anika,YYZ,MLE) B (date = Jul29)(P ∗)
≡ ¬(¬Redeemed(Anika,YYZ,MLE) U (date = Jul29))(P ∗)
≡ ¬∃s, s′. Starts(P ∗, s) ∧ OnPath(P ∗, s′) ∧ date(s′) = Jul29
∧ ∀s∗. s ≤ s∗ < s′ ⊃ ¬Redeemed(Anika,YYZ,MLE, s∗).
It follows from this, (4.114), and (4.115), that there is a situation SR that is between
the situation interval [S∗, S∗∗) and over which Anika has redeemed her Cool Air Miles
for a ticket from YYZ to MLE:
S∗  SR ≺ S∗∗ ∧ Redeemed(Anika,YYZ,MLE, SR). (4.116)
Now, it follows from Axiom 4.5.26(g) that initially the agent knows that Redeemed
is false, i.e. Know(¬Redeemed(Anika,YYZ,MLE), S0). Fix arbitrary K-accessible
situation Sk0 in S0. Then from Axiom 4.5.26(g) and Definition 3.4.5, we have:
¬Redeemed(Anika,YYZ,MLE, Sk0 ). (4.117)
By the SSA for Redeemed, i.e. Axiom 4.5.18, it follows that Redeemed will only
become true if the redeemMiles(Anika,YYZ,MLE, d) action happens for some date
d. Since by the unique names axioms the drop, adopt, and addBlacklistLoc actions
are not the same as the redeemMiles action, it follows from (4.117) and Axiom 4.5.18
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that:
¬Redeemed(Anika,YYZ,MLE, Sk3 ),
where Sk3 = do(addBlacklistLoc(MLE,Aug26), do(adopt(φ2, 3), do(drop(φ2), S
k
0 )))
and φ2 = During(At(Anika,EYW), Jul29,Aug05).
Note that since by Axiom 3.4.10, all situations that are K-accessible in S3 must be
progressed from those that were K-accessible in S0, the above also holds for any
arbitrary K-accessible situation in S3. From this and (4.114), it thus follows that:
¬Redeemed(Anika,YYZ,MLE, S∗).
From this, (4.116), and Axiom 4.5.18, it follows that there must be a situation s be-
tween S∗ and S∗∗ where an appropriate redeemMiles action occurs:
∃s. S∗ ≺ do(redeemMiles(Anika,YYZ,MLE), s) ≺ S∗∗. (4.118)
I will show that this is impossible since the preconditions of redeemMileswill always
be false in this interval. Note that by Axiom 4.5.26(e), it follows that the agent knows
that initially MLE is not blacklisted for all dates, i.e. ∀d. Know(¬Blacklisted(MLE, d), S0).
Then from Axiom 4.5.26(e) and Definition 3.4.5, for any arbitrary K-accessible situa-
tion Sk0 we have:
¬Blacklisted(MLE, d, Sk0 ). (4.119)
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By the SSA for Blacklisted, i.e. Axiom 4.5.16, it follows that MLE will be black-
listed only if the addBlacklistLoc(MLE, d) action happens for some date d. Since
by the unique names axioms the drop and the adopt actions are not the same as the
addBlacklistLoc action, it follows from Axiom 4.5.16 that:
∀d. ¬Blacklisted(MLE, d, Sk2 ),
where Sk2 = do(adopt(φ2, 3), do(drop(φ2), S
k
0 ))).
Again, since by Axiom 3.4.10, all situations that are K-accessible in S2 must be pro-
gressed from those that were K-accessible in S0, the above also holds for any arbitrary
K-accessible situation in S2. From this and Definition 3.4.5, it follows that the agent
will also know in S2 that this is the case:
Know(∀d. ¬Blacklisted(MLE, d), S2). (4.120)
But after the addBlacklistLoc(MLE,Aug26) action happens, by Axiom 4.5.16 it fol-
lows that MLE will be blacklisted at least until Aug 26:
Blacklisted(MLE,Aug26, Sk3 ).
Moreover, since by Axiom 3.4.10, all situations that are K-accessible in S3 must be
progressed from those that were K-accessible in S2, the above also holds for any
arbitrary K-accessible situation in S3. From this and Definition 3.4.5, it follows that
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the agent will know this is S3:
Know(Blacklisted(MLE,Aug26), S3).
It follows from this and (4.114) that:
Blacklisted(MLE,Aug26, S∗). (4.121)
Now by this and the preconditions of redeemMiles, i.e. Axiom 4.5.12, for (4.118) to
hold, MLE must be removed from the blacklist no later than the date of S∗∗, which by
the above definition of S∗∗ is Jul 29. But by (4.121) and Axiom 4.5.8, this is impossible
as the removeBlacklistLoc(MLE) action can only happen in a situation whose date
is later than Aug 26. It thus follows from this and the SSA for Blacklisted, i.e. Axiom
4.5.16 that MLE is blacklisted for all situations in the interval [S∗, S∗∗]:
∀s. S∗  s  S∗∗ ⊃ Blacklisted(MLE,Aug26, s).
Thus by this and Axiom 4.5.12 the action redeemMiles(Anika,YYZ,MLE) cannot
occur between S∗ and S∗∗, which is contradictory to (4.118). Hence it follows that:
KImpossible(φ0, S3), (4.122)
i.e. the first conjunct of the proposition holds. Note that it also follows that such a path
P ∗ does not exist, i.e.:
¬∃p, s. Starts(p, s) ∧K(s, S3) ∧ φ0(p). (4.123)
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I will next show that the second conjunct holds, i.e. ¬CGoal(φ0, S3). This follows
from (4.122) and Corollary 4.4.4.
Assume that φ1 stands for During(At(Anika,VRA), Jul29,Aug05). I will next
show that the third conjunct holds, i.e. that CGoal(φ1, S3). In the following I will do
this by showing that there is a path that is in the intersection of the GR-accessible
paths (i.e. in G∩) up to level 1 in S3 and over which φ1 holds, that this path is
also GR-accessible at level 2 in S3, and that φ1 holds over all paths that are in GR-
accessible at level 2 in S3; then I will use these to show that φ1 holds over all paths
that are in G∩ up to any level n. First, let me prove the first one. Let me start by
constructing such a path P ∗1 by giving the situations/actions on the path; I can then
show that G∩(P ∗1 , 1, S3). The situations/actions on P
∗
1 are as follows: S3, S4 =
do(purchase(Anika,YYZ,VRA, Jul29), S3), S5 = do(dateT ick, S4), S6 = do(date
T ick, S5), S7 = do(dateT ick, S6), S8 = do(fly(Anika,YYZ,VRA), S7), followed
by infinitely many dateT ick actions.
Now, note that P ∗1 starts with S3, and by the reflexivity of K (i.e. Axioms 3.4.2 and
3.4.10), we have:
Starts(P ∗1 , S3) ∧K(S3, S3). (4.124)
I will now show that φ1 holds over P ∗1 . To this end, note that from Definition 4.5.2,
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it follows that φ1(P ∗1 ) if and only if the following holds:
∃s1, s2. OnPath(P ∗1 , s1) ∧ OnPath(P ∗1 , s2) ∧ date(s1) = Jul29 ∧ date(s2) = Aug05
∧ ∀s. OnPath(P ∗1 , s) ∧ date(s) > Jul29 ∧ date(s) < Aug05 ⊃ At(Anika,VRA, s).
I will now argue that this is indeed that case. First note that by Axiom 4.5.11, the
purchase(Anika,YYZ,VRA, Jul29) action is always possible, and thus it is possible
in S3. Also by Axiom 4.5.19, Anika has the ticket from YYZ to VRA for Jul 29 in S4:
HasTicket(Anika,YYZ,VRA, Jul29, S4). (4.125)
Now by Axiom 4.5.6, the dateT ick action is always possible. By Axiom 4.5.26(d)
and Definition 3.4.5, it follows that date(S0) = Jul26. Moreover, since by the unique
names axioms the drop, adopt, addBlacklistLoc, and purchase actions do not refer
to the dateT ick action, by Axiom 4.5.15 it follows that the date of S4 is also Jul 26,
i.e.: date(S4) = Jul26. Moreover, from this and Axiom 4.5.15 it follows that:
date(S7) = Jul29. (4.126)
Now, note that by (4.125) and Axiom 4.5.19, it follows that:
HasTicket(Anika,YYZ,VRA, Jul29, S7). (4.127)
Moreover, from Axiom 4.5.26(f) and Definition 3.4.5, it follows that:
∀l, d. ¬FlightsCancelled(YYZ, l, d, S0).
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From this, the unique names axioms (which say that none of the actions performed so
far is a startDisruptionBtwn action), and Axiom 4.5.17, it follows that:
∀l, d. ¬FlightsCancelled(YYZ, l, d, S7). (4.128)
Furthermore, from Axiom 4.5.26(b) and Definition 3.4.5, it follows that:
At(Anika,YYZ, S0).
From this, the unique names axioms (which say that none of the actions performed so
far is a fly action), and Axiom 4.5.14, it follows that:
At(Anika,YYZ, S7). (4.129)
Again, from Axiom 4.5.24, it follows that:
YYZ 6= VRA.
From this, (4.127), (4.126), (4.128), (4.129), and Axiom 4.5.5 it follows that the
fly(Anika,YYZ, VRA) action is possible in S7.
Now, by (4.129) and Axiom 4.5.14, Anika will be in VRA after the fly(Anika,YYZ,
VRA) action happens in S7, i.e.:
At(Anika,VRA, S8).
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Also, since by our construction above none of the rest of the actions on P ∗1 is a fly
action, Anika will stay in VRA for all situations that follows S7 on P ∗1 :
∀s. OnPath(P ∗1 , s) ∧ S7 ≺ s ⊃ At(Anika,VRA, s). (4.130)
Again, from (4.126), the unique names axioms (which says that the fly action is
not a dateT ick action), and Axiom 4.5.15, it follows that:
date(S14) = Aug05, (4.131)
where, S14 = do(dateT ick, do(dateT ick, do(dateT ick, do(dateT ick, do(dateT ick,
do(dateT ick, S8)))))). Recall from above that φ1 holds over P ∗1 if there are two situ-
ations associated with dates Jul 29 and Aug 05 on P ∗1 and Anika is at VRA in all the
situations on P ∗1 that are within this situation interval (see the unnumbered equation
right after (4.124)). It thus follows from (4.126), (4.131), and (4.130) that:
φ1(P
∗
1 ). (4.132)
Next, I will show that G∩(P ∗1 , 1, S3). Since by the unique names axioms the
addBlacklistLoc action is not an adopt or drop action, the G-accessible paths in
S2 will simply be progressed when it happens. Thus from Proposition 4.5.32, Axiom
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4.3.3, and Definitions 4.3.4, 4.2.1 and 4.2.2, it follows that:
∀p. G(p, 0, S3) ≡ ∃s. Starts(p, s) ∧ SameHist(s, S3) ∧ φ0(p), (4.133)
∀p. G(p, 1, S3) ≡ ∃s. Starts(p, s) ∧ SameHist(s, S3), (4.134)
∀p. G(p, 2, S3) ≡ ∃s. Starts(p, s) ∧ SameHist(s, S3) ∧ φ1(p). (4.135)
From (4.133), it follows that ∀p. G(p, 0, S3) ⊃ φ0(p). From this, (4.123), and Defini-
tion 4.2.4, it follows that there are no GR-accessible paths at level 0 in S3, i.e.:
¬∃p. GR(p, 0, S3). (4.136)
Then by Axiom 4.2.7, it follows that:
∀p. G∩(p, 0, S3) ≡ ∃s′. Starts(p, s′) ∧K(s′, S3).
By (4.124), P ∗1 is indeed such a path and thus we have:
G∩(P ∗1 , 0, S3). (4.137)
Moreover, from (4.124) and Definition 3.2.7, it follows that:
Starts(P ∗1 , S3) ∧ SameHist(S3, S3). (4.138)
Thus by this and (4.134), it follows that G(P ∗1 , 1, S3). Moreover, from this, (4.124),
and Definition 4.2.4, it follows that GR(P ∗1 , 1, S3). From this, (4.137), and Axiom
4.2.7, it follows that:
G∩(P ∗1 , 1, S3). (4.139)
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Furthermore, from (4.124), (4.138), (4.132), (4.135), and Definition 4.2.4, it follows
that:
GR(P
∗
1 , 2, S3), (4.140)
∀p. GR(p, 2, S3) ⊃ φ1(p). (4.141)
Now by (4.139), (4.140), (4.141), and Axiom 4.2.7, it follows that φ1 holds over all
paths that are in the intersection of the GR-accessible paths up to level 2 in S3, i.e.:
∀p. G∩(p, 2, S3) ⊃ φ1(p). (4.142)
From this and Axiom 4.2.7, it follows that:
∀p. (∀n. G∩(p, n, S3)) ⊃ φ1(p).
Finally, from this and Definitions 4.2.10 and 4.2.10 and 4.2.9, it follows that the third
conjunct holds, i.e. CGoal(φ1, S3).
Next, I will prove that the fourth conjunct holds. Assume that φ2 stands for
During(At(Anika,EYW), Jul29,Aug05). Then I need to show that ¬CGoal(φ2, S3).
By Definitions 4.2.10 and 4.2.9, to show that ¬CGoal(φ2, S3) we have to prove that
∃p. (∀n. G∩(p, n, S3)) ∧ ¬φ2(p). Since I have shown that CGoal(φ1, S3), by Defini-
tions 4.2.10 and 4.2.9 it follows that ∃p. (∀n. G∩(p, n, S3)) ∧ φ1(p). Thus from the
definition of φ1, we have:
∃p. ∀n. G∩(p, n, S0) ∧ During(At(Anika,VRA), Jul29,Aug05)(p).
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From this, the fact that At is functional over the date interval (Jul29, Aug05), i.e.
Lemma 4.5.28, and that EYW 6= VRA, i.e. Axiom 4.5.24, it follows that:
∃p. ∀n. G∩(p, n, S0) ∧ ¬During(At(Anika,EYW), Jul29,Aug05)(p). (4.143)
The conjunct thus follows.
Finally, I will prove that the last conjunct holds; this is related to the proof of the
previous conjunct. In this case, note that initially the agent knows that Anika has not
visited her best friend (i.e. Axiom 4.5.26(j)), that the fluent AnikaVisitedBFF becomes
true only if she visits her best friend (i.e. Axiom 4.5.21), that by the unique names ax-
ioms for actions none of the actions performed so far is the anikaV isitsBFF action,
and that Anika can only visit her best friend between Jul29 and Aug05 if she is located
at EYW during this period (i.e. Axiom 4.5.13). Given that she is not, i.e. (4.143), it
follows that:
∃p. ∀n. G∩(p, n, S0) ∧ ¬Between(AnikaVisitedBFF, Jul29,Aug05)(p).
From this and Definitions 4.2.10 and 4.2.9 it then follows that the last conjunct holds,
i.e.:
¬CGoal(Between(AnikaVisitedBFF, Jul29,Aug05), S3).
The proposition thus follows.
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Finally, assume that the agent later learns that as a result of an upcoming hurri-
cane, all flights going from Toronto to Varadero are cancelled for a week. Again, we
can model this by having the exogenous action startDisruptionBtwn(YYZ,VRA,
Aug02) occur next. In that case, it can be shown that the agent will choose the Keys
as Anika’s destination in S4 = do(startDisruptionBtwn(YYZ,VRA,Aug02), S3),
since it has become impossible to fly to Varadero before Aug03:
Proposition 4.5.34.
DTA |=
Know(∀s. now ≺ s ∧ date(s) < Aug03 ⊃ ¬Poss(fly(Anika,YYZ,VRA), s), S4)
∧ ¬CGoal(During(At(Anika,MLE), Jul29,Aug05)
∧ (Redeemed(Anika,YYZ,MLE) B (date = Jul29)), S4)
∧ ¬CGoal(During(At(Anika,VRA), Jul29,Aug05), S4)
∧ CGoal(During(At(Anika,EYW), Jul29,Aug05), S4)
∧ CGoal(Between(AnikaVisitedBFF, Jul29,Aug05), S4).
Proof Sketch. The proof for this can be approached similarly to that of the previous
proposition; in fact, much of this proof sketch is a continuation of the previous one.
For the first conjunct, it can be shown that:
• by Axiom 4.5.26(f), the agent initially knows that all flights from YYZ are run-
335
ning;
• by the unique names axioms, none of the actions performed so far is a startDisr-
uptionBtwn action, and thus by the SSA for FlightsCancelled (Axiom 4.5.17)
and the SSA for K (Axiom 3.4.10), the agent still knows in S3 that all flights
from YYZ are operating; thus by Axiom 4.5.9, the agent knows that the startDis-
ruptionBtwn(YYZ,MLE,Aug02) action is possible in S3; and
• by the SSA for FlightsCancelled (Axiom 4.5.17), the flights from YYZ to VRA
are cancelled at least until Aug03 in S4 and by Axiom 3.4.10, the agent also
knows this; moreover, by Axiom 4.5.17 and the preconditions of endDisruption-
Btwn (Axiom 4.5.10), the agent also knows that this route cannot be restored
anytime before Aug03.
Thus by the preconditions of fly, i.e. Axiom 4.5.5, the agent knows that it is not
possible to execute the fly(Anika,YYZ,VRA) action in a situation that is preceded
by a K-accessible situation in S4 and whose date is earlier than Aug03.
Next consider the last two conjuncts; let’s call the content of these c-goals φ2 and
φ3, respectively. Note that the last two conjuncts can be proven as before by (i) con-
structing a path over which φ2 and φ3 hold, (ii) proving that this path is in G∩ up to
level 2 in S4, (iii) showing that the path is in the GR relation at level 3 in S4, (iv)
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showing that φ2 ∧ φ3 holds over all paths that are in the GR relation at level 3 in S4,
and then using these to (v) prove that φ2 ∧ φ3 holds over all paths that are in the G∩
intersection for all levels n in S4. Here, I will handle the proof for these two conjuncts
simultaneously by constructing a single such path P ∗ over which φ2 and φ3 hold, prov-
ing that G∩(P ∗, 2, S4), i.e. step (i) and (ii) above. The proof for (iii), (iv), and (v)
are similar to that of the previous proposition, so I will skip them.
I’ll start by giving the situations/actions for P ∗: S4, S5 = do(purchase(Anika,YYZ,
EYW, Jul29), S4), S6 = do(dateT ick, S5), S7 = do(dateT ick, S6), S8 = do(dateT ick,
S7), S9 = do(fly(Anika,YYZ,EYW), S8), S10 = do(dateT ick, S9), S11 = do(anika-
V isitsBFF, S10), followed by infinitely many dateT ick actions. It is straightforward
to show that φ2 ∧ φ3 holds over P ∗.
Next, I’ll show (ii). Note that I have shown earlier that there are no GR-accessible
paths at level 0 in S3, i.e. ¬∃p. GR(p, 0, S3) (see (4.136) in the proof of Proposition
4.5.33). From this and the SSA for G (Axiom 4.3.3), it follows that this also holds for
S4 since by the unique names axioms the startDisruptionBtwn action does not refer
to an adopt or a drop action (and thus no paths were added back to the G-relation at
level 0 in S4). Thus by Axiom 4.2.7, it follows that:
∀p. G∩(p, 0, S4) ≡ ∃s′. Starts(p, s′) ∧K(s′, S4).
Now consider path P ∗ that starts with S4; note that it follows from the above and the
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reflexivity of K that P ∗ is in G∩ up to level 0 in S4 (as it starts with a K-accessible
situation in S4, namely S4):
G∩(P ∗, 0, S4). (4.144)
Moreover, I have shown earlier (see (4.134) in the proof for Proposition 4.5.33) that:
∀p. G(p, 1, S3) ≡ ∃s. Starts(p, s) ∧ SameHist(s, S3).
From this, the unique names axioms for actions, and the SSA for G (Axiom 4.3.3), it
follows that theseG-accessible paths will simply be progressed when the startDisrup-
tionBtwn action happens in S3 since this action is not an adopt or a drop action, and
thus we have:
∀p. G(p, 1, S4) ≡ ∃s. Starts(p, s) ∧ SameHist(s, S4).
Since by Definition 3.2.7, SameHist(S4, S4), it follows that G(P ∗, 1, S4), and from
Definition 4.2.4 and the reflexivity of K that GR(P ∗, 1, S4), and finally from (4.144)
and Axiom 4.2.7 that:
G∩(P ∗, 1, S4). (4.145)
Furthermore, previously I have shown that (see (4.137) in the proof of Proposition
4.5.33):
∀p. G(p, 2, S3) ≡ ∃s. Starts(p, s) ∧ SameHist(s, S3) ∧ φ1(p),
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where φ1 stands for During(At(Anika,VRA), Jul29,Aug05). From this and the SSA
forG (Axiom 4.3.3), it follows that theseG-accessible paths will simply be progressed
when the startDisruptionBtwn action happens in S3 since the action performed in
S3 is not an adopt or a drop action. Thus from this and the fact that the date in S4 is
the same as in S3 (by SSA 4.5.15 and the fact that the startDisruptionBtwn action
is not a dateT ick action, i.e. Axiom 4.5.22), we have:
∀p. G(p, 2, S4) ≡ ∃s. Starts(p, s) ∧ SameHist(s, S4) ∧ φ1(p).
But since the agent knows that the fly(Anika,YYZ,EYW) action is not executable in
any situation before Aug03 (see the third bullet above), it follows from the definition of
During (i.e. Definition 4.5.2) that there are no paths that start with S4 or some situation
that has the same action history as S4 and over which φ1 holds, and thus there are no
GR-accessible paths at level 2 in S4, i.e. ¬∃p. GR(p, 2, S4). Thus from this, (4.144),
(4.145), and Axiom 4.2.7, it follows that:
G∩(P ∗, 2, S4). (4.146)
Again, the proof for (iii), (iv), and (v) is similar to that of the previous property.
Thus the last two conjuncts hold.
Finally, consider the second and the third conjuncts. Let’s call the content of these
c-goals φ0 and φ1, respectively. Now by Definitions 4.2.10 and 4.2.9, to show that
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¬CGoal(φ, S4) for some φ, we have to prove that ∃p. (∀n. G∩(p, n, S4)) ∧ ¬φ(p).
This is how both the second and the third conjuncts can be proven. Now, note that in
the above, I argued that φ2 ∧ φ3 holds over all paths p that are in the G∩ intersection
for all levels n in S4 (see (v) above); as argued in the previous proof, neither φ0 nor φ1
can hold over such a path p as by Lemma 4.5.28, At is functional over date intervals.
This thus proves that the second and the third conjuncts hold.41 The proposition thus
follows.
In this section, I used a simple example to illustrate how an agent’s prioritized
goals can be specified in my framework, how they can be used to derive her chosen
goals, and how these chosen goals evolve when the world changes. My formaliza-
tion of prioritized goals is related to the notion of preferences found in the literature
[215, 216], and in fact, my framework can be used to specify an agent’s preferences.
In the above example, I considered the agent’s priorities over a couple of preference
criteria only, namely the choice of Anika’s destination location and the possibility of
redeeming Cool Air Miles. In this example, the agent has preferences over mutually
exclusive choices. I could have easily extended it to deal with multiple preference cri-
teria over which the agent has independent choices. For instance, assume that Anika
41Note that I didn’t however prove that ∃p. ∀n. G∩(p, n, S4). Nevertheless, this follows from Propo-
sition 4.4.2 and Definitions 4.2.10 and 4.2.9.
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absolutely requires that she stays in a four-star or better hotel room as she had a very
bad experience with lower quality rooms last year. Moreover, she prefers not to spend
for a five-star hotel room. Nevertheless, she is willing to upgrade to a five-star room to
be in a preferred destination. In this framework, Anika’s preferences can be specified
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using a goal hierarchy whose first few levels are as follows:
Init(s) ⊃
((G(p, 0, s) ≡ ∃s′. Starts(p, s′) ∧ Init(s′) ∧
During(At(Anika,MLE), Jul29,Aug05)(p) ∧
(Redeemed(Anika,YYZ,MLE) B (date = Jul29))(p) ∧
During(BookedRoom(4∗), Jul29,Aug05)(p))
∧ (G(p, 1, s) ≡ ∃s′. Starts(p, s′) ∧ Init(s′) ∧
During(At(Anika,MLE), Jul29,Aug05)(p) ∧
(Redeemed(Anika,YYZ,MLE) B (date = Jul29))(p) ∧
During(BookedRoom(5∗), Jul29,Aug05)(p))
∧ (G(p, 2, s) ≡ ∃s′. Starts(p, s′) ∧ Init(s′) ∧
During(At(Anika,EYW), Jul29,Aug05)(p) ∧
During(BookedRoom(4∗), Jul29,Aug05)(p))
∧ (G(p, 3, s) ≡ ∃s′. Starts(p, s′) ∧ Init(s′) ∧
During(At(Anika,EYW), Jul29,Aug05)(p) ∧
During(BookedRoom(5∗), Jul29,Aug05)(p)).
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Note that, the above specification assumes that the individual utility of the two prefer-
ence criteria under question is zero – it is unnecessary to book a hotel room if Anika
is not going anywhere; also, it does not make sense for her to go somewhere without
having a hotel room booked. In this framework, such dependent preferences can be
captured by specifying them as conjunctive goals at the same level (as above). I can
also simulate cases where preference independence is assumed, as commonly found
in the planning with preferences literature [215]. When preferences are independent
and additive, rather than modeling them as conjunctions at the same level, we need to
specify these preferences at different levels. For example, assume that independently
of her travel, Anika prefers to submit a research paper before July 25th rather than not
doing so. This can be modeled by adding two prioritized goals to her goal hierarchy;
at some higher priority level, she has the p-goal to submit the paper before July 25,
while at some lower priority level, she has the p-goal to submit it after July 25. The
goal hierarchy looks as follows (here the “· · · ” stands for the goals for levels 1 and 2
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as in Axiom 4.5.1):
Init(s) ⊃
((G(p, 0, s) ≡ ∃s′. Starts(p, s′) ∧ Init(s′) ∧
During(At(Anika,MLE), Jul29,Aug05)(p) ∧
(Redeemed(Anika,YYZ,MLE) B (date = Jul29))(p))
∧ · · ·
∧ (G(p, 3, s) ≡ ∃s′. Starts(p, s′) ∧ Init(s′) ∧
Between(AnikaVisitedBFF, Jul29,Aug05)(p))
∧ (G(p, n, s) ≡ ∃s′. Starts(p, s′) ∧ Init(s′) ∧
(PaperSubmitted(Anika) B (date = Jul25))(p))
∧ (G(p, n+ 1, s) ≡ ∃s′. Starts(p, s′) ∧ Init(s′) ∧
(¬PaperSubmitted(Anika) B (date = Jul25))(p)),
where n ≥ 4. Note that the actual position of these p-goals relative to other p-goals in
the hierarchy does not affect the chosen goals involving travel as long as there is no in-
teraction w.r.t achievability, i.e. as this preference criterion is independent of her other
preference attributes (independence of achievability implies independence of prefer-
ences).
To summarize, in this section I showed how a realistic travel planning agent can
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be specified, illustrating the usefulness of my proposed framework. I discussed how
the agent’s prioritized goals and chosen goals change as a result of actions, including
exogenous ones. In addition, I discussed how different types of preferences of the
example agent can be modeled within this account.
4.6 Conclusion, Discussion and Future Work
In this chapter, I proposed a possible worlds semantics for specifying the prioritized
goals of an agent. I showed how this hierarchy of goals can be used to specify her
chosen goals assuming that agents chose as many of their highest priority goals as
possible while ensuring their chosen goals are consistent with each other and with the
agent’s knowledge. Then using a successor-state axiom, I specified how these goals
evolve when the world changes. My formalization ensures that an agent’s chosen goals
are always consistent, that her goals properly evolve as a result of regular actions as
well as of adopting and dropping goals, and that agents can introspect their goals. I
also showed that in my account, while chosen goals are closed under logical conse-
quence, primary c-goals are not, and thus they are side-effect free. In other words, an
agent need not (primarily) intend all known consequences of her (primary) intentions;
e.g. she can have the primary c-goal that φ and know that φ always implies ψ, and
still not have the primary c-goal that ψ. In my framework, an agent always tries to
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optimize her chosen goals, and so agents specified using this framework behave some-
what ideally. Given this simplifying assumption, here I have focused on developing
an expressive framework that captures an idealized form of rationality without worry-
ing about tractability. It would be desirable to study restricted fragments of the logic
where reasoning is tractable. Also, before defining more limited forms of rational-
ity, one should have a clear specification of what ideal rationality really is so that one
understands what compromises are being made.
Note that I could have modeled prioritized goals syntactically by treating the agent’s
set of p-goals as just an arbitrary set of temporal formulae, and then defining the set
of c-goals as a maximal consistent subset of p-goals. However, my possible world
semantics has some advantages over this: it clearly defines when goals are consistent
with each other and with what is known. One can easily specify how goals change
when an action a occurs, e.g. the goal to do a next and then do b becomes the goal to
do b next, the goal that 3Φ ∨ 3Ψ becomes the goal that 3Ψ if a makes achieving Φ
impossible, etc. Also, it is possible to model introspection of goals with constraints on
the accessibility relations G and K.
Unlike Cohen and Levesque, I handle both intended actions and (declarative) goals
uniformly (an intended complex action σ can be represented using the goal that ∃s.
OnPath(path, s)∧Do(σ, now, s), i.e. that the goal accessible paths are such that there is
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a situation s on each of these paths that can be reached from the starting situation of this
path by performing σ; see Chapter 7 for more on this). As in their account, intentions of
agents in my framework also persist (e.g. see Proposition 4.4.24). Like their intentions,
my chosen goals are also relativized, in particular w.r.t a matching drop action. Put
otherwise, under certain assumptions, an agent can drop an intention/primary chosen
goal by performing the associated drop action (see Proposition 4.4.15). Like Rao and
Georgeff, I also use a branching time temporal logic. Also, my agents are both single-
mindedly and open-mindedly committed to their intentions. Finally, unlike both Cohen
and Levesque and Rao and Georgeff, I show how agents’ intentions can evolve.
As discussed in Chapter 2, recently there have been a few proposals that deal with
goal change. Shapiro et al. [200] present a situation calculus based framework where
an agent adopts a goal when she is requested to do so by another agent, and remains
committed to this goal unless the requester cancels this request; a goal is retained even
if the agent learns that it has become impossible, and in this case the agent’s goals
become inconsistent. Shapiro and Brewka [196] modify this framework to ensure that
goals are dropped when they are believed to be impossible or when they are achieved.
Although developed independently, these accounts have commonalities to mine in the
sense that they also assume a priority ordering over the set of (in their case, requested)
goals, and in every situation they compute intentions by computing a maximal consis-
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tent goal set that is also compatible with the agent’s beliefs. In their framework, goals
are only partially ordered and inconsistencies between goals at the same level (given
goals at higher levels and knowledge) can be resolved differently in different models.
In fact, the agent’s intentions in do(a, s) in a model may be quite different from her
intentions in s, although a did not make any of her goals in s impossible or inconsis-
tent with higher priority goals, simply because the inconsistencies between goals at the
same priority level are resolved differently in s and do(a, s). This is rather unintuitive,
in particular in the context of intentions. Recall that one of the defining properties of
intentions is that an agent’s intentions persist, unless they become impossible to bring
about or have already been fulfilled. Note that, while one might argue that a partial
order over goals might be more general, allowing this means that additional control
information is required to obtain a single goal/intention state after the agent’s goals
change. In other words, the problem with a partial ordering is that it does not specify
what a rational agent should do when two of her goals that have equal priority become
inconsistent with each other. My account, on the other hand, imposes a total order-
ing on goals and thus I was able to ensure that under suitable conditions, an agent’s
intentions (i.e. chosen goals) persist. Also, I provide a more expressive formalization
of prioritized goals: I model goals using infinite paths while they use finite paths, and
thus can model many types of goals that Shapiro and Brewka cannot, as discussed in
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Chapter 2. Finally, another difference between their framework and mine is that they
specify the order on goals syntactically rather than semantically.
My goal dynamics is in line with da Costa Pereira et al.’s goal revision postulates
for rational agents [43, 44, 42]. As mentioned in Chapter 2, these postulates are based
on notions of consistency of sets of desires and executability of desires that seems
problematic. In my framework, I specify executability using a formal action theory
(including action precondition axioms), and I interpret consistency among a set of
(achievement) goals as the existence of a path starting with the current situation over
which all of these goals hold. With this interpretation, I think these postulates are in
fact sound. A formal version of their I1 postulate is shown to hold in my framework
by Proposition 4.4.2 and Corollary 4.4.4. Note that I2 seems problematic unless the
ordering over desires is total, which is the case for my framework. If a partial order is
assumed, an agent might have several alternative sets of chosen goals, none of which is
better than the others. I formalize and prove I3 in Corollary 4.4.13. Proposition 4.4.12
shows that I5 is partially satisfied in my framework (I didn’t prove that i /∈ I(Sd)).
Finally, I believe that I4 and I5 are both satisfied in my framework; proving this is left
for future work.
While independently motivated, the notion of belief-goal consistency in my frame-
work is similar to the one presented by Icard et al. [107]. Recall from Chapter 2 that
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intentions in their framework are simply (primitive) action and time index pairs. As
mentioned earlier, their account seems problematic since while it ensures that there is a
path over which all the intended actions are executed at the appropriate time index and
the preconditions of these are satisfied before their execution, there is no guarantee that
the path is in fact a realistic one. In other words, this path is allowed to include non-
executable actions as long as they are not intended. However as discussed in Chapter
2, given a proper interpretation, many of the postulates they propose seem to be sound.
A formal version of their BI1 postulate is shown to hold in my framework by Propo-
sition 4.4.2. I reject BI2, as agents are supposed to be committed to their intentions;
they may be allowed to give up their existing intentions for a new (and conflicting) one
under certain circumstances, but not always. For instance, in my framework an agent
can give up a primary c-goal ψ at some level m if she adopts another conflicting goal
φ at a higher priority level n than m (Proposition 4.4.12 shows that the new goal φ is
successfully adopted as long as it is consistent with all higher priority goals than n, and
even if it is possibly inconsistent with some goal that has lower priority than n). How-
ever, it will not be rational to force the agent to abandon ψ simply because she adopted
a new goal, e.g. when she adopts the conflicting goal φ at a lower priority level than
m. Corollary 4.4.13 shows that BI3 is partially satisfied in my framework. I believe
the persistence property in Proposition 4.4.24 can be generalized to show that BI3 is
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indeed satisfied for my framework. Again, I believe thatBI4 also can be shown to hold
for primary c-goals (but not for chosen goals, as these are closed under consequence).
I leave these for future work. The SSA for G in Axiom 4.3.3 already takes care of
postulate BI6, as an agent’s goals here are updated (by progressing the G-accessible
paths) even when the action performed is not an adopt or drop action. As we have
seen, such updates to G may drop some chosen goals and add some other chosen goals
(i.e. deactivate some levels and make others active, as prescribed by Axiom 4.2.7). Fi-
nally, as argued before, postulatesBI5 andBI7 do not hold for my introspective agents
since changes in their intentions also change their knowledge about their intentions.
To specify agents’ goals, Baral and Zhao introduced their non-monotonic LTL
logic called N-LTL [7] and its improved version ER-LTL [8]. Their objective in these
papers is to enable the agent specifier to gradually specify the agent’s goals in a man-
ner that allows for partial goal retraction/update/revision, strengthening/weakening the
conditions (in case of a conditional goal), and even complete change in the goal, i.e.
specify goals in an elaboration tolerant manner [147]. Specifying goals in such a way
is useful in many time critical domains where complete retraction of a previously spec-
ified goal followed by reformulation and re-delegation of an updated version can be
costly. They showed how a non-monotonic ER-LTL program can be translated into
a monotonic LTL specification. However, the authors do not handle goal dynamics,
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i.e. discuss how goals evolve when actions/events occur in these frameworks. In my
framework, new goals can be adopted and existing goals can be dropped, and p-goals
need not be consistent, while the agent constantly re-optimizes her c-goals; more anal-
ysis of the elaboration tolerance of my model is left for future work.
In van Benthem et al.’s [225, 226] dynamic epistemic preference logic, agents’
preferences are “upgraded” in response to public announcement-like suggestions and
commands. In their framework, a suggestion to prefer ϕ leads to a model change that
removes preferences for ¬ϕ over ϕ. Their notion of preference is quite abstract and
covers vast areas including decision theory, optimality theory, game theory, conditional
logic, non-monotonic logic, belief revision theory (whose semantics may involve pref-
erences over possible worlds), etc. As argued, my prioritized goals can be used to
model preferences. Moreover, I model goals and goal dynamics, i.e. how exactly these
goals evolve as a result of regular actions as well as special actions (like adopt); they
however do not address any of these issues (preferences in their framework can be
results of agents’ goals, which they don’t define).
Arguably, one limitation of my account is that my agents waste resources trying to
optimize their c-goals at every step. In Chapter 6, I propose an alternative semantics
for specifying the prioritized goals of agents that eliminates the filter override mecha-
nism altogether. That framework can be used to design agents that are very committed
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to their chosen goals. In the future, I would like to develop a hybrid account where the
agent is strongly committed to her chosen goals, and where the filter override mech-
anism is only triggered under appropriate conditions. Also, it would be interesting to
identify a set of postulates for goal change that most people can agree on and examine
how they differ from belief change postulates.
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Chapter 5
Handling Subgoals
5.1 Introduction
Any proper formalization of goals and their dynamics must also capture the depen-
dencies between goals and subgoals and plans adopted as a means to achieve these
goals. In particular, the dynamics of (sub)goals should conform to the following set of
intuitive rules:
• The subgoals and plans adopted as means to bring about a goal should be dropped
if the parent goal becomes impossible.
• They should also be dropped when the parent goal is brought about fortuitously/in
an unexpected way before the subgoals are achieved.
• Again, the abandonment/dropping of a parent goal should remove all of its sub-
354
goals from the goal hierarchy.
• In contrast to this, the dropping of a subgoal should be independent of that of its
parent goal – the agent might realize that one of the subgoals ψ of a goal φ has
become impossible, and thus might want to drop ψ; however, she may still want
to keep φ as her goal as there might be other means to fulfill φ known to her.
• Finally, these constraints on subgoal dynamics should carry over to subgoals of
subgoals of a goal, and thus e.g., if ψ3 is a subgoal of ψ2, and ψ2 is a subgoal of
ψ1, then the dropping of ψ1 should trigger the dropping of both ψ2 and ψ3 from
the agent’s goal hierarchy.
In this chapter, I introduce a new action for adopting a subgoal with respect to a
parent goal. I then extend the successor-state axiom proposed in Chapter 4 to deal
with subgoal adoption, and discuss how subgoals change when an agent’s knowledge
changes as a result of the execution of some (possibly exogenous) action or when
she adopts or drops a (sub)goal. I also give a definition of subgoals. After that, I
prove some properties; in particular, I show that the proposed formalization of subgoal
dynamics ensures that adopting a subgoal with respect to a supergoal has the desired
effects, that dropping a supergoal always drops all its subgoals but not necessarily vice
versa, and that the subgoal relation is transitive. Finally, returning to our discussion
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from Chapter 4, I explain why existing belief revision type approaches are not suitable
for modeling this relationship between goals and their subgoals.
5.2 Subgoal Dynamics
In this section, I discuss how the framework presented in Chapter 4 can be extended to
handle subgoals. To this end, I first introduce an action adoptRelTo(ψ, φ) for adopting
a subgoal ψ relative to a supergoal φ. The action precondition axiom for this is as
follows:
Axiom 5.2.1.
Poss(adoptRelTo(ψ, φ), s) ≡ ∃m. PGoal(φ,m, s) ∧ ¬∃n. PGoal(ψ, n, s).
That is, an agent can adopt a subgoal ψ with respect to a parent goal φ in situation s if
at some level in s, she has the p-goal that φ, and if she does not already have the p-goal
that ψ at some level in s. I assume that unique names axioms as in axiom schema 3.3.2
and 3.3.3 are available for adoptRelTo.
An agent’s subgoals must be dropped when the corresponding parent goal is dropped
or becomes impossible. When adopting a subgoal ψ with respect to a supergoal φ, in
addition to recording the newly adopted goal ψ, we need to model the fact that ψ is a
subgoal of φ. This information can later be used to drop the subgoal when the parent
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goal is dropped. One way of modeling this is to ensure that the adoption of a subgoal
ψ with respect to a parent goal φ adds a new p-goal that contains both this subgoal
and this parent goal, i.e. ψ ∧ φ. Recall from Chapter 4 that to handle the dropping of
a goal φ, I require the agent to drop the p-goals at all G-accessibility levels that imply
φ. Thus, if the agent drops the parent goal φ, she will also drop all of its subgoals
including ψ, since the G-accessibility levels where the parent goal φ holds include the
G-accessibility levels where the subgoal ψ holds.
Note that the parent goal φ could be a p-goal at multiple levels. I assume that the
subgoal ψ is always adopted with respect to the highest priority supergoal level, i.e. the
highest priority level where φ holds. I think that this is reasonable and works in most
cases. However, it may be argued that the subgoal ψ should be adopted with respect
to all the levels where the supergoal φ hold. But this makes subgoal dynamics quite
complex to follow. Moreover, if the agent wants to adopt a subgoal ψ with respect
to a supergoal φ at a different level (say m) than the highest priority level where φ
holds (say n, where n < m), she could do this by adopting ψ with respect to the more
specific supergoal (than φ) at level m. Nevertheless, when the only p-goal at level n
implies the one at level m, we have a problem. But this can also be avoided by using
the adopt action instead, and adopting the goal that φ ∧ ψ at level m + 1.42 Another
42This brings up the question of whether one should define adoptRelTo in terms of adopt; while I
think that this could be done, this would make it harder to determine, given the action history, whether
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possible solution is to redefine adoptRelTo to take an argument for the level of the
intended supergoal, which I leave for future work. I also assume that the subgoal ψ
is always adopted at the level immediately below the supergoal φ’s level, i.e. at level
n + 1, where n is the highest level where the supergoal φ holds. The reason for doing
this is that since ψ is a means to the end φ, they should have similar priorities. While I
think this is reasonable, this could also be generalized if necessary.
To handle subgoals, I add an additional case to the successor-state axiom for G
(thus I replace Axiom 4.3.3 in Chapter 4 with the following axiom):
Axiom 5.2.2 (SSA for G).
G(p, n, do(a, s)) ≡
∀φ, ψ. (a 6= adopt(φ) ∧ a 6= adoptRelTo(ψ, φ) ∧ a 6= drop(φ) ∧
Progressed(p, n, a, s))
∨ ∃φ,m. (a = adopt(φ,m) ∧ Adopted(p, n,m, a, s, φ))
∨ ∃φ, ψ. (a = adoptRelTo(ψ, φ) ∧ SubGoalAdopted(p, n, a, s, ψ, φ))
∨ ∃φ. (a = drop(φ) ∧ Dropped(p, n, a, s, φ)).
The part of the SSA for G that handles subgoal adoption is defined as follows:
a goal is adopted relative to some parent goal or unconditionally adopted. Thus for simplicity, here I
introduce adoptRelTo as a primitive action.
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Definition 5.2.3.
SubGoalAdopted(p, n, a, s, ψ, φ) def=
if (AdoptedLevel(φ,m, s) ∧ n < m) then Progressed(p, n, a, s)
else if (AdoptedLevel(φ, n, s)) then (Progressed(p, n− 1, a, s) ∧ ψ(p))
else Progressed(p, n− 1, a, s),
where,
Definition 5.2.4.
AdoptedLevel(φ, n, s) def= PGoal(φ, n− 1, s) ∧ ∀m. m < n− 1 ⊃ ¬PGoal(φ,m, s).
Thus, to handle the adoption of a subgoal ψ with respect to a supergoal φ, I add a
new p-goal φ ∧ ψ to the agent’s goal hierarchy. My formalization of this uses the
abbreviation AdoptedLevel(φ, n, s), which says that n is the level where the subgoal
should be adopted, that is, the level which is immediately below the highest priority
level such that the parent goal φ is implied by the only p-goal at this level. The G-
accessible paths at all levels above the slot where the subgoal is to be inserted, i.e.
m, such that AdoptedLevel(φ,m, s) holds, are simply progressed. The G-accessible
paths at level m are the ones that can be obtained by progressing the paths from the
level immediately above it (i.e. from the highest priority level where φ holds) over
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which ψ holds and eliminating those where ψ does not hold. This guarantees that
φ ∧ ψ holds in this level, and thus as discussed above, the subgoal ψ will be dropped
when the supergoal φ is dropped. The G-accessible paths at all levels below m are the
ones that can be obtained by progressing paths from the level immediately above it.
Thus the agent acquires the subgoal that ψ at level m, and all the p-goals with priority
m or less in s are pushed down one level in the hierarchy.
Let me give an example of subgoal dynamics; for this I extend the running exam-
ple of Chapter 4. Assume that we have an agent who initially has the following three
p-goals: 2BeRich, 3GetPhD, and 2BeHappy at level 0, 1, and 2, respectively (see
second column of Table 5.1). Suppose that the agent knows that one way of always
being rich is to always work hard, which in turns can be fulfilled by always being en-
ergetic. Assume that with this in mind, our agent adopts the subgoal that 2WorkHard
with respect to the p-goal that2BeRich, and then adopts the sub-subgoal that2BeEnrg
with respect to the subgoal that2WorkHard, starting in S0. Then the agent’s goal hier-
archy in S1 = do(adoptRelTo(2WorkHard,2BeRich), S0) should include the p-goal
that 2WorkHard, and in S2 = do(adoptRelTo(2BeEnrg,2WorkHard), S1) should
also include the p-goal that 2BeEnrg. According to the successor-state axiom for G,
our agent’s goal hierarchy in S1 and in S2 will be as in Table 5.1.43 In S0, the supergoal
43For simplicity in Table 5.1, I only show the agent’s relevant p-goals rather than her only p-goals
(which in addition reflect the actions that have been performed so far).
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G-Level S0 S1 S2 S3
0 2BeRich 2BeRich 2BeRich 2BeRich
1 3GetPhD 2BeRich ∧ 2WorkHard 2BeRich ∧ 2WorkHard TRUE
2 2BeHappy 3GetPhD 2BeRich ∧ 2WorkHard ∧ 2BeEnrg TRUE
3 TRUE 2BeHappy 3GetPhD 3GetPhD
4 TRUE TRUE 2BeHappy 2BeHappy
Table 5.1: Example of an Agent’s Subgoal Dynamics
2BeRich holds at level 0, and thus AdoptedLevel(2BeRich, 1, S0) holds, i.e. the agent
adopts2WorkHard at priority level 1. Similarly in S1, the supergoal2WorkHard holds
at level 1, and thus AdoptedLevel(2WorkHard, 2, S1) holds.
Now, suppose that in S2, the agent wants to drop the p-goal that 2WorkHard.
Then in S3 = do(drop(2WorkHard), S2), she should no longer have 2BeEnrg as
a p-goal, but should retain the supergoal that 2BeRich. After the agent drops the
p-goal that 2WorkHard, by the successor-state axiom for G we can see that all the G-
accessible levels where 2WorkHard holds will be replaced by the trivial only p-goal
that the correct history of actions in S3 has happened (see S3 in Table 5.1). This shows
that dropping 2WorkHard results in the dropping of all of its subgoals (in this case
2BeEnrg), but that its parent goal 2BeRich is retained.
I define the SubGoal relation as follows:
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Definition 5.2.5.
SubGoal(ψ, φ, s) def= ∃n. PGoal(φ, n, s) ∧ ¬PGoal(ψ, n, s)
∧ ∀m. PGoal(ψ,m, s) ⊃ PGoal(φ,m, s) ∧ n < m.
This says that ψ is a subgoal of φ in situation s iff there exists a G-accessibility level
n in s such that φ is a p-goal at n while ψ is not, and for all G-accessibility levels m in
s where ψ is a p-goal, φ is also a p-goal and n has higher priority than m, i.e. ψ is not
a p-goal at any level higher than n. The intuition behind my notion of subgoals is that
it corresponds to the cases where there is some level in the goal hierarchy where the
supergoal holds, and the conjunction of the supergoal and the subgoal holds at another
lower priority level. Thus the relationship between goals and subgoals is viewed as a
special case of prioritized goals. As discussed above, I use the conjunction φ ∧ ψ to
facilitate the dropping of the subgoal ψ when the supergoal φ is dropped. Also, since
ψ is a means to the end φ, the supergoal φ should have higher priority than the subgoal
ψ. The above definition captures part of this intuition.
Note that a consequence of this definition is that the same subgoal cannot have
two different supergoals (unless one subsumes the other or by transitivity, which I
discuss later). This does not pose a problem however, since the preconditions of the
adoptRelTo(ψ, φ) action requires that the agent does not already have the subgoal ψ
as a p-goal at some level (and thus, as a subgoal of another parent goal). Thus an agent
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cannot attempt to adopt a subgoal relative to two different parent goals.
5.3 Properties
I now show that my formalization of subgoals has some desirable properties. Let’s
define DSGOAgt as DOAgt\{Axiom 4.3.3} ∪ {Axiom 5.2.1, Axiom 5.2.2} (as well as the
associated definitions). First, I can prove that an agent acquires the p-goal that ψ after
she adopts it as a subgoal of another goal φ in s, provided that she has the p-goal at
some level in s that φ (which is required for adoptRelTo(ψ, φ) to be executable in s):
Proposition 5.3.1 (Subgoal Adoption-1).
DSGOAgt |= ∃m. PGoal(φ,m, s) ⊃ ∃n. PGoal(ψ, n, do(adoptRelTo(ψ, φ), s)).
Proof. Fix φ1, ψ1,M1, and S1. From the antecedent, we have:
PGoal(φ1,M1, S1). (5.1)
Fix N1 such that AdoptedLevel(φ1, N1, S1) holds. By (5.1) and Definition 5.2.4, such
a level N1 indeed exists. By Axiom 5.2.2 and Definitions 5.2.3, 4.3.4, and 5.2.4, the
agent’s G-accessible paths in do(adoptRelTo(ψ1, φ1), S1) at levelN1 are the ones that
can be obtained by progressing her G-accessible paths at N1−1 in S1, and over which
ψ1 holds; thus we have:
∀p. G(p,N1, do(adoptRelTo(ψ1, φ1), S1)) ⊃ ψ1(p). (5.2)
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If such a path exists, then the consequent follows from (5.2) and Definition 4.2.1.
Otherwise, the consequent follows trivially by Definition 4.2.1.
Secondly, I can show that if an agent has the primary c-goal that φ at level n− 1 in
situation s, then she acquires the primary c-goal that ψ at level n after she adopts it as
a subgoal of φ at n in s, provided that she does not have the c-goal at n − 1 in s that
¬ψ next:
Proposition 5.3.2 (Subgoal Adoption-2).
DSGOAgt |= PrimCGoal(φ, n− 1, s) ∧ AdoptedLevel(φ, n, s)
∧ ¬CGoal(¬∃s′, p′. Starts(s′) ∧
Suffix(p′, do(adoptRelTo(ψ, φ), s′)) ∧ ψ(p′), n− 1, s)
⊃ PrimCGoal(ψ, n, do(adoptRelTo(ψ, φ), s)).
Proof. Fix φ1, ψ1, N1, and S1. From the antecedent, we have:
PrimCGoal(φ1, N1 − 1, S1), (5.3)
AdoptedLevel(φ1, N1, S1), (5.4)
¬CGoal(¬∃s′, p′. Starts(s′) ∧
Suffix(p′, do(adoptRelTo(ψ1, φ1), s′)) ∧ ψ1(p′), N1 − 1, S1).
(5.5)
By (5.4), Axiom 5.2.2, and Definitions 5.2.3, 4.3.4, and 5.2.4, the agent’sG-accessible
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paths in do(adoptRelTo(ψ1, φ1), S1) at N1 are the ones that can be obtained by pro-
gressing her G-accessible paths at N1 − 1 in S1, and over which ψ1 holds:
∀p. G(p,N1, do(adoptRelTo(ψ1, φ1), S1)) ≡
Progressed(p,N1 − 1, adoptRelTo(ψ1, φ1), S1) ∧ ψ1(p).
(5.6)
Regardless of whether such a path exists, it follows from (5.6) and Definition 4.2.1
that:
PGoal(ψ1, N1, do(adoptRelTo(ψ1, φ1), S1)). (5.7)
From (5.5) and Definition 4.2.8, it follows that there is a path, say P1, such that P1
is in the prioritized intersection of GR-accessible paths up to level N1 − 1 in S1, that
the adoptRelTo(ψ1, φ1) action happens next along P1, and that ψ1 holds over P1 af-
terwards:
G∩(P1, N1 − 1, S1) ∧
∃s′, p′. Starts(P1, s′) ∧ Suffix(p′, P1, do(adoptRelTo(ψ1, φ1), s′)) ∧ ψ1(p′).
(5.8)
Now, since G∩(P1, N1 − 1, S1), by Lemma 4.4.10 P1 must start with a K-accessible
situation in S1, i.e.:
∀s. Starts(P1, s) ⊃ K(s, S1). (5.9)
Also, note that by (5.8), P1 is a path and the first action that happens along P1, i.e. in
the starting situation of P1, is adoptRelTo(ψ1, φ1). From this, Corollary 3.5.41, and
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Definition 3.3.1 it follows that:
∀s. Starts(P1, s) ⊃ Poss(adoptRelTo(ψ1, φ1), s). (5.10)
Consider the suffix of P1 after the adoptRelTo(ψ1, φ1) action has been performed; let
us call this path P2. Since the adoptRelTo action is not a knowledge-producing action,
by (5.9), (5.10), and Axiom 3.4.10 it follows that:
∀s. Starts(P2, s) ⊃ K(s, do(adoptRelTo(ψ1, φ1), S1)). (5.11)
By (5.3), Definition 4.2.12, Axiom 4.2.7, and (5.8), it follows that:
GR(P1, N1 − 1, S1). (5.12)
By (5.6), (5.12), (5.8), and Definition 4.2.4, it follows that:
G(P2, N1, do(adoptRelTo(ψ1, φ1), S1)). (5.13)
Again, by (5.13), (5.11), and Definition 4.2.4, it follows that P2 must beGR-accessible
at N1 in do(adoptRelTo(ψ1, φ1), S1):
GR(P2, N1, do(adoptRelTo(ψ1, φ1), S1)). (5.14)
Now, I claim that all levels with priority higher than N1 that are active before
the occurrence of the adoptRelTo(ψ1, φ1) action will remain active.44 To see this,
44Recall from Definition 4.4.1 that ActiveLevel(n, s) is defined as ∃p. G(p, n, s) ∧G∩(p, n, s).
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note that the only goal that can become impossible merely by the occurrence of this
adoptRelTo action is the goal that states that this action does not happen next, as well
as any consequences of this. However, by (5.5) no levels in the goal hierarchy that
have such a goal and that have priority higher than N1 are active in S1. Put otherwise,
by (5.8) and Axiom 4.2.7, there is a path, namely P1, that is GR-accessible at all active
levels n with priority higher than N1 in S1; thus:
∀n. n < N1 ∧ ActiveLevel(n, S1) ⊃ GR(P1, n, S1). (5.15)
Note that, the next action that happens along P1 is the adoptRelTo(ψ1, φ1) action.
Moreover, according to Axiom 5.2.2 and Definitions 5.2.3 and 4.3.4, after the adoptRel-
To(ψ1, φ1) action happens, the GR-accessible paths at all levels that have higher pri-
ority than N1 are simply progressed to reflect the fact that this action has happened:
∀n. n < N1 ⊃ (∀p. G(p, n, do(adoptRelTo(ψ1, φ1), S1)) ≡
Progressed(p, n, adoptRelTo(ψ1, φ1), S1)).
(5.16)
Then by this, (5.8), and (5.15), all active levels in S1 that have priority higher than N1
must have at least one path that can be progressed, namely P1, and thus any such level
that was active in S1 must also be active in do(adoptRelTo(ψ1, φ1), S1).
Moreover, I claim that since no active level n with higher priority than N1 in S1
became inactive due to the occurrence of adoptRelTo(ψ1, φ1), no inactive level with
higher priority than N1 in S1 can become active in do(adoptRelTo(ψ1, φ1), S1). I will
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prove this by contradiction. Assume that there is a level M < N1 s.t. M is inactive
in S1 and active in do(adopt(ψ1, φ1), S1). Then, from Definition 4.4.1, it follows that
there is a path Pb s.t.:
G(Pb,M, do(adoptRelTo(ψ1, φ1), S1)), and (5.17)
G∩(Pb,M, do(adoptRelTo(ψ1, φ1), S1)). (5.18)
From (5.18), Definition 4.4.1, and Axiom 4.2.7, Pb must be GR-accessible at all levels
n in do(adoptRelTo(ψ1, φ1), S1), where n < M and n is active in S1 (since, recall that
all these levels remain active after the adoptRelTo(ψ1, φ1) action happens). By this,
(5.17), Definition 4.2.4, (5.16), and Definition 4.3.4, there is a path Pa that starts with
some situation SPa s.t. Pb is the suffix of Pa starting in do(adoptRelTo(ψ1, φ1), SPa)
and Pa is G-accessible at all active levels with higher priority than M in S1 and at M
in S1. Moreover, by this, (5.18), Lemma 4.4.10 and the SSA forK (i.e. Axiom 3.4.10),
it follows that Pa is GR-accessible at all active levels with higher priority than M in S1
and at M in S1. But then, by Axiom 4.2.7 and Definition 4.4.1, M is an active level in
S1, a contradiction. Thus, it follows that:
∀n. n < N1 ⊃ (ActiveLevel(n, S1) ≡ ActiveLevel(n, do(adoptRelTo(ψ1, φ1), S1))).
Furthermore, by this, (5.8), (5.15), and (5.16), P2 must be G-accessible from all
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these active levels in do(adoptRelTo(ψ1, φ1), S1):
∀n. n < N1 ∧ ActiveLevel(n, do(adoptRelTo(ψ1, φ1), S1) ⊃
G(P2, n, do(adoptRelTo(ψ1, φ1), S1)).
From this, (5.11), and Definition 4.2.4, P2 must be GR-accessible from all these active
levels in do(adoptRelTo(ψ1, φ1), S1):
∀n. n < N1 ∧ ActiveLevel(n, do(adoptRelTo(ψ1, φ1), S1) ⊃
GR(P2, n, do(adoptRelTo(ψ1, φ1), S1)).
Finally, by this, (5.14), Definition 4.4.1, and Axiom 4.2.7, it follows that:
G∩(P2, N1, do(adoptRelTo(ψ1, φ1), S1)). (5.19)
The consequent follows from (5.7), (5.14), (5.19), and Definition 4.2.12.
I can also show that subgoals are dropped when their parent goal is dropped. More
precisely, I show that after dropping the p-goal that φ in s, an agent does not have the
p-goal (and thus the primary c-goal) that the progression of ψ at level n, provided that
ψ is a subgoal of φ in s, that ψ is a p-goal at n in s, and that the progression of ψ is not
strongly inevitable in do(drop(φ), s):
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Proposition 5.3.3 (Supergoal Drop).
DSGOAgt |= SubGoal(ψ, φ, s) ∧ PGoal(ψ, n, s)
∧ ¬StronglyInevitable(ProgOf(ψ, drop(φ)), do(drop(φ), s))
⊃ ¬PGoal(ProgOf(ψ, drop(φ)), n, do(drop(φ), s)).
Proof. Fix φ1, ψ1, N1 and S1. From the antecedent, we have:
SubGoal(ψ1, φ1, S1), (5.20)
PGoal(ψ1, N1, S1), (5.21)
¬StronglyInevitable(ProgOf(ψ1, drop(φ1)), do(drop(φ1), S1)). (5.22)
From (5.20) and Definition 5.2.5, it follows that for any level n in S1 where ψ1 is a
p-goal, φ1 is also a p-goal:
∀n. PGoal(ψ1, n, S1) ⊃ PGoal(φ1, n, S1). (5.23)
From (5.22) and Definitions 3.5.13 and 3.5.12, it follows that there is a path P1 such
that:
∃s. SameHist(s, do(drop(φ1), S1)) ∧ Starts(P1, s) ∧ ¬ProgOf(ψ1, drop(φ1))(P1).
(5.24)
Now, consider level N1 in S1; by (5.21), ψ1 is a p-goal at N1 in S1. By this and (5.23),
PGoal(φ1, N1, S1), and thus by Axiom 5.2.2, and Definition 4.3.6, we can see that the
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G-accessible paths at N1 in do(drop(φ1), S1) are the ones that start with situations that
share the same action history as do(drop(φ1), S1). Since by (5.24), P1 is such a path,
it will be included in the G-relation at N1 in do(drop(φ1), S1) :
G(P1, N1, do(drop(φ1), S1)). (5.25)
The consequent follows from (5.24), (5.25), and Definition 4.2.1.
Note that, this does not hold if we replace PGoal in the consequent with CGoal since
ψ could be a consequence of a combination of other active p-goals, i.e. a non-primary
c-goal. Also, this property can be generalized to show that in addition to the above, ψ
is indeed not a p-goal at some level n where ¬PGoal(ψ, n, s) after the drop(φ) action
happens in s, provided that she don’t have the p-goal at n in s that the drop(φ) action
does not happen next or ψ holds after it happens, i.e. that ¬PGoal(¬∃s′. Do(drop(φ),
now, s′) ∨ ψ, n, s).
The next property says that dropping a subgoal does not affect the parent goal.
In particular, an agent retains the p-goal that the progression of φ after she drops a
subgoal ψ of some goal φ in some situation s:
Proposition 5.3.4 (Subgoal Drop).
DSGOAgt |= SubGoal(ψ, φ, s)
⊃ ∃n. PGoal(ProgOf(φ, drop(ψ)), n, do(drop(ψ), s)).
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Proof. Fix φ1, ψ1, and S1. From the antecedent, we have:
SubGoal(ψ1, φ1, S1). (5.26)
From (5.26) and Definition 5.2.5, it follows that there is a level N1 in S1 where φ1 is a
p-goal but ψ1 is not:
PGoal(φ1, N1, S1) ∧ ¬PGoal(ψ1, N1, S1). (5.27)
Now, by (5.27), Axiom 5.2.2, and Definitions 4.3.6 and 4.3.4, we can see that after the
drop(ψ1) action has been performed in S1, the agent’s G-accessible paths at level N1
will be the ones that can be obtained by progressing her G-accessible paths at N1 in
S1; thus from this, (5.27), and Definitions 4.2.1 and 4.4.14, we have:
∀p. G(p,N1, do(drop(ψ1), S1)) ⊃ ProgOf(φ1, drop(ψ1))(p). (5.28)
The consequent follows from (5.28) and Definition 4.2.1.
I next show that adopting logically equivalent subgoals with respect to logically
equivalent supergoals has the same result:
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Proposition 5.3.5 (Extensionality w.r.t. Subgoal Adoption).
(a). DSGOAgt |= ∀p.(φ1(p) ≡ φ2(p)) ∧ ∀p.(ψ1(p) ≡ ψ2(p)) ⊃
PGoal(φ∗, do(adoptRelTo(ψ1, φ1), s)) ≡ PGoal(φ∗, do(adoptRelTo(ψ2, φ2), s)),
(b). DSGOAgt |= ∀p.(φ1(p) ≡ φ2(p)) ∧ ∀p.(ψ1(p) ≡ ψ2(p)) ⊃
CGoal(φ∗, do(adoptRelTo(ψ1, φ1), s)) ≡ CGoal(φ∗, do(adoptRelTo(ψ2, φ2), s)).
Proof. Similar to that of Proposition 4.4.7.
As a consequence, this property also holds for primary c-goals:
Corollary 5.3.6.
DSGOAgt |= ∀p.(φ1(p) ≡ φ2(p)) ∧ ∀p.(ψ1(p) ≡ ψ2(p)) ⊃
(PrimCGoal(φ∗, do(adoptRelTo(ψ1, φ1), s))
≡ PrimCGoal(φ∗, do(adoptRelTo(ψ2, φ2), s))).
Proof. Follows from Definition 4.2.12, Proposition 5.3.5(a), the SSA for G (i.e. Ax-
iom 5.2.2 and Definitions 5.2.3, 5.2.4, and 4.3.4), and Axiom 4.2.7.
Finally, I examine the properties of the SubGoal relation. To this end, I first show
that the SubGoal relation is irreflexive/strict:
Proposition 5.3.7 (Irreflexivity of Subgoals).
DSGOAgt |= ∀s. ¬SubGoal(ψ, ψ, s).
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Proof. Trivially follows from Definition 5.2.5.
Secondly, I show that the SubGoal relation is antisymmetric, i.e. if a goal ψ is a
subgoal of another goal φ in situation s, then φ cannot also be a subgoal of ψ in s:
Proposition 5.3.8 (Antisymmetry of Subgoals).
DSGOAgt |= ∀s. SubGoal(ψ, φ, s) ⊃ ¬SubGoal(φ, ψ, s).
Proof. Trivially follows from Definition 5.2.5.
Thirdly, it can be shown that the SubGoal relation is transitive, i.e. if ψ1 is a subgoal
of ψ2 in s, and if ψ2 is a subgoal of ψ3 in s, then ψ1 must also be a subgoal of ψ3 in s:
Proposition 5.3.9 (Transitivity of Subgoals).
DSGOAgt |= ∀s. SubGoal(ψ1, ψ2, s) ∧ SubGoal(ψ2, ψ3, s) ⊃ SubGoal(ψ1, ψ3, s).
Proof. Follows from Definition 5.2.5.
Finally, as a consequence of Propositions 5.3.9 and 5.3.8, it can be shown that the
SubGoal relation is acyclic, since any transitive asymmetric binary relation is acyclic.
In other words, it can be shown that for any situation s, if there exists a finite set
of distinct formulae ψ1, ψ2, · · · , ψk such that k > 1 and SubGoal(ψi, ψi+1, s) for all
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i ∈ {1, 2, · · · , k − 1}, then it must be the case that ¬SubGoal(ψk, ψ1, s). Thus the
following axiom schema can be shown to be entailed by theory DSGOAgt:
(k > 1 ∧ SubGoal(ψ1, ψ2, s) ∧ · · · ∧ SubGoal(ψk−1, ψk, s)) ⊃ ¬SubGoal(ψk, ψ1, s).
While I did not prove persistence properties for supergoals, for achievement su-
pergoals much follows from the ones in the previous chapter (see Section 4.4.4), since
achievement supergoals are simply ordinary prioritized achievement goals in the goal
hierarchy. Also, persistence of realistic prioritized achievement subgoals seem to hold
just as in Proposition 4.4.22. On the other hand, to show persistence of chosen achieve-
ment subgoals, we need stronger conditions in the antecedent of Proposition 4.4.24
since subgoals are affected by their supergoals in the sense that levels with subgoals
will become inactive if the supergoal becomes impossible (recall from Definition 5.2.5
that the supergoal follows from all levels where the subgoal is a p-goal). Finally, it
would be interesting to identify the conditions under which the SubGoal relation per-
sists. I leave these for future work.
5.4 Conclusion
I introduced the adoptRelTo action that can be used to adopt a subgoal relative to
a supergoal. I then discussed how we can modify the successor-state axiom for G
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in Chapter 4 to handle subgoal adoption. I also proposed a definition of the subgoal
relation. Finally, I proved some intuitive properties of subgoal dynamics that are in
line with the requirements specified in Section 5.1. The proposed subgoal dynamics
ensures that subgoals are automatically dropped when their parent goals become im-
possible or are dropped, but not vice versa. Again, this notion carries over hierarchies
of subgoals in the sense that, for example, a subgoal is also dropped when one of its
ancestor goals (w.r.t. the SubGoal relation) becomes impossible or is dropped, but not
vice versa.
Note that, while my formalization of subgoal dynamics satisfies most of the re-
quirements discussed in Section 5.1, here I do not handle fortuitous achievement of
parent goals. It would be nice to modify the proposed account to handle early achieve-
ment of goals by automatically dropping subgoals whose parent goal has been fulfilled.
However, this seems quite challenging to do for arbitrary temporally extended goals.
The special case of achievement goals should be solvable with some ingenuity. One
idea to this end is as follows: instead of adopting the goal that (3Φ∧3Ψ) in response
to the adoptRelTo(3Ψ,3Φ) action, the agent could adopt the goal that:
(3Φ ∧3Ψ ∧ ¬(Φ B Ψ)),
which states that the supergoal Φ must be eventually achieved, and so must be the sub-
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goal Ψ, but the supergoal Φ must not be achieved before the subgoal Ψ.45 Note that
this also allows the case where the supergoal and the subgoal are achieved simultane-
ously. Thus, if the parent goal Φ is achieved before the subgoal Ψ has been achieved,
it will violate the ¬(Φ B Ψ) condition and thus the agent will make this goal inactive.
As for the general case when arbitrary temporally extended (sub)goals are involved,
it seems that one first needs to identify the satisfaction conditions of such goals, and
then do a case-by-case analysis and handle each type of goal separately. Making these
ideas precise is left for future work.
Note that while one might be tempted to try to employ existing belief revision
type approaches to model prioritized goals, subgoals, and their dynamics, this does
not work. Modeling prioritized goals using an ordinal conditional function κ (i.e. κ-
ranking) and specifying goal dynamics as revising this function appropriately (e.g., as
formalized for belief revision originally by Spohn [217] and then by Darwiche and
Pearl [46]) seems to work, but only when subgoals are not considered. When one
adds the non-trivial relationship between goals and subgoals to the equation, such a
formalization produces unintuitive results. For instance, one way of specifying that ψ
is a subgoal of φ is to ensure that the worlds where φ ∧ ψ hold are most preferred and
thus are assigned a small ordinal (e.g. 0), that the worlds where the supergoal φ hold
45Let’s call this formula the satisfaction condition of the subgoal 3Ψ relative to the parent goal 3Φ.
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but the subgoal ψ is false (i.e. where φ ∧ ¬ψ hold) are somewhat less desired and are
assigned a higher ranking, and that the rest of the worlds (i.e. where the supergoal φ is
false) are assigned a still higher ordinal and thus are the least preferred by the agent,
i.e.:
κ(ω : φ ∧ ψ) < κ(ω : φ ∧ ¬ψ) < κ(ω : ¬φ).
Given this κ ranking, contraction by the subgoal ψ (according to the standard approach
in [46]) produces the following:
κ(w : φ) < κ(w : ¬φ ∧ ¬ψ) < κ(w : ¬φ ∧ ψ).
This is a bit strange as all non-φ worlds should arguably be equally preferable to the
agent after dropping ψ. Moreover, contraction by the supergoal φ produces:
κ(w : φ ∧ ψ ∨ ¬φ) < κ(w : φ ∧ ¬ψ).
Again, intuitively the agent should have no preferences over ψ and ¬ψ worlds. One
might wonder why one cannot adjust the standard contraction function to make it work.
However, it can be argued that there does not exist an appropriate revision function for
κ –modeling the contraction of some goal– that ensures that, e.g., all worlds become
equally desirable after the agent drops the supergoal that φ (i.e. after contracting κ by
φ), that also properly handles the contraction by ψ (i.e. the dropping of subgoals) and
by ordinary prioritized goals (i.e. the dropping of these goals). That is, while there
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might be several revision functions for κ, each of which works properly for the drop-
ping of ordinary prioritized goals, subgoals, or supergoals, it is impossible to tailor a
single function that works for all of these operations. In other words, since contracting
the subgoal ψ should only cause ψ to be dropped while contracting the parent goal φ
should cause both φ and its subgoal ψ (as well as all of its sub-subgoals etc.) to be
dropped, we need to have some additional representation to capture this subgoal rela-
tion and use this information if we want to handle both types of contractions uniformly.
Thus to deal with this, I avoid using such techniques while modeling prioritized goals,
subgoals, and their dynamics.
While I made some simplifying assumptions regarding the level of the parent goal
relative to which the subgoal is adopted (see Section 5.2), to the best of my knowledge,
my account is indeed the first attempt to formalize the dependencies between subgoals
and their parent goals using a semantic approach. As discussed in Chapter 2, the exist-
ing syntactic approaches to deal with this neither properly handle (sub)goal dynamics
nor deal with prioritized goals. While such syntactic accounts of subgoals might enjoy
certain advantages, in particular from a computational efficiency standpoint, they suf-
fer from many other serious problems. For instance, consistency between (sub)goals is
not automatically maintained. Moreover, in most of these frameworks, subgoals do not
properly evolve in response to actions/events, as do ordinary goals. Finally, the many
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desirable properties of the SubGoal relation discussed in Section 5.3 must also be ex-
plicitly enforced, e.g. the acyclicity of the SubGoal relation. My account of subgoals
in this chapter avoids these problems.
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Chapter 6
A Revised Logical Framework of Prioritized Goals for
Committed Agents
6.1 Introduction
In the previous two chapters, I presented a formalization of prioritized goals, subgoals,
and their dynamics for agents that always try to optimize their chosen goals. In that
“optimizing agent” framework, an agent’s chosen goals are very dynamic. For in-
stance, as mentioned earlier, a currently inactive p-goal φ may become active at some
later time, for example, if a higher priority active/chosen goal that is currently block-
ing φ — as it is inconsistent with φ — becomes impossible. This also means that
another currently active/chosen goal ψ may as a result become inactive, not because
ψ has become impossible or was dropped, but due to the fact that ψ has lower pri-
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ority than and is inconsistent with the newly activated goal φ. For instance, in my
running example in Chapter 4, after the goBankrupt action happens, the agent drops
her c-goal that 2BeHappy as the higher priority and conflicting goal that 3GetPhD
has become active. As discussed in Chapter 4, in that framework chosen goals can
be viewed as Bratman et al.’s intentions with an automatic ‘opportunity analyzer’ and
‘filter override mechanism’ [21] that forces the optimizing agent to drop her intentions
when opportunities to commit to other higher priority goals arise.
Such very dynamic chosen goals/intentions are problematic as a foundation for an
agent programming language, as the agents spend a lot of effort in “recomputing” their
intentions and plans to achieve them, and their behavior becomes hard to predict for
the programmer. To avoid this, here I develop a modified version of the optimizing
agent framework that eliminates agents’ (inactive) desires (and as a consequence, the
opportunity analyzer and the filter override mechanism) altogether. Alternatively put,
I warrant that in this framework agents’ “desires” remain realistic and consistent with
their knowledge and intentions.46 As we will see later, such desires are in fact a subset
of the agents’ intentions. I achieve this by ensuring that in this framework, agents’ sets
of G-accessible paths are the same as that of their GR-accessible paths, and that their
p-goals are dropped as soon as they become inactive, i.e. become inconsistent with
46Recall from Chapter 2 that traditionally agents’ wishes or desires include goals that are impossible
to bring about and that are mutually inconsistent.
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their knowledge and/or their intentions. In the resulting “committed agent” frame-
work, agents’ p-goals are much more dynamic than in the original framework. On the
other hand, their c-goals are now much more persistent than before, and are simply the
consequential closure of their p-goals, as these must now all be consistent with each
other and with the agents’ knowledge.
In this chapter, I present the modifications to the optimizing agent framework that
are necessary to specify this “committed agent” framework. I then prove some desir-
able properties about a committed agent’s (chosen) goals, goal dynamics, goal intro-
spection, and goal persistence. These show the similarities and differences with the
optimizing agent framework. Finally, in light of these properties, I discuss how the
committed agent framework compares to the optimizing agent framework, followed
by some concluding remarks.
6.2 Specifying Prioritized Goals and Goal Dynamics for Commit-
ted Agents
I want to restrict the goals in the agent’s goal hierarchy to be realistic and mutually
consistent at all times, i.e. consistent with her knowledge and her other goals in all sit-
uations. I can obtain a committed agent framework with the following simple changes
to my optimizing agent axiomatization: (1) I constrain the agent’s initial G-accessible
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paths at all levels to be realistic, i.e. consistent with her knowledge; (2) I require that
initially the agent knows that her p-goals are consistent with each other; (3) I don’t
allow the agent to adopt a p-goal or subgoal that is inconsistent with her current c-
goals, or to drop a p-goal that has become known to be inevitable; and (4) I modify the
successor-state axiom for G so that the constraints in (1) and (2) above are preserved.
In the following I formalize and discuss each of these changes, one at a time.
First of all, I require that all initial G-accessible paths at all levels in the agent’s
goal hierarchy must be realistic, and thus they must start with aK-accessible situation.
I specify this by imposing the following constraint on the domain theory:
Assumption 6.2.1 (PGoal Strong Realism).
∀p, n, s. Init(s) ∧G(p, n, s) ⊃ ∃s′. Starts(p, s′) ∧K(s′, s).
This, along with Definitions 4.2.1, 4.2.4, and 4.2.5, ensures that given an initial situ-
ation s and a priority level n, the agent’s set of p-goals at n in s and that of realistic
p-goals at n in s are the same, i.e.:
∀s. Init(s) ⊃ ∀n, φ. PGoal(φ, n, s) ≡ RPGoal(φ, n, s).
Secondly, I require that the agent initially know that all of her p-goals are consistent
with each other and with her knowledge. This can be specified by ensuring that initially
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there exists a realistic path over which all of her p-goals hold. Thus I require the
domain theory to satisfy the following constraint:
Assumption 6.2.2 (PGoal Consistency).
∀s. Init(s) ⊃ ∃p. ∀n. G(p, n, s).
This thus ensures that the agent’s initial (realistic) p-goal hierarchy is consistent. Note
that, the additional condition that the starting situation of p be K-accessible in s is
unnecessary, since this follows from Assumption 6.2.1.
It is the responsibility of the agent designer to ensure that these two constraints are
entailed by the committed agent theory. A pragmatic consequence of these assump-
tions is that agents’ initial p-goals no longer represent true desires, which are usually
allowed to be impossible to bring about and/or conflicting with each other, but rather
their “goals”. In fact, the elimination of desires in this framework considerably simpli-
fies c-goal dynamics and contributes to the persistence of c-goals. I will come back to
this issue later. Also, I will show that if these constraints are asserted for the initial sit-
uations, they continue to hold for all situations as they are preserved by the (modified)
successor-state axiom for G.
Thirdly, recall that in the optimizing agent framework, I allow the agents to adopt
desires that are currently inconsistent with their chosen goals. As discussed earlier,
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while in that framework such adopted desires are initially inactive, they might later be-
come active and trigger the dropping of other (lower priority) chosen goals/intentions.
This is consistent with my model of the opportunity analyzer and the filter override
mechanism for intentions. Thus in the optimizing agent framework, the adoption of a
goal φ results in the adoption of the p-goal that φ, but not necessarily in the adoption of
the c-goal that φ. Similarly, the dropping of a goal that φ results in the dropping of the
p-goal that φ, but not necessarily in the dropping of the realistic p-goal or the c-goal
that φ — φ could be inevitable or could be a consequence of other c-goals; moreover,
the agent could have φ as a realistic p-goal without also having it as a p-goal (recall
that when the drop(φ) action happens, the agent drops φ only from the levels where φ
is a p-goal). Thus the adopt and drop actions in the optimizing agent framework are
meant to be viewed as operations over the agents’ desires. In contrast, in the commit-
ted agent framework, we want our agents to be more committed to their chosen goals;
thus they should be allowed to adopt a new goal only if it is consistent with all their
current c-goals. Similarly, they should be permitted to drop a goal only if the goal —
relative to their sets of primary chosen goals— is indeed dropable. These changes in
the prerequisites for the adopt and drop actions mean that these actions no longer refer
to the adoption and dropping of desires of the agent. Rather, they should be viewed as
that of (primary) chosen goals or intentions of the agent.
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Thus, I update the action precondition axioms for adopt(φ, n), adoptRelTo(ψ, φ),
and drop(φ) as follows. An agent can adopt the c-goal that φ at level n in situation s
if she does not already have φ as her p-goal at some level m in s (as before), and she
does not intend in s that ¬φ next:47
Axiom 6.2.3.
Poss(adopt(φ, n), s) ≡ ¬∃m. PGoal(φ,m, s) ∧
¬CGoal(¬∃s′, p′. Starts(s′) ∧ Suffix(p′, do(adopt(φ, n), s′)) ∧ φ(p′), s).
Moreover, an agent can adopt a subgoal ψ w.r.t. the parent goal φ if she has the parent
goal that φ as a p-goal at some level m in s and she does not already have the p-goal
that ψ at some level n in s (as before), and she does not intend in s that ¬ψ next:
Axiom 6.2.4.
Poss(adoptRelTo(ψ, φ), s) ≡ ∃m. PGoal(φ,m, s) ∧ ¬∃n. PGoal(ψ, n, s) ∧
¬CGoal(¬∃s′, p′. Starts(s′) ∧ Suffix(p′, do(adoptRelTo(ψ, φ), s′) ∧ ψ(p′), s).
Finally, an agent can drop the c-goal that φ in situation s if she has φ as her p-goal at
some level n in s (as before), and if φ is not known to be inevitable in s:
47This may seem very restrictive as φ is required to be consistent with the agent’s p-goals even at
priority lower than n. But note that if the agent drops the inconsistent lower priority p-goals, she will
then be able to adopt φ.
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Axiom 6.2.5.
Poss(drop(φ), s) ≡ ∃n. PGoal(φ, n, s) ∧ ¬KInevitable(φ, s).
Thus unlike in the optimizing agent framework, in this framework I do not allow an
agent to adopt a goal or a subgoal that is inconsistent with her current chosen goals.
Also, an agent is not allowed to drop a goal if it is known to be inevitable. Note that,
in these axioms, I didn’t replace the PGoal operators with CGoals; as I will show later,
for any given situation, all p-goal levels are always active, so in this framework having
a p-goal that φ amounts to having the (primary) c-goal that φ.
Finally, I modify the successor-state axiom for G to preserve Assumptions 6.2.1
and 6.2.2 for all situations and thus eliminate the opportunity analyzer and the filter
override mechanism. I achieve this by replacing the Progressed construct in Axiom
5.2.2 and Definition 4.3.6 with the ProgressedAndFiltered construct, the Progressed
construct in Definitions 4.3.5 and 5.2.3 with the ProgressedCA construct, and the Same-
Hist construct in Definitions 4.3.5 and 4.3.6 with the K-relation. In the following,
I specify the dynamics of p-goals in the committed agent framework by giving the
successor-state axiom for the G relation, and then discuss the changes required for
each case, one at a time:
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Axiom 6.2.6 (SSA for G).
G(p, n, do(a, s)) ≡
∀φ, ψ,m. (a 6= adopt(φ,m) ∧ a 6= adoptRelTo(ψ, φ) ∧ a 6= drop(φ) ∧
ProgressedAndFiltered(p, n, a, s))
∨ ∃φ,m. (a = adopt(φ,m) ∧ AdoptedCA(p, n,m, a, s, φ))
∨ ∃φ, ψ. (a = adoptRelTo(ψ, φ) ∧ SubGoalAdoptedCA(p, n, a, s, ψ, φ))
∨ ∃φ. (a = drop(φ) ∧ DroppedCA(p, n, a, s, φ)).
The above axiom and the following definitions are exactly as in the optimizing agent
framework, with the exception of the aforementioned changes, so I will only discuss
these changes. Again, given some situation, the purpose of these changes is to pre-
serve Assumptions 6.2.1 and 6.2.2 for all possible successor situations (I will show this
preservation formally in Section 6.3.2). First, let us consider the case when the action
performed is a regular, i.e. non-adopt/drop action; for this, I replaced Progressed(p, n, a, s)
with ProgressedAndFiltered(p, n, a, s) (cf. Axiom 6.2.6), which is defined as follows:
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Definition 6.2.7.
ProgressedAndFiltered(p, n, a, s) def=
if (n = 0 ∧ ∃p′. ProgressedCA(p′, n, a, s))
then ProgressedCA(p, n, a, s)
else if (n 6= 0 ∧ ∃p′. G∩(p′, n− 1, do(a, s)) ∧ Progressed(p′, n, a, s))
then ProgressedCA(p, n, a, s)
else ∃s′. Starts(p, s′) ∧K(s′, do(a, s)),
where the ProgressedCA construct is defined as follows:
Definition 6.2.8.
ProgressedCA(p, n, a, s)
def
= Progressed(p, n, a, s) ∧ ∃s′. Starts(p, s′) ∧K(s′, do(a, s)).
Here ProgressedAndFiltered plays a similar role to Progressed in the Chapter 4 defini-
tion, but also drops goals that have become known to be impossible or inconsistent with
higher priority goals. After some action a happens in s, ProgressedAndFiltered(p, n, a, s)
replaces aG-accessible path (say with starting situation s∗) at level n in swith its suffix
p w.r.t. s′ (where s′ = do(a, s∗)), provided that s′ is K-accessible in do(a, s). This is
modeled using the ProgressedCA construct, which only progresses realistic goal paths.
In addition, if a makes one or more p-goals at n impossible or inconsistent with higher
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priority p-goals, then ProgressedAndFiltered(p, n, a, s) adds back to the G-relation at
level n any path p that starts with a K-accessible situation in do(a, s). It thus con-
tributes to the maintenance of Assumption 6.2.2 by replacing the only p-goal at all
such inactive levels in the agent’s goal hierarchy in do(a, s) with the trivial formula
that she be in a K-accessible situation in do(a, s), thus effectively dropping these in-
active p-goals. Note that any path p that is in the ProgressedAndFiltered(p, n, a, s)
relation must start with a situation that is K-accessible in do(a, s). ProgressedAnd-
Filtered thus also ensures that Assumption 6.2.1 is preserved for all levels when the
action performed is a regular action.
Next, consider the case where the action performed is an adopt action. Note that,
the preconditions for adopt guarantee that for any executable situation, the agent’s
c-goals are consistent after an adopt action happens; thus if s is executable and a is
possible in s, then Assumption 6.2.2 is automatically maintained in do(a, s). To pre-
serve Assumption 6.2.1, in obtaining Definition 6.2.9 from Definition 4.3.5 I replace
SameHist with the K-relation for the priority level where the goal is adopted, and
Progressed with ProgressedCA for all other levels:
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Definition 6.2.9.
AdoptedCA(p, n,m, a, s, φ)
def
=
if (n < m) then ProgressedCA(p, n, a, s)
else if (n = m) then ∃s′. Starts(p, s′) ∧K(s′, do(a, s)) ∧ φ(p)
else ProgressedCA(p, n− 1, a, s).
The former modification ensures that all the G-accessible paths at the adopted level
in do(a, s) are realistic in that each of them starts with a K-accessible situation in
do(a, s). The latter warrants that this also holds for all other levels (again, note that
ProgressedCA(p, n, a, s) requires that p starts with aK-accessible situation in do(a, s)).
Thirdly, let us consider the case for an adoptRelTo action. As in the previous
case, the preconditions for adoptRelTo ensure that for any executable situation, As-
sumption 6.2.2 is automatically preserved. To maintain Assumption 6.2.1, in obtaining
Definition 6.2.10 from Definition 5.2.3 I use ProgressedCA instead of Progressed for
all levels, thus ensuring that theG-accessible paths at all levels in do(a, s) are realistic:
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Definition 6.2.10.
SubGoalAdoptedCA(p, n, a, s, ψ, φ)
def
=
if (∃m. AdoptedLevel(φ,m, s) ∧ n < m) then ProgressedCA(p, n, a, s)
else if (AdoptedLevel(φ, n, s)) then (ProgressedCA(p, n− 1, a, s) ∧ ψ(p))
else ProgressedCA(p, n− 1, a, s).
Finally, to handle a drop action, in obtaining Definition 6.2.11 from Definition
4.3.6 I replace the SameHist construct with the K-relation for the levels from where
the goal is dropped, and the Progressed construct with ProgressedAndFiltered for all
other levels:
Definition 6.2.11.
DroppedCA(p, n, a, s, φ)
def
=
if PGoal(φ, n, s) then ∃s′. Starts(p, s′) ∧K(s′, do(a, s))
else ProgressedAndFiltered(p, n, a, s).
The former preserves Assumption 6.2.1 for the dropped levels, by adding back to these
levels only those paths that starts with a K-accessible situation in do(a, s), rather than
those that starts with a situation that has the same history as do(a, s) (see Definition
4.3.6). The latter is somewhat different from the above two cases (i.e. that for adopt
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and adoptRelTo). This is because the preconditions for drop do not ensure that the
agent does not currently have the dropped goal as her c-goal or that she does not intend
not to execute this drop action next; such a requirement would be too strong as there is
no point in dropping a c-goal unless the agent has it as her c-goal. As discussed above,
ProgressedAndFiltered preserves Assumption 6.2.1 for the rest of the levels in the
goal hierarchy. Moreover, it also ensures that there is a common G-accessible path in
do(a, s) that is accessible from all of these levels, and that starts with a K-accessible
situation in do(a, s). This along with the fact that the G relations at the levels from
where the goal is dropped include all paths that starts with a K-accessible situation in
do(a, s) thus also preserves Assumption 6.2.2. I will prove these results formally in
the next section.
These modifications thus ensure that if the occurrence of an action a in some situa-
tion s makes a p-goal φ at level n impossible or inconsistent with other higher priority
p-goals, φ (as well as the only p-goal at level n) is dropped from the agent’s p-goal hi-
erarchy. Therefore, unlike in the optimizing agent framework, where the agent keeps
both active and inactive p-goals in an attempt to keep optimizing her c-goals, in this
framework the agent simply drops a p-goal as soon as it becomes inactive.
I can now define the theory DSGCAgt for modeling committed agents with subgoals
as follows:
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Definition 6.2.12.
DSGCAgt def= DSGOAgt\{Axioms 4.3.1, 5.2.1, 4.3.2, 5.2.2}
∪ {Assumptions 6.2.1 – 6.2.2} ∪ {Axioms 6.2.3 – 6.2.6}.
Note that according to the above successor-state axiom, the agent’s G-accessibility
relation at some level in do(a, s) depends on some of her G-accessibility relations at
other (higher priority) levels in do(a, s). Therefore at a first glance, this axiom may not
seem well defined. To show that it is in fact well defined, in the following I prove that
this axiom is “Markovian”, i.e. that G(p, n, do(a, s)) only depends on the K and the
G relations in situation s and on the action a. First I show that for any path p, priority
level n, and situation s, G∩(p, n, s) can be completely specified in terms of a formula
that does not mention G∩:
Proposition 6.2.13. For all n:
DSGCAgt |= ∀p, s. G∩(p, n, s) ≡ ΠG∩(p, n, s),
where ΠG∩(p, n, s) is a formula that does not mention G∩ and whose free variables
are among p and s.
Proof. (By induction on n) The base case is trivial, since the right-hand side of Axiom
4.2.7 does not mention G∩ and only consists of free variables from {p, s} when n = 0.
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For the inductive hypothesis, fix M and assume that the proposition holds for n = M,
i.e. ∀p, s. G∩(p,M, s) ≡ ΠG∩(p,M, s), where ΠG∩(p,M, s) is a formula that does
not mention G∩ and whose free variables are among p and s. I need to show that the
proposition holds for n = M + 1. This also trivially follows from Axiom 4.2.7, since
the right-hand side of this axiom only mentions occurrences of G∩ at level M with
free variables from {p, s}, and by the inductive hypothesis, all such occurrences can
be replaced by ΠG∩(p,M, s).
Next, I show that for any path p, level n, and situation s, G∩(p, n, s) can be com-
pletely specified in terms of a formula that does not mention the G-accessibility rela-
tions at levels that have lower priority than n:
Proposition 6.2.14. For all n:
DSGCAgt |= ∀p, s. G∩(p, n, s) ≡ ΠG(p, n, s),
where ΠG(p, n, s) is a formula that does not mention G∩ and G relations at m, where
m > n, and whose free variables are among p and s.
Proof Sketch. (By induction on n) Similar to the proof of Proposition 6.2.13.
Finally, I show that an agent’s G-accessible paths in situation do(a, s) can be com-
pletely specified in terms of a formula that does not mention her K and G accessibility
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relations in do(a, s). To be more specific, I show that for any priority level n, we can
progressively substitute the right-hand side of the successor-state axiom for G with a
formula that talks about the K and the G relations only in situation s:
Proposition 6.2.15. For all n:
DSGCAgt |= ∀p, a, s. G(p, n, do(a, s)) ≡ ΠKG(p, n, a, s),
where ΠKG(p, n, a, s) is a formula that mentions the K and the G relations only in
situation s, and whose free variables are among p, a, and s.
Proof. (By strong induction on n) For the base case, fix A1 and S1 and set n =
0. By Axiom 6.2.6 and Definitions 6.2.7, 6.2.9, 6.2.10, 6.2.11, 6.2.8, and 4.3.4,
G(p, 0, do(A1, S1)) can be specified using a formula that involves the G accessibil-
ity relation in S1 and the K accessibility relation in do(A1, S1), and whose only free
variable is p. In this formula, if we replace the K relation in do(A1, S1) by the right-
hand side of Axiom 3.4.10, we obtain a formula ΠKG(p, 0, A1, S1) that mentions the
K and the G accessibility relations only in situation S1 and whose only free variable
is p. Thus, the G relation at level 0 in do(A1, S1) can be expressed with a formula that
mentions the K and the G relations only in situation S1.
For the inductive hypothesis, fix An, Sn, and M , and assume that for all n s.t. 0 <
n ≤ M , and for all p, G(p, n, do(An, Sn)) can be completely specified by a formula
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ΠKG(p, n,An, Sn) that mentions the K and the G relations in Sn only and whose only
free variable is p. I need to show that the proposition holds forM+1. Again by Axiom
6.2.6 and Definitions 6.2.7, 6.2.9, 6.2.10, 6.2.11, 6.2.8, and 4.3.4, we can see that G
at level M + 1 in situation do(An, Sn), i.e. G(p,M + 1, do(An, Sn)), can be specified
using a formula Π′KG(p,M +1, An, Sn) whose only free variable is p and that involves
the G relation in Sn, the K relation in do(An, Sn), and the G∩ relation at level M in
do(An, Sn); note that the latter appears as G∩(p′,M, do(An, Sn)), where p′ is bound.
By Proposition 6.2.14, we can replace every occurrence of G∩(p′,M, do(An, Sn)) in
Π′KG(p,M + 1, An, Sn) with a formula ΠG(p
′,M, do(An, Sn)) that, w.r.t. the G rela-
tion, only mentions G at levels m in do(An, Sn), where m ≤ M . By the inductive
hypothesis, these G relations in ΠG(p′,M, do(An, Sn)) can be expressed using a for-
mula Π′′KG(p
′,M,An, Sn) that mentions the K and the G relations in Sn only. More-
over from Axiom 4.2.7, we can see that ΠG(p′,M, do(An, Sn)) also mentions the K
relation in do(An, Sn). As in the base case, we can use the right-hand side of Axiom
3.4.10 to replace the K relation in do(An, Sn) (both in Π′KG(p,M + 1, An, Sn) and
ΠG(p
′,m′, do(An, Sn))) by a formula that mentions the K relation in Sn only. Thus
we can obtain a specification ofG(p,M+1, do(An, Sn)) using a formula Π′KG(p,M+
1, An, Sn) that refers to the agent’s K and G relations only in situation Sn.
Note that, the successor-state axiom for G and Axiom 6.2.5 together ensure that
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for any executable situation s, the agent does not have the realistic p-goal that φ after
she drops it in s (see Proposition 6.3.28 below). However, this does not necessarily
hold for c-goals, as φ could be a consequence of the agent’s other c-goals. I could have
modified the successor-state axiom to identify and drop, e.g. a minimal set of c-goals
that contribute to φ; but this would have complicated the framework further, e.g. by
incorporating techniques used for belief revision to minimize the change in the agent’s
revised c-goals, etc. I leave this for future work.
6.3 Properties
In this section, I show that my formalization of committed agents has some desirable
properties. Many of these or their corresponding versions (in particular those in Sec-
tions 6.3.1, 6.3.3, 6.3.4, and 6.3.5) have been already shown to hold in the optimizing
agent framework. I also point out the differences between the two frameworks.
6.3.1 Basic Properties
I start with some basic properties. The proofs for these are exactly the same as in the
optimizing agent framework since they do not refer to any of the axioms that deal with
goal dynamics. First, I can show that an agent’s chosen goals are consistent:
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Proposition 6.3.1 (Consistency of CGoals).
DSGCAgt |= ∀s. ¬CGoal(False, s).
Proof. Same as that of Proposition 4.4.2.
Recall that in the optimizing agent framework, an agent is allowed to have a p-goal
that is impossible (as her G-accessible paths at some given level can be empty). In
contrast, in the committed agent framework the above property can be shown to hold
for (realistic) p-goals (and as a consequence, for primary c-goals) for all executable
situations. I show this formally in Corollary 6.3.17.
The property of realism also holds for the committed agent framework, and thus
all known to be inevitable goals are also chosen/intended:
Proposition 6.3.2 (Realism).
DSGCAgt |= ∀s. KInevitable(φ, s) ⊃ CGoal(φ, s).
Proof. Same as that of Proposition 4.4.3.
Again, recall that realism does not hold for p-goals/primary c-goals in the optimiz-
ing agent framework – an agent may know that something has become inevitable and
not have it as her p-goal or primary c-goal. In contrast, this can’t be the case in the
committed agent framework. In particular, p-goal realism can be shown to hold in this
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framework (see Corollary 6.3.7). Moreover, primary c-goal realism also holds in the
framework for executable situations (by Corollaries 6.3.7 and 6.3.20).
From these two propositions, it follows that no known to be impossible goal is ever
chosen/intended:
Corollary 6.3.3.
DSGCAgt |= ∀s. CGoal(φ, s) ⊃ ¬KImpossible(φ, s).
Proof. Same as that of Corollary 4.4.4.
Once again, unlike in the optimizing agent framework, the above property can also
be shown to hold for agents’ (realistic) p-goals and primary c-goals for all executable
situations (see Corollary 6.3.19). This is because in this framework, all p-goals of the
agent are always active, i.e. chosen.
6.3.2 Dynamic Properties I: Preservation of PGoal Strong Realism and Consis-
tency, and its Consequences
I next discuss some properties of goals that are specific to committed agents. In par-
ticular, in this section I show that if Assumptions 6.2.1 and 6.2.2 are prescribed to
hold for the initial situations, then they will remain true in all situations as they are
preserved by the SSA for G. Moreover, I show how a committed agent’s prioritized
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goals and chosen goals are related; to be more specific, I prove that an agent’s chosen
goals are just the intersection of her p-goals.
First, I show that Assumption 6.2.1 is preserved for all non-initial situations:
Proposition 6.3.4.
DSGCAgt |= ∀p, n, a, s. G(p, n, do(a, s)) ⊃ ∃s′.Starts(p, s′) ∧K(s′, do(a, s)).
Proof. (By induction on s) The base case holds by Assumption 6.2.1. The general
case trivially follows from Axiom 6.2.6 and Definitions 6.2.7, 6.2.9, 6.2.10, 6.2.11,
and 6.2.8, as ProgressedAndFiltered(p, n, a, s), AdoptedCA(p, n,m, a, s, φ), SubGoal-
AdoptedCA(p, n, a, s, ψ, φ), DroppedCA(p, n, a, s, φ), and ProgressedCA(p, n, a, s) all
by definition ensure that p must start with a K-accessible situation in do(a, s).
Thus in this framework, an agent’s set of G and GR-accessible paths are equivalent:
Corollary 6.3.5.
DSGCAgt |= ∀p, n, s. G(p, n, s) ≡ GR(p, n, s).
Proof. Follows from Assumption 6.2.1, Proposition 6.3.4, and Definition 4.2.4.
It follows that an agent’s set of p-goals at some level n in situation s and that of realistic
p-goals are the same:
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Corollary 6.3.6.
DSGCAgt |= ∀n, s. PGoal(φ, n, s) ≡ RPGoal(φ, n, s).
Proof. Follows from Corollary 6.3.5 and Definitions 4.2.1 and 4.2.5.
I can also show that the property of realism holds for a committed agent’s p-goals:
Corollary 6.3.7.
DSGCAgt |= ∀s. KInevitable(φ, s) ⊃ ∀n. PGoal(φ, n, s).
Proof. (By contradiction) Fix φ1 and S1 and assume that KInevitable(φ1, S1). From
this and Definition 3.5.14, we have that φ1 holds over any path that starts with a situa-
tion that is K-accessible in S1, i.e.:
∀p, s′. Starts(p, s′) ∧K(s′, S1) ⊃ φ1(p). (6.1)
Fix N1 and assume that: ¬PGoal(φ1, N1, S1). Then by Definition 4.2.1, there exists a
G-accessible path P1 at N1 in S1 over which ¬φ1 holds, i.e. ¬φ1(P1). But by Assump-
tion 6.2.1 and Proposition 6.3.4, P1 must start with a situation that is K-accessible in
S1, and thus by (6.1), φ1 holds over P1, i.e. φ1(P1) — a contradiction.
I next show that Assumption 6.2.2 is preserved by the successor-state axiom for G
and thus holds for all situations. In the following, I start by giving some lemmata that
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I will need to get this result. The first lemma states that for any situation s and priority
level n, any path p that is in the G∩ relation at n in s must start with a K-accessible
situation in s:
Lemma 6.3.8.
DSGCAgt |= ∀p, n, s. G∩(p, n, s) ⊃ ∃s′. Starts(p, s′) ∧K(s′, s).
Proof. (By induction on n). Fix S1. The base case where n = 0 follows trivially
from Axiom 4.2.7 and Definition 4.2.4. For the inductive case, fix N1 and assume that
∀p. G∩(p,N1, S1) ⊃ ∃s. Starts(p, s) ∧K(s, S1). Fix path P1 s.t. G∩(P1, N1 + 1, S1).
I need to show that P1 starts with a K-accessible situation in S1. Note that by Axiom
4.2.7, path P1 is in G∩ at N1 + 1 in S1 iff:
if ∃p′. (GR(p′, N1 + 1, S1) ∧G∩(p′, N1, S1))
then (GR(P1, N1 + 1, S1) ∧G∩(P1, N1, S1))
else G∩(P1, N1, S1).
In both these cases G∩(P1, N1, S1) must hold, and thus ∃s′. Starts(P1, s′) ∧K(s′, S1)
follows from the inductive hypothesis.
The next lemma states that if a path is GR-accessible for all levels up to m in
situation s, then it must be in the G∩ relation up to m in s:
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Lemma 6.3.9.
DSGCAgt |= ∀m, p, s. (∀n. n ≤ m ⊃ GR(p, n, s)) ⊃ G∩(p,m, s).
Proof. (By induction on m) Fix situation S1 and path P1. The base case, i.e. when
m = 0, follows trivially from Axiom 4.2.7. For the inductive case, fix M1 and assume:
∀n. n ≤M1 + 1 ⊃ GR(P1, n, S1). (6.2)
We need to show that G∩(P1,M1 + 1, S1). From (6.2) and the inductive hypothesis,
we have:
G∩(P1,M1, S1). (6.3)
From Axiom 4.2.7, (6.2), and (6.3), we can see that P1 is G∩-accessible at M1 + 1 in
S1 iff both GR(P1,M + 1, S1) and G∩(P1,M1, S1) holds. The former follows from
(6.2) while the latter from (6.3).
The next lemma says that if there is a path p that is GR-accessible for all levels up
to level m in situation s, then any path p′ that is in the G∩ relation at some higher or
equal priority (w.r.t. m) level n′ in s must also be GR-accessible at n′ in s:
Lemma 6.3.10.
DSGCAgt |= ∀m, s. (∃p. (∀n. n ≤ m ⊃ GR(p, n, s))) ⊃
(∀p′, n′. n′ ≤ m ∧G∩(p′, n′, s) ⊃ GR(p′, n′, s)).
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Proof. (By contradiction) For the antecedent, fix M1, S1, and P1 and assume:
∀n. n ≤M1 ⊃ GR(P1, n, S1). (6.4)
For the consequent, fix P ′1 and N
′
1 and assume:
N ′1 ≤M1 ∧G∩(P ′1, N ′1, S1). (6.5)
By contradiction, assume:
¬GR(P ′1, N ′1, S1). (6.6)
Axiom 4.2.7 gives us two cases. First consider the case when N ′1 = 0. In that case,
from Axiom 4.2.7 we have that a path p is G∩ accessible at 0 in S1 iff:
if ∃p′. GR(p′, 0, S1) then GR(p, 0, S1)
else ∃s′. Starts(p, s′) ∧K(s′, S1).
Since by (6.5), P ′1 is G∩-accessible at 0 in S1, and by (6.4), there is a path, namely P1,
that is GR-accessible at 0 in S1, P ′1 must be GR-accessible at 0 in S1 — a contradiction
with (6.6).
Now consider the case for N ′1 > 0. From (6.4) and (6.5), we have:
GR(P1, N
′
1, S1). (6.7)
Again, from (6.4), (6.5) and Lemma 6.3.9, it follows that:
G∩(P1, N ′1 − 1, S1). (6.8)
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Since N ′1 > 0, from Axiom 4.2.7 we have that a path p is G∩-accessible at N
′
1 in S1
iff:
if ∃p′. (GR(p′, N ′1, S1) ∧G∩(p′, N ′1 − 1, S1))
then (GR(p,N ′1, S1) ∧G∩(p,N ′1 − 1, S1))
else G∩(p,N ′1 − 1, S1).
Since by (6.7), there is a path, namely P1, that is GR-accessible at N ′1 in S1 and by
(6.8), P1 is in the G∩ relation at N ′1 − 1 in S1, the condition in the if holds, and thus
any path p that is in the G∩ relation at N ′1 in S1 must be GR-accessible at N
′
1 in S1 (i.e.
the condition in the then must hold for p). Since by (6.5) P ′1 is such a path, it must be
GR-accessible at N ′1 in S1 — a contradiction with (6.6).
Finally, the last lemma says that if there is a path p that is in theG∩ relation at level
n in situation s, then it is also in the G∩ relation at all higher priority (w.r.t. n) levels
m in s:
Lemma 6.3.11.
DSGCAgt |= ∀p, n, s. G∩(p, n, s) ⊃ (∀m. m < n ⊃ G∩(p,m, s)).
Proof. (By induction on n) In the base case, where n = 0, the consequent trivially
holds. For the inductive case, where n > 0, fix N1, and assume that:
∀p, s. G∩(p,N1, s) ⊃ (∀m. m < N1 ⊃ G∩(p,m, s)).
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Also fix P1 and S1 and assume that G∩(P1, N1 + 1, S1). From this and Axiom 4.2.7, it
follows that:
G∩(P1, N1, S1). (6.9)
From this and the inductive hypothesis, it follows that:
∀m. m < N1 ⊃ G∩(P1,m, S1). (6.10)
The consequent follows from (6.9) and (6.10).
Using these lemmata, I now prove that Assumption 6.2.2 also hold for any exe-
cutable situation as it is preserved by the successor-state axiom for G:
Proposition 6.3.12.
DSGCAgt |= ∀s. Executable(s) ⊃ ∃p. ∀n. G(p, n, s).
Proof. (By induction on s) For the base case, fix situation Sinit s.t. Init(Sinit) and as-
sume that Executable(Sinit). The consequent trivially follows from this and Assump-
tion 6.2.2.
For the inductive case, fix situation S∗ and assume that:
∃p. ∀n. G(p, n, S∗). (6.11)
Also, fix action A∗ and assume that:
Executable(do(A∗, S∗)). (6.12)
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I need to show that ∃p. ∀n. G(p, n, do(A∗, S∗)). From (6.12) and Definition 3.3.1, we
have:
Poss(A∗, S∗). (6.13)
Now, the successor-state axiom for G, i.e. Axiom 6.2.6, gives us four cases. For each
of these cases, I will prove that ∃p. ∀n. G(p, n, do(A∗, S∗)). Let us consider them, one
at a time.
A∗ is a regular action (i.e. not an adopt, adoptRelTo, or drop action): In this case, by
Axiom 6.2.6, I need to show that there is a path p such that ∀n. ProgressedAndFilter-
ed(p, n, A∗, S∗). I will prove this by strong induction on level n. First consider the base
case, i.e. when n = 0. From Definitions 6.2.7 and 6.2.8, ProgressedAndFiltered(p, 0,
A∗, S∗) holds for some path p at level 0 after A∗ has happened in S∗ iff:
if (∃p′, s′. Progressed(p′, 0, A∗, S∗) ∧ Starts(p′, s′) ∧K(s′, do(A∗, S∗)))
then Progressed(p, 0, A∗, S∗) ∧ ∃s′. Starts(p, s′) ∧K(s′, do(A∗, S∗))
else ∃s′. Starts(p, s′) ∧K(s′, do(A∗, S∗)).
If there exists aG-accessible path P1 at 0 in S∗ whose suffix p′ relative toA∗ starts with
a situation that is K-accessible in do(A∗, S∗), then ProgressedAndFiltered(P1, 0, A∗,
S∗). Otherwise, let P1 be a path that starts with a situation that is K-accessible in
do(A∗, S∗). Since K is reflexive, and do(A∗, S∗) is executable (by (6.12)), by the
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assumption that there is an executable action in all situations and Proposition 3.5.36,
such a path P1 indeed exists. Clearly, ProgressedAndFiltered(P1, 0, A∗, S∗) holds.
For the inductive case, fix M and assume that there is a path P1 s.t. ∀n. n ≤ M ⊃
ProgressedAndFiltered(P1, n, A∗, S∗); I need to show that:
∃p. (∀n. n ≤M + 1 ⊃ ProgressedAndFiltered(p, n,A∗, S∗)).
Note that, by Axiom 6.2.6, the fact that A∗ is a regular action, and the inductive hy-
pothesis, it follows that P1 is G-accessible at all levels up to M in do(A∗, S∗) since
ProgressedAndFiltered holds for all these levels. From this and Corollary 6.3.5, we
have:
∀n. n ≤M ⊃ GR(P1, n, do(A∗, S∗)). (6.14)
By (6.14) and Lemma 6.3.10, any path that is in G∩ at all levels up to and including
M in do(A∗, S∗) must also be GR-accessible at all levels n in do(A∗, S∗) s.t. n ≤M :
∀p. (∀n. n ≤M ⊃ G∩(p, n, do(A∗, S∗))) ⊃ (∀n′. n′ ≤M ⊃ GR(p, n′, do(A∗, S∗))).
(6.15)
Now, by Definitions 6.2.7 and 6.2.8, a path p is in ProgressedAndFiltered at level
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M + 1 after A∗ has happened in S∗ iff:
if (∃p′. G∩(p′,M, do(A∗, S∗)) ∧ Progressed(p′,M + 1, A∗, S∗)
∧ ∃s′. Starts(p′, s′) ∧K(s′, do(A∗, S∗)))
then Progressed(p,M + 1, A∗, S∗) ∧ ∃s′. Starts(p, s′) ∧K(s′, do(A∗, S∗))
else ∃s. Starts(p, s) ∧K(s, do(A∗, S∗)).
Note that, if the condition in the if is false, then P1 is in ProgressedAndFiltered
at level M + 1 after A∗ has happened in S∗ if it starts with a situation that is K-
accessible in do(A∗, S∗). This follows trivially from the inductive hypothesis and Def-
initions 6.2.7 and 6.2.8, since any path that is in the ProgressedAndFiltered (and the
ProgressedCA) relation in do(A
∗, S∗) must by definition start with a K-accessible situ-
ation in do(A∗, S∗).
On the other hand, if there is a path p′ s.t. p′ is in theG∩ relation atM in do(A∗, S∗)
and p′ is also the suffix of a G-accessible path at level M + 1 in S∗ relative to A∗,
then set P ′1 to be p
′. Thus we have: ProgressedAndFiltered(P ′1,M + 1, A
∗, S∗). Let
me show that P ′1 is also in the ProgressedAndFiltered relation at all higher priority
levels than M + 1. To this end, first note that by the assumption of this subcase that
G∩(P ′1,M, do(A
∗, S∗)) and Lemma 6.3.11, it follows that for all n s.t. 0 ≤ n ≤ M,
G∩(P ′1, n, do(A
∗, S∗)) holds. Moreover, from this, (6.15), and Definition 4.2.4, we
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have that ∀n. n ≤ M ⊃ G(P ′1, n, do(A∗, S∗)). From this, Axiom 6.2.6, and the fact
that A∗ is a non-adopt/drop action, we have that ∀n. n ≤ M ⊃ ProgressedAndFilter-
ed(P ′1, n, A
∗, S∗). So there exists a path p s.t. ∀n. ProgressedAndFiltered(p, n, A∗, S∗).
A∗ is an adopt action: Fix φ1 and N1, and assume that A∗ = adopt(φ1, N1). Now,
from (6.13), Axiom 6.2.3, and Definitions 4.2.10 and 4.2.9, we have that there is a
path, say P1, such that P1 starts with some situation S1, P1 is G∩-accessible at all
levels in S∗, and the next action performed over P1 is A∗ = adopt(φ1, N1), after
which φ1 holds over the suffix, say P2, of this path that starts with do(A∗, S1):
∀n. G∩(P1, n, S∗) ∧ Starts(P1, S1) ∧ Suffix(P2, P1, do(A∗, S1)) ∧ φ1(P2). (6.16)
From (6.16) and Lemma 6.3.8, it follows that:
∃s. Starts(P1, s) ∧K(s, S∗). (6.17)
Again, from (6.16) and Corollary 3.5.41, it follows that:
∃s. Starts(P1, s) ∧ Poss(A∗, s). (6.18)
Moreover, since A∗, which is an adopt action, is not a knowledge-producing action, it
follows from (6.17), (6.18), and the SSA for K (i.e. Axiom 3.4.10) that:
∃s. Starts(P2, s) ∧K(s, do(A∗, S∗)). (6.19)
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Note that to prove that ∃p. ∀n. G(p, n, do(A∗, S∗)), by Axiom 6.2.6 and the fact
thatA∗ is an adopt action it suffices to show that ∀n. AdoptedCA(P2, n,N1, A∗, S∗, φ1).
First consider the case where n = N1. By Definition 6.2.9, AdoptedCA(P2, N1, N1, A
∗,
S∗, φ1) iff P2 starts with aK-accessible situation in do(A∗, S∗) and φ1(P2). The former
follows from (6.19). On the other hand, the latter follows from (6.16).
Next consider the case where n < N1. By Definitions 6.2.9, 6.2.8, and 4.3.4, and
(6.19), to show that ∀n. n < N1 ⊃ AdoptedCA(P2, n,N1, A∗, S∗, φ1), it is sufficient to
prove that ∀n. n < N1 ⊃ GR(P1, n, S∗) ∧ Suffix(P2, P1, do(A∗, S∗)). Now consider
the case where n > N1. Again by Definitions 6.2.9, 6.2.8, and 4.3.4, and (6.19), to
show that ∀n. n > N1 ⊃ AdoptedCA(P2, n,N1, A∗, S∗, φ1), it is sufficient to prove
that ∀n. n > N1 ⊃ GR(P1, n − 1, S∗) ∧ Suffix(P2, P1, do(A∗, S∗)). Thus, to cover
both these cases, I need to show that:
∀n. GR(P1, n, S∗) ∧ Suffix(P2, P1, do(A∗, S∗)).
From this and (6.16), I only need to show that ∀n. GR(P1, n, S∗). Now, from (6.11)
and Corollary 6.3.5, it follows that ∃p. ∀n. GR(p, n, S∗). Finally, from this, (6.16), and
Lemma 6.3.10, it follows that ∀n. GR(P1, n, S∗). Thus, there exists a path p, namely
P2, s.t. ∀n. AdoptedCA(p, n,N1, A∗, S∗, φ1).
A∗ is an adoptRelTo action: The proof for this case is similar to the proof for adopt
actions.
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A∗ is an drop action: The proof for this case is similar to the one for regular actions.
It thus follows that ∃p. ∀n. G(p, n, do(A∗, S∗)).
As a consequence of Proposition 6.3.12, I can show that if a path p is in the G∩
relation at some level n for some executable situation s, then p must be G-accessible
at all higher priority levels than n in s and at n in s:
Corollary 6.3.13.
DSGCAgt |= ∀p, n, s. Executable(s) ∧G∩(p, n, s) ⊃ (∀m. m ≤ n ⊃ G(p,m, s)).
Proof. Fix P1, N1, and S1, and assume that:
Executable(S1), (6.20)
G∩(P1, N1, S1). (6.21)
From (6.20) and Proposition 6.3.12, it follows that ∃p. ∀n. G(p, n, S1). From this and
Corollary 6.3.5, it follows that ∃p. ∀n. GR(p, n, S1). Finally, from this, (6.21), and
Lemma 6.3.10, it follows that ∀n. n ≤ N1 ⊃ GR(P1, n, S1). The consequent follows
from this and Definition 4.2.4.
Moreover, I can show that in this framework all of the p-goals of an agent are active
and thus her chosen goals are just the intersection of her p-goals. More precisely, for
any executable situation s, a committed agent’s c-goal- or G∩-accessible paths in s are
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exactly those that are GR-accessible (and G-accessible) at all levels in s, i.e. those that
satisfy all her realistic p-goals (and p-goals):
Proposition 6.3.14.
(a). DSGCAgt |= ∀s. Executable(s) ⊃ (∀p. G∩(p, s) ≡ ∀n. GR(p, n, s)),
(b). DSGCAgt |= ∀s. Executable(s) ⊃ (∀p. G∩(p, s) ≡ ∀n. G(p, n, s)).
Proof. (a). Fix situation S1 such that Executable(S1). By Definition 4.2.9, I need to
show that ∀p. (∀n. G∩(p, n, S1)) ≡ (∀n. GR(p, n, S1)). First let us consider the (⊂)
direction. Fix P1 and assume:
∀n. GR(P1, n, S1). (6.22)
I’ll prove this by induction on n. For the base case, by (6.22) and Axiom 4.2.7, we have
G∩(P1, 0, S1). For the inductive case, fix M and assume G∩(P1,M, S1). Then from
Axiom 4.2.7, it also follows thatG∩(P1,M+1, S1), as by (6.22) we haveGR(P1,M+
1, S1) and by the inductive hypothesis we have G∩(P1,M, S1).
Next, let us consider the (⊃) direction. Fix path P1 and assume:
∀n. G∩(P1, n, S1). (6.23)
Since S1 is executable, by Proposition 6.3.12 and Corollary 6.3.5 it follows that there
is a path, say P2, that is GR-accessible at all levels in S1:
∀n. GR(P2, n, S1). (6.24)
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Then it follows from (6.24), (6.23), and Lemma 6.3.10 that ∀n. GR(P1, n, S1).
(b). Follows from Proposition 6.3.14 (a) and Corollary 6.3.5.
Using this proposition, it can be shown that for any executable situation s, if an
agent has a p-goal that φ at some level n in s, then she has it as her c-goal in s:
Proposition 6.3.15.
DSGCAgt |= ∀n, s. Executable(s) ∧ PGoal(φ, n, s) ⊃ CGoal(φ, s).
Proof. Fix φ1, N1, and S1. By Definition 4.2.1 and the antecedent, we have:
∀p. G(p,N1, S1) ⊃ φ1(p). From this and Definition 4.2.4, we have:
∀p. GR(p,N1, S1) ⊃ φ1(p). (6.25)
Since by the antecedent S1 is executable, we can apply Proposition 6.3.14 (a), and get
that:
∀p. G∩(p, S1) ⊃ GR(p,N1, S1). (6.26)
From (6.25) and (6.26), it follows that: ∀p. G∩(p, S1) ⊃ φ1(p). The consequent fol-
lows from this and Definition 4.2.10.
Moreover, for any executable situation s, the consequences of an agent’s p-goals
in s are also her c-goals in s:
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Proposition 6.3.16.
DSGCAgt |= ∀s. Executable(s) ⊃
(∀p, n1, n2. PGoal(φ1, n1, s) ∧ PGoal(φ2, n2, s) ∧ (φ1(p) ∧ φ2(p) ⊃ ψ(p))
⊃ CGoal(ψ, s)).
Proof Sketch. Analogously to the proof of Proposition 6.3.15, it can be shown that
both φ1 and φ2 holds over all G∩-accessible paths in s, and since ∀p. φ1(p) ∧ φ2(p) ⊃
ψ(p), so does ψ. The consequent follows from this and Definition 4.2.10.
It is easy to see that this proposition can be generalized for more than two p-goals.
As a consequence of Proposition 6.3.15, I can show that for any executable situa-
tion, an agent’s p-goals at any level are individually consistent:
Corollary 6.3.17.
DSGCAgt |= ∀s. Executable(s) ⊃ ∀n. ¬PGoal(False, n, s).
Proof. (By contradiction) Fix S1 and N1 and assume: Executable(S1)∧ PGoal(False,
N1, S1). Then by Proposition 6.3.15, we have CGoal(False, S1). But by Proposition
6.3.1, we have ¬CGoal(False, S1) – a contradiction.
Moreover for any executable situation, an agent’s p-goals at all levels are collec-
tively consistent:
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Corollary 6.3.18.
DSGCAgt |= ∀n, s. Executable(s) ∧ PGoal(φ, n, s) ⊃ ¬∃n′. PGoal(¬φ, n′, s).
Proof. (By contradiction) Fix S1, φ1, N1, and N2 and assume that:
Executable(S1), (6.27)
PGoal(φ1, N1, S1), (6.28)
PGoal(¬φ1, N2, S1). (6.29)
By (6.27), (6.28), and Proposition 6.3.15, we have CGoal(φ1, S1), while from (6.27),
(6.29), and Proposition 6.3.15, we have CGoal(¬φ1, S1). Thus we have CGoal(False,
S1). But by Proposition 6.3.1, we have ¬CGoal(False, S1) – a contradiction.
Again for any executable situation, an agent’s p-goals are not known to be impos-
sible:
Corollary 6.3.19.
DSGCAgt |= ∀n, s. Executable(s) ∧ PGoal(φ, n, s) ⊃ ¬KImpossible(φ, s).
Proof. Fix φ1, N1, and S1 and assume that Executable(S1)∧PGoal(φ1, N1, S1). From
this and Proposition 6.3.15, we have CGoal(φ1, S1). Finally, from this and Corollary
6.3.3, we have ¬KImpossible(φ1, S1).
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Finally for any executable situation s, having the p-goal that φ at some level n in s
is equivalent to having the primary c-goal that φ at n in s:
Corollary 6.3.20.
DSGCAgt |= ∀s. Executable(s) ⊃ (∀n. PGoal(φ, n, s) ≡ PrimCGoal(φ, n, s)).
Proof Sketch. Fix φ1, N1, and S1 and assume that:
Executable(S1). (6.30)
I have to show that PGoal(φ1, N1, S1) ≡ PrimCGoal(φ1, N1, S1). The (⊂) direction
trivially follows from the definition of PrimCGoal(φ1, N1, S1) (Definition 4.2.14).
For the (⊃) direction, I need to show that ∃p. G(p,N1, S1) ∧ G∩(p,N1, S1) (by
Definition 4.2.14). From (6.30) and Proposition 6.3.12, it follows that there is a path,
say P1, s.t.:
∀n. G(P1, n, S1), and thus (6.31)
G(P1, N1, S1). (6.32)
From (6.31) and Corollary 6.3.5, we have ∀n. GR(P1, n, S1), and thus ∀n. n ≤ N1 ⊃
GR(P1, n, S1). Finally, from this and Lemma 6.3.9, it follows that G∩(P1, N1, S1).
Thus from this and (6.32), it follows that ∃p. G(p,N1, S1) ∧G∩(p,N1, S1).
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Note that none of the main results that I presented in Section 6.3.2 hold for opti-
mizing agents (as expected, Lemmata 6.3.8, 6.3.9, and 6.3.10, which deal solely with
properties of Axiom 4.2.7, hold for the optimizing agent framework as well). In par-
ticular, recall that an optimizing agent is allowed to have true desires, which can be
individually inconsistent, known to be impossible to bring about, or inconsistent with
each other and with what she knows. As discussed in Chapter 4, in some of these cases,
the agent’s sets of G- or GR- accessible paths at some levels can be empty. Also, some
of her lower priority p-goals or desires can be inactive. In contrast, the above results
show that in the committed agent framework, all p-goal levels are always considered
to be active, and thus can’t be empty. The agent’s p-goals and realistic p-goals are the
same. Finally, her chosen goals or intentions are really the consequential closure of
her prioritized goals.
6.3.3 Dynamic Properties II: Extensionality, Adoption, and Drop
I next discuss some properties of a committed agent’s goal dynamics. First of all, I can
show that a committed agent always wants to be in a situation that has the same action
history as the current situation:
Proposition 6.3.21 (Correct Action History).
∀p, n, s. G(p, n, s) ⊃ ∃s′. Starts(p, s′) ∧ SameHist(s, s′).
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Proof. Follows from Assumption 6.2.1, Proposition 6.3.4, and Lemma 3.5.34.
In contrast, by Proposition 4.4.6 an optimizing agent only wants to be in a world that
has the same action history as the current situation, if initially she wants to be in an
initial world. Such an additional initial condition is not required in the committed
agent framework as Assumption 6.2.1 along with Lemma 3.5.34 already ensure that
this is the case.
The next proposition says that adopting and dropping logically equivalent goals
has the same result:
Proposition 6.3.22 (Extensionality w.r.t. Adoption and Drop).
(a). DSGCAgt |= (∀p. φ1(p) ≡ φ2(p)) ⊃
(∀n, n′, s. PGoal(ψ, n′, do(adopt(φ1, n), s)) ≡ PGoal(ψ, n′, do(adopt(φ2, n), s))),
(b). DSGCAgt |= (∀p. φ1(p) ≡ φ2(p)) ⊃
(∀n, s. PGoal(ψ, n, do(drop(φ1), s)) ≡ PGoal(ψ, n, do(drop(φ2), s))),
(c). DSGCAgt |= (∀p. φ1(p) ≡ φ2(p)) ⊃
(∀n, s. CGoal(ψ, do(adopt(φ1, n), s)) ≡ CGoal(ψ, do(adopt(φ2, n), s))),
(d). DSGCAgt |= (∀p. φ1(p) ≡ φ2(p)) ⊃
(∀s. CGoal(ψ, do(drop(φ1), s)) ≡ CGoal(ψ, do(drop(φ2), s))).
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Proof. (a). Follows from the fact that we use a possible worlds/paths semantics for
p-goals.
(b). Similar to that of Proposition 6.3.22(a).
(c). Follows from Definition 4.2.10 and the fact that the G∩-accessible paths are the
same in both situations given the antecedent.
(d). Similar to that of Proposition 6.3.22(c).
Note that although by Proposition 6.3.15, for any executable situation an agent’s p-
goals are also her c-goals in this framework, Proposition 6.3.22(a) and (b) alone are
inadequate for capturing extensionality of chosen goals w.r.t. adopt and drop; the rea-
son for this is that the agent might have a c-goal φ without necessarily having the
p-goal that φ, e.g. φ can be a consequence of two or more p-goals at different priority
levels. Thus (c) and (d) above are also required. Also, as shown in Chapter 4, these
results also hold for optimizing agents.
Moreover, adopting logically equivalent subgoals relative to logically equivalent
parent goals yields the same goal state:
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Proposition 6.3.23 (Extensionality w.r.t. Subgoal Adoption).
(a). DSGCAgt |= ∀p.(φ1(p) ≡ φ2(p)) ∧ ∀p.(ψ1(p) ≡ ψ2(p)) ⊃
PGoal(φ∗, do(adoptRelTo(ψ1, φ1), s)) ≡ PGoal(φ∗, do(adoptRelTo(ψ2, φ2), s)),
(b). DSGCAgt |= ∀p.(φ1(p) ≡ φ2(p)) ∧ ∀p.(ψ1(p) ≡ ψ2(p)) ⊃
CGoal(φ∗, do(adoptRelTo(ψ1, φ1), s)) ≡ CGoal(φ∗, do(adoptRelTo(ψ2, φ2), s)).
Proof. (a). Similar to that of Proposition 6.3.22(a).
(b). Similar to that of Proposition 6.3.22(c).
Again, as shown in Chapter 5, these results hold for optimizing agents as well.
As a consequence of Proposition 6.3.22(a),(b), and 6.3.23(a), these properties also
hold for a committed agent’s primary c-goals:
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Corollary 6.3.24.
(a). DSGCAgt |= ∀p. (φ1(p) ≡ φ2(p)) ⊃
(∀n, s. PrimCGoal(ψ, do(adopt(φ1, n), s))
≡ PrimCGoal(ψ, do(adopt(φ2, n), s))),
(b). DSGCAgt |= ∀p. (φ1(p) ≡ φ2(p)) ⊃
∀s. PrimCGoal(ψ, do(drop(φ1), s)) ≡ PrimCGoal(ψ, do(drop(φ2), s)).
(c). DSGCAgt |= ∀p. (φ1(p) ≡ φ2(p)) ∧ ∀p. (ψ1(p) ≡ ψ2(p)) ⊃
(∀s. PrimCGoal(φ∗, do(adoptRelTo(ψ1, φ1), s))
≡ PrimCGoal(φ∗, do(adoptRelTo(ψ2, φ2), s))).
Proof. (a). Follows from Definition 4.2.12 and Proposition 6.3.22(a).
(b). Follows from Definition 4.2.12 and Proposition 6.3.22(b).
(c). Follows from Definition 4.2.12 and Proposition 6.3.23(a).
Once again, as I showed earlier, these also hold for the optimizing agent framework.
The next few properties deal with (sub)goal adoption and drop and confirm that
adopting and dropping (sub)goals has the intended effect. I start by showing that after
adopting φ at level n in situation s, an agent acquires the p-goal that φ at n:
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Proposition 6.3.25 (PGoal Adoption).
DSGCAgt |= ∀n, s. PGoal(φ, n, do(adopt(φ, n), s)).
Proof. Fix φ1, N1, and S1. From Axiom 6.2.6 and Definition 6.2.9, we have that the
agent’s G-accessible paths at N1 in do(adopt(φ1, N1), S1) are the ones that start with
situations that are K-accessible in do(adopt(φ1, N1), S1) and over which φ1 holds:
∀p. G(p,N1, do(adopt(φ1, N1), S1)) ≡
∃s. Starts(p, s) ∧K(s, do(adopt(φ1, N1), S1)) ∧ φ1(p).
(6.33)
If such a path p exists, then the consequent follows from (6.33) and Definition 4.2.1.
Otherwise, the consequent holds trivially from Definition 4.2.1.
Note that the above proof relies on the argument that if there does not exist a path
that starts with a situation that is K-accessible in do(adopt(φ, n), s) and over which φ
holds, then the agent trivially has the p-goal that φ at n after adopt(φ, n) has been per-
formed in s. However, Axiom 6.2.3 ensures that in this framework for any executable
situation s, such a path indeed exists. Note that the property in Proposition 6.3.25 also
holds for optimizing agents as shown in Proposition 4.4.9.
Moreover, after adopting a p-goal φ at some level n in some situation s, an agent
also acquires the c-goal that φ provided that s is an executable situation and that the
adopt(φ, n) action is executable in s:
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Proposition 6.3.26 (CGoal Adoption).
DSGCAgt |= ∀n, s. Executable(s) ∧ Poss(adopt(φ, n), s))
⊃ CGoal(φ, do(adopt(φ, n), s)).
Proof. Follows from Definition 3.3.1, Propositions 6.3.25, and 6.3.15.
Furthermore, the above result also holds for a committed agent’s primary c-goals:
Proposition 6.3.27 (Primary CGoal Adoption).
DSGCAgt |= ∀n, s. Executable(s) ∧ Poss(adopt(φ, n), s)
⊃ PrimCGoal(φ, do(adopt(φ, n), s)).
Proof. Follows from Definition 3.3.1, Proposition 6.3.25, and Corollary 6.3.20.
In Proposition 4.4.12, a variation of this property is shown to hold for optimizing
agents as well. However, in that case, one needs to ensure that the agent does not
intend not to execute the adopt(φ, n) action next, and φ is consistent with all her higher
priority c-goals in s, i.e. her c-goals up to level n−1. Note that in the above proposition,
this is guaranteed by the preconditions of the adopt action and the antecedent which
ensures that the adopt(φ, n) action is possible in s.
I can also show that if an agent has a p-goal that φ at some level n in some situation
s, then she will not have the progression of φ as her realistic p-goal after she drops it,
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provided that it is not the case that the progression of φ has become known to be
inevitable after the drop action happens in s:
Proposition 6.3.28 (RPGoal Drop).
DSGCAgt |= ∀n, s. (PGoal(φ, n, s)
∧ ¬KInevitable(ProgOf(φ, drop(φ)), do(drop(φ), s)))
⊃ ¬RPGoal(ProgOf(φ, drop(φ)), n, do(drop(φ), s)).
Proof. Fix φ1, N1, and S1. From the antecedent, we have:
PGoal(φ1, N1, S1), (6.34)
¬KInevitable(ProgOf(φ1, drop(φ1)), do(drop(φ1), S1)). (6.35)
We can see from Axiom 6.2.6 and Definition 6.2.11 that after the drop(φ1) action has
been performed in S1, each G-accessibility level in S1 where φ1 is a p-goal is replaced
by the set of paths that start with a situation that is K-accessible in do(drop(φ1), S1).
Thus, by (6.34), Axiom 6.2.6, and Definition 6.2.11, we have:
G(p,N1, do(drop(φ1), S1)) ≡ ∃s′. Starts(p, s′) ∧K(s′, do(drop(φ1), S1)). (6.36)
By (6.35) and Definitions 3.5.14 and 3.5.12, there exists a path P1 that starts with
a situation that is K-accessible from do(drop(φ1), S1), and over which the formula
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¬ProgOf(φ1, drop(φ1)) holds:
∃s′. Starts(P1, s′) ∧K(s′, do(drop(φ1), S1)) ∧ ¬ProgOf(φ1, drop(φ1))(P1). (6.37)
Thus by (6.36) and (6.37), we have G(P1, N1, do(drop(φ1), S1))). The consequent
follows from this, (6.37), and Definitions 4.2.4 and 4.2.5.
Note that, in contrast to the corresponding Proposition 4.4.15 which uses the condition
in the antecedent that the progression of φ is not strongly inevitable in do(drop(φ), s),
this proposition requires that progression of φ is not known to be inevitable in do(dro−
p(φ), s). This is due to the fact that Assumption 6.2.1 and Proposition 6.3.4 ensure that
in this framework all G-accessible paths in situation do(drop(φ), s) always start with
a K-accessible situation in do(drop(φ), s). Thus as long as there is a path that starts
with a K-accessible situation in do(drop(φ), s) and over which the progression of φ
does not hold, the proposition follows.
Next, I show that similar to an optimizing agent, a committed agent acquires the
p-goal that ψ after she adopts it as a subgoal of another goal φ in s, provided that she
has the p-goal at some level in s that φ:
Proposition 6.3.29 (Subgoal Adoption-1).
DSGCAgt |= ∃m. PGoal(φ,m, s) ⊃ ∃n. PGoal(ψ, n, do(adoptRelTo(ψ, φ), s)).
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Proof. Fix φ1, ψ1,M1, and S1. From the antecedent, we have:
PGoal(φ1,M1, S1). (6.38)
FixN1 such that AdoptedLevel(φ1, N1, S1) holds. By (6.38) and Definition 5.2.4, such
a level N1 indeed exists. By Axiom 6.2.6 and Definitions 6.2.10, 6.2.8, and 5.2.4, the
agent’s G-accessible paths in do(adoptRelTo(ψ1, φ1), S1) at levelN1 are the ones that
can be obtained by progressing her G-accessible paths at N1−1 in S1, that start with a
K-accessible situation in do(adoptRelTo(ψ1, φ1), S1), and over which ψ1 holds; thus
we have:
∀p. G(p,N1, do(adoptRelTo(ψ1, φ1), S1)) ⊃ ψ1(p). (6.39)
If such a path exists, then the consequent follows from (6.39) and Definition 4.2.1.
Otherwise, the consequent follows trivially by Definition 4.2.1.
Also, I can show that an agent acquires the c-goal that ψ after she adopts it as
a subgoal of another goal φ in s, provided that s is an executable situation and the
adoptRelTo action is executable in s:
Proposition 6.3.30 (Subgoal Adoption-2).
DSGCAgt |= ∀s. Executable(s) ∧ Poss(adoptRelTo(ψ, φ), s) ⊃
CGoal(ψ, do(adoptRelTo(ψ, φ), s)).
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Proof. Follows from Definition 3.3.1, Propositions 6.3.29, and 6.3.15.
Furthermore, the above result also holds for a committed agent’s primary c-goals:
Proposition 6.3.31 (Subgoal Adoption-3).
DSGCAgt |= ∀s. Executable(s) ∧ Poss(adoptRelTo(ψ, φ), s) ⊃
PrimCGoal(ψ, do(adoptRelTo(ψ, φ), s)).
Proof. Follows from Definition 3.3.1, Proposition 6.3.29, and Corollary 6.3.20.
In contrast, the corresponding proposition for optimizing agents in Chapter 5 (i.e.
Proposition 5.3.2) requires that (a) the parent goal φ is a primary c-goal at level n− 1
in s, where n is the adopted level, and that (b) the agent does not intend not to execute
the adoptRelTo(ψ, φ) action next and she does not have the c-goal up to the adopted
level that ¬ψ next. Again, note that in the above proposition, we only require the
parent goal φ to be a p-goal at some level; but this and Corollary 6.3.20 imply that
φ is a primary c-goal in s. Moreover, (b) also follows from the preconditions of the
adoptRelTo(ψ, φ) action and the antecedent that this action is executable in s.
The last two properties in this section show that dropping subgoals and their su-
pergoals works as intended. First, I prove that subgoals are dropped when their parent
goal is dropped. More precisely, I show that after dropping the p-goal that φ in s, an
agent does not have the p-goal (and thus the primary c-goal) that the progression of ψ
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at some level n, provided that ψ is a subgoal of φ in s, that ψ is a p-goal at n in s, and
that the progression of ψ is not known to be inevitable in do(drop(φ), s):
Proposition 6.3.32 (Supergoal Drop).
DSGCAgt |= SubGoal(ψ, φ, s) ∧ PGoal(ψ, n, s)
∧ ¬KInevitable(ProgOf(ψ, drop(φ)), do(drop(φ), s))
⊃ ¬PGoal(ProgOf(ψ, drop(φ)), n, do(drop(φ), s)).
Proof. Fix φ1, ψ1, N1 and S1. From the antecedent, we have:
SubGoal(ψ1, φ1, S1), (6.40)
PGoal(ψ1, N1, S1), (6.41)
¬KInevitable(ProgOf(ψ1, drop(φ1)), do(drop(φ1), S1)). (6.42)
From (6.40) and Definition 5.2.5, it follows that for any level n in S1 where ψ1 is a
p-goal, φ1 is also a p-goal:
∀n. PGoal(ψ1, n, S1) ⊃ PGoal(φ1, n, S1). (6.43)
From (6.42) and Definitions 3.5.14, 3.5.12, and 3.4.5, it follows that there is a path P1
such that:
∃s. K(s, do(drop(φ1), S1)) ∧ Starts(P1, s) ∧ ¬ProgOf(ψ1, drop(φ1))(P1). (6.44)
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Now, consider level N1 in S1; by (6.41), ψ1 is a p-goal at N1 in S1. By this, (6.43),
PGoal(φ1, N1, S1), and thus by Axiom 6.2.6, and Definition 6.2.11, we can see that
the G-accessible paths at N1 in do(drop(φ1), S1) are the ones that start with situations
that are K-accessible in do(drop(φ1), S1). Since by (6.44), P1 is such a path, it will be
included in the G-relation at N1 in do(drop(φ1), S1) :
G(P1, N1, do(drop(φ1), S1)). (6.45)
The consequent thus follows from (6.44), (6.45), and Definition 4.2.1.
Again, note that the corresponding optimizing agent result (i.e. Proposition 5.3.3)
uses StronglyInevitable in the antecedent rather than KInevitable, since unlike in the
committed agent framework, G-accessible paths are not required to start with a K-
accessible situation in do(drop(φ), s) in that framework. Also, as with the optimizing
agent framework, this proposition does not hold if we replace PGoal in the consequent
with CGoal since ψ could be a consequence of a combination of two or more p-goals,
i.e. a non-primary c-goal. Finally, as in the optimizing agent framework, this property
can be generalized to show that in addition to the above, ψ is indeed not a p-goal at
some level n where ¬PGoal(ψ, n, s) after the drop(φ) action happens in s, provided
that she don’t have the p-goal at n in s that the drop(φ) action does not happen next or
ψ holds after it happens, i.e. that ¬PGoal(¬∃s′. Do(drop(φ), now, s′) ∨ ψ, n, s).
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The next property formalizes the conditions under which the dropping of a subgoal
does not affect the parent goal. It states that an agent retains the p-goal that the pro-
gression of φ after she drops a subgoal ψ of some goal φ in some executable situation
s, provided that the drop action is possible in s, and that she does not have the c-goal
in s that the drop action does not happen next:
Proposition 6.3.33 (Subgoal Drop).
DSGCAgt |= ∀s. (Executable(s) ∧ Poss(drop(ψ), s) ∧ SubGoal(ψ, φ, s)
∧ ¬CGoal(¬∃s′. Starts(s′) ∧ OnPath(do(drop(ψ), s′)), s))
⊃ ∃n. PGoal(ProgOf(φ, drop(ψ)), n, do(drop(ψ), s)).
Proof. Fix φ1, ψ1, and S1. From the antecedent, we have:
Executable(S1) ∧ Poss(drop(ψ1), S1), (6.46)
SubGoal(ψ1, φ1, S1), and (6.47)
¬CGoal(¬∃s′. Starts(s′) ∧ OnPath(do(drop(ψ1), s′)), S1). (6.48)
From (6.47) and Definition 5.2.5, it follows that there is a level N1 in S1 where φ1 is a
p-goal but ψ1 is not, and for any level n that has priority higher or equal to N1, ψ1 is
not a p-goal at n in S1:
PGoal(φ1, N1, S1), (6.49)
∀n. n ≤ N1 ⊃ ¬PGoal(ψ1, n, S1). (6.50)
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Also, by (6.48) and Definitions 4.2.10 and 4.2.9, there is a path, say P1, that is in
the G∩ relation at all levels n, and where the next action performed on the path is
drop(ψ1):
∀n. G∩(P1, n, S1), and (6.51)
∃s′. Starts(P1, s′) ∧ OnPath(P1, do(drop(ψ1), s′)). (6.52)
By (6.51) and Lemma 6.3.8, it follows that P1 starts with a K-accessible situation in
S1:
∃s. Starts(P1, s) ∧K(s, S1). (6.53)
From (6.46) and Definition 3.3.1, it follows that:
Executable(do(drop(ψ1), S1)).
From this, (6.51), and Proposition 6.3.14(b), it follows that:
∀n. G(P1, n, S1). (6.54)
Also, from this, it follows that:
G(P1, N1, S1). (6.55)
Again, from this and (6.49), it follows that:
φ1(P1). (6.56)
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Now, consider the suffix of P1 that starts with do(drop(ψ1), SP1), where SP1 is the
starting situation of P1; let us call it P2. It follows from (6.56) and Definition 4.4.14
that ProgOf(φ1, drop(ψ1)) holds over P2; thus:
Suffix(P2, P1, do(drop(ψ1), SP1)) ∧ ProgOf(φ1, drop(ψ1))(P2). (6.57)
Now, note that by (6.50), (6.55), (6.57), Axiom 6.2.6, and Definitions 6.2.11 and
6.2.7, to show the consequent, it is sufficient to prove that:
(a) if N1 = 0 then ProgressedCA(P2, N1, drop(ψ1), S1), and
(b) if N1 6= 0 then
G∩(P2, N1 − 1, do(drop(ψ1), S1)) ∧ Progressed(P2, N1, drop(ψ1), S1).
If these conditions hold, then this means that the else clause in Definition 6.2.7 is never
selected and thus no new paths are added to the G relation at N1 in do(drop(ψ1), S1).
Thus, in this case, by (6.49), which implies that φ1 holds over all G-accessible paths
at N1 in S1, and Definition 4.4.14, ProgOf(φ1, drop(ψ1)) holds over all G-accessible
paths at N1 in do(drop(ψ1), S1), and the consequent follows from this and Definition
4.2.1. I will now prove that (a) and (b) holds.
For (a), assume that N1 = 0. Also, let’s call the starting situation of P2, SP2 , where
SP2 = do(drop(ψ1), SP1). Then by Definitions 6.2.8 and 4.3.4, I need to show that:
G(P1, N1, S1) ∧ Suffix(P2, P1, SP2) ∧K(SP2 , do(drop(ψ1), S1)).
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From (6.55) and (6.57), to prove this I just need to show thatK(SP2 , do(drop(ψ1), S1)).
From (6.53), it follows that K(SP1 , S1). From this, the SSA for K (i.e. Axiom 3.4.10),
and the fact that the drop(ψ1) action is not a knowledge-producing action, it follows
that K(SP2 , do(drop(ψ1), S1)) holds if the drop(ψ1) action is possible in SP1 . This
follows from (6.57), Corollary 3.5.41, and Definition 3.3.1. Thus (6.58) and (a) hold:
K(SP2 , do(drop(ψ1), S1)). (6.58)
For (b), assume that N1 6= 0. Note that by (6.54), (6.57), and Definition 4.3.4, it
follows that Progressed(P2, N1, drop(ψ1), S1). I thus need to show that G∩(P2, N1 −
1, do(drop(ψ1), S1)). Note that by Lemma 6.3.9, this holds if ∀n. n < N1 ⊃ GR(P2,
n, do(drop(ψ1), S1)). By Corollary 6.3.5, I simply need to show that:
∀n. n < N1 ⊃ G(P2, n, do(drop(ψ1), S1)).
I will prove this by strong induction on n. First assume that n = 0. Then by (6.50),
Axiom 6.2.6, and Definitions 6.2.11 and 6.2.7, it follows that P2 is G-accessible at
level 0 in do(drop(ψ1), S1) if ProgressedCA(P2, 0, drop(ψ1), S1) holds. This follows
from (a) above. For the inductive case, assume that:
∀n. n < M1 ∧M1 < N1 − 1 ⊃ G(P2, n, do(drop(ψ1), S1)).
I need to show that G(P2,M1 + 1, do(drop(ψ1), S1)). Again, by (6.50), Axiom 6.2.6,
and Definitions 6.2.11 and 6.2.7, it follows that P2 is G-accessible at level M1 + 1 in
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do(drop(ψ1), S1) if:
G∩(P2,M1, do(drop(ψ1), S1)) ∧ ProgressedCA(P2,M1 + 1, do(drop(ψ1), S1)).
From the inductive hypothesis, Corollary 6.3.5, and Lemma 6.3.9, it follows that
G∩(P2,M1, do(drop(ψ1), S1)). Finally, from (6.54), (6.57), (6.58), and Definitions
6.2.8 and 4.3.4, it follows that ProgressedCA(P2,M1+1, do(drop(ψ1), S1)). Thus it fol-
lows that ∀n. n < N1 ⊃ G(P2, n, do(drop(ψ1), S1)) and hence (b) holds as well.
I presented a corresponding version of this property for the optimizing agent frame-
work in Proposition 5.3.4. As shown there, unlike in the committed agent framework
goals persist under more relaxed conditions after one of their subgoal is dropped. In
particular, the situation s is not required to be executable, nor is the drop(ψ) action
required to be executable in s. Moreover, the agent is even allowed to have the c-goal
that the drop(ψ) action does not happen next. The reason behind these differences is
that in the optimizing agent framework, the agent’s set of G-accessible paths at some
level is allowed to be empty (p-goals are really “desires” there). Also, an agent can
have conflicting p-goals and thus having a p-goal that ψ in that framework does not
necessarily imply that the agent also has ψ as a c-goal. In contrast, all of the p-goals
of a committed agent are also her c-goals, and thus p-goal persistence requires much
stronger conditions.
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6.3.4 Goal Introspection
Just like an optimizing agent, a committed agent should be able to introspect her goals
– if she has a realistic p-goal that φ, she should know that she has this as her realistic
p-goal; moreover, if she does not have a realistic p-goal that φ, she should know this.
It is easy to see that in this framework, the constraints on K and G that are required
to yield positive and negative introspection are the same as in the optimizing agent
framework. Thus, if the KGTrans constraint is satisfied for some priority level n and
some situation s, then the agents will have positive introspection of realistic p-goals at
n in s:
Proposition 6.3.34.
DSGCAgt |= ∀s, n. KGTrans(n, s) ⊃ (RPGoal(φ, n, s) ⊃ Know(RPGoal(φ, n), s)).
Proof. Same as that of Proposition 4.4.17.
Moreover, if the KGEuc constraint is satisfied for some priority level n in s, then
the agents will have negative introspection of realistic p-goals at n in s:
Proposition 6.3.35.
DSGCAgt |= ∀s, n. KGEuc(n, s) ⊃ (¬RPGoal(φ, n, s) ⊃ Know(¬RPGoal(φ, n), s)).
Proof. Same as that of Proposition 4.4.19.
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I will next show that as in the optimizing agent framework, these constraints also
persist for executable situations in this framework if they hold for all initial situations
as they are preserved by the (modified) successor-state axiom for G. However, in
contrast to Chapter 4, I will prove just one (combined) property. This is necessary
to deal with subgoals i.e. the case for adoptRelTo actions.48 Also, for this I use the
following lemma, which says that for any situation s, the level n where a subgoal ψ is
adopted w.r.t. a parent goal φ in s is unique:
Lemma 6.3.36.
∀n1, n2, s. (AdoptedLevel(φ, n1, s) ∧ AdoptedLevel(φ, n2, s)) ⊃ n1 = n2.
Proof. Follows from Definition 5.2.4.
I next show the persistence of KGTrans and KGEuc:
Theorem 6.3.37.
DSGCAgt |= (∀n, s. Init(s) ⊃ KGTrans(n, s) ∧KGEuc(n, s)) ⊃
(∀n, s. Executable(s) ⊃ KGTrans(n, s) ∧KGEuc(n, s)).
48Recall that in Chapter 4, I did not prove persistence of KGTrans and KGEuc w.r.t. subgoal
adoptions, since subgoals are introduced later in Chapter 5. However, these persistence results can also
be shown to hold when subgoal adoptions are allowed by proving a theorem similar to Theorem 6.3.37
below.
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Proof. (By induction on s) Assume that:
∀n, s. Init(s) ⊃ KGTrans(n, s) ∧KGEuc(n, s). (6.59)
The base case, where s is an initial situation, is trivial. For the inductive case, we fix
S1 and A1 and assume that:
Executable(do(A1, S1)). (6.60)
FixN1. I need to show thatKGTrans(N1, do(A1, S1)) andKGEuc(N1, do(A1, S1)).
From (6.60) and Lemma 3.5.29, we have:
Executable(S1), and (6.61)
Poss(A1, S1). (6.62)
(6.61) and the inductive hypothesis imply:
∀n. KGTrans(n, S1), and (6.63)
∀n. KGEuc(n, S1). (6.64)
I will next show that KGTrans(N1, do(A1, S1)) and KGEuc(N1, do(A1, S1)).
Proof of KGTrans(N1, do(A1, S1)): Assume that S2 = do(A1, S1). Let us expand
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KGTrans(N1, S2); fix S12 , S
2
2 , and P2, and assume:
K(S12 , S2), (6.65)
K(S22 , S
1
2), (6.66)
G(P2, N1, S
1
2), (6.67)
Starts(P2, S22). (6.68)
I need to show that G(P2, N1, S2). (6.65), (6.66), and Axiom 3.4.10 imply that there
exist S11 and S
2
1 such that:
K(S11 , S1) ∧ S12 = do(A1, S11), and (6.69)
K(S21 , S
1
1) ∧ S22 = do(A1, S21). (6.70)
Now, note that by (6.65), (6.66), and the transitivity of K (i.e. Axiom 3.4.3), we have:
K(S22 , S2). (6.71)
Note that, since K is an equivalence relation (as it is reflexive, i.e. Axiom 3.4.2, and
Euclidean, i.e. Axiom 3.4.4), by (6.69), (6.63), and (6.64), it follows that S1 and S11
have the same set of G-accessible paths at all levels:
∀p, n. G(p, n, S1) ≡ G(p, n, S11). (6.72)
Moreover, by the fact thatK is an equivalence relation, (6.69), (6.72), Definition 4.2.4,
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and Axiom 4.2.7, it follows that:
∀p, n. G∩(p, n, S1) ≡ G∩(p, n, S11). (6.73)
Finally, by (6.69), (6.63), (6.64), Propositions 6.3.34 and 6.3.35, and Definition 5.2.4,
it follows that ∀n. AdoptedLevel(φ, n, S1) ⊃ AdoptedLevel(φ, n, S11), and from this
and Lemma 6.3.36, it follows that:
∀n. AdoptedLevel(φ, n, S1) ≡ AdoptedLevel(φ, n, S11). (6.74)
Now, to show that P2 is G-accessible at level N1 in situation S2, we will need
to analyze the SSA for G. A close look at it gives us five cases with five different
mutually exclusive conditions that apply in S11 : Case 1, where one simply progresses
the old set of G-accessible paths before the action A1 has happened (i.e. in S11) and
ensures that these paths start withK-accessible situations in S12 to obtain the new set of
G-accessible paths after the occurrence of A1, Case 2, which involves progression and
K-accessibility check with shifting levels, Case 3, which involves processing/filtering
the old set of G-accessible paths to handle the adoption of a goal at level N1, Case
4, which involves processing/filtering the old set of G-accessible paths to handle the
adoption of a subgoal w.r.t. a supergoal at levelN1, and Case 5 that involves processing
them to handle the dropping of a goal at level N1 as well as to handle regular actions
and drop actions that make p-goals at level N1 incompatible with other higher priority
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p-goals and/or with the agent’s knowledge (see below for details). Let us discuss each
case, one at a time. Thus the successor-state axiom for G (i.e. Axiom 6.2.6) and (6.67)
give us five cases:
• Case 1. The action A1 is such that:
∀p. G(p,N1, do(A1, S11)) ≡ ProgressedCA(p,N1, A1, S11).
By Axiom 6.2.6 and Definitions 6.2.7, 6.2.9, 6.2.10, and 6.2.11, this is the case
if (a1) the action A1 is a regular (non-adopt/drop action) whose occurrence does
not make the p-goals at level N1 impossible or inconsistent with higher priority
goals and with the agent’s knowledge (i.e. there is a path P ∗ starting with situ-
ation SP ∗ that is in G∩ up to level N1 in S11 over which A1 happens next, and
do(A1, SP ∗) remains K-accessible from do(A1, S11)), or (a2) A1 is an adopt ac-
tion, but it does not refer to the adoption of a goal φ at levelN1 or at some higher
priority level than N1 (and thus ¬(A1 = adopt(φ,M) ∧M ≤ N1)), or (a3) A1
is an adoptRelTo action, but it does not refer to the adoption of a subgoal ψ
w.r.t. a supergoal φ at level N1 or at some higher priority level than N1 (and thus
¬(A1 = adoptRelTo(ψ, φ)∧∃m. AdoptedLevel(φ,m, S11)∧m ≤ N1)), or (a4)
A1 is a drop(φ) action, but it does not refer to the dropping of a goal φ atN1 (i.e.
¬PGoal(φ,N1, S11)) and the occurrence of A1 does not make the p-goals at level
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N1 impossible or inconsistent with higher priority goals and with the agent’s
knowledge (and thus there is a path P ∗ starting with situation SP ∗ that is in G∩
up to level N1 in S11 over which A1 = drop(φ) happens next, and do(A1, SP ∗)
remainsK-accessible from do(A1, S11)). By the SSA forG (i.e. Axiom 6.2.6 and
Definitions 6.2.7, 6.2.9, 6.2.10, and 6.2.11) and (6.67), in all these cases P2 is
the simple progression of some path P1 that was G-accessible at N1 in S11 , with
the additional condition that P2 must start with a K-accessible situation in S12 ,
i.e. ProgressedCA(P2, N1, A1, S
1
1). Thus, we have:
Starts(P1, S21) ∧ Suffix(P2, P1, do(A1, S21)) ∧G(P1, N1, S11). (6.75)
Definition 4.4.16, (6.63), (6.69), (6.70), and (6.75) imply that:
G(P1, N1, S1). (6.76)
Note that, by (6.72) and the fact that the agent knows what the action A1 is (i.e.
A1 refers to the same action in all K-accessible situations, let’s call this fact
(f1)) it can be shown that all the conditions (a1) to (a4) that hold for S11 also
hold for S1. In particular, (a1) follows from the facts that A1 refers to the same
action in S1 and S11 (i.e. by (f1)), that S2 = do(A1, S1) and S
1
2 = do(A1, S
1
1)
are in the same K equivalence class (by (6.65) and (6.69)), and (6.73). (a2)
follows from (f1). (a3) follows from (f1) and (6.74). Finally, (a4) follows from
444
(f1), (6.72), (6.65), (6.69), and (6.73). By this, Axiom 6.2.6, Definitions 6.2.7,
6.2.8, 6.2.9, 6.2.10, and 6.2.11, the assumption regardingA1 for this case, (6.75),
and (6.76), the progression of P1 (i.e. P2) will be retained in the G-relation at
N1 in S2 = do(A1, S1); this is because by (6.75), (6.76), and Definition 4.3.4,
Progressed(P2, N1, A1, S1) holds, and by (6.68) and (6.71), P2 starts with a K-
accessible situation in S2. Thus by these and Definition 6.2.8, ProgressedCA(P2,
N1, A1, S1), and hence we have G(P2, N1, S2).
• Case 2. A1 refers to the adoption of a goal φ at a higher priority level than
N1, i.e. ∃m. A1 = adopt(φ,m) ∧ m < N1 or to the adoption of a subgoal
ψ with respect to a parent goal φ at a higher priority level than N1, i.e. A1 =
adoptRelTo(ψ, φ) ∧ ∃m. AdoptedLevel(φ,m, S11) ∧m < N1. In this case, by
Definitions 6.2.9 and 6.2.10, P2 is the progression of some path P1 that was G-
accessible atN1−1 in S11 , provided that P2 starts with aK-accessible situation in
S12 , i.e. ProgressedCA(P2, N1−1, A1, S11) (since adopting the (sub)goal at higher
priority than N1 has pushed all the goals that has priority lower than m−1 down
by one level):
Starts(P1, S21) ∧ Suffix(P2, P1, do(A1, S21)) ∧G(P1, N1 − 1, S11).
The rest of the proof for this case is similar to that of Case 1.
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• Case 3. A1 refers to the adoption of a goal φ at N1, i.e. A1 = adopt(φ,N1).
Since A1 refers to the same action in S1 and S11 , then by Definition 6.2.9, P2
is included in the G-relation at N1 in S2 if it starts with a situation that is K-
accessible in S2, and if φ(P2) holds. (6.68) and (6.71) imply this former. The
latter also holds, otherwise by the SSA for G, P2 would have not been included
in the G-relation at N1 in S12 (but it is included by (6.67)).
• Case 4. A1 refers to the adoption of a subgoal ψ w.r.t. a parent goal φ at N1, i.e.
A1 = adoptRelTo(ψ, φ) ∧ AdoptedLevel(φ,N1, S11). Note that, as in Case 1,
it can be shown that all the assumptions for this case for S11 also hold for S1; in
particular, we have AdoptedLevel(φ,N1, S1). Then by Definition 6.2.10, P2 is
included in theG-relation atN1 in S2 if (a) P2 is the progression of some path P1
that was G-accessible at N1−1 in S1, (b) P2 starts with a K-accessible situation
in S2, and (c) if ψ(P2) holds. Now, since by (6.67), G(P2, N1, S12) holds, from
the SSA forG and the assumption for this case (including that for AdoptedLevel)
it follows thatG(P1, N1−1, S11). From this, (6.69), (6.70), (6.63), and Definition
4.4.16, it follows that G(P1, N1 − 1, S1). Thus (a) holds. Moreover, (b) follows
from (6.68) and (6.71). Finally, (c), i.e. that ψ(P2), also holds, otherwise by the
assumptions for this case regarding A1 (and AdoptedLevel) and the SSA for G,
P2 would have not been included in the G-relation at N1 in S12 (but it is included
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by (6.67)).
• Case 5. The action A1 is such that:
∀p. G(p,N1, do(A1, S11)) ≡ ∃s′. Starts(p, s′) ∧K(s′, do(A1, S11)).
By Axiom 6.2.6 and Definitions 6.2.7 and 6.2.11, this is the case if the action
A1 is a regular action whose occurrence makes the p-goals at level N1 impos-
sible or inconsistent with higher priority goals and with the agent’s knowledge
(i.e. there are no paths P ∗ s.t. P ∗ starts with situation SP ∗ , P ∗ is in G∩ up to
level N1 in S11 , A1 happens over P
∗ next, and do(A1, SP ∗) remains K-accessible
from do(A1, S11)), or A1 refers to the dropping of a goal φ, i.e. A1 = drop(φ),
where ¬PGoal(φ,N1, S1), but the occurrence of A1 makes the p-goals at level
N1 impossible or inconsistent with higher priority goals and with the agent’s
knowledge (i.e. there are no paths P ∗ s.t. P ∗ starts with situation SP ∗ , P ∗ is in
G∩ up to level N1 in S11 , A1 = drop(φ) happens over P
∗ next, and do(A1, SP ∗)
remains K-accessible from do(A1, S11)), or A1 refers to the dropping of a goal φ
atN1, i.e.A1 = drop(φ),where PGoal(φ,N1, S11). As in Case 1, it can be shown
that by the inductive hypothesis, all these conditions also hold for S1. Thus, by
Definitions 6.2.7 and 6.2.11, P2 is included in the G-relation at N1 in S2 if it
starts with a situation that is K-accessible in S2. Again, (6.68) and (6.71) imply
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this condition.
It thus follows that KGTrans(N1, do(A1, S1)).
Proof of KGEuc(N1, do(A1, S1)): Let us expandKGEuc(N1, S2); fix S12 , S
2
2 , and P2,
and assume:
K(S12 , S2), (6.77)
K(S22 , S2), (6.78)
G(P2, N1, S2), (6.79)
Starts(P2, S22). (6.80)
I need to show that G(P2, N1, S12). (6.77), (6.78), and Axiom 3.4.10 imply that there
exist S11 and S
2
1 such that:
K(S11 , S1) ∧ S12 = do(A1, S11), and (6.81)
K(S21 , S1) ∧ S22 = do(A1, S21). (6.82)
Now, note that by (6.77), (6.78), and the Euclideanism of K (i.e. Axiom 3.4.4), we
have:
K(S22 , S
1
2). (6.83)
Note that, since K is an equivalence relation (as it is reflexive, i.e. Axiom 3.4.2, and
Euclidean, i.e. Axiom 3.4.4), by (6.81), (6.63), and (6.64), it follows that S1 and S11
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have the same set of G-accessible paths at all levels:
∀p, n. G(p, n, S1) ≡ G(p, n, S11). (6.84)
Moreover, by the fact thatK is an equivalence relation, (6.81), (6.84), Definition 4.2.4,
and Axiom 4.2.7, it follows that:
∀p, n. G∩(p, n, S1) ≡ G∩(p, n, S11). (6.85)
Finally, by (6.81), (6.63), (6.64), Propositions 6.3.34 and 6.3.35, and Definition 5.2.4,
it follows that ∀n. AdoptedLevel(φ, n, S1) ⊃ AdoptedLevel(φ, n, S11), and from this
and Lemma 6.3.36, it follows that:
∀n. AdoptedLevel(φ, n, S1) ≡ AdoptedLevel(φ, n, S11). (6.86)
Now, to show that P2 isG-accessible at levelN1 in situation S12 , we will need to an-
alyze the SSA for G. A close look at it gives us five cases with five different mutually
exclusive conditions that apply in S1: Case 1, where one simply progresses the old set
of G-accessible paths before the action A1 has happened and ensures that these paths
start with K-accessible situations in S2 to obtain the new set of G-accessible paths
after the occurrence of A1, Case 2, which involves progression and K-accessibility
check with shifting levels, Case 3, which involves processing/filtering the old set of
G-accessible paths to handle the adoption of a goal at level N1, Case 4, which involves
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processing/filtering the old set of G-accessible paths to handle the adoption of a sub-
goal w.r.t. a supergoal at level N1, and Case 5 that involves processing them to handle
the dropping of a goal at level N1 as well as to handle regular actions and drop actions
that make p-goals at level N1 incompatible with other higher priority p-goals and/or
with the agent’s knowledge (see below for details). Let us discuss each case, one at a
time. Thus the successor-state axiom for G (i.e. Axiom 6.2.6) and (6.79) give us five
cases:
• Case 1. The action A1 is such that:
∀p. G(p,N1, do(A1, S1)) ≡ ProgressedCA(p,N1, A1, S1).
By Axiom 6.2.6 and Definitions 6.2.7, 6.2.9, 6.2.10, and 6.2.11, this is the case
if (a) the action A1 is a regular (non-adopt/drop action) whose occurrence does
not make the p-goals at level N1 impossible or inconsistent with higher prior-
ity goals and with the agent’s knowledge (i.e. there is a path P ∗ starting with
situation SP ∗ that is in G∩ up to level N1 in S1 over which A1 happens next,
and do(A1, SP ∗) remains K-accessible from do(A1, S1)), or (b) A1 is an adopt
action, but it does not refer to the adoption of a goal φ at level N1 or at some
higher priority level than N1 (and thus ¬(A1 = adopt(φ,M)∧M ≤ N1)), or (c)
A1 is an adoptRelTo action, but it does not refer to the adoption of a subgoal ψ
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w.r.t. a supergoal φ at level N1 or at some higher priority level than N1 (and thus
¬(A1 = adoptRelTo(ψ, φ) ∧ ∃m. AdoptedLevel(φ,m, S1) ∧m ≤ N1)), or (d)
A1 is a drop(φ) action, but it does not refer to the dropping of a goal φ atN1 (i.e.
¬PGoal(φ,N1, S1)) and the occurrence of A1 does not make the p-goals at level
N1 impossible or inconsistent with higher priority goals and with the agent’s
knowledge (i.e. there is a path P ∗ starting with situation SP ∗ that is in G∩ up to
levelN1 in S1 over whichA1 = drop(φ) happens next, and do(A1, SP ∗) remains
K-accessible from do(A1, S1)). By the SSA for G and (6.79), in all these cases
P2 is the simple progression of some path P1 that was G-accessible at N1 in S1,
with the additional condition that P2 must start with a K-accessible situation in
S2, i.e. i.e. ProgressedCA(P2, N1, A1, S1). Thus, we have:
Starts(P1, S21) ∧ Suffix(P2, P1, do(A1, S21)) ∧G(P1, N1, S1). (6.87)
Definition 4.4.18, (6.64), (6.81), (6.82), and (6.87) imply that:
G(P1, N1, S
1
1). (6.88)
Note that, by (6.84) and the fact that the agent knows what the action A1 is (i.e.
A1 refers to the same action in all K-accessible situations, let’s call this fact
(f1)) it can be shown that all the conditions (a1) to (a4) that hold for S11 also
hold for S1. In particular, (a1) follows from the facts that A1 refers to the same
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action in S1 and S11 (i.e. by (f1)), that S2 = do(A1, S1) and S
1
2 = do(A1, S
1
1)
are in the same K equivalence class (by (6.77) and (6.81)), and (6.85). (a2)
follows from (f1). (a3) follows from (f1) and (6.86). Finally, (a4) follows from
(f1), (6.84), (6.77), (6.81), and (6.85). By this, Axiom 6.2.6, Definitions 6.2.7,
6.2.8, 6.2.9, 6.2.10, and 6.2.11, the assumption regardingA1 for this case, (6.87),
and (6.88), the progression of P1 (i.e. P2) will be retained in the G-relation at
N1 in S12 = do(A1, S
1
1); this is because by (6.87), (6.88), and Definition 4.3.4,
Progressed(P2, N1, A1, S11) holds, and by (6.80) and (6.83), P2 starts with a K-
accessible situation in S12 . Thus by these and Definition 6.2.8, ProgressedCA(P2,
N1, A1, S
1
1), and hence we have G(P2, N1, S
1
2).
• Case 2. A1 refers to the adoption of a goal φ at a higher priority level than
N1, i.e. ∃m. A1 = adopt(φ,m) ∧ m < N1 or to the adoption of a subgoal
ψ with respect to a parent goal φ at a higher priority level than N1, i.e. A1 =
adoptRelTo(ψ, φ) ∧ ∃m. AdoptedLevel(φ,m, S1) ∧m < N1. In this case, by
Definitions 6.2.9 and 6.2.10, P2 is the progression of some path P1 that was G-
accessible atN1−1 in S1, provided that P2 starts with aK-accessible situation in
S2, i.e. ProgressedCA(P2, N1− 1, A1, S1) (since adopting the (sub)goal at higher
priority than N1 has pushed all the goals that has priority lower than m−1 down
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by one level):
Starts(P1, S21) ∧ Suffix(P2, P1, do(A1, S21)) ∧G(P1, N1 − 1, S1).
The rest of the proof for this case is similar to that of Case 1.
• Case 3. A1 refers to the adoption of a goal φ at N1, i.e. A1 = adopt(φ,N1).
Since A1 refers to the same action in S1 and S11 , then by Definition 6.2.9, P2
is included in the G-relation at N1 in S12 if it starts with a situation that is K-
accessible in S12 , and if φ(P2) holds. (6.80) and (6.83) imply this former. The
latter also holds, otherwise by the SSA for G, P2 would have not been included
in the G-relation at N1 in S2 (but it is included by (6.79)).
• Case 4. A1 refers to the adoption of a subgoal ψ w.r.t. a parent goal φ at N1, i.e.
A1 = adoptRelTo(ψ, φ) ∧ AdoptedLevel(φ,N1, S1). Note that, as in Case 1, it
can be shown that all the assumptions for this case for S1 also hold for S11 ; in
particular, we have AdoptedLevel(φ,N1, S11). Then by Definition 6.2.10, P2 is
included in theG-relation atN1 in S12 if (a) P2 is the progression of some path P1
that was G-accessible at N1−1 in S11 , (b) P2 starts with a K-accessible situation
in S12 , and (c) if ψ(P2) holds. Now, since by (6.79), G(P2, N1, S2) holds, from
the SSA forG and the assumption for this case (including that for AdoptedLevel)
it follows thatG(P1, N1−1, S1). From this, (6.81), (6.82), (6.64), and Definition
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4.4.18, it follows that G(P1, N1 − 1, S11). Thus (a) holds. Moreover, (b) follows
from (6.80) and (6.83). Finally, (c), i.e. that ψ(P2), also holds, otherwise by the
assumptions for this case regarding A1 (and AdoptedLevel) and the SSA for G,
P2 would have not been included in the G-relation at N1 in S2 (but it is included
by (6.79)).
• Case 5. A1 is a regular action whose occurrence makes the p-goals at level
N1 impossible or inconsistent with higher priority goals and with the agent’s
knowledge (i.e. there are no paths P ∗ s.t. P ∗ starts with situation SP ∗ , P ∗ is in
G∩ up to level N1 in S1, A1 happens over P ∗ next, and do(A1, SP ∗) remains
K-accessible from do(A1, S1)), or A1 refers to the dropping of a goal φ, i.e.
A1 = drop(φ), where ¬PGoal(φ,N1, S1), but the occurrence of A1 makes the
p-goals at levelN1 impossible or inconsistent with higher priority goals and with
the agent’s knowledge (i.e. there are no paths P ∗ s.t. P ∗ starts with situation
SP ∗ , P ∗ is in G∩ up to level N1 in S1, A1 = drop(φ) happens over P ∗ next,
and do(A1, SP ∗) remains K-accessible from do(A1, S1)), or A1 refers to the
dropping of a goal φ at N1, i.e. A1 = drop(φ), where PGoal(φ,N1, S1). As
in Case 1, it can be shown by the inductive hypothesis that all these conditions
also hold for S11 . Thus, by Definitions 6.2.7 and 6.2.11, P2 is included in the G-
relation at N1 in S12 if it starts with a situation that is K-accessible in S
1
2 . Again,
454
(6.80) and (6.83) imply this condition.
It thus follows that KGEuc(N1, do(A1, S1)). The theorem thus follows.
6.3.5 Goal Persistence
I next discuss persistence of these motivational attitudes. As in the optimizing agent
case, I focus on persistence of achievement goals only. I will need the following defi-
nition for this:
Definition 6.3.38.
KnowProdAct(agt, a) .= BinarySensingAction(a) ∧ agent(a) = agt
∨ NonBinarySensingAction(a) ∧ agent(a) = agt
∨ ∃inf. a = informWhether(inf, agt,Ψ)
∨ ∃inf. a = informRef(inf, agt, θ).
That is, an action a is a knowledge-producing action for some agent agt if it is a binary
or non-binary sensing action whose agent is agt, or if a involves some informer inf
informing agt whether some formula Ψ holds or of the value of some term θ.
Given this, first I can show that if an agent has a (realistic) p-goal that 3Φ in some
executable situation s, then she will retain this p-goal after some action a has been
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performed in s, provided that:49
• she knows in s that Φ has not yet been achieved,
• that a is not the action of dropping a p-goal,
• that a is not a knowledge-producing action for her,50
• and that the agent does not have the c-goal not to execute a next in s.
Proposition 6.3.39 (Persistence of PGoals).
DSGCAgt |= PGoal(3Φ, n, s) ∧ Executable(s) ∧ Know(¬Φ, s)
∧ ¬a = drop(ψ) ∧ ¬KnowProdAct(a) ∧ ¬CGoal(¬∃s′. Do(a, now, s′), s)
⊃ ∃m. PGoal(3Φ,m, do(a, s)).
49In the following, I use CGoal(∃s′. Do(a, now, s′), s) as an abbreviation for CGoal(Starts(now) ∧
∃s′. OnPath(s′)∧Do(a, now, s′), s); here now refers to the starting situation of the (suppressed) CGoal-
accessible path.
50As mentioned in Chapter 4, I suppress the agent argument agt in knowledge and goals. Following
this, I also suppress the agent argument in KnowProdAct(a) below.
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Proof. Fix Φ1, N1, S1, and A1. By the antecedent, we have:
PGoal(3Φ1, N1, S1), (6.89)
Executable(S1), (6.90)
Know(¬Φ1, S1), (6.91)
¬A1 = drop(ψ), (6.92)
¬KnowProdAct(a), and (6.93)
¬CGoal(¬∃s′. Do(a, now, s′), S1). (6.94)
Now, by (6.89) and Definitions 4.2.1, 3.5.8, and 3.5.7, since the agent has the p-goal
that 3Φ1 at N1 in S1, the following holds:
∀p. G(p,N1, S1) ⊃ ∃s∗. OnPath(p, s∗) ∧ Φ1(s∗). (6.95)
Thus the p-goal that 3Φ1 will persist after A1 has been performed in S1 if there is a
level n such that 3Φ1 holds over all G-accessible paths at n in do(A1, S1). After the
A1 action has been performed in S1, the G relation at every level will be updated in
accordance with the SSA for G. By Axiom 6.2.6, there are four cases to consider: (1)
A1 is a regular action, (2) A1 is the adoption of some goal, (3) A1 is the adoption of a
subgoal w.r.t. some parent goal, or (4) A1 is the dropping of some goal. The last case,
i.e. an explicit dropping of a goal is ruled out by (6.92). So let us consider the other
three cases, one at a time:
457
1. A1 is a regular action (i.e. neither adopt, nor adoptRelTo, nor drop):
First, assume that A1 is a regular action. Then, by Axiom 6.2.6 and Definition
6.2.7, the set of G-accessible paths at N1 in S1 will be progressed and filtered to
reflect the fact that A1 has just happened. Note that, from (6.94) and Definition
4.2.10, it follows that there is a path P1 starting with some situation SP1 that is
in the G∩ relation in S1 and over which the next action performed is A1. Let’s
call the suffix of P1 starting in do(A1, SP1), P2. Thus, we have:
G∩(P1, S1) ∧ Starts(P1, SP1) ∧ Suffix(P2, P1, do(A1, SP1)). (6.96)
By (6.90), (6.89), Proposition 6.3.15, and Definition 4.2.10, it follows that:
3Φ1(P1). (6.97)
From (6.96) and Lemma 6.3.8, it follows that:
K(SP1 , S1). (6.98)
Since P1 is a path, by (6.96), Definition 3.5.16, Corollary 3.5.41 and Lemma
3.5.29 it follows that:
Poss(A1, SP1). (6.99)
Thus, by (6.98), (6.99), Axiom 3.4.10, and the fact that A1 is not a knowledge-
producing action for the agent (i.e. (6.93)), it follows that:
K(do(A1, SP1), do(A1, S1)). (6.100)
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From (6.96), (6.90), and Proposition 6.3.14(b), it follows that:
∀n. G(P1, n, S1). (6.101)
I will now show that the following condition holds (let’s call it (a)):
∀p. G(p,N1, do(A1, S1)) ≡ ProgressedCA(p,N1, A1, S1). (a)
That is, all G-accessible paths at N1 in do(A1, S1) are suffixes of those that are
G-accessible at N1 in S1. By the fact that A1 is a regular action, Axiom 6.2.6,
and Definition 6.2.7, to show that (a) holds, I need to show that there exist a path
that is the progression by A1 of a G-accessible path in S1 that is consistent with
higher priority levels than N1 and knowledge. I will show that P2 satisfies this
condition. Put otherwise, by Axiom 6.2.6 and Definition 6.2.7, I need to show
that:
• ProgressedCA(P2, N1, A1, S1), if N1 = 0, and
• G∩(P2, N1 − 1, do(A1, S1)) ∧ Progressed(P2, N1, A1, S1), otherwise.
If these hold, then no new paths are added to the set of G-accessible paths at
N1 in do(A1, S1), i.e. the else clause in Definition 6.2.7 is never selected. First,
assume that N1 = 0. Then from (6.101), (6.100), (6.96), and Definitions 6.2.8
and 4.3.4, it follows that ProgressedCA(P2, 0, A1, S1). Also, from this, Axiom
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6.2.6, Definition 6.2.7, and the fact that A1 is a regular action, we have:
G(P2, 0, do(A1, S1)). (6.102)
Next, consider the case where N1 6= 0. Note that from (6.101), (6.96), and
Definition 4.3.4, it follows that:
∀n. Progressed(P2, n, A1, S1). (6.103)
Thus I just need to show that ∀n. n ≥ 0 ⊃ G∩(P2, n, do(A1, S1)). I will show
this by induction on n. The base case, where n = 0, follows from (6.102),
Corollary 6.3.5, and Axiom 4.2.7. For the inductive step, fix levelK and assume
that G∩(P2, K, do(A1, S1)). From this, (6.103), Axiom 6.2.6, Definition 6.2.7,
and the fact that A1 is a regular action, it follows that G(P2, K + 1, do(A1, S1)).
From this and Corollary 6.3.5, it follows thatGR(P2, K+1, do(A1, S1)). Finally,
from this, the inductive hypothesis, and Axiom 4.2.7, it follows thatG∩(P2, K+
1, do(A1, S1)). Thus condition (a) follows.
Note that despite (a) above, 3Φ1 can still fail to be a p-goal at N1 in do(A1, S1)
if there is a G-accessible path at N1 in do(A1, S1), but 3Φ1 does not hold over
this path. Thus I will next show that this is not the case. Given (a), it follows
from Axiom 6.2.6 and Definition 6.2.7 that the G-accessible paths at level N1
in situation do(A1, S1) can only be obtained by progressing those at N1 in S1
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and checking that these paths start with a K-accessible situation in do(A1, S1).
Thus 3Φ1 does not hold over a G-accessible path (and by Corollary 6.3.5, a
GR-accessible path) at N1 in do(A1, S1) if there is a K-accessible situation in
S1, say S ′1, where there is a path P
′
1 that starts with S
′
1, P
′
1 is G-accessible at N1
in S1, the suffix of P ′1 that starts with do(A1, S
′
1), let’s call it P
′
2, isGR-accessible
at N1 in do(A1, S1), and 3Φ1 does not hold over P ′2:
K(S ′1, S1) ∧ Starts(P ′1, S ′1) ∧G(P ′1, N1, S1) ∧ Suffix(P ′2, P ′1, do(A1, S ′1))
∧GR(P ′2, N1, do(A1, S1)) ∧ ¬3Φ1(P ′2).
(6.104)
By (6.95) and (6.104), it follows that ∃s. OnPath(P ′1, s)∧Φ1(s). By this, (6.104),
and Definitions 3.5.8 and 3.5.7, it follows that Φ1(S ′1). But by (6.104), (6.91),
and Definition 3.4.5, we have ¬Φ1(S ′1), a contradiction! Thus it follows that
3Φ1 holds over all GR-accessible paths, and by Corollary 6.3.5, over all G-
accessible paths at N1 in do(A1, S1).
2. A1 is the adoption of some goal:
Fix Ψ1 and N2 and assume that A1 = adopt(Ψ1, N2). Again, we have two cases,
one where the agent adopts the goal Ψ1 at a lower priority level than N1, i.e.
N2 > N1, and another where she adopts the goal at level N1 or at a higher
priority level than N1, i.e. N2 ≤ N1. Let us consider each case, one at a time:
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(a) Assume that N2 > N1. Now, from Axiom 6.2.6 and Definitions 6.2.9,
we can see that after the adopt(Ψ1, N2) action happens, the G-accessible
paths at level N1 in situation do(A1, S1) are those that can be obtained
by progressing those at N1 in S1 and checking that these paths start with
a K-accessible situation in do(A1, S1). If there are no such paths, then
the agent’s G-accessible paths at N1 in do(A1, S1) will be empty, and by
Definition 4.2.1, the agent will trivially have the p-goal that 3Φ1 at N1 in
do(A1, S1).
So, assume that there is indeed one such path, but 3Φ1 does not hold over
this path. I will prove by contradiction that this is impossible. Thus 3Φ1
does not hold over a G-accessible path (and by Corollary 6.3.5, a GR-
accessible path) at N1 in do(A1, S1) if there is a K-accessible situation in
S1, say S ′′1 , where there is a path P
′′
1 that starts with S
′′
1 , P
′′
1 is G-accessible
at N1 in S1, the suffix of P ′′1 that starts with do(A1, S
′′
1 ), let’s call it P
′′
2 , is
GR-accessible at N1 in do(A1, S1), and 3Φ1 does not hold over P ′′2 :
K(S ′′1 , S1) ∧ Starts(P ′′1 , S ′′1 ) ∧G(P ′′1 , N1, S1) ∧ Suffix(P ′′2 , P ′′1 , do(A1, S ′′1 ))
∧GR(P ′′2 , N1, do(A1, S1)) ∧ ¬3Φ1(P ′′2 ).
(6.105)
By (6.95) and (6.105), it follows that ∃s. OnPath(P ′′1 , s) ∧ Φ1(s). By this,
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(6.105), and Definitions 3.5.8 and 3.5.7, it follows that Φ1(S ′′1 ). But by
(6.105), (6.91), and Definition 3.4.5, we have ¬Φ1(S ′′1 ), a contradiction!
Thus it follows that3Φ1 holds over all GR-accessible paths, and by Corol-
lary 6.3.5, over all G-accessible paths at N1 in do(A1, S1).
(b) Assume that N2 ≤ N1. Similar to case (a) above, it can be shown that the
p-goal that 3Φ1 persists in this case as well, however at level N1 + 1 as
the p-goals at N1 in S1 are pushed down one level in the hierarchy after the
adopt action happens.
3. A1 is the adoption of some subgoal w.r.t. some parent goal: This case is similar
to case 2 above.
The proposition thus follows.
Note that, unlike in the optimizing agent case, we need to ensure that 3Φ is consis-
tent with higher priority active p-goals after a happens in s, since the successor-state
axiom for G in this case automatically drops such incompatible p-goals from the goal
hierarchy. In the above proposition, this is guaranteed by checking that the action a is
compatible with the agent’s current intentions (i.e. that the agent does not have a c-goal
not to execute a next). Thus in the absence of such an additional constraint, agents’
p-goals may not persist. Moreover, changes in the agent’s knowledge via knowledge-
463
producing actions may also force her to drop the p-goal, e.g. if she learns that the goal
is indeed impossible to achieve. This shows that agents’ p-goals are much more dy-
namic in the committed agent framework. Also, as in the optimizing agent case, the
level n where 3Φ is a p-goal may change, e.g. if the action performed is an adopt
action with priority higher than or equal to n. Again, I believe that the dropping of
an unrelated p-goal should not affect persistence, and hence it should be possible to
strengthen this proposition. This is left for future work.
I can show that this property also follows if we replace the consequent with CGoal(
3Φ, do(a, s)), provided that a is executable in s:
Proposition 6.3.40 (Persistence of CGoals).
DSGCAgt |= PGoal(3Φ, n, s) ∧ Executable(s) ∧ Know(¬Φ, s) ∧ Poss(a, s)
∧ ¬a = drop(ψ) ∧ ¬KnowProdAct(a) ∧ ¬CGoal(¬∃s′. Do(a, now, s′), s)
⊃ CGoal(3Φ, do(a, s)).
Proof. From the antecedent and Definition 3.3.1, it follows that Executable(do(a, s)).
The proposition follows from this and Propositions 6.3.39 and 6.3.15.
Again, by Corollary 6.3.20, this proposition also follows if the consequent is replaced
with a primary c-goal, i.e. PrimCGoal(3Φ, do(a, s)). Also, this shows that in contrast
to the optimizing agent framework, agents’ chosen goals are more persistent in the
464
committed agent framework in the sense that when actions are executable, the persis-
tence of p-goals necessarily implies the persistence of chosen goals in this framework.
6.4 Discussion and Conclusion
In this chapter, I presented a variant of my original “optimizing agent” prioritized goals
and subgoals framework (proposed in Chapter 4 and 5) that allows one to model more
committed agents by using a restricted notion of desires/goals. Here, I required that
initially the agent’s goals are known to be possible and consistent with each other. I
gave a modified successor-state axiom for the goal accessibility relationG and showed
that this axiom, along with the modified action precondition axioms for adopt and
drop actions, preserve the initially prescribed constraints on the agent’s goals for all
executable situations.
In this committed agent framework, all of the p-goals of the agent are always real-
istic and chosen (i.e. p-goals are c-goals too). Put otherwise, an agent’s chosen goals in
this framework are simply the consequential closure of her prioritized goals. As such,
all priority levels are always active. As a consequence, an agent’s p-goals are much
more dynamic in contrast to the original (optimizing agent) framework – an agent will
drop a p-goal if it becomes known to be impossible or inconsistent with other higher
priority p-goals and knowledge. On the other hand, an agent’s chosen goals in this
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framework are much more persistent than in the original framework. The agent will
not drop a chosen goal φ simply because another higher priority chosen goal φ′ has
become impossible, triggering the activation of a third (higher priority than φ, lower
priority than φ′, and currently inactive) goal ψ that is inconsistent with φ; indeed such a
goal ψ would have been dropped by the committed agent earlier, since it is inconsistent
with the higher priority goal φ′. I proved variants of many of the properties (includ-
ing introspection and persistence properties) that I showed for optimizing agents and
discussed how they differ from those presented earlier in Chapter 4 and 5.
While it can be argued that agents specified in this committed agent framework
are somewhat overly committed to their goals in the sense that they will ignore op-
portunities to bring about more valuable goals in favor of already committed to and
conflicting goals, I maintain that this framework is nonetheless quite useful. First, it
provides an alternative commitment strategy to that of optimizing agents. Secondly,
this simple framework can be useful for dealing with complex domains and illustrating
other orthogonal issues therein with more clarity. In fact, in the next chapter, I use this
framework as a starting point for defining a rational BDI agent programming language,
and discuss some issues with rationality that have not been addressed previously. The
optimizing agent framework of Chapter 4 and 5 and the committed agent framework
of this chapter sit at opposite end of the continuum. In the former, the agent is contin-
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uously reconsidering her commitment to goals and reoptimizing her choice over de-
sires, while in the latter once a goal is no longer chosen/committed to, it is permanently
dropped. Essentially, the committed agent thus eliminates “the opportunity analyzer
and the filter override mechanism” [21] from the underlying deliberation model. Nev-
ertheless, as mentioned in Chapter 4, it would be certainly interesting to study a hybrid
account that achieves some sort of balance between these two different commitment
strategies by providing some control over intention reconsideration. I leave this for
future work.
467
Chapter 7
SR-APL : Specifying A Simple Rational Agent
Programming Language with Prioritized Goals
7.1 Introduction
This chapter contributes to the foundations of Belief-Desire-Intention Agent Program-
ming Languages/frameworks (BDI APLs), such as PRS [108], AgentSpeak [172], etc.
Recall from Chapter 2 that while there has been much recent work on incorporat-
ing declarative goals in these APLs [100, 247, 185, 47, 101, 235, 186], to keep them
tractable and practical, they sacrifice some principles of rationality. In particular, while
selecting plans to achieve a declarative goal, they ignore other concurrent intentions
of the agent. As a consequence, the selected plan may be inconsistent with the agent’s
other intentions (I call this the intention consistency problem). Thus the execution of
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such an intended plan can render other contemporary intentions impossible to bring
about. Also, these APLs with Declarative Goals (APLwDGs, henceforth) typically
rely on syntactic formalizations of declarative goals, subgoals, and their dynamics,
whose properties are often not well understood. Often, achievement goals are the only
type of temporally extended goals supported in these frameworks (e.g. [100, 47]).
In this chapter, I develop a logical framework for a BDI agent programming lan-
guage with prioritized declarative goals called Simple Rational APL (SR-APL, hence-
forth), that addresses most of these deficiencies of previous APLwDGs. SR-APL com-
bines ideas from the situation calculus-based Golog family of APLs (e.g. ConGolog
[51]), my expressive semantic formalization of prioritized goals, subgoals, and their
dynamics as specified in Chapter 6, and work on BDI APLs. I ensure that an SR-APL
agent’s chosen declarative goals and adopted plans are consistent with each other and
with her knowledge. In doing this, I will address two fundamental questions about
rational agency:
1. What does it mean for a BDI agent to be committed to concurrently execute a
set of plans next while keeping the option of further commitments to other plans
open, in a way that does not allow procrastination?
2. How can one ensure consistency between an agent’s adopted declarative goals
and adopted plans, given that some of the latter might be abstract, i.e., only
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partially instantiated in the sense that they include subgoals for which the agent
has not yet adopted a (concrete) plan?
I will show how agents specified in the SR-APL framework satisfy some key ratio-
nality requirements. SR-APL is not a practical implemented APL and more work is
required to make it practical, perhaps by restricting the proposed representations and
reasoning. The framework however tries to bridge the gap between agent theories
and practical APLs by providing a model and specification of an idealized BDI agent
whose behavior is closer to what a rational agent does. As such, it serves as a ba-
sis for understanding how compromises made during the development of a practical
APLwDG affect the agent’s rationality.
I start the chapter by discussing a motivating example that illustrates the main
issues with current APLwDGs. I then describe the components of an SR-APL agent
and specify the semantics of SR-APL. Following that, I show that my agents behave in
ways that satisfy some key rationality principles. Finally, I summarize my results and
discuss possible future work.
7.2 A Motivating Example
Consider a blocks world agent AgtBW with domain DBW , where each block is one of
four possible colors: blue, yellow, green, and red, represented by the four predicates
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B(b), Y(b), G(b), and R(b), respectively. There is only one action stack(b, b′) for
stacking block b onto block b′. A block b can be stacked on another block b′ in situation
s if b and b′ represent distinct blocks, both b and b′ are clear in s, and b is on the table
in s:
Axiom 7.2.1.
Poss(stack(b, b′), s) ≡ b 6= b′ ∧ Clear(b, s) ∧ Clear(b′, s) ∧ OnTable(b, s).
There are no unstacking actions, so the agent cannot use a block to build two different
towers at different times. In the following, I specify the successor-state axioms for the
fluents in this domain. First of all, block b is on the table after some action a happens
in situation s if and only if b is on the table in s and a is not the action of stacking it on
top of another block b′:
Axiom 7.2.2.
∀b, a, s. OnTable(b, do(a, s)) ≡ OnTable(b, s) ∧ ¬∃b′. a = stack(b, b′).
Secondly, block b is on block b′ after a has happened in s if and only if b is on the table
in s and a refers to the action of stacking b on b′, or if b is already on b′ in s:
Axiom 7.2.3.
∀b, b′, a, s. On(b, b′, do(a, s)) ≡ (OnTable(b, s) ∧ a = stack(b, b′)) ∨ On(b, b′, s).
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Thirdly, in this domain, the color of the blocks (i.e. blue, yellow, green, and red) does
not change:
Axiom 7.2.4.
(i). ∀b, a, s. B(b, do(a, s)) ≡ B(b, s).
(ii). ∀b, a, s. Y(b, do(a, s)) ≡ Y(b, s).
(iii). ∀b, a, s. G(b, do(a, s)) ≡ G(b, s).
(iv). ∀b, a, s. R(b, do(a, s)) ≡ R(b, s).
Finally, I say that block b is clear in situation s if there are no blocks on b:
Definition 7.2.5.
∀b, s. Clear(b, s) def= ¬∃b′. On(b′, b, s).
Assume that there are four blocks, BB, BY , BG, and BR, one of each color. The
agent AgtBW knows the color of these blocks, and knows that initially all the blocks
are on the table and are clear:
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Axiom 7.2.6.
Know(∀x. OnTable(x) ≡ x = BB ∨BY ∨BG ∨BR, S0) ∧
Know(∀x. Clear(x) ≡ x = BB ∨BY ∨BG ∨BR, S0) ∧
Know(∀x. B(x) ≡ x = BB, S0) ∧ Know(∀x. Y(x) ≡ x = BY , S0) ∧
Know(∀x. G(x) ≡ x = BG, S0) ∧ Know(∀x. R(x) ≡ x = BR, S0).
Now let us go back to our discussion of BDI agent programming languages. Re-
call from Chapter 2 that a typical BDI APLwDG uses a user-specified hierarchical
plan library Π containing planning rules, a procedural goal-base Γ containing a set
of (possibly abstract) plans that the agent is committed to executing, and a declara-
tive goal-base ∆ containing the set of declarative goals that the agent is committed to
achieving. In response to events in the environment and to goals in ∆, in each cycle
the agent interleaves selecting plans from Π to handle such events and goals, adopting
them to Γ, and executing actions from plans in Γ. The execution of some of these
actions can in turn trigger the adoption of other declarative goals. This process is
repeated until all the goals in ∆ are successfully achieved and all plans in Γ are suc-
cessfully executed. In the following, I informally discuss a fundamental problem with
such a typical APLwDG, namely the intention consistency problem: when a new plan
is adopted, the plan is not required to be consistent with an agent’s current intentions,
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and thus the intended procedural and declarative goals may become inconsistent in
these APLwDGs. Later, I will formally prove that an SR-APL agent is free from this
problem.
To this end, assume that our agent AgtBW has the following two declarative goals:
(1) to eventually have a 2 blocks tower that has a green block on top and a non-yellow
block underneath, and (2) to have a 2 blocks tower with a blue block on top and a
non-red block underneath; thus ∆ = {3TowerGY¯ ,3TowerBR¯}, where these goals are
defined as follows:
Definition 7.2.7.
TowerGY¯
def
= ∃b, b′. OnTable(b′) ∧ On(b, b′) ∧ G(b) ∧ ¬Y(b′),
TowerBR¯
def
= ∃b, b′. OnTable(b′) ∧ On(b, b′) ∧ B(b) ∧ ¬R(b′).
Assuming that the goal3TowerGY¯ has higher priority than3TowerBR¯ , the following
initial goal axioms can be used to specify the agent AgtBW ’s goals:51
Axiom 7.2.8.
(a). Init(s) ⊃ ((G(p, 0, s) ≡ ∃s′. Starts(p, s′) ∧K(s′, s) ∧3TowerGY¯ (p))
∧ ((G(p, 1, s) ≡ ∃s′. Starts(p, s′) ∧K(s′, s) ∧3TowerBR¯(p))).
(b). Init(s) ∧ n ≥ 2 ⊃ (G(p, n, s) ≡ ∃s′. Starts(p, s′) ∧K(s′, s)).
51Note that in these axioms, I require that G-accessible paths start with a K-accessible situation in s
(rather than an arbitrary initial situation); this is needed to comply with Assumption 6.2.1.
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Suppose that our agent AgtBW ’s plan library ΠBW has two planning rules:52
Definition 7.2.9.
ΠBW
def
= { 3TowerGY¯ : [OnTable(b) ∧ OnTable(b′) ∧ b 6= b′ ∧ Clear(b)
∧ Clear(b′) ∧ G(b′) ∧ ¬Y(b)]← stack(b′, b),
3TowerBR¯ : [OnTable(b) ∧ OnTable(b′) ∧ b 6= b′ ∧ Clear(b)
∧ Clear(b′) ∧ B(b′) ∧ ¬R(b)]← stack(b′, b) }.
That is, if the agent AgtBW has the goal to have a green and non-yellow tower and
knows about a green block b′ and a distinct non-yellow block b that are both clear and
are on the table, then she should adopt the plan of stacking b′ on b, and similarly for the
goal of having a blue and non-red tower. Let’s define our blocks world domain DBW
as D ∪ {Axiom 7.2.1 – Axiom 7.2.8}.
Now, consider a typical APLwDG, that (without considering the overall consis-
tency of the agent’s intentions) simply selects plans whose context condition is satis-
fied from the rule-base Π for the agent’s goals in the declarative goal-base ∆, adds
these selected plans to the agent’s plan-base Γ, and eventually executes them in an
attempt to achieve her goals.53 I claim that such an APL is not always sound and ra-
52Recall that a planning rule of the form φ : Ψ ← σ means that the agent should consider adopting
and executing the plan σ if she has the goal that φ and she currently knows/believes that Ψ.
53While I will not attempt to do so, it would not be hard to modify the proposed language definition
in the next section to specify such an APLwDG.
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tional in this example domain. For instance, according to this plan library, one way
of building a green non-yellow (and a blue non-red) tower is to construct a green-blue
(a blue-green, respectively) tower. While these two plans are individually consistent,
they are inconsistent with each other, since the agent AgtBW has only one block of
each color. Thus a rational agent should not adopt these two plans. However, the fol-
lowing would be a legal trace for our blocks world domain in such a typical APLwDG
(here as usual a configuration 〈Γ,∆〉 is a tuple consisting of the set of intended plans
Γ and the set of intended declarative goals ∆ of the agent; also C1 ⇒ C2 denotes a
transition from configuration C1 to configuration C2 that is allowed by the transition
system semantics of the APL):
〈{},∆〉 ⇒ 〈{stack(BB, BG)},∆〉 ⇒ 〈{stack(BB, BG), stack(BG, BB)},∆〉 ⇒
〈{stack(BG, BB)}, {3TowerGY¯ }〉.
The agent AgtBW first moves to configuration 〈{stack(BB, BG)},∆〉 by adopting the
plan stack(BB, BG) in response to3TowerBR¯ , then to 〈{stack(BB, BG), stack(BG, BB)},
∆〉 by adopting stack(BG, BB) to handle3TowerGY¯ , and then to 〈{stack(BG, BB)}, {3
TowerGY¯ }〉 by executing the intended action stack(BB, BG). At this point, AgtBW is
stuck and cannot perform any further transitions and complete successfully. Thus,
in such an APL, not only is the agent allowed to adopt two inconsistent plans, but
the execution of one of these plans makes other concurrent goals impossible (e.g. the
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execution of stack(BB, BG) makes the higher priority goal 3TowerGY¯ impossible to
achieve).
The problem arises in part because actions are not reversible in this domain; there is
no action for moving a block back to the table or for unstacking it. This is common in
real world domains, for instance, most tasks with deadlines or that consume resources
are such, e.g. doing some errands before noon, a robot delivering mail without running
out of battery power, etc. While such irrational behavior could in principle be avoided
by using appropriate conditions in the antecedent of the plan-selection rules (e.g. by
stating that the agent should only adopt a given plan if she does not have certain other
interacting goals), this puts an excessive burden on the agent programmer. Ideally,
such reasoning about goals should be delegated to the agent.
7.3 Agent Programming with Prioritized Goals
The proposed framework SR-APL combines elements from BDI agent programming
languages such as AgentSpeak [172] and from the ConGolog logic programming lan-
guage [51], which is defined on top of the situation calculus. In addition, to facilitate
monitoring of goal achievement and performing plan failure recovery, I incorporate
declarative goals in SR-APL. To specify the operational semantics of plans in SR-
APL, I will use (elements of) the semantics of the ConGolog APL (see Chapter 3).
477
7.3.1 Components of SR-APL
Before going over the operational semantics of SR-APL, I first discuss its various com-
ponents. First of all, I have a set of axioms/theory DSGCAgt specifying actions that can
be done, the initial knowledge and goals of the agent, and their dynamics, as discussed
in Chapter 6. Henceforth, I will use D to refer to this theory. Recall that in the com-
mitted agent framework, I allow the agent to have infinitely many p-goals. However,
here I assume a finite set of initial p-goals. I also assume that these are all achievement
goals 3Φ, where Φ is a situation suppressed formula without temporal operators and
without epistemic or goal operators. Since a finite number of achievement p-goals is
assumed, I can use the abbreviation NPGoals(n, s), which states that n is the highest
priority level starting where (and after which) the agent’s goal hierarchy is empty, i.e.
where the agent has the trivial p-goal that she is in a K-accessible situation. Thus
if NPGoals(n, s) holds, then adopting a p-goal at level n in situation s essentially
amounts to adopting the p-goal at a lower priority level than any other existing p-goals
in s. I define NPGoals(n, s) as below.
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Definition 7.3.1.
NPGoals(n, s) def= (∀m. m ≥ n ⊃ NoGoalsAt(m, s))
∧ (¬NoGoalsAt(n− 1, s) ∨ n = 0),
where, NoGoalsAt(n, s) def= OPGoal(∃s′. K(s′, s) ∧ Starts(s′), n, s).
That is, NPGoals(n, s) holds in some situation s if n is the highest priority level where
the agent’s p-goals at level n and all lower priority levels are the trivial p-goal that
she be in a K-accessible situation. Recall from the SSA for G (i.e. Axiom 6.2.6) that
when a p-goal at some level m is dropped or becomes impossible or inconsistent with
other higher priority p-goals and knowledge, the G-accessible paths at m are simply
replaced with paths that starts with a current K-accessible situation. In other words,
my SSA for G does not compact levels in the sense of removing such an empty level
altogether from the goal hierarchy. The above definition takes this into account and
thus there may be a level m that has higher priority than n and where the agent has
the trivial p-goal that she be in a K-accessible situation, as long as there is at least one
“non-empty” level with priority lower than m.
Note that in the situation calculus, both declarative and procedural goals are given
declarative semantics. For instance, the Do construct is used to represent an agent’s
adopted plans: having the goal that ∃s′. Starts(now) ∧ OnPath(s′) ∧ Do(σ, now, s′)
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amounts to having the adopted plan that σ. Thus unlike in other APLwDGs, I use
the theory D to uniformly specify both declarative and procedural goals of the agent.
This considerably simplifies the task of maintaining the consistency between these two
types of goals compared to APLs where declarative and procedural goals are stored in
two separate goal bases.
Moreover, I also have a plan library Π with rules of the form φ : Ψ← σ, where φ
must be an achievement goal formula of the form3Φ, Ψ is an situation suppressed for-
mula expressing a condition on what the agent knows, and σ is a plan; φ,Ψ, and σ may
have free variables in them such that free(σ) ⊆ free(φ) ∪ free(Ψ). A rule φ : Ψ ← σ
means that if the agent has some instance of the c-goal that φ (i.e. has the ground c-goal
that φ′, where φ′ is φθ with some substitution θ of the free variables in φ) and knows
that some ground instance of Ψ, Ψ′θ holds, then she should consider adopting the plan
that σθ (for the substitution θ of the free variables in φ and Ψ). The plan language for
σ is a simplified version of ConGolog and includes the constructs listed in Table 7.1.
I use the ConGolog APL here because it has a situation calculus-based semantics that
is well specified and compatible with my agent theory. I could have used any APL
with these characteristics. Also, in order to keep the proposed framework in line with
current APLwDGs, I only use a subset of the ConGolog constructs. Here I assume that
primitive actions a in a plan cannot be exogenous. In addition to these ConGolog con-
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nil The empty program
a Primitive action
φ? Waiting for a condition
σ1;σ2 Sequence
adoptRelTo(3Φ,∃s, s′. Starts(s) ∧ OnPath(s′) ∧ DoAL(σ, s, s′)) Subgoal adoption
Table 7.1: SR-APL Plan Language
structs, the plan language includes the special action for declarative subgoal adoption,
adoptRelTo(3Φ, ψ) as specified in Chapter 6; here3Φ is an achievement declarative
subgoal to be adopted and ψ is a path formula relative to which it is adopted. ψ is of
the form ∃s, s′. Starts(s) ∧ OnPath(s′) ∧ DoAL(σ, s, s′), which roughly says that ψ
holds over a path if the plan σ, possibly along with other actions is executed over the
path starting from the starting situation of the path (see Section 7.3.2 for the definition
of DoAL). Thus adoptRelTo(3Φ, ψ) here refers to the adoption of the achievement
declarative goal 3Φ w.r.t. the goal to execute σ, possibly along with other actions.
While my account of goal change is expressive enough to handle arbitrary temporally
extended goals, here I focus on achievement goals and procedural goals exclusively.
Thus I assume that the goal formula φ in a rule φ : Ψ ← σ must be an achievement
goal 3Φ. Note that extending my framework to support maintenance goals should
be straightforward, since maintenance goals behave like additional constraints on the
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agent behavior in contrast to achievement goals for which the agent needs to plan for.
Nevertheless, I leave this for future work.
I now define an SR-APL agent as a tuple, 〈D,Π〉. Here, D is a (committed agent)
theory specifying the domain, i.e. the actions and the initial knowledge and goals of
the agent, and their dynamics. I assume that D is complete with respect to the actual
initial state, and thus for any situation suppressed formula Φ without K or G, either
D |= Φ(S0) or D |= ¬Φ(S0).54 Also, I constrain the initial goals of the agent in D to
declarative achievement goals only. Finally, Π is a plan library with rules of the form
φ : Ψ← σ that allows the agent to adopt new plans w.r.t. her declarative achievement
goals given her knowledge. φ here must be a declarative achievement goal 3Φ, and σ
is formed using the constructs in Table 7.1. Thus, for example, our blocks world agent
AgtBW in the initial situation can be specified using the program 〈DBW ,ΠBW 〉.
7.3.2 Semantics of SR-APL
Using these components, I next specify the semantics of SR-APL. I use a transition
system [168] for this. As mentioned above, I use my situation calculus domain theory
D to represent both adopted declarative goals and procedural goals/plans and how they
54This is required to handle sensing actions and exogenous actions that carry new information prop-
erly in the context of my meta-theoretical approach to the semantics of SR-APL below. I will come
back to this issue later.
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evolve. Initially the goals in D are restricted to be achievement declarative goals only.
As specified by the successor-state axiom for G (i.e. Axiom 6.2.6), the goals in D
are updated by adding plans or other declarative goals to the agent’s goal hierarchy
when a transition rule makes the agent perform an adopt or adoptRelTo action (note
that while the SR-APL plan language in Table 7.1 does not include adopt actions, the
transition rules in Table 7.3 utilize both of these actions). I ensure that an agent’s
declarative goals and adopted plans are consistent with each other and with the agent’s
knowledge. In my semantics, I specify this by checking that there exists a course of
actions that the agent considers possible (i.e. a realistic path), and if she were to follow
this path, she would end up realizing all of her declarative goals and executing all of
her procedural goals.
Recall from Section 7.1 that specifying such a language raises some fundamental
questions about rational agency, for instance: how to specify a BDI agent’s open-
ended commitment towards concurrently executing multiple plans while ensuring that
the agent does not procrastinate? An SR-APL agent can work on multiple goals at
the same time. Thus at any time, an agent might be committed to several plans that
she will be executing in an interleaved fashion. We need a mechanism to model the
agent’s adopted plans in the goal hierarchy specified by D. One way of specifying an
agent’s commitment to execute a plan σ next at some level n inD is to say that she has
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the p-goal at n that ∃s, s′. Starts(s) ∧ OnPath(s′) ∧ Do(σ, s, s′), i.e. that each of her
G-accessible paths p at n is such that it starts with some situation s, it has the situation
s′ on it, and s′ can be reached from s by executing σ. However, this does not allow for
the interleaved execution of several plans, since Do requires that σ be executed before
any other actions/plans.
A better alternative is to represent the procedural goal as ∃s, s′. Starts(s)∧OnPath(s′)
∧ DoAL(σ, s, s′), which says that the agent has the p-goal at level n to do at least the
plan σ next, and possibly more. DoAL(σ, s, s′) holds if there is an execution of plan
σ, possibly interleaved with zero or more actions by the agent herself, that starts in
situation s and ends in s′:55
Definition 7.3.2.
DoAL(σ, s, s′) def= Do(σ‖(pia. Agent(a) = agt?; a)∗, s, s′).
In addition to providing a mechanism for combining the already adopted plans, this
also allows the agent to be open towards future commitments to other plans. Put oth-
erwise, the DoAL construct in her already committed to plans allows her to accommo-
date other plans that she might have already or adopt in the future.
However, a new problem with this approach is that it allows the agent to procras-
55Note that, while my theory supports exogenous actions performed by other agents, I assume that
all actions in the plans of agt that specify her behavior must be performed by agt herself.
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tinate in the execution of the intended plans in D. For instance, suppose that the agent
has the p-goal at priority level n1 to execute the plan σ1 and at level n2 to execute σ2
next. Then, according to my definition of DoAL, the agent has the intention at level
n1 to execute σ1 and at level n2 to execute σ2, possibly concurrently with other actions
next, since I use DoAL to specify those goals. The “other actions” at level n1 (n2, re-
spectively) are meant to be actions from the plan σ2 (σ1, respectively). However, noth-
ing requires that the additional actions that the agent might execute are indeed from
σ2(σ1, respectively), and thus this allows her to perform actions that are completely
unnecessary as long as they do not make the execution of σ1 and σ2 impossible.
To deal with this, I include an additional component, a procedural intention-base
Γ, in an SR-APL agent configuration. Γ is a finite list of plans that the agent is currently
actively pursuing. To avoid procrastination, I will require that any action that the agent
actually performs comes from Γ (as specified in the transition rule Astep below). In the
following, I will use Γ‖ to denote the concurrent composition of the plans in Γ:56
Definition 7.3.3.
Γ‖ def= if (Γ = [ ]) then nil else First(Γ)‖(Rest(Γ)‖).
56I will use various standard list operations, e.g. First (representing the first item of a list), Rest
(representing the sublist that contains all but the first item of a list), Cons (for constructing a new list
from an item and a list), Member (for checking membership of an item within a list), Remove (for
removing all occurrences of a given item from a list), Replace (for replacing all occurrences of a given
item by another item in a list), etc.
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In SR-APL, a plan configuration 〈σ, s〉 is a tuple consisting of an SR-APL plan
σ and a ground situation term s. An agent configuration on the other hand is a tuple
〈Γ, s〉 that consists of a list of plans Γ and a ground situation term s. The initial agent
configuration is 〈[ ], S0〉. Note that implicitly an agent configuration also includes the
knowledge and the goals of the agent, but that these can be obtained from the (fixed)
theory D and the situation in the configuration.
The semantics of SR-APL are defined by a two-tier transition system. Plan-level
transition rules specify how a plan written in SR-APL’s plan language may evolve.
These rules are defined within the language/theory. On top of this, I define agent-
level transition rules to specify how an SR-APL agent’s configuration may evolve.
Unlike the plan-level transition rules, these rules are defined meta-theoretically as these
involve dealing with the procedural intention-base Γ.
Plan-Level Transition Rules
The plan-level transition rules are simply a subset of the ConGolog transition rules
specified in Axioms 3.6.1 and 3.6.2. Since plans are written using SR-APL’s plan
language in Table 7.1, I only need the subset for the constructs listed in Table 7.1.
Here, I will use 〈σ, s〉 → 〈σ′, s′〉 as an alternative notation for Trans(σ, s, σ′, s′). For
the reader’s convenience, I list these transition rules again in Table 7.2 (note that the
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ΓF1 . Final(nil, s) ≡ True,
ΓF2 . Final(a, s) ≡ False,
ΓF3 . Final(φ?, s) ≡ φ(s),
ΓF4 . Final([δ1; δ2], s) ≡ Final(δ1, s) ∧ Final(δ2, s),
ΓT1 . ¬∃δ′, s′. 〈nil, s〉 → 〈δ′, s′〉,
ΓT2 . 〈a, s〉 → 〈δ′, s′〉 ≡ Poss(a, s) ∧ δ′ = nil ∧ s′ = do(a, s),
ΓT3 . ¬∃δ′, s′. 〈φ?, s〉 → 〈δ′, s′〉,
ΓT4 . 〈[δ1; δ2], s〉 → 〈δ′, s′〉 ≡ ∃δ′1. (δ′ = [δ′1; δ2] ∧ 〈δ1, s〉 → 〈δ′1, s′〉)
∨ Final(δ1, s) ∧ 〈δ2, s〉 → 〈δ′, s′〉.
Table 7.2: Plan-Level Transition Rules
adoptRelTo special action is handled by the same rule as normal actions).
Agent-Level Transition Rules
The agent-level transition rules are given in Table 7.3 and are mostly similar to those
of a typical BDI APL.57 First of all, I have a rule Asel for selecting and adopting a plan
57In the following, I use CGoal(∃s′. DoAL(σ, now, s′), s) or simply CGoal(DoAL(σ), s) as a short-
hand for CGoal(∃s′. Starts(path, now) ∧ OnPath(path, s′) ∧ DoAL(σ, now, s′), s). Thus, DoAL(σ)
or ∃s′. DoAL(σ, now, s′) here is the path formula ∃s′. Starts(path, now) ∧ OnPath(path, s′) ∧
DoAL(σ, now, s′) that has a free path variable/placeholder path that is often suppressed; path will
get bound by the context in which the formula DoAL(σ) appears. Similarly, I will use DoAL(σ)
as an argument to the adoptRelTo action as in adoptRelTo(ψ,DoAL(σ)), as a shorthand for
adoptRelTo(ψ,∃s′. Starts(now) ∧ OnPath(s′) ∧ DoAL(σ, now, s′)). Finally, while DoAL(σ) is not
technically a program/plan and rather a predicate, here I often abuse the notation and say, e.g. that
“DoAL(σ) is executable” rather than that “DoAL(σ) holds”, etc.; in these I am actually referring to the
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using the plan library Π for some realistic achievement p-goal 3Φ. It states that if:
(a) there is a rule in the plan library Π which says that the agent should adopt an
instance of the plan σ if she has an instance of 3Φ as her p-goal at some level n
and knows that some instance of Ψ holds,
(b) 3Φ′ is a (realistic) p-goal with priority n in situation s for which the agent hasn’t
yet adopted any subgoal,
(c) the agent knows in s that Ψ′,
(d) θ1 unifies Φ and Φ′, i.e. mgu(Φ,Φ′) = θ1, and θ2 unifies Ψ and Ψ′, i.e. mgu(Ψ,
Ψ′) = θ2, and
(e) the adoption of the plan of doing at least σθ1θ2 w.r.t. the p-goal3Φθ1 is possible
in s,
then she can adopt the plan σθ1θ2, adding DoAL(σθ1θ2) as a subgoal of 3Φθ1 to her
goals in the theory D, and adding σθ1θ2 to Γ. Here, I say that a theory D entails that
some goal φ has been “handled” in some situation s if and only if there exists a goal ψ
such that D entails that ψ is a subgoal of φ in s, i.e.:
program (σ‖(pia. Agent(a) = agt?; a)∗).
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Definition 7.3.4.
Handled(φ, s,D) iff there exists a ψ such that D |= SubGoal(ψ, φ, s).
Recall that, by Axiom 6.2.4, it follows that if the action of adopting a subgoal ψ
relative to a parent goal φ is executable in some situation s, then the agent does not
have the c-goal that ¬ψ next in s. Assuming that the agent already has the c-goal to
execute DoAL(Γ‖) in s,58 this and condition (e) above imply that the agent does not
have the c-goal not to execute σθ1θ2 concurrently with Γ‖ and possibly other actions
next:
(I). ¬CGoal(¬∃s′, s′′. Do(adoptRelTo(DoAL(σθ1θ2),3Φθ1), now, s′)
∧ DoAL(σθ1θ2 ‖ Γ‖, s′, s′′), s).
Moreover, from Proposition 6.3.30, it follows that an SR-APL agent acquires the c-
goal that ψ after she adopts it as a subgoal of φ in s, provided that s is an exe-
cutable situation and that the adoptRelTo(ψ, φ) action is executable in s. Thus for
any executable situation s, (assuming that the agent already has the c-goal to execute
DoAL(Γ‖) in s) we have from this and (e) that:
(II). CGoal(∃s′. DoAL(σθ1θ2 ‖ Γ‖, now, s′),
do(adoptRelTo(DoAL(σθ1θ2),3Φθ1), s)).
58See Proposition 7.4.7 below, where I show that under appropriate conditions, this is indeed the case.
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Member(3Φ : Ψ← σ,Π), D |= PGoal(3Φ′, n, s) for some n,
¬Handled(3Φ′, s,D), D |= Know(Ψ′, s), mgu(Φ,Φ′) = θ1, mgu(Ψ,Ψ′) = θ2,
(Asel) D |= Poss(adoptRelTo(DoAL(σθ1θ2),3Φθ1), s)
〈Γ, s〉 ⇒ 〈Cons(σθ1θ2,Γ), do(adoptRelTo(DoAL(σθ1θ2),3Φθ1), s)〉
Member(σ,Γ), D |= Know(〈σ, now〉 → 〈σ′, do(a, now)〉, s),
(Astep) D |= PGoal(DoAL(σ), n, s) for some n, D |= ¬CGoal(¬∃s′. Do(a, now, s′), s)
〈Γ, s〉 ⇒ 〈Replace(σ, σ′,Γ), do(a, s)〉
(Aexo) D |= Exo(a) ∧ Poss(a, s)
〈Γ, s〉 ⇒ 〈Γ, do(a, s)〉
(Aclean) Member(σ,Γ), D |= ¬∃n. PGoal(DoAL(σ), n, s)
〈Γ, s〉 ⇒ 〈Remove(σ,Γ), s〉
D |= Know(¬∃Γ′, s′. 〈Γ‖, now〉 → 〈Γ′, s′〉, s) D |= Know(¬Final(Γ‖, now), s),
For all σ such that Member(σ,Γ) we have:
D |= ∃n. PGoal(DoAL(σ), n, s), Handled(DoAL(σ), s,D),
D |= Agent(→a ) = agt ∧ Know(∃s′. Do(→a , now, s′) ∧ ∃Γ′, s′′. 〈Γ‖, s′〉 → 〈Γ′, s′′〉, s),
(Arep) D |= NPGoals(m, s) for some m, D |= Poss(adopt(Do(→a ),m), s)
〈Γ, s〉 ⇒ 〈Cons(→a ,Γ), do(adopt(Do(→a ),m), s)〉
Table 7.3: Agent-Level Transition Rules
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(I) ensures that the adopted subgoal σθ1θ2 is consistent with Γ‖ (and with all the declar-
ative goals of the agent) in the sense that they can be executed concurrently, possibly
along with other actions in s. (II) confirms that σθ1θ2 is indeed intended after the
adoptRelTo action has happened. Note that this notion of consistency is a weak one,
since it does not guarantee that there is an execution of the program (σθ1θ2 ‖ Γ‖) after
the adoptRelTo action happens, but rather ensures that DoAL(σθ1θ2 ‖ Γ‖) holds. In
other words, σθ1θ2 and the plans in Γ alone might not be concurrently executable, and
additional actions might be required. I will come back to this issue later.
Secondly, I have a transition rule Astep for single stepping the agent program by
executing an intended action from the procedural goal-base Γ. It says that if:
(a) the agent knows that a plan σ in Γ can make a plan-level transition in situation s
by performing a primitive action awith plan σ′ remaining in do(a, s) afterwards,
(b) DoAL(σ) is a (realistic) p-goal with priority n in s, and
(c) the transition is consistent with the agent’s goals in the sense that she does not
have the c-goal not to execute a in s,
then the agent can execute a, and Γ and s can be updated accordingly.
Once again I have a weak consistency requirement in condition (c) above. Ideally,
I would have added to (c) that the agent can continue from do(a, s) in the sense that
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she does not have the c-goal not to execute the remaining plan σ′ concurrently with the
other plans in Γ in do(a, s), i.e. that:
D |= ¬CGoal(¬∃s′. Do(a; Replace(σ, σ′,Γ)‖, now, s′), s).
However, this would be too demanding as Γ may be incomplete in the sense that it
may include abstract plans that have actions that trigger the adoption of subgoals, for
which the execution of Γ‖ waits; but Γ does not have any adopted plans yet that can
achieve these subgoals. Thus Γ‖ by itself might currently have no complete execution,
and will only become completely executable when all such subgoals have been fully
expanded.
For example, consider a new agent for our blocks world domain Agt3TBW who has
the goal to eventually build a 3 blocks tower, i.e. 33Tower, where 3Tower is defined
as follows:
Definition 7.3.5.
3Tower def= ∃b, b′, b′′. OnTable(b) ∧ On(b′, b) ∧ On(b′′, b′).
The agent Agt3TBW ’s initial goals can be defined using the following initial goal axiom:
Axiom 7.3.6.
(a). Init(s) ⊃ G(p, 0, s) ≡ ∃s′. Starts(p, s′) ∧K(s′, s) ∧33Tower(p).
(b). Init(s) ∧ n > 0 ⊃ G(p, n, s) ≡ ∃s′. Starts(p, s′) ∧K(s′, s).
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The agent Agt3TBW ’s domain theory D3TBW is the same as that for DBW , but with the
substituted initial goal axioms, i.e. D3TBW def= DBW \ {Axiom 7.2.9} ∪ {Axiom 7.3.6}.
Also, in addition to the rules in ΠBW , her plan library Π3TBW as specified below includes
a new planning rule that can be used to build a 3 blocks tower.
Definition 7.3.7.
Π3TBW
def
= ΠBW ∪ {33Tower : [¬Y(b) ∧ G(b′) ∧ Y(b′′) ∧ b 6= b′ ∧ Clear(b) ∧ Clear(b′)
∧ Clear(b′′) ∧ OnTable(b) ∧ OnTable(b′) ∧ OnTable(b′′)]
← σ1},
σ1
def
= adoptRelTo(3TowerGY¯ ,DoAL(σ2));σ2,
σ2
def
= TowerGY¯ ?; stack(b
′′, b′).
This new rule says that, if the agent knows about a non-yellow block b, a distinct green
block b′, and a yellow block b′′ that are all clear and on the table, then her goal of
building a 3 blocks tower can be fulfilled by adopting the plan that involves adopting
the declarative subgoal to eventually build a green non-yellow tower, waiting for the
achievement of this subgoal, and then stacking the yellow block on the green block.
Now, suppose that in response to her goal 33Tower, the agent Agt3TBW adopted σ1
as above as a subgoal of this goal using the Asel rule, and thus σ1 is added to the
procedural goal-base Γ. In the next few steps, she will step through the adopted plan
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σ1, executing one action at a time in an attempt to achieve her goal that 33Tower.
Note that in SR-APL, the hierarchical decomposition of a subgoal, e.g. σ1 above,
is a two step process. In the first step, in response to the execution (via Astep) of
the adoptRelTo(3TowerGY¯ ,DoAL(σ2)) action in her plan σ1 in Γ, the agent adopts
3TowerGY¯ as a subgoal of the remaining plan σ2, possibly along with other actions,
i.e. relative to DoAL(σ2). Then in the second step, she uses the Asel rule to select
and adopt a plan for the subgoal 3TowerGY¯ . I assume that the subgoal 3TowerGY¯ must
always be achieved before the supergoal. To do this, I suspend the execution of the
supergoal by waiting for the achievement of the subgoal. This can be specified by
the programmer by having the supergoal σ2 start with the wait action TowerGY¯ ? that
waits for the subgoal to be achieved. But this means that σ2 (and thus σ1) by itself,
i.e. without the DoAL construct, might not have a complete execution as it might get
blocked when it reaches TowerGY¯ ?. Moreover, since σ2 is a member of Γ, Γ
‖ will have
a complete execution only when all the subgoals in Γ have been fully expanded. To
deal with this in rule Asel, I use a weak consistency check that does not verify if Γ‖ is
executable, but instead only guarantees that DoAL(Γ‖) is executable. However, my se-
mantics ensures that any action a performed by the agent must not make the concurrent
execution of all the adopted plans of the agent possibly with other actions impossible,
i.e. it must be consistent with DoAL(Γ‖), since Astep requires that doing amust be con-
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sistent with all her DoAL procedural goals (and other concurrent declarative goals) in
her goal hierarchy, i.e. that D |= ¬CGoal(¬∃s′. Do(a, now, s′), s). This weak notion
of consistency thus addresses another fundamental issue of rational agency, namely,
maintaining consistency between an agent’s declarative and procedural goals, while
allowing the latter to include abstract plans with unexpanded subgoals.
In my definition of an SR-APL agent, I require that the theoryD be complete w.r.t.
the actual initial state S0. This is required to handle sensing. Without this assumption,
the agent may get stuck due to lack of knowledge about whether some action in the
current situation is executable or not, even after performing a corresponding sensing
action. For example, consider the plan where the agent senses the value of Φ (which
she doesn’t know initially) and then perform action a if Φ holds and b if ¬Φ holds.59
Suppose also that a is only possible if Φ holds and b is only possible if ¬Φ holds. If
the theory D did not say what the actual value of Φ is in S0, then neither a nor b could
be performed by the Astep rule after the sensing of Φ because it would not be entailed
that the agent knows that a is executable after senseΦ occurs, and similarly for b. Note
that given the above completeness assumption (which for the example says that either
D |= Φ(S0) or D |= ¬Φ(S0)), if D entails that Φ holds initially, D will also entail that
59While the SR-APL plan language does not include non-deterministic branch, this can be simu-
lated using the plan senseΦ; adoptRelTo(3Ψ,True) and two planning rules in the rule library Π that
condition on the outcome of the sensing.
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that the agent knows that a is executable after senseΦ occurs, and similarly for the ¬Φ
case.
Note that another way (that does not require this constraint on D) to address this
issue with sensing is to updateD after a sensing action happens to add the sensed value
observed, i.e. by choosing a sensed fluent value that is consistent with D and changing
D toD∪{SF(a, s)} orD∪{¬SF(a, s)}. But this requires storing the updated theory or
the sensed values in the agent configuration. The first approach generates the possible
executions of the agent for a given environment (the one specified by D). If there is
uncertainty about the environment, each model needs to be considered separately. The
second approach generates the possible executions for all possible environments (i.e.
models of D). For simplicity, here I adopt our approach.
Thirdly, I have a rule Aexo for accommodating exogenous actions, i.e. actions oc-
curring in the agent’s environment that are not under her control. When such an action
a occurs in situation s, the agent must update her knowledge and goals by progressing
the situation component of her configuration to do(a, s), provided that doing a is pos-
sible in s. Note that, the condition in the antecedent of the Aexo rule is a strong one
since here I require that the theory D entails that the exogenous action a is possible
in situation s, i.e. D |= Poss(a, s). This eliminates some possible executions of the
agent program that involve exogenous actions. For instance, it may be the case that
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Poss(a, s) holds in some model of D but does not hold in another. In such a case,
the agent should have considered the transition of a in s as a legal one. However,
this cannot arise in our case as we assume that D is complete w.r.t. the actual ini-
tial state. I could have dropped this assumption and used the weaker condition that
D∪{Exo(a)}∪ {Poss(a, s)} is satisfiable in the antecedent of the Aexo rule, but again
this requires updating the theory with Know(Poss(a, now), s) after a happens and stor-
ing the theory in the agent configuration. For simplicity, I stick with the condition that
Poss(a, s) be entailed by D here.
Fourthly, I use the Aclean rule for dropping adopted plans that are no longer in-
tended in the theoryD from the procedural goal-base Γ. It says that if there is a plan σ
in Γ, and executing σ possibly along with other actions is no longer a (realistic) p-goal,
then σ should be dropped from Γ. This is required when the occurrence of an exoge-
nous action a forces the agent to drop a plan from her goal hierarchy in D by making
it impossible to execute or rendering it inconsistent with her higher priority (realistic)
p-goals. Recall that my theory of prioritized goals for committed agents automatically
drops such plans from the agent’s goal-hierarchy specified by D in do(a, s), since by
Corollary 6.3.17 and Propositions 6.3.1 and 6.3.16, for any executable situation, an
SR-APL agent’s p-goals are both individually consistent and collectively consistent
with each other and with what she knows.
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Finally, I have a rule Arep for repairing an agent’s plans in case she gets stuck, i.e.
when for all plans σ in Γ, the agent has the (realistic) p-goal that DoAL(σ) at some
level n in the goal hierarchy specified by theory D, and thus all of these DoAL(σ)
goals are still individually executable and collectively consistent, but together they are
not concurrently executable without some non-σ actions in the sense that Γ‖ has no
plan-level transition in s. This could happen as a result of an exogenous action or as
a side effect of my weak consistency check in rule Asel, as discussed below. The Arep
rule says that if:
(a) the agent knows that Γ‖ does not have a plan-level transition in s (which ensures
that Astep can’t be applied),
(b) she also knows that Γ‖ is not considered to be completed in s,
(c) for each plan σ in Γ:
– the agent currently has the (realistic) p-goal at some level that DoAL(σ)
(which ensures that Aclean can’t be applied), and
– DoAL(σ) has been handled (and thus Asel is not applicable),
(d) there is a sequence of actions
→
a such that the agent of these actions is the agent
herself, and
→
a repairs Γ in the sense that the agent knows that there is a plan-level
transition of Γ‖ after
→
a has been executed in s, and
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(e) it is possible to adopt Do(
→
a) at the lowest priority level in situation s, i.e. at level
m, where NPGoals(m, s),
then in an attempt to repair Γ, the agent may adopt
→
a at the lowest priority level m.
Why do we need this rule? One reason is because the agent could get stuck due to
the occurrence of an exogenous action e, e.g. when emakes the preconditions of a plan
σ in Γ false. Note that, DoAL(σ) might still be known to be executable after the occur-
rence of e, e.g. if there is a known to be executable action r (implicitly represented by
the additional actions in the DoAL construct) that can be used to restore the precondi-
tions of σ. In such cases, DoAL(σ) may be retained in the goal hierarchy specified by
theory D after e occurs, and since this does not make the triggering condition of the
Aclean rule true, so may σ in Γ.
Another reason repair may be needed is that I use a weak consistency check when
adopting plans via Asel and executing actions via Astep. While adopting new plans,
the SR-APL semantics does not require the agent to ensure that all possible interleav-
ings of this plan and her already adopted plans be executable. In fact, it does not even
require that there be at least one such executable interleaving. Rather, it ensures that
there must be at least one possible interleaving of her new and existing plans, possibly
along with additional known to be executable actions (encoded by the DoAL construct,
as depicted in the example below). Similarly, while executing plans from the procedu-
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ral goal-base Γ, the SR-APL semantics only ensures that the agent does not perform
an action that makes one of her goals impossible to bring about. But this action can
indeed come from an interleaving that is not further executable without executing ad-
ditional actions, and thus the agent might get stuck and need to add extra actions using
the repair rule to continue from there.
Let me give an example to clarify this. Assume a domain with actions a, b, and r,
all of which are initially known to be possible. The execution of b makes the precon-
ditions of a false, while that of r restores them. Our agent has two adopted plans in
the goal hierarchy in theory D, DoAL(a) and DoAL(b), and Γ = [a, b]. Note that an
SR-APL agent could end up having such a goal hierarchy (through the Asel rule), since
as discussed above, although b; a is not a valid execution of Γ‖ (since the execution of
b breaks the preconditions of a), both a; b and b; r; a are indeed valid executions of
DoAL(a) and DoAL(b). Now, since I only do weak consistency checking, my seman-
tics allows the agent to pick a “wrong” choice of plan interleaving, e.g. to perform b
as the first action.60 That is, to execute b using the Astep transition rule, we only need
to ensure that b has a plan-level transition in s and that this transition is consistent with
the agent’s goals in D, i.e. with DoAL(a) and DoAL(b), both of which hold. After the
execution of b, the agent will get stuck, as there is no action in the remainder of Γ (i.e.
60Note that this however does not mean that Astep allows the agent to perform an action that makes
one of her goals impossible, e.g. to execute b when such a repair action r is not available.
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in [a]) that she can perform. To deal with this, I include the repair rule that makes the
agent plan for and commit to a sequence of actions that can be used to repair Γ, which
for my example is r.
Note that, I could have avoided the need for repairing plans in this case by strength-
ening the conditions of the Astep rule to do a strong consistency check by expanding all
subgoals in Γ. However, this requires modeling the plan selection/goal decomposition
process as part of the consistency check, which I leave for future work. I could have
also relied on plan failure recovery techniques [247]. Finally, note that my repair rule
does a form of conformant planning; more sophisticated forms of planning such as
synthesizing conditional plans that include sensing actions could also be performed.
When the agent has complete information, there must be a repair plan available to
the agent (whose actions can be performed by the agent herself) if her goals are con-
sistent. In my framework, since the successor-state axiom for G drops all inconsistent
goals/plans, the agent’s p-goals are always consistent, and thus if complete informa-
tion is assumed, it is always possible to repair the remaining plans. Consider another
example: assume that our agent has DoAL(a) and DoAL(b) as her (realistic) p-goals
and Γ = [a, b]. In addition, assume that she has the c-goal not to execute an action
from Γ‖ (i.e. CGoal(¬∃s′,Γ′. 〈Γ‖, now〉 → 〈Γ′, s′〉, s)); then it must be the case that
she does not have the c-goal not to execute Γ‖ along with other actions (e.g. some
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repair action), i.e.:
¬CGoal(¬∃s′. DoAL(a‖b, now, s′), s).
Otherwise, one of DoAL(a) or DoAL(b) would have been dropped by the successor-
state axiom for G as by Propositions 6.3.1 and 6.3.16, for all executable situations, an
agent’s p-goals are always consistent with each other. Thus the agent thinks/considers
it possible that there exist a plan that can repair Γ. If the agent has complete informa-
tion, then she must know of such a plan
→
a . Also, since by Definition 7.3.2, the agent
of the “other actions” in the DoAL construct is the agent herself, this means that she
is also the agent of
→
a . If on the other hand the agent has only incomplete informa-
tion, then a repair plan may need to perform sensing actions and branch on the results.
Again, I leave this kind of conditional planning for future work.
Also, note that this rule allows the agent to procrastinate in the sense that in ad-
dition to the plan that actually repairs Γ, she is allowed to adopt and execute actions
that are unnecessary. This could be avoided by constraining the repair plan
→
a, e.g. by
requiring it to be the shortest or the least costly plan etc. I leave this for future work.
Finally, note that while SR-APL agents rely on a user-specified plan library Π, they
can achieve a goal even if such plans are not specified. Indeed the Arep rule can be used
as a first principles planner for goals that can be achieved using sequential conformant
plans. Thus, given a goal 3Φ, all the programmer needs to do to trigger the planner is
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to add a plan of the form (3Φ : true← Φ?) to the plan library Π. Since the program
Φ? is neither executable nor final, it will eventually trigger the Arep rule, which will
make the agent adopt a sequence of actions to achieve Φ.
In my operational semantics, I want to ensure that the procedural goals in Γ are
consistent with those in the theory D before expansion of a subgoal/execution of an
action occurs; so I assume that the Aclean rule has higher priority than Asel and Astep.
We can do this by adding appropriate preconditions to the antecedent of the latter,
which I leave out for brevity.
To summarize, SR-APL is based on the committed agent theory presented in Chap-
ter 6, and thus it inherits many desirable properties therein. In particular, in SR-APL
I formalize both declarative goals and plans uniformly in the same goal hierarchy
specified by theory D. I maintain the consistency of adopted declarative and pro-
cedural goals by ensuring that there exist a path considered possible by the agent
over which all of her adopted declarative goals hold and that encodes the concur-
rent execution of all of her adopted plans, possibly along with other actions, i.e.
¬CGoal(¬∃s′. DoAL(Γ‖, now, s′), s). Whenever the agent’s goals/plans become in-
consistent due to some external interference, the successor-state axiom for G in D
drops some of the adopted goals/plans, respecting their priority, and consistency of the
goal-base is automatically restored. Moreover, in SR-APL I also have a procedural
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goal-base Γ containing the adopted plans in D, whose sole purpose is to ensure that
the agent does not procrastinate w.r.t. her adopted plans. The set of transition rules
of SR-APL allows an SR-APL agent to select, adopt, and execute plans from the plan
library and thus serves as SR-APL’s practical reasoning component. While adopting
plans and executing actions, I use a weak consistency check, which avoids checking
if the plans in the procedural goal-base Γ are concurrently executable (without addi-
tional actions) while ensuring consistency. SR-APL also includes a repair rule that
can be used to repair plans if the agent gets stuck (1) due to external interferences, (2)
as a result of my weak consistency check, or (3) due to the existence of an adopted
declarative goal for which there is no plan specified in the plan library.
7.3.3 Execution Traces
Let me now define some useful notions of program execution in SR-APL.
Definition 7.3.8. A labeled execution trace T relative to a theory D is a (possibly
infinite) sequence of configurations 〈Γ0, s0〉 l0⇒ 〈Γ1, s1〉 l1⇒ 〈Γ2, s2〉 l2⇒ 〈Γ3, s3〉 l3⇒ · · · ,
such that 〈Γ0, s0〉 = 〈[ ], S0〉 is the initial configuration, and for all configurations
〈Γi, si〉 in T , the agent level transition rule li can be used to obtain 〈Γi+1, si+1〉.
Here li is one of Asel, Astep, Aexo, Aclean, and Arep in general, and in the absence
of exogenous actions, li can be one of Asel, Astep, Aclean, and Arep. I will sometime
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suppress these labels.
Definition 7.3.9. A complete trace T relative to a theoryD is a finite labeled execution
trace relative to D, 〈Γ0, s0〉 l0⇒ · · · ln−1⇒ 〈Γn, sn〉, such that 〈Γn, sn〉 does not have an
agent level transition, i.e. 〈Γn, sn〉;.
Returning to our discussion on rationality properties, note that when arbitrary ex-
ogenous actions can occur, even the best laid plans can fail. So here I only consider
the case where exogenous actions are absent. I model this using the following axiom,
which I call NoExo:
Axiom 7.3.10 (NoExo).
∀a. ¬Exo(a).
I could have considered exogenous actions, but in that case I would have to complicate
the framework further, e.g. by assuming a fair environment that gives a chance to the
agent to perform actions. Moreover, it is not obvious what rational behavior means in
such contexts. I leave this for future work.
For our blocks world example, I can show that in the absence of external interfer-
ences, my SR-APL agent AgtBW for domain DBW will not adopt inconsistent plans
as seen in Section 7.2 (as rule Asel ensures that all adopted plans can be executed con-
currently) and will in fact achieve all her goals, i.e. have a green and non-yellow tower
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and a blue and non-red tower built. Thus, we have that:
Proposition 7.3.11.
(a). There exists a complete trace T relative to DBW ∪ {NoExo} for our agent
〈DBW ∪ {NoExo},ΠBW 〉.
(b). For all such complete traces T = 〈Γ0, s0〉 ⇒ 〈Γ1, s1〉 ⇒ · · · ⇒ 〈Γn, sn〉, I have:
DBW ∪ {NoExo} |= Final(Γ‖n, sn) ∧ TowerGY¯ (sn) ∧ TowerBR¯(sn).
(c). There are no infinite traces relative to DBW ∪ {NoExo}.
Proof Sketch. (a). This can be proven by constructing a trace and proving that it is
indeed a valid trace of our blocks world agent 〈DBW ∪ {NoExo},ΠBW 〉. The trace T
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is as follows:
〈[ ], S0〉 Asel⇒
〈[stack(BG, BR)], do(A0, S0)〉 Asel⇒
〈[stack(BG, BR), stack(BB, BY )], do(A1, S1)〉 Astep⇒
〈[stack(BB, BY )], do(A2, S2)〉 Astep⇒
〈[ ], do(A3, S3)〉,
where: A0 = adoptRelTo(DoAL(stack(BG, BR)),3TowerGY¯ ),
A1 = adoptRelTo(DoAL(stack(BB, BY )),3TowerBR¯),
A2 = stack(BG, BR), and
A3 = stack(BB, BY ),
and S1 = do(A0, S0), S2 = do(A1, S1), etc. The rest of the proof concern with show-
ing that T is indeed a proper trace, i.e. that each of these agent level transitions is
possible in the corresponding situation.
(b). This can be proven by constructing an execution tree for our blocks world agent
〈DBW∪{NoExo},ΠBW 〉. It can be shown that there are only six execution paths/traces
in the tree, all of which involve adopting (via the Asel rule) the two plans/actions
stack(BG, BR) and stack(BB, BY ) in response to the two achievement goals in the
goal hierarchy, and executing these plans (via Astep), since executing these two plans
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is the only way to achieve AgtBW ’s goals. These different traces reflect the order in
which each goal is handled and each adopted plan is executed. Any other execution
paths are ruled out since the conditions in the antecedent of any other candidate rule is
false in the corresponding situation. For example, it can be shown that a trace where
the agent tries to execute a plan before adopting it, or one where the agent tries to
apply the Aexo, the Aclean, or the Arep rule in any situation is not a valid trace since the
corresponding transition rules are not applicable given the situation.
Clearly in all these six cases, the agent’s goals of building the two towers are
achieved, since all of them involve executing the (executable) stack(BB, BY ) and the
stack(BG, BR) actions in an executable situation.
(c). Follows from the discussion above.
Thus when exogenous actions cannot occur, any execution of our SR-APL blocks
world agent AgtBW terminates and achieves all her goals.
A similar result can be shown for our 3 blocks tower example:
Proposition 7.3.12.
(a). There exists a complete trace T relative to D3TBW ∪ {NoExo} for our agent
〈D3TBW ∪ {NoExo},Π3TBW 〉.
(b). For all such complete traces T = 〈Γ0, s0〉 ⇒ 〈Γ1, s1〉 ⇒ · · · ⇒ 〈Γn, sn〉, I have:
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D3TBW ∪ {NoExo} |= Final(Γ‖n, sn) ∧ 3Tower(sn).
(c). There are no infinite traces relative to D3TBW ∪ {NoExo}.
Proof Sketch. (a). This can be proven by constructing a trace and proving that it is
indeed a valid trace of our blocks world agent 〈D3TBW ∪ {NoExo},Π3TBW 〉. The trace T
is as follows:
〈[ ], S0〉 Asel⇒
〈[σ1], do(A0, S0)〉 Astep⇒
〈[σ2], do(A1, S1)〉 Asel⇒
〈[σ2, stack(BG, BR)], do(A2, S2)〉 Astep⇒
〈[σ2], do(A3, S3)〉 Astep⇒
〈[ ], do(A4, S4)〉,
where: σ1
.
= adoptRelTo(3TowerGY¯ ,DoAL(σ2));σ2,
σ2
.
= TowerGY¯ ?; stack(BY , BG), and
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A0 = adoptRelTo(DoAL(σ1),33Tower),
A1 = adoptRelTo(3TowerGY¯ ,DoAL(σ2)),
A2 = adoptRelTo(DoAL(stack(BG, BR)),3TowerGY¯ ),
A3 = stack(BG, BR),
A4 = stack(BY , BG).
and S1 = do(A0, S0), S2 = do(A1, S1), etc. The rest of the proof concern with show-
ing that T is indeed a proper trace, i.e. that each of these agent level transitions is
possible in the corresponding situation.
(b). Again, this can be proven by constructing an execution tree for our blocks world
agent 〈D3TBW ∪ {NoExo},Π3TBW 〉. It can be shown that there are only two execution
paths/traces in the tree; one is given in (a), while the other trace involves fulfilling the
subgoal 3TowerGY¯ using a different substitution for its plan, namely stack(BG, BB).
Note that although at some point in each trace, the agent will have two plans in the
procedural goal-base, the adopted plans must be executed in a particular order in both
traces as one of them (i.e. σ2) cannot be executed before the execution of the other (in
this case, either stack(BG, BR) or stack(BG, BB)) since it must wait for the parent
goal of the latter to be fulfilled. Any other execution paths are ruled out since the
conditions in the antecedent of any other candidate rule is false in the corresponding
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situation. For example, it can be shown that a trace where the agent tries to execute
a plan before adopting it, or one where the agent tries to apply the Aexo, the Aclean,
or the Arep rule in any situation is not a valid trace since the corresponding transition
rules are not applicable given the situation.
Clearly in both cases, the agent’s goals of building a 3 tower is achieved, since both
involve executing the (executable) stack(BG, b) (where b is either BR or BB) and the
stack(BY , BG) actions in an executable situation.
(c). Follows from the discussion above.
7.4 Rationality of SR-APL Agents
Let us now return to the general case. I can show that several rationality properties
hold for arbitrary SR-APL agents (again I only consider the cases where exogenous
actions do not occur). First of all, for all domains D that are part of an SR-APL agent,
in every executable situation the agent’s knowledge and c-goals/intentions as specified
by D must be consistent:61
Proposition 7.4.1 (Consistency of Knowledge and CGoals).
D |= ∀s. Executable(s) ⊃ ¬Know(False, s) ∧ ¬CGoal(False, s).
61This follows independently from the underlying agent theoryDSGCAgt as discussed/shown in Chapter
3 and 6.
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Proof. ¬Know(False, s) follows from the facts that I am using a possible worlds se-
mantics for knowledge, that K is initially constrained to be reflexive (and thus serial),
and that K continues to be reflexive after any executable sequence of actions since this
is preserved by the successor-state axiom for K (as discussed in Chapter 3). The proof
for ¬CGoal(False, s) on the other hand is as that of Proposition 6.3.1.
Before proceeding further, let me prove a useful lemma:
Lemma 7.4.2 (Situations on a Trace are Executable).
If T = 〈Γ0, s0〉 l0⇒ 〈Γ1, s1〉 l1⇒ · · · is a (possibly infinite) trace of an SR-APL agent
relative to a theoryD, then for all i such that i ≥ 0, we have thatD |= Executable(si).
Proof. (By induction in s) For the base case, by Axiom 3.2.2 and Lemma 3.5.17, it
follows that Executable(S0). For the inductive step, fix Si and assume that Executab-
le(Si). I need to show that the application of any agent-level transition rule that changes
the situation to do(A, Si) for some action A preserves the executability of the updated
situation, i.e. that Executable(do(A, Si)). By the inductive hypothesis and Definition
3.3.1, this is the case if Poss(A, Si) holds. Note that there are four such transition rules
(that changes the situation), namely all but rule Aclean. In all these cases, the antecedent
of the rule ensures that Poss(A, Si) (for Astep, this follows from the antecedent that
D |= Know(〈σ, now〉 → 〈σ′, do(A, now)〉, Si), Axiom 3.6.2, the reflexivity of K, i.e.
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Axiom 3.4.2, and by induction on the structure of the program σ). It thus follows that
Executable(do(A, Si)).
Secondly, I can show that the procedural goals in Γ and the declarative and pro-
cedural goals in the theory D ∪ {NoExo} remain consistent. Let’s first define the
following notion of consistency:
Definition 7.4.3 (Consistency of goals in Γ and D in situation s).
The procedural goals in Γ are consistent with those in the theory D in situation s in
a configuration 〈Γ, s〉 if and only if for all σ such that Member(σ,Γ), we have that
D |= PrimCGoal(DoAL(σ), s).
Note that the above definition allows additional declarative goals in theory D in situ-
ation s that are not in Γ; however, this is not a problem since it is possible that these
goals have not yet been handled in s.
Also, let’s define DExo as follows:
Definition 7.4.4.
DExo def= D ∪ {NoExo}.
Furthermore, for this I will also need domains that do not involve actions that are
knowledge-producing for the agent agt under consideration. I model this using the
following axiom which I call NoKnowProdAct:
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Axiom 7.4.5 (NoKnowProdAct).
∀a. ¬KnowProdAct(agt, a).
Finally, let’s define DExo,KPA as follows:
Definition 7.4.6.
DExo,KPA def= DExo ∪ {NoKnowProdAct}.
Then we have that:
Proposition 7.4.7 (Consistency of Γ and DExo,KPA).
If T = 〈Γ0, s0〉 l0⇒ 〈Γ1, s1〉 l1⇒ · · · is a (possibly infinite) trace of an SR-APL agent
relative to a theory DExo,KPA such that for all Astep transitions 〈Γj−1, sj−1〉
Astep⇒
〈Γj, do(aj−1, sj−1)〉 on T and σ1, σ2, if σ1 ∈ Γj−1 and σ2 ∈ Γj−1 and σ1 6= σ2, then
DExo,KPA |= Know(∃σ′1. 〈σ1, now〉 → 〈σ′1, do(aj−1, now)〉, sj−1) ≡ Know(¬∃σ′2.
〈σ2, now〉 → 〈σ′2, do(aj−1, now〉, sj−1):
then for all i such that i ≥ 0, we have that si+1 = do(a, si) for some a, and for all con-
figurations 〈Γi, si〉, the procedural goals in Γi are consistent with those in the theory
DExo,KPA in si.
Proof. (By induction on n, where n is the length of a partial trace of T ) Fix an arbi-
trary partial trace of T of length n. First consider the base case where n = 1, i.e. where
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there is only one configuration in the partial trace. Note that, it follows from Definition
7.3.8 that all traces of length 1 contain only the initial configuration 〈Γ0, S0〉, and Γ0
is of the form [ ]. Since there are no plans in Γ0 that agent intend to execute (possi-
bly with other actions) next, and there is just one situation S0 in the partial trace, the
consequent thus trivially follows from Definition 7.4.3.
For the inductive step, assume that the proposition holds for all partial traces of
length n = M. I need to show that this is the case for all partial traces of length
n = M + 1, i.e. (given the inductive hypothesis) that for configuration 〈ΓM , SM〉 in
the partial trace, the procedural goals in ΓM are consistent with those in the theory
DExo,KPA in SM and that SM = do(A, SM−1) for some A. Note that by the transition
rules in Table 7.3, the only way the situation in the M + 1th configuration (i.e. SM ) re-
mains unchanged is via the application of the Aclean rule. But from this, the antecedent
of the Aclean rule, and the inductive hypothesis, this is impossible as by the inductive
hypothesis there are no plans σ in ΓM−1 for which the agent does not have a primary
c-goal in SM−1 (and by Definition 4.2.12, the p-goal in SM−1) that DoAL(σ). Thus, in
the absence of exogenous actions, SM is of the form do(A, SM−1) for some action A;
also, only three of the agent-level transition rules can be applied, namely Asel, Astep,
and Arep. I will now show that the consistency between ΓM andDExo,KPA is preserved
for the application of all these rules.
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The Case for Asel: The application of this rule changes the situation to SM =
do(adoptRelTo(DoAL(σ),3Φ), SM−1) for some σ and Φ, and also adds the plan σ to
ΓM . Since by Lemma 7.4.2, SM is an executable situation, by Definition 3.3.1, Axiom
6.2.4, and Proposition 6.3.31, the newly adopted goal DoAL(σ) is indeed a primary
c-goal at some level in SM . Thus I just need to show that the goals corresponding to
the previously adopted plans in ΓM are retained in DExo,KPA in SM , i.e. those that
are above or below the adopted level n, where AdoptedLevel(3Φ, n, SM) (note that
I do not need to consider level n itself, since by Axiom 6.2.6 and Definition 6.2.10,
any previously adopted plan in ΓM that is a p-goal at level n in SM is also a p-goal at
level n − 1 in SM ). To this end, note that since by the antecedent of the Asel rule, the
adoptRelTo(DoAL(σ),3Φ) action is possible in SM−1, it follows from Axiom 6.2.4
that the agent does not intend in SM−1 not to execute DoAL(σ) next. Thus there is a
path P1 starting with some situation SP1 that is in G∩ in SM−1 and over which the next
action performed is the adoptRelTo(DoAL(σ),3Φ) action, and DoAL(σ) holds over
P2, which is the suffix of P1 that starts with SP2 = do(adoptRelTo(DoAL(σ),3Φ), SP1) :
G∩(P1, SM−1) ∧ Starts(P1, SP1) ∧ SP2 = do(adoptRelTo(DoAL(σ),3Φ), SP1)
∧ Suffix(P2, P1, SP2) ∧ ∃s. OnPath(P2, s) ∧ DoAL(σ, SP2 , s).
(7.1)
Now assume that there is a σ∗ in ΓM−1 and DoAL(σ∗) is a primary c-goal (and thus by
definition 4.2.12, a p-goal) at some level H that has higher priority than the adopted
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level n (i.e. H < n) in SM−1, i.e.:
σ∗ ∈ ΓM−1 and D |= PrimCGoal(DoAL(σ∗), H, SM−1) ∧H < n. (asm-1)
I will first prove that the progression of DoAL(σ∗) after the adoptRelTo(DoAL(σ),3Φ)
action happens in SM−1, i.e. DoAL(σ∗) itself, is still a p-goal (and by Lemma 7.4.2
and Corollary 6.3.20, a primary c-goal) at level H after this action occurs. Note that,
by (7.1) and Proposition 6.3.14(b), P1 must also be G-accessible at H in SM−1:
G(P1, H, SM−1). (7.2)
Since P1 is a path, by Corollary 3.5.41 and Lemma 3.5.29 it follows that the adoptRel−
To(DoAL(σ),3Φ) action is executable in SP1 :
Poss(adoptRelTo(DoAL(σ),3Φ), SP1). (7.3)
Again, by (7.1) and Lemma 6.3.8, it follows that:
K(SP1 , SM−1). (7.4)
Now, from (7.4), (7.3), Axiom 3.4.10, and the fact that the adoptRelTo(DoAL(σ),3Φ)
action is not a knowledge-producing action, it follows that:
K(do(adoptRelTo(DoAL(σ),3Φ), SP1), SM).
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Then, after the adoptRelTo(DoAL(σ),3Φ) action happens, we can see that by this,
(7.1), Axiom 6.2.6, and Definitions 6.2.10, 6.2.8, and 4.3.4, P2 is retained in the G-
relation at H in SM :
G(P2, H, SM). (7.5)
Also, since by assumption (asm-1) the agent has the p-goal that DoAL(σ∗) at level H
in SM−1, there are no paths that are G-accessible at H in SM−1 over which DoAL(σ∗)
does not hold, and thus by the SSA for G (i.e. Axiom 6.2.6, and Definitions 6.2.10,
6.2.8, and 4.3.4), none in SM either (over which the progression of DoAL(σ∗) after
adoptRelTo(DoAL(σ),3Φ) happens in SM−1, i.e. DoAL(σ∗) itself, does not hold).
From this, (7.5), and Definition 4.2.1, it follows that the agent has the p-goal (and
by Lemma 7.4.2 and Corollary 6.3.20, the primary c-goal) at H in do(adoptRelTo(
DoAL(σ),3Φ), SM−1) that DoAL(σ∗). Thus given assumption (asm-1) (i.e. that H <
n), the agent retains the plan DoAL(σ∗) at H in SM .
Similarly, it can be shown that if there is a σ′ in ΓM−1 and DoAL(σ′) is a primary
c-goal at some level L that has lower priority than the adopted level n (i.e. L > n) in
SM−1, then the agent will retain this primary c-goal at level L + 1 in SM (this is easy
to see by Axiom 6.2.6 and Definition 6.2.10). Thus the consistency between ΓM and
DExo,KPA is maintained w.r.t. the Asel rule.
The Case for Astep: From the antecedent of the rule, it follows that DExo,KPA |=
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Know(〈σ, now〉 → 〈σ′, do(A, now)〉, SM−1), for some σ ∈ ΓM−1, σ′, and A. From
this, Axiom 3.6.2, the reflexivity of K (i.e. Axiom 3.4.2), and by induction on the
structure of the program σ, it can be shown that:
Poss(A, SM−1). (7.6)
Moreover, it follows from the antecedent that there is a level N such that:
PGoal(DoAL(σ), N, SM−1), (7.7)
¬CGoal(¬∃s′. Do(A, now, s′), SM−1). (7.8)
Now, note that since A must come from a plan σ in ΓM−1, it must be of a form allowed
in the SR-APL plan language in Table 7.1, and thus must be either an adoptRelTo
action or a regular action. If A is an adoptRelTo action, then by this fact and (7.6),
the proof is similar to the Asel case (with the exception at level N ; since now the
adoptRelTo action is coming from the plan σ at level N , the progression of DoAL(σ)
after A happens in SM−1 in this case is DoAL(σ′); but this is accounted for in the
updated ΓM in the consequent of the Astep rule, and thus does not cause a problem).
Otherwise, A must be a regular action. Now, from (7.8), it follows that there is a path
P1 starting with some situation SP1 that is in the G∩ relation in SM−1 and over which
A happens next. Let’s call the suffix of P1 starting in do(A, SP1), P2. Thus:
Starts(P1, SP1) ∧G∩(P1, SM−1) ∧ Suffix(P2, P1, do(A, SP1)). (7.9)
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Since P1 is a path, by Corollary 3.5.41 and Lemma 3.5.29 it follows that A is exe-
cutable in SP1 :
Poss(A, SP1). (7.10)
By (7.9) and Lemma 6.3.8, it follows that:
K(SP1 , SM−1). (7.11)
From (7.11), (7.10), Axiom 3.4.10, and the fact that A is not a knowledge producing
action, it follows that:
K(do(A, SP1), SM). (7.12)
Again, by (7.9), Lemma 7.4.2, and Proposition 6.3.14(b), it follows that:
∀n. G(P1, n, SM−1). (7.13)
Now, assume that σ∗ is a plan in ΓM−1. By the inductive hypothesis, there is a
level H such that PrimCGoal(DoAL(σ∗), H, SM−1). I will show that the progression
of DoAL(σ∗) afterA happens in SM−1 is retained as a p-goal (and by Lemma 7.4.2 and
Corollary 6.3.20, a primary c-goal) at level H . Note that the progression of DoAL(σ∗)
at all levels except at level N is simply DoAL(σ∗) since the action A comes from
the plan at level N (note that it is not possible for plans at different priority levels
to have the same first action A due to the restriction on T that for all Astep transitions
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〈Γj−1, sj−1〉 Astep⇒ 〈Γj, do(aj−1, sj−1)〉 on T and σ1, σ2, if σ1 ∈ Γj−1 and σ2 ∈ Γj−1 and
σ1 6= σ2, then DExo,KPA |= Know(∃σ′1. 〈σ1, now〉 → 〈σ′1, do(aj−1, now)〉, sj−1) ≡
Know(¬∃σ′2. 〈σ2, now〉 → 〈σ′2, do(aj−1, now〉, sj−1)). On the other hand, the pro-
gression of DoAL(σ∗) at level N , i.e. that of DoAL(σ), is DoAL(σ′) as the action A
indeed comes from σ. But this does not pose a problem in the consistency between ΓM
and the p-goal at level N in do(A, SM−1) since this is accounted for in ΓM (as we can
see from the consequent of rule Astep).
Now, by Axiom 6.2.6 and Definitions 6.2.7, 6.2.8, and 4.3.4, to show that the
progression of DoAL(σ∗) is still a p-goal (and thus by Lemma 7.4.2 and Corollary
6.3.20, a primary c-goal) at level H , it suffices to show that:
• if H = 0 then ∃p. ProgressedCA(p,H,A, SM−1), and
• if H > 0 then ∃p. G∩(p,H − 1, do(A, SM−1)) ∧ Progressed(p,H,A, SM−1).
Thus the else clause in Definition 6.2.7 is never selected and as such no new paths are
added to the updated G relation at level H . Then the paths in G at level H in SM will
be those obtained by progressing the paths in G at H in SM−1 after A occurs. Since
all paths in G at H in SM satisfy DoAL(σ∗), the progression of DoAL(σ∗) will be
a p-goal at level H in SM by Definition 4.2.1. I will now show that P2 is indeed a
path that satisfies the above conditions for both H = 0 and H > 0. First consider the
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case where H = 0; by (7.13), (7.12), (7.9), and Definitions 6.2.8 and 4.3.4, it follows
that ProgressedCA(P2, 0, A, SM−1). Thus by Axiom 6.2.6 and Definition 6.2.7, we also
have:
G(P2, 0, do(A, SM−1)). (7.14)
Next consider the case where H > 0. I will prove this by induction on level n.
Note that by (7.13), (7.9), and Definition 4.3.4, it follows that:
∀n. Progressed(P2, n, A, SM−1). (7.15)
Now, consider the base case, where n = 1; By (7.14), Corollary 6.3.5, and Axiom
4.2.7, it follows that G∩(P2, 0, do(A, SM−1)). The base case thus follows from this
and (7.15). For the inductive step, fix level n = L, where L ≥ 1, and assume that:
G∩(P2, L− 1, do(A, SM−1)) ∧ Progressed(P2, L, A, SM−1). (7.16)
I need to show that:
G∩(P2, L, do(A, SM−1)) ∧ Progressed(P2, L+ 1, A, SM−1).
From (7.16), Axiom 6.2.6, and Definition 6.2.7, it follows thatG(P2, L, do(A, SM−1)).
Moreover, from this, (7.16), Corollary 6.3.5, and Axiom 4.2.7, it follows that G∩(P2,
L, do(A, SM−1)). The inductive case then follows from this and (7.15). It thus follows
that the progression of all such DoAL(σ∗) plans are p-goals (and a primary c-goal) at
level H in the theory DExo,KPA in do(A, SM−1).
522
The Case for Arep: This case is similar to the Asel case, since in this case, the action is
an adopt action that the agent knows is possible in SM−1.
Thus in the absence of exogenous actions, the Aclean transition rule is never used
since the agent’s plans in Γ and in the theory DExo,KPA always remain consistent,
provided that whenever the Astep rule is used, the agent does not choose an action
that is a common prefix of two different plans.62 Note that, if the agent is allowed
to choose an action from such a plan, then it is possible that the agent’s procedural
goal-base Γ and theory DExo,KPA may become “inconsistent” (i.e. out of sync). Con-
sider the following example. Suppose that Γ = {[a; b], [a; c]} and DExo,KPA entails
that PrimCGoal(DoAL([a; b]), s) and PrimCGoal(DoAL([a; c]), s), and thus Γ and
DExo,KPA are consistent in s. Now suppose that the agent performs the action a via
the Astep rule to get Γ′ = {[b], [a; c]}. Note that, the progression by a of DoAL([a; b])
is DoAL(b | [a; b]), since the action a could have been produced by the outside action
part of DoAL. Similarly, the progression by a of DoAL([a; c]) is DoAL(c | [a; c]).
Then by Definition 7.4.3, to show that the agent’s plans in Γ′ and the theory DExo,KPA
are consistent in do(a, s), we need to show that DExo,KPA entails that:
1. DoAL(b | [a; b])(p) ⊃ DoAL(b)(p), and
62Recall from Table 7.3 that applications of Aclean do not change the situation.
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2. DoAL(c | [a; c])(p) ⊃ DoAL([a; c])(p).
While the former holds, the latter does not (since a path over which c happens and a
never happens is one that satisfies DoAL(c | [a; c]) but not DoAL([a; c])(p)). The root
cause of this problem is that the Astep rule treats the members of the procedural goal-
base Γ as concurrently running plans and thus progresses only one plan when an action
happens, while in the declarative side the theory DExo,KPA allows actions to be shared
by multiple DoAL goals and thus progresses all of them when the action happens. I
could have avoided this issue, e.g. by renaming each instance of an action to include
its thread number, etc. I leave this for future work.
Also, note that for this proposition, I assume that the actions involved are not
knowledge-producing for the agent. When such knowledge-producing actions are al-
lowed, the agent may learn that one of her plans has become inconsistent with her other
(higher priority) plans; recall that in the committed agent framework, such inconsistent
plans (i.e. DoAL goals in the theory D) are automatically dropped to maintain consis-
tency. In that case, Γ and DExo,KPA will become “inconsistent”. One could modify
the Asel rule to ensure that intended plans are consistent in all K-alternatives. I leave
this for future work. Finally, I conjecture that given in addition that the trace T is com-
plete, when exogenous actions or actions that are knowledge-producing for the agent
are allowed, if si = si+1, then there exists j such that 0 < i < j < n (where n is the
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length of T ) and the goals in Γj are consistent with those in the theoryD in sj . That is,
whenever there is some procedural goal in Γi that is not a goal w.r.t. the theory D, the
Aclean rule will remove it from Γi, and eventually consistency will be restored. Note
that, the potential scenario where the agent must clear/drop an infinite set of goals is
ruled out since the trace T is assumed to be complete, and thus by Definition 7.3.9,
T is required to be a finite sequence whose last configuration does not have any agent
level transitions. I leave proving this conjecture for future work.
It follows from Proposition 7.4.7 that in all such configurations 〈Γ, s〉, the agent
intends to execute the plans in Γ concurrently starting in s, possibly with other actions:
Corollary 7.4.8 (Γ‖ is Intended).
If T = 〈Γ0, s0〉 l0⇒ 〈Γ1, s1〉 l1⇒ · · · is a (possibly infinite) trace of an SR-APL agent
relative to a theory DExo,KPA such that for all Astep transitions 〈Γj−1, sj−1〉
Astep⇒
〈Γj, do(aj−1, sj−1)〉 on T and σ1, σ2, if σ1 ∈ Γj−1 and σ2 ∈ Γj−1 and σ1 6= σ2, then
DExo,KPA |= Know(∃σ′1. 〈σ1, now〉 → 〈σ′1, do(aj−1, now)〉, sj−1) ≡ Know(¬∃σ′2.
〈σ2, now〉 → 〈σ′2, do(aj−1, now〉, sj−1):
then for all i such that i ≥ 0, we have that:
DExo,KPA |= CGoal(∃s′. DoAL(Γ‖i , now, s′), si).
Proof. The proof is straightforward from Proposition 7.4.7 and Definitions 7.3.3, 7.4.3,
7.3.2, and 4.2.12.
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Finally, my agents evolve in a rational way:
Proposition 7.4.9 (Rationality of Actions in a Trace).
If T = 〈Γ0, s0〉 l0⇒ 〈Γ1, s1〉 l1⇒ · · · is a (possibly infinite) trace of an SR-APL agent
relative to a theory DExo, then for all i such that i > 0 and for all a such that si =
do(a, si−1), we have:
(a). DExo |= ¬CGoal(¬∃s′. Do(a, now, s′), si−1).
(b). If li−1 = Astep then: there exists σ, σ′, such that Member(σ,Γi−1),
DExo |= Know(〈σ, now〉 → 〈σ′, do(a, now)〉, si−1), and
DExo |= CGoal(∃s′. DoAL(σ, now, s′), si−1).
(c). DExo |= ∀φ, ψ, n. (a = adoptRelTo(ψ, φ) ∨ a = adopt(ψ, n)) ⊃
¬CGoal(¬∃s′, p′. Starts(s′) ∧ Suffix(p′, do(a, s′)) ∧ ψ(p′), si−1).
Proof. Fix action A and situation Si−1.
(a). First, note that since the transition involves an action, in the absence of exogenous
actions, only three of the agent-level transition rules can be applied, namely Asel,Astep,
and Arep. I will thus prove this by showing that the antecedents of all these rules ensure
that the agent does not intend not to execute A next. Let’s consider Asel rule first. In
this case, A = adoptRelTo(ψ, φ) for some goals ψ and φ. Also, from the antecedent
of the rule, it follows that Poss(A, Si−1). The consequent follows from this and Axiom
526
6.2.4 (and Definitions 3.5.16, 3.6.4, and 3.6.3, and Axioms 3.6.2 and 3.6.1). For the
Astep rule, the consequent trivially follows from the antecedent of this rule. Finally,
the proof for the Arep rule case is similar to that for the Asel rule.
(b). Since li−1 = Astep, if follows from the antecedent of the rule that there is a level n
and plans σ, σ′, such that:
Member(σ,Γi−1), (7.17)
DExo |= Know(〈σ, now〉 → 〈σ′, do(A, now)〉, Si−1), and (7.18)
DExo |= PGoal(DoAL(σ), n, Si−1). (7.19)
From (7.19), Lemma 7.4.2, and Proposition 6.3.15, it follows that CGoal(DoAL(σ),
Si−1). The proposition follows from this, (7.17), and (7.18).
(c). Since exogenous actions are not possible and a is either an adoptRelTo or an
adopt action, we only need to consider three agent-level transition rules, namely Asel,
Arep, and Astep (since SR-APL’s plan language includes adoptRelTo actions). For the
first two type of rules, it follows from the antecedent of the rule that Poss(A, Si−1)
holds. Moreover, for the Astep rule, by the antecedent, it follows that there is a σ
in Γi−1 such that DExo |= Know(〈σ, now〉 → 〈σ′, do(A, now)〉, Si−1). From this,
Axiom 3.6.2, the reflexivity of K, i.e. Axiom 3.4.2, and by induction on the structure
of the program σ, it can be shown that Poss(A, Si−1) holds for this case as well. The
527
proposition then follows from this and Axioms 6.2.4 and 6.2.3.
This states that SR-APL is sound in the sense that any trace produced by the APL
semantics is consistent with the agent’s chosen goals. To be precise, (a) if an SR-APL
agent performs the action a in situation si−1, then it must be the case that she does not
have the intention not to execute a in si−1. Moreover, (b) if a is performed via Astep,
then a is indeed intended in si−1 in the sense that she has the intention to execute some
plan σ possibly along with some other actions next, and she knows that σ can execute
a next. Finally, (c) if a is the action of adopting a subgoal ψ w.r.t. a supergoal φ or
that of adopting a goal ψ at some level n (performed via Asel, Arep, or Astep), then the
agent does not have the c-goal in si−1 not to bring about ψ next.
These properties thus show that in the absence of exogenous actions, in all possible
executions an SR-APL agent behaves rationally in the sense that her mental states (i.e.
her knowledge and adopted declarative and procedural goals) always remain consistent
and that any action performed by the agent is consistent with her intentions.
7.5 Conclusion and Future Work
Based on the Committed Agent variant of my rich theory of goals, in this chapter I de-
veloped a specification of an rational BDI agent programming framework that handles
prioritized goals, provides semantics for goal dynamics and goal-subgoal dependen-
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cies, and maintains the consistency of adopted declarative and procedural goals. I also
showed that an agent specified in this language satisfies some strong rationality proper-
ties. While doing this, I addressed some fundamental questions about rational agency.
I model an agent’s concurrent commitments by incorporating the DoAL construct in
her adopted plans, which allows her to be open-ended towards future commitments to
plans, while using a procedural goal-base Γ to prevent procrastination. I formalized a
weak notion of consistency between goals and plans that does not require the agent to
commit to a means to achieve all adopted goals while checking for consistency.
In addition to the APLs discussed in Chapter 2, there has been work that focuses on
maintaining consistency of a set of concurrent intentions. For example, Clement et al.
[33, 34] argue that agents should be able to reason about abstract HTN plans and their
interactions before they are fully refined. They propose a method for deriving summary
information (i.e. external preconditions and effects) of abstract plans and discuss how
this information can be used to coordinate the interactions of plans at different levels
of abstractions. Thangarajah et al. [221] use such summary information to detect
and resolve conflicts between goals at run time. Horty and Pollack [104] propose a
decision theoretic approach to compute the utility of adopting new (non-hierarchical)
plans, given a set of already adopted plans. While some of these approaches can be
integrated in APLs (e.g. [221]), they leave out many aspects of rationality (e.g. they do
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not say what the agent should do if external interference makes two of her intentions
permanently incompatible), and do not deal with declarative goals.
In this chapter, I focused on developing an expressive agent programming frame-
work that yields a rational/robust agent without worrying about tractability. Thus my
framework is a specification and model of an ideal APL rather than a practical APL.
The idea behind this exercise is to bring current BDI agent programming languages a
step closer towards rational agent theories. As discussed, there are a few restrictions
to this framework. For instance, recall that to show our otherwise clean consistency
result, I had to limit to non-knowledge-producing actions; also I assumed that plans
do not share actions. I leave figuring out how to resolve these issues for future work.
In the future, I would also like to investigate how one can restrict SR-APL to ensure
decidability/tractability.
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Chapter 8
Conclusions and Future Work
8.1 Conclusions
In this thesis, I have presented two frameworks for specifying prioritized goals of
agents. In developing these frameworks, I have made contributions that can be classi-
fied into five categories: setting the stage by formalizing infinite paths within the sit-
uation calculus, specifying prioritized goals and goal dynamics for optimizing agents,
modeling prioritized goals and goal dynamics for committed agents, capturing the de-
pendencies between goals and their subgoals, and exhibiting the applicability of my
approach by developing the BDI agent programming language SR-APL.
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Formalizing Paths in the Situation Calculus
I extended Reiter’s formalization of the situation calculus [178] by incorporating a new
sort of infinite paths in this language. I gave a sound and complete axiomatization of
paths and proved many desirable properties about them. The utility of adding paths as
a new sort is twofold: it allows for first-order quantifications over paths; moreover I
can now have arbitrary temporally extended goals, which can be evaluated over these
infinite paths. This sets the stage for my frameworks for prioritized goals and subgoals.
Specifying Optimizing Agents
On top of this extended language, which is further enriched with Scherl and Levesque’s
Knowledge modality [188], I presented a framework for modeling agent’ prioritized
goals. My framework supports rich temporally extended desires, which are allowed
to be mutually contradictory. It specifies how these desires/goals change when ac-
tions/events occur, including goal adoption, goal drop, and exogenous actions. Given
an arbitrary situation and the prioritized desires of an agent in that situation, I have a
method for deriving the consistent set of chosen goals or intentions of the agent for
that situation. This method along with the proposed dynamics of desires ensure that
agents specified using this framework always optimize their chosen goals. In partic-
ular, my agents behave like Bratman’s intentional agents that always trigger the filter
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override mechanism in an attempt to constantly optimize their chosen goals. Thus
agents specified using this optimizing agent framework are very idealized.
Among other intuitively desirable properties, I showed that my agents’ chosen
goals are consistent, realistic, and possible, that they are aware of their goals, that their
(achievement) chosen goals persist, and that their goals properly evolve as a result of
various actions (including external events). I also modeled an online travel planning
example and proved interesting properties of this domain.
Specifying Committed Agents
Optimizing agents are quite idealized and costly. Real-world agents have limited re-
sources. To deal with this, I proposed another framework where agents are strongly
committed to their chosen goals. For this, I revised the optimizing agent framework
essentially by forcing the agent to drop desires when they are no longer chosen. An
agent specified using this framework drops a desire when the desire becomes impos-
sible, or when it becomes inconsistent with other higher priority goals. Moreover, the
agent is not allowed to adopt a desire if it is inconsistent with her current chosen goals.
Such a framework, although still does not duly formalize Bratman’s original notion
of intentions — that agents should be strongly committed to their intentions, but must
also be able to revise them under certain (rare) conditions, in particular when doing so
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increase their utility considerably — is applicable for the real-world. In particular, in
contrast to the computationally demanding optimizing agent framework, the commit-
ted agent framework is more suitable as a foundation for a BDI agent programming
language, albeit at the cost of rationality.
Modeling Goal-Subgoal Dependencies
I extended both these frameworks to include subgoals and their dynamics. In particu-
lar, I model subgoal change in a way that properly maintains the dependencies between
goals and their parent goals. I showed that when a goal is dropped, all of its subgoals
(and theirs, etc.) are also dropped. Moreover, when a chosen goal becomes impossi-
ble, all of its subgoals (and theirs, etc.) are also dropped from the agent’s set of chosen
goals. To the best of my knowledge, this is the first and the only account found in the
literature that uses a semantic approach to capture this relationship between goals and
subgoals.
Applicability of the Proposed Frameworks
In order to demonstrate the feasibility of using my prioritized goal frameworks to spec-
ify multiagent systems, I developed a model for a simple rational agent programming
language, SR-APL, that combines the committed agent framework, work on BDI agent
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programming languages with declarative goals, and the situation calculus based Con-
Golog agent programming language [51]. I showed that agents specified using this
language behaves rationally, particularly when effects of actions are irreversible or
when time sensitive goals are involved. SR-APL thus contributes to bridging the gap
between rational agent theories and agent programming languages with declarative
goals.
8.2 Future Work
The work presented here can be extended in many ways. In my theory of prioritized
goals, I have proposed two frameworks that to some extent lies at the two extremes
of the “resource-boundedness vs. tractability” spectrum – the optimizing agent frame-
work formalizes ideally rational agents that always reconsider their intentions; on the
other hand, the committed agent framework models over-committed agents that never
give up their intentions even if opportunities to commit to higher priority goals arise,
and thus effectively minimizing their reasoning costs w.r.t. intention reconsideration.
Hence it would be interesting to work on a hybrid account of intention reconsideration
where the agent is strongly committed to her chosen goals but where she reconsiders
some of her prioritized goals under specific conditions.
I would like to work on a more complete set of AGM-like postulates for priori-
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tized goals and their dynamics. These postulates will serve as a specification for the
relationship between an agent’s knowledge and her prioritized goals, and for the up-
date/revision and contraction of her prioritized goals.
For both optimizing and committed agent framework, I discussed some properties
that show when exactly an agent’s chosen achievement goals can be expected to persist.
It would be nice to generalize these persistence properties and identify the conditions
under which arbitrary temporally extended goals persist.
I have a method for dropping a subgoal when its parent goal is dropped or becomes
impossible. However my proposed subgoal dynamics do not give up a subgoal when its
parent goal is fulfilled unexpectedly. To this end, I would like to modify my framework
to handle early achievement of goals, i.e. automatically drop subgoals whose parent
goal have been achieved. Note that this seems quite challenging to do so for arbitrary
temporally extended goals, as in that case one first needs to identify the satisfaction
conditions of such a goal, and then do a case-by-case analysis and handle each type of
goals separately. The special case of achievement goals should be solvable with some
effort.
In [166], Pirri and Reiter proved a relative consistency property for basic action
theories in the situation calculus that states that such a theory is consistent if and only if
the initial state axioms are consistent. While I did not prove such a relative consistency
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property, I conjecture that it should be possible to extend the results in [166] to show
that relative consistency holds for instances of my agent theories.
In the future, I would also like to investigate restricted versions of SR-APL that are
practical, with an understanding of how they compromise rationality. I think this can
be done. For instance if I assume a finite domain, then reasoning with the underlying
theory should be decidable. I could adapt techniques from partial order planning such
as summary information/causal links to support consistency maintenance [33, 34, 221].
I could also simply find a global linear plan and cache it, using summary information
to revise it when necessary. There are some controller synthesis techniques that can
deal with temporally extended goals [167, 29].
Also, it would be desirable to study a version of SR-APL where the agent fully
expands an abstract plan and checks its executability before adopting it. Finally, while
the underlying agent theory supports arbitrary temporally extended goals, in SR-APL
I only consider achievement goals. I would like to relax this in the future.
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